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CHAPTER CXXXVII.

THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE OF 1916: FIRST PHASE.

RESULTS OF THE AUSTRO-GERMAN ADVANCE IN 1915—THE RUSSIAN "OFFENSIVE" OF MARCH, 1916—RUSSIAN OBJECTS AND GERMAN EXAGGERATIONS—PREPARATION FOR THE GREAT RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE—ANALYSIS OF POSITIONS AND STRENGTHS—THE RUSSIAN COMMANDERS DESCRIBED—THE GERMANS AND AUSTRIANS—AUSTRIAN CONFIDENCE—LUXURY IN THE FIELD—THE STRATEGIC PROBLEM—RUSSIA STRIKES—ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST THREE WEEKS—AUSTRIAN LINE BROKEN—FALL OF LUTSK—AND DUBNO—KALEDIN'S SUCCESS—THE EAST-GALICIAN FRONT—THE BUKOVINA—FALL OF CZERNOVITZ—DRAMATIC ACCOUNT OF THE EVACUATION—CONQUEST OF THE BUKOVINA.

THE great Austro-German advance of 1915 had stopped without having achieved its strategic object. It had not attained the line on which the initiative for further operations would have rested exclusively with the Central Powers.* East of the Niemen and the Bug the Germanic armies had occupied the main strategic centre of Vilna and the important railway junctions of Baranovitché and Kovel; in the south they had advanced their front to the line of the Ikva and Strypa; and on the right bank of the Dniester they had advanced almost to the very frontier of Bessarabia. Yet our Allies had retained in the north the line of the Dvina with Riga and Dvinsk, the railway junctions of Molodetchna and Minsk, the railway across the Pripet Marshes, the strategic centre of Rovno—which occupied in the region south of the Pripet Marshes a position analogous to that of Vilna in the northern districts—and a considerable tract of East Galicia, which in view of its highly developed net of roads and railways formed a useful base for future Russian operations. Thus, on the strategic line separating Inner Russia from the

outlying Lithuanian, White Russian and Polish provinces, the relative position of the opposing forces with regard to the next campaign remained one of even balance.

It was now the main task of the Russian forces to preserve intact the advantages which that line offered for a future offensive, whilst behind the front new armies were raised and trained, and arrangements were made for equipping them and supplying them with plentiful munitions. To have gained the necessary respite without having anywhere yielded ground to an enemy who had already reached the full development of his forces was, between the autumn of 1915 and the first days of June, 1916, the achievement of the armies defending the Russian front.

Numerous local encounters—the usual incidents of stationary trench warfare—and two series of bigger operations constitute the sum of military events during the winter and spring of 1915–1916. German imagination expanded the operations of that period into decisive offensives, so as to be able to proclaim their "total failure," to speak of the "terrifying losses of the enemy," and to repeat once more the hackneyed tale of the "unbreakable" nature of the German front. As a matter of

* For a detailed analysis of that line cf. Vol. VII., Chapter CX., especially pp. 81–82.



MEN OF RUSSIA'S NEW ARMY ON THE MARCH.

fact, however, both the Russian attacks in the Bukovina—about the New Year of 1916—and the operations which our Allies undertook in Lithuania in the second half of March were merely local actions very much restricted in purpose and extent. In either case one of the chief aims of the Russians was to forestall an imminent movement of the enemy—and in so far as that object was concerned they were fully successful. Throughout the period intervening between the close of the great Germanic offensive of 1915 and the commencement of the Allied offensive in 1916 the Austro-German forces proved unable to resume the initiative on the Eastern front.

On February 21 the Germans opened their offensive against Verdun. In the following weeks elaborate preparations were begun by them also on the Dvina, evidently with a view to similar operations against some sector of the Riga-Dvinsk front. Partly in order to relieve the pressure in the west, and partly in order to forestall the offensive which, for the coming spring, was expected on their own front, our Allies opened on March 16 a short counter-offensive in Lithuania. The time and

place chosen by the Russian Command by themselves sufficiently explain the aim and nature of these operations. The blow was delivered in the district which, north of the Pripet Marshes, forms the most vital sector of the German front. Vilna is the main strategic centre for the entire region between the Niemen, the Dvina and the Marshes; its safety was an essential preliminary condition for a German offensive anywhere between Dvinsk and Baranovitché. Between Postavy and Smorgon the battle-line approached, however, within from 40 to 60 miles of Vilna. Attacks against that sector left no choice to the enemy; he had to counter them with all his strength. Still it is evident that our Allies could not have expected to carry by a *coup de main* a sector of such enormous strategic importance. The strength of the German fortifications in it was certain to correspond to its significance, and at all times it was held by a concentration of forces greater than was to be found in any other part of the line. Moreover, the neighbourhood of Vilna and the comparatively high development of railways and roads in that region furnished the means for the rapid bringing up of reinforce-

ments. In view of the lessons taught by the fighting round Verdun, which had been proceeding for more than three weeks when the Russian operations were started, a strategic rupture of the German front in the region of Vilna could hardly have been hoped for except as the result of long and steady pounding of their lines. Yet the Russian "offensive" was started in the country of the thousand lakes, of forest and marshy valleys, at a moment when the imminent melting of the snow was certain soon to render the entire region unfit for any serious military operations. But then the Russians did not mean the attacks which they delivered in Lithuania in March, 1916, to be the beginning of a big offensive. They aimed at immediate results; by a threat which could not have been left unheeded they meant to disturb German calculations—and it is

evident that they succeeded in achieving that aim. The time for *decisive* action against the Central Powers had not yet arrived—either in the east, west or south.

The attacking Russian forces operated in two groups. South of the Bereswotsh-Postavy-Svientsiany railway-line stood a group of three army corps and one cavalry division under General Baluyeff; the isthmus between Lakes Narotch and Vishnieff was the main objective of its attacks. A similar force commanded by General Pleshkoff operated between Postavy and Lake Drisviaty. On the German side the front between Lake Vishnieff and Lake Drisviaty was held by the Tenth Army under General von Eichhorn, consisting of 11½ infantry and two cavalry divisions (besides two other cavalry divisions in reserve), and supported on the left wing by a few divisions of the Eighth



A RUSSIAN OFFICER INTERROGATING AUSTRIAN PRISONERS.

Army under General von Scholtz. Thus, in so far as numbers were concerned, the opposing forces were fairly evenly matched.

On March 16 the Russian batteries opened a violent bombardment of the German lines. In the hope of forestalling, or at least disturbing, the coming Russian attacks, the Germans delivered on the following day an impetuous attack against the Russian positions south of Tverieteh, and on March 18 at Miedziany. The attacks failed completely and the enemy had to retire in haste, leaving some booty in the hands of the Russians. On March 19 our



GENERAL KUROPATKIN,
Commander of the Northern Armies.

Allies captured the village of Velikoie Selo, north of Vileity. On the same day marked progress was made by them between Lakes Narotch and Vishnieff. After a severe fight the Russians succeeded in carrying the village of Zanapche and in occupying part of the enemy trenches near Ostrovliany and in front of Baltagouzy. The next few days witnessed a series of attacks and counter-attacks on the isthmus between the lakes, during which positions were frequently changing hands. By March 23 our Allies had advanced their lines still farther in the direction of Blizniki and Mokrytsa. In this region between Lakes Vishnieff and Narotch the troops of General Baluyeff captured during the four days, March 18 to 21,

18 officers and 1,255 men and one 5-in. howitzer 18 machine-guns, 26 field mortars, 10 hand mortars and considerable quantities of small arms and ammunition.

Simultaneously with the fighting on the isthmus similar encounters were proceeding in three other sectors of the Lithuanian front: between the Lake Miadziol and Postavy, near Tverietch, and north of Vidzy, on the line Lake Sekla-Mintsiouny. Finally, on the Dvina, half-way between Riga and Dvinsk, in front of the curve which the river forms between Lievenhof and Friedrichstadt, our Allies carried by a sudden and sharp attack a series of German trenches in the region of Augustenhof and Buschhof. In almost every part of the line where fighting was proceeding the Russians succeeded in improving their tactical position. That was all that had been counted upon. "On the whole, the series of engagements latterly reported in the official *communiqués*," wrote *The Times* correspondent at Petrograd, under date of March 23, "bears the character of an encounter battle"—and warnings were given out from well-informed quarters at Petrograd that nothing more should be expected at that season of the year, on the very threshold of spring. And indeed in the last days of March the general thaw and the melting of the snow, which was lying on the ground several feet high, put an end to the fighting in Lithuania. It was once more resumed in the last days of April. By a considerable military effort the Germans recaptured the trenches which the Russians had taken from them in the isthmus between Lakes Narotch and Vishnieff, but were unable to advance any further.

In June, when the great Russian offensive south of the Marshes was breaking up the Austro-German front and casting a shadow far before it over Central Europe, the German Headquarters felt the urgent need of reassuring the population by means of a heroic legend. A graphic description had to be given, so crudely coloured as to impress itself even on minds beginning to yield to fear. It had to be demonstrated that every Russian offensive *must necessarily* break down and end in disaster; it had to be shown that the sacred ground of the Fatherland could not ever again be in danger of contamination by a hostile foot. On June 9—the date is significant—German Headquarters published an account of the Russian "offensive" of March, 1916. The official pen ran riot in describing an encounter of Russians



GENERAL BRUSILOFF,
Commander of the Russian Armies in the Great Offensive south of the Pripiet.

and Germans: "Indeed, a shattering and yet elevating picture! Out yonder, masses forging forward through deep mud and swamps, driven by blows of the knout and by the fire of their own guns. Here the iron wall of the Hindenburg Army. Firm, rigid in iron and steel. Still firmer in the will of every single man: to hold out even against overwhelming odds. Nobody

here turns back with anxious glances, nobody looks back at the police behind the front. There are no police. All eyes are bent steadily to the front, and the stones of the wall are the soldier-hearts of the defenders."

One wonders what German soldiers must have felt when reading the fustian of their own Headquarters, whether rage and shame did not

make their blood boil when thinking of the twaddler who, somewhere safe behind the front, was writing down the opponent for the comfort of nervous people at home, and making the fighters of his own army ridiculous. And a month later these very scribes were complaining of the British *communiqués* being "written in a style which has nothing in common with military brevity and simplicity" and "is no longer the language of a soldier"!

But the immediate tactical results were not the only aim and profit of the military operations undertaken by the Russians in the autumn and winter of 1915-16. They had also their educational value. "In every movement, great or small, that we have made this winter," said General Brusiloff to *The Times* correspondent, Mr. Stanley Washburn, at the conclusion of the first stage of the offensive in June, 1916, "we have been studying the best methods of handling the new problems which modern warfare presents. At the beginning of the war, and especially last summer, we lacked the preparations which the Germans have been making for the past 50 years. Personally I was not discouraged, for my faith in Russian troops and

Russian character is an enduring one. I was convinced that, given the munitions, we should do exactly as we have done in the past two weeks."

The task of Russia was in a way similar to that of Great Britain. In the middle of the war she had to build up new armies and devise the means for supplying them with the necessary war material. As against England, indeed, Russia was favoured in having vast cadres of highly trained officers and in possessing, in the widest sense of the word, the tradition of a great national army. But she was handicapped in matters of industrial development and of communications both within her own empire and with the outer world. In spite of this, however, Russia, during the period of suspense in the fighting, accomplished results which had never entered the calculations of the enemy and surpassed even the hopes of her Allies. In fact, they could never have been achieved had it not been for the unanimous, enthusiastic support which the entire Russian nation gave to every enterprise connected with the war. That is true of individuals as well as of organizations. Among the latter it was especially the Unions of *Zemstvos* and Towns which did the



A CAPTURED AUSTRIAN TRENCH.

On the right is Captain Baranoff, chief of General Brusiloff's escort.



RUSSIAN DUG-OUTS.
Near the fighting-line.

most important work. "The desire to work on the part of the Unions was so great," said General Alexeieff, Chief of the General Staff. "that they willingly undertook anything, great or small, provided it was of use to the army."

Whilst the direction of the armies in the field rested with General Alexeieff, dependent immediately on the Tsar himself, up to the end of March General Polivanoff presided over the work of the War Office. On March 29 General Polivanoff was relieved of his office, and was succeeded by General Shuvaieff.*

The summer of 1916 found the Russian armies between the Baltic Sea and the Rumanian frontier grouped in three main divisions. General Kuropatkin, who by an Imperial Ukase dated February 19 had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Armies in place of General Plehve, was in charge of the Riga-Dvinsk line. He had three armies under his command—the Twelfth Army of General Gorbatowski with headquarters at Venden, the Fifth Army based on Rzezytsa, and the First Army of General Litvinoff in the



district of Disna. German writers put their aggregate strength at 35 to 41 divisions of infantry, and 13½ divisions of cavalry.

The centre facing Vilna remained under the command of General Evert, who by the magnificent skill displayed in the retreat from the Niemen and Vilia had enhanced the high reputation which he had earned in the Russo-Japanese War. His group included the Second Army under General Smirnoff round Dokshitse, the Tenth Army of General Radkievitch with headquarters at Minsk, the Fourth Army of General Rogoza on the Upper Niemen, and the Third Army of General Lesh on the northern outskirts of the Pripet Marshes. German estimates of the strength of the Russian centre

* See Vol. VIII., p. 204.



ON THE RIGHT OF THE RUSSIAN LINE.
Repulse of a German attack in the district near Dvinsk.

varied from $42\frac{1}{2}$ to $50\frac{1}{2}$ infantry and $8\frac{1}{2}$ cavalry divisions.

One may safely assume that these figures were more or less exaggerated. It was the regular policy of German writers to enhance the figures of the forces opposed to them (not of those opposed to the Austrians!) and to discount the strength of enemy reserves, so as to magnify the greatness of their own "achievements" and to prove the hopelessness of the enemy's cause.

Ever since the distinction between northern and southern theatres of war had arisen on the Russian front, the armies south of the Pripet Marshes had remained under the command of General Ivanoff. In the first days of April, that fine old soldier having been called to Imperial Headquarters to act as military adviser to the Tsar, his place at the front was taken by General Brusiloff, who had hitherto led the Eighth Army. At the beginning of the summer offensive his command included four armies (towards the end of June, when Volhynia had become the main battle-ground of Europe, the army of General Lesh also was transferred to this theatre of war). The four original armies of General Brusiloff were—his own old army with headquarters at Rovno, now under the command of General Kaledin; the Eleventh Army under General Sakharoff on the borders of Volhynia and Podolia; the Seventh Army under General Shcherbatieff in Eastern Galicia; and lastly, the Ninth Army of General Lechitsky on the Dniester and the frontier between the Bukovina and Bessarabia. German estimates put the strength of the Southern Armies in May, 1916, at 41 divisions of infantry and 14 divisions of cavalry—which is much nearer the mark than the estimate of the northern groups.

It was in the southern area, and especially in the spheres of operation of the Eighth and Ninth Russian Armies, that the decisive battles were to be fought during the opening stages of the new Russian offensive. The victories of June, 1916, added new lustre to the reputation of General Brusiloff, and made known throughout the world the hitherto unfamiliar names of Generals Kaledin and Lechitsky.

Alexey Alexeyevitch Brusiloff belonged to an old Russian noble family. Of medium height and spare build, with finely moulded features, steady, sharp grey eyes, and elegant, easy movement, General Brusiloff had preserved to the full his bodily vigour. A famous



GENERAL EVERT,

Commanded the Russian Armies in the centre.

horseman—a distinction which it is by no means easy to earn in Russia—he had all through life kept in training. Although the requirements of his professional work, as its sphere was widening, led him away from the interests of his younger years, he preserved the appearance of the typical cavalry officer. It was in the cavalry that he started his career. His work for the development and training of that arm, which had always taken a prominent part in the Russian forces, left a permanent mark on its organization. In 1906, at the age of 53, Brusiloff was appointed to the command of the Second Cavalry Division of the Guard. Being known as an able administrator, he was subsequently attached for some time as military assistant to the Governor-General of Warsaw, General Skalon. In 1911 General Brusiloff was entrusted with the command of the army corps stationed at Vinitsa (Russian Podolia) and of its military district, which, bordering on East Galicia, was the most important military area within the Kieff command.

Thus General Brusiloff had spent the years following on the Japanese War, during which the Russian Army was reorganized, in the frontier-districts to the north and east of

Galicja. The outbreak of the war found him in command of the forces concentrated in Russian Podolia. It was then but natural that he should be chosen to lead the army which invaded Galicja from the east. Previous chapters of this history have told the story of his rapid advance on Nizhniow and Halitch, of the grand battles which the Eighth Army fought under his leadership in the Carpathian Mountains, of its raids into Hungary, and finally of the retirement which followed on the catastrophe of the adjoining Third Army on the Dunajets. Even in the course of that retirement Brusiloff's army still managed to capture vast numbers of prisoners, and it concluded its retreat in the first days of September, 1915, by a brilliant counter-offensive in Volhynia, which gave it for a time command of Lutsk, and permanently secured Rovno. It therefore surprised no one when General Brusiloff was chosen successor to General Ivanoff.

In the command of his own army he was succeeded by General Kaledin. Before the opening of the great Russian offensive Kaledin's name was little known, even in Russia, except in military circles. At the beginning of the war he led a cavalry division in General Brusiloff's army. He distinguished himself in every one of the many actions in which he was

engaged, and was soon entrusted with the command of an army corps, and finally was picked out by General Brusiloff to succeed him at the head of the entire Eighth Russian Army. He was a short, thick-set man. His quiet, sober eyes inspired confidence in anyone who had dealings with him. The conduct of the Volhynian battle in June, 1916, proved that at any rate in the military art he was a past master—a fact which not even enemy writers dared to question.

One other of General Brusiloff's army-commanders rivalled in June, 1916, the fame of General Kaledin. It was General Lechitsky, the leader of the Russian offensive against the Bukovina. His career reads like a romance. He was born in 1856, the son of a Greek-Orthodox priest in a small provincial town. He himself was intended by his parents for the Church and consequently attended the theological school at Vilna. He felt, however, that his real vocation was that of a soldier. Too poor to enter a military school, he joined the army as a volunteer in a reserve battalion, and by this roundabout way reached the cadets' corps. He then spent some 16 years as a company officer in Siberia. For many years he struggled in obscurity with hardly a chance of ever rising above the level of so many patient,



RUSSIAN INFANTRY ON THEIR WAY TO THE TRENCHES.



GENERAL LECHITSKY.

The leader of the Russian offensive against the Bukovina.

quiet regimental officers whose work makes the life of the Russian Army and whose names pass into the oblivion of the crowd. The Boxer Revolt in China gave him his first chance of showing his true mettle; he was soon promoted to the rank of a colonel. He subsequently did excellent work in the Russo-Japanese War, and was a short time afterwards made a general. In 1906 he was entrusted with the command of the First Division of the Guard, and in 1911 he was put at the head of the army district of Chabarovsk in Eastern Siberia. During the Great War it was not until June, 1916, that he appeared in a big offensive action as commander of an Army—with the result that in the south, between the Dniester and Pruth, the Russians advanced within a month about 50 miles, and that the name of General Lechitsky became one of the best known in Europe.

On the side of the enemy the Pripet Marshes marked approximately the division between the spheres of the two Germanic Allies. Although one Austro-Hungarian army corps remained in the northern region, and a few German divisions and two German commanders operated in the southern district, it is still correct for the period of relative suspense (September, 1915—June, 1916) to call the line between the Pripet Marshes and the Rumanian border the Austro-Hungarian front. Having done most of the work in 1915, the Austrians wished to be able to call some quarter their own; soon after the fall of Brest-Litovsk a segregation of troops was carried out, and

Field-Marshal Archduke Frederick (and also General Conrad von Hötzendorf, the Chief of the Austrian General Staff) came again to their own. The Archduke now commanded the armies south of the Marshes, whilst Field-Marshal von Hindenburg and the shadowy Prince Leopold of Bavaria directed the forces between the Baltic Sea and the Pripet.

Hindenburg's command embraced four armies whilst one army and an army detachment looked for guidance to the military genius from the House of Wittelsbach. A group consisting of $7\frac{1}{2}$ infantry divisions and one cavalry division held the line from the Baltic Sea till about Friedrichstadt. Next to it stood the Eighth German Army under General von Scholtz; it consisted of nine infantry and three cavalry divisions, and its sphere of operation extended till about Vidzy. The adjoining Tenth Army under General von Eichhorn had the biggest effectives at its disposal, but had the shortest front to defend. It included $11\frac{1}{2}$ infantry and two cavalry divisions (besides another two cavalry divisions in reserve), and occupied the district between Vidzy and the Upper Vilia; it was thus primarily upon this Army that devolved the task of protecting Vilna, its headquarters. From north of Smorgon down to the



GENERAL KALEDIN,
Commanded the Russian Army at Rovno.

Niemen extended the positions of the Twelfth Army under General von Fabeck (eight divisions with one brigade in reserve).

South of the Niemen extended the realm of Prince Leopold of Bavaria, monarch of one of the many kingdoms of Poland which were vainly planned during the war, and chief of a group of armies which never existed.* The line between the Niemen and the Oginiski Canal was held by his one and only companion, General von Woyrsch, commanding the Ninth German Army (in a "birthday article" which the Vienna *Neue Freie Presse* devoted to Prince Leopold in November, 1915, he himself had been described as its commander). The Ninth Army included eight German infantry divisions and the 12th Austro-Hungarian army corps. This detachment, consisting mainly of Transylvanian troops, was the remainder of the Kövess Group, which had become engulfed in Woyrsch's Army in July, 1915, when General Dankl, with part of the, in any case, slender First Austro-Hungarian Army, had been transferred to the Italian front. Subsequently, on the commencement of the new campaign against Serbia, in the autumn of 1915, the leader of the remainder of the First Austro-Hungarian Army in the north, General Kövess von Kövesshaza, was removed with part of his troops to Serbia, whilst the 12th army corps was left in the midst of its German comrades. However well the Germans conducted publicity campaigns for themselves and for any German commander or division which might happen to find itself within the Austrian lines, the presence of their "weaker brethren" within their own half of the line was regularly passed over in silence until it came to bear the brunt of a Russian attack. Then, on June 16, 1916, the Vienna *Neue Freie Presse* devoted a whole article to that newly discovered Austrian detachment, stating that "the news of their presence in Lithuania" may surprise its readers, "as it was not hitherto generally known that a detachment of Imperial and Royal troops stood so far north in the midst of German armies." In fact, the only writer who had previously mentioned it was the Military Correspondent of *The Times* in his remarkable article on the German Armies in Russia, published on April 23, 1916.

* Attention has been previously called to the peculiar military career of Prince Leopold, who had risen to the rank of commander of a group of armies for the occasion of his entry into Warsaw; cf. Chapter XCI., pp. 328 and 358, and Chapter CX., p. 114.

Besides the Ninth Army there was only a small detachment in the thick of the Pripet swamps (made separate probably in order to mark the difference of standing between mere army commanders and the Royal Prince of Bavaria). That detachment consisted of three infantry and two cavalry divisions.

Thus the German forces north of the Pripet Marshes seem to have included 48 divisions of infantry and 10 divisions of cavalry, representing an aggregate strength of probably 1,200,000 men. The most striking feature was the almost complete absence of strategic reserves; these had been drained for the Verdun front.

It was the kindly, grandfatherly spirit of Archduke Frederick which presided over the fates of *Mittel-Europa* in the country south of the Marshes during the spring of 1916. The days of the grim Mackensen had gone, and the Prussian Von Linsingen and the Bavarian Count Bothmer were as yet merely subordinates of the old gentleman whom fate and the Habsburg family had chosen for a general. Born in 1856, he celebrated his 60th birthday on June 4—indeed a day which history will remember, though for reasons very different from those on which the courtiers of Vienna expatiated.

It is a family tradition of the Habsburgs to produce military geniuses. Archduke Frederick, a grandson of Archduke Charles, the hero of Aspern, and a nephew of Archduke Albrecht of Custozza fame, was chosen to be a *real* soldier. He entered the army at the age of 15. At the age of 24 he was already a colonel, two years later a general. As a man of 30 he was put in command of a division, and three years later of a whole army-corps. Having shown such extraordinary abilities in his youth, he became in 1906 Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian Landwehr, and on July 12, 1914, the Emperor Francis Joseph appointed him to the highest command of the common Austro-Hungarian Army. At the time that the Germans thought Russia to have been "finished off for good" they handed over to him the southern portion of the Eastern front.

Two separate regions may be distinguished within that area: the Russian district of Volhynia and the Austrian territories in East Galicia and the Bukovina. The differences in the development of means of communication and in their directions preserve the importance of this frontier line, which otherwise (according to the principles of the text-books) should



A SACRED SYMBOL OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY.

A portrait of Nicholas II. under guard during an advance.

have ceased to exist with the outbreak of war.

The Volhynian district was held by two Austrian armies: the Third Austro-Hungarian Army under General Puhallo von Brlog, between the Marshes and Tehartoryisk, and the Fourth Army under Archduke Joseph Ferdinand within the Volhynian Triangle of Fortresses (the Austrians held Lutsk and Dubno, and were facing Rovno). Into these two armies seems to have been merged, at a date which was never announced, and in a way which was never described, the army of General von Linsingen—and he himself re-

mained in Volhynia in a character which was never defined until the middle of June, 1916. Then, after the first Austrian defeats, the German official *communiqués* (not those of Vienna!) suddenly began to speak of a new "group of armies" under Von Linsingen. The Prussian had now openly taken out of the weak Habsburg hands the command in the Volhynian battle area.

It will be remembered that in the winter of 1914-15, when the battles were raging in the Carpathians, a German "Army of the South" was holding the mountain-chain from the Uzsok Pass to the upper courses of the Bystrzytsas.



ARCHDUKE FREDERICK.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Austro-Hungarian Army, with his grandchildren—the children of Princess Hohenlohe.

Its chief commander was Von Linsingen, and its élite, the Prussian army corps containing the Third Division of the Guard, was led by Count Bothmer. Even then more than half of the effectives of the "German Army of the South" consisted of Austro-Hungarian troops. During the advance in the summer of 1915 it was split up, Linsingen proceeding to Volhynia, whilst Bothmer advanced against the Tarnopol-Trembovla front. Each of these halves served as framework for a new army filled out with fresh Austrian troops. Meantime no increase was made in their German leaven—on the contrary, much of it was removed. The last withdrawal was the Prussian Guard of Bothmer's Army, which had to go to replenish the German effectives before Verdun. Towards the end of May, 1916, there were left hardly more than three German divisions in the midst of the Austrian forces. Two of these stood in Volhynia, whilst the 48th German Reserve Division was the only one remaining with the army of General Count Bothmer.

Of Austro-Hungarian troops the two Volhynian armies included $12\frac{1}{2}$ infantry and seven cavalry divisions, besides the Polish legions

composed of all arms and amounting to something more than a division.

The front of the adjoining Second Austro-Hungarian Army under General von Boehm-Ermolli also extended mainly over Russian soil. Its line stretched from south of Dubno to a point north of the Tarnopol-Krasne-Lvoff railway-line. Still, up to the time when it was dragged into the maelstrom of the Volhynian battle, this army, with its headquarters and bases on Austrian soil, belonged to the Galician rather than to the Volhynian group. It included about eight infantry divisions—all of them Austrian or Hungarian. The rest of the Austrian front was held by the two Armies of Count Bothmer and General von Pflanzer-Baltin, the point of junction between them lying in the district of Butchatch. In March, 1916, their aggregate strength amounted to about 20 Austro-Hungarian and two German infantry divisions and four divisions of Austro-Hungarian cavalry. It was especially within that sector that changes were effected in the course of the spring. Besides the Third Division of the Prussian Guard, whose withdrawal to Verdun was mentioned above, these armies lost a few infantry divisions to the Italian front. Yet the largest withdrawals for the Trentino offensive did not come from the armies at the front, but from the bases in the rear. The Italian campaign had an effect on the position of the Austro-Hungarian armies in the east analogous to that which the Verdun offensive exercised on Hindenburg's line. It left them bare of strategic reserves.

The best authorities estimated the strength of the enemy's infantry in the south at the time when our Allies opened their great offensive at about 38 Austro-Hungarian and three German infantry divisions. Their strength in infantry seems, therefore, to have been about equal to that of General Brusiloff's armies, though the Russians undoubtedly possessed a marked superiority in cavalry.

The fact has been frequently commented upon that at the time when the Russians opened their offensive of 1916 the Austro-Hungarian armies at the eastern front included hardly any Czech, Yugo-Slav or Ruthenian regiments—*i.e.*, few elements friendly at heart to the Slav cause. Those troops had been sent mainly to the Italian front, whilst Germans, Magyars, Italians and Poles were sent to Russia and Galicia. Indeed, all along the line could be found Magyar regiments or whole army corps,

as, *e.g.*, the group of General von Szurnay in the north, the detachment of General von Goglia near Podkamien (south of Brody), and very considerable numbers of Hungarian regiments within Pflanzer-Baltin's army. Similarly, German-Austrians—Viennese regiments, Alpine divisions, Germans from Bohemia and Moravia—were posted along the entire front. Still, Czech and Yugo-Slav soldiers were by no means absent. They were scattered in groups among the troops whose loyalty could be relied upon by the Austro-Hungarian Army Command; these had to keep watch over them, send them everywhere into the most exposed positions, and where any suspicion of "treason" arose, fire at them from behind. Yet even so, it remains to be known whether these bodies of men, devoted to the cause of Slav freedom and hating the German-Magyar rule, did not contribute in some measure to the victories of our Russian Allies. Anyhow, the Russians soon became aware of their presence, and whilst the true enemies among the prisoners were started off on their weary journey to Siberia or Turkestan, the Slavs were placed at once on farms behind the Russian front, where labour was needed for the approaching harvest. They were a real godsend to the farmers, as was shown by numerous notices on the subject which appeared in the Press of Southern Russia.

Of all the handicaps under which the Austro-Hungarian Army Command was suffering the most dangerous was perhaps its almost pathetic conceit. It was not merely the daily twaddle of the *Neue Freie Presse* and inspired statements for the consumption of neutrals which proclaimed the impregnability of the Austrian positions and the invincibility of Austrian troops. Prominent army commanders made statements to that effect even in private, intimate conversations. Of their public declarations it will suffice to quote a single one. On the very eve of the new Russian offensive Baron Conrad von Hötendorf, Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, was reported as saying to the Swedish journalist, Herr Nils Lago Linqvist: "We have held out for two years, and those two years were the worst. Now we can hold out in a cheerful and confident frame of mind as long as it pleases our enemies. To hold out, of that we are certainly capable. We are not to be conquered again."* The *Pester Lloyd* had the doubtful taste to reprint that conversation in its issue of June 8.

Even the production of food was a concern of the Austro-Hungarian Army at the front. Convinced of the impossibility of ever again having to retreat, it devoted all its spare energies to the tilling of the fields behind the

* "Uns ringt man nicht mehr nieder."



A CAPTURED AUSTRIAN TRENCH.

Built on a river bank.



AN URGENT DISPATCH.
A Russian General travelling in a carriage receives important news.

battle line. The peaceful pursuits of its detachments in reserve quarters no less eloquently proves the confidence then prevailing in the Austrian Army than the luxuries and amenities of the life of its officers, even in what for their soldiers was the firing-line.

Towards the end of June, 1916, Mr. Stanley Washburn, *The Times* Special Correspondent with the Russian Forces, visited some districts behind the Austrian front in Volhynia and described the elaborate arrangements which had been made in that region for the well-being and pleasure of the troops :

At a safe distance from rifle fire behind the lines one came on the officers' quarters, which seemed like a veritable park in the heart of the forest. Here one found a beer garden with buildings beautifully constructed from logs and decorated with rustic tracery, while chairs and tables made of birch still stood in lonely groups about the garden just where they were left when the occupants of the place suddenly departed. In a sylvan bower was erected a beautiful altar of birch trimmed with rustic tracteries, the whole being surrounded by a fence through which one passed under an arch neatly made of birch branches. The Austrians must have had an extremely comfortable time here. Everything is clean and neat, and, no matter how humble the work, it is always replete with good taste. One of the advancing corps captured a trench with a piano in it, and if the stories of large quantities of miscellaneous *lingerie* (not included in the official list of trophies) that fell into Russian hands are to be believed, one feels that the Austrians did not spend a desolate or lonely winter on this front. . . .

Emerging from the belt of woods, we cross an open bit of country, and everywhere find signs of the Austrians' intention to make their stay as comfortable as possible. In fact, the Russians can make no complaint of the state in which the enemy has left the territory which he has been occupying. Nothing has been destroyed that belonged to the Russian peasantry, and, indeed, very little of the works the Austrians themselves created. Every village has been carefully cleaned up, each house is neatly white-washed, with numbers painted on the front. Ditches have been cut along the sides of the streets and most of the houses have been tastefully fenced in by the rustic birch-work which one sees everywhere here. In several villages parks have been constructed, with rustic bandstands.

Arrangements had also been made for the local revictualling of the armies. Besides bakeries and slaughter-houses the Austrian Army had close behind the front its own sausage factories (*Wursterzeugungsanlagen*), rooms fitted for the pickling and smoking of meat, and, finally, suitable places for the cold storage of the provisions. The meat-packers of one army corps alone of the army of General von Pflanzer-Baltin produced every third day about a ton of sausages and smoked meat. (And the description of all these indescribable delights was officially given out to hungry Austria about a fortnight before the commencement of the Russian offensive!) Yet strict economy was exercised in the slaughter-

houses of the "Imperial and Royal Army." All tallow was carefully collected, and whatever remained after the soldiers had been provided with grease for their rifles and boots was handed over to the soap factory—of course, again one owned and worked by the Army itself.

Every detachment had behind the front its own vegetable gardens, which were tilled and looked after by the soldiers resting in reserve positions. The total surface of these gardens amounted to thousands of acres. And in those villages and camps behind the front the Army fattened even its own pigs and cattle!

Work on an even greater scale was done in conjunction with the local population. The horses of the cavalry and artillery were used in the fields, motor-ploughs and all kinds of machines, strange and incomprehensible to the local peasant, were worked by the army mechanics and engineers. Thus, for example, the army of Pflanzer-Baltin, behind whose front lay the Bukovina, one of the most fertile countries in the world, cooperated in the tilling of many hundred thousand acres of land. Of course, it never crossed their minds that it might be not they who were to reap the harvest. One more detail may be mentioned as illustrating the feeling of absolute security which prevailed in Austrian and even German Government circles. Vast quantities of grain bought in Rumania were stored in the Bukovina, comparatively close behind the front. When the Russian offensive broke through the Austrian lines, and all railways were blocked with war material, transports, wounded soldiers, refugees, etc., there was no time to remove to safety all the accumulated stores. A considerable part of them was captured by the Russians or perished in conflagrations. Thus near Itskany no less than five big Austrian granaries and 15 smaller ones belonging to the German military authorities were consumed by fire.

Yet one can hardly be surprised if the Austro-Hungarian Army Command thought its front impregnable. Every possible device had been adopted to render it so. In most sectors there were five distinct consecutive lines of trenches, many of them even 15 or 20 feet deep. The woodwork and fittings were most elaborate, the dug outs of the same pattern which was familiar on the Western front. A thorough and efficient system of communication had been established in the rear of the battle-line.



PATROL OF RUSSIAN LANCERS.

About to set off to scour the surrounding woods and plains.

Everywhere were field railways, and one could hardly find anywhere more beautifully laid tracks than were those behind the Austrian front. And this system of roads and railways was always being further developed. When the Russians broke through the Austrian lines they came across many tracks which were only just in process of construction.

More difficult than on the high plateau of the south was the work of entrenching and of constructing roads and railways in the marshy regions of northern Volhynia. It was there in many places impossible to dig trenches of the usual kind. Recourse was had to a system of parapets secured by breastwork such as was generally used in the wars of the seventeenth century. The roads were made of logs, not of stone; they were artificial causeways rather than roads. In some districts they presented one long stretch of wide bridges, at points even of considerable height, so as to secure them against the spring floods. In the country between the lower courses of the Styr and the Stochod some of these bridges attained even the length of two miles and more.

In short, as far as the mere work of preparing their positions was concerned and of organizing their communications and supplies behind the front, the Austrians can hardly be reproached with carelessness or inefficiency. They had practically the same technical means for resisting the enemy's offensive as the Germans

north of the Marshes or in France, and if their resistance was not equal to that of their allies, it was due to the fact that their Headquarters were caught napping, that the general standard of the average Austro-Hungarian soldier had been lowered during the preceding two years of war, and that many of the troops had not their heart in the fight. It is possible that an excessive amount of artillery had been withdrawn for the Italian front, and it is certain that no sufficient strategic reserves had been left for the Eastern front. Yet, above all, the fact remains that the Russian soldier had established a marked individual superiority over his opponent from the Habsburg Monarchy; and he who would not acknowledge that fact would search in vain for the causes of the catastrophic character which from the very first day the Russian offensive assumed for the Austro-Hungarian Army.

"Everything in war is very simple," said Von Moltke, "but the simple things are very difficult." This is certainly true of the Russian summer offensive of 1916. Its strategic scheme was extremely simple, but its execution was one of the most colossal undertakings which any army ever had to face. The offensive extended all along the line—i.e., in all the most important districts some sectors were singled out for attack. The timing of these attacks to a single day made it impossible

for the enemy to throw his forces to and fro behind the front, and compelled him to fight each of the series of initial battles with the support of merely local reserves.

The results of the first two or three days determined the further development of the Russian scheme. "You can plan a campaign," was another of Moltke's sayings, "only up to the beginning of the first battle." The Russian offensive was successful beyond all expectation in the districts of Lutsk, Butchatch, and between the Dniester and the Pruth. It failed to break through the enemy front on the line extending from the border of Volhynia and Galicia (round Zalostse) to about Visniovtchyk on the Strypa. Similarly, in the north, hardly any progress was made on the Styr below Kolki. The question therefore arose, how far a strategic advance was possible through the breaches effected in the enemy front. Two of the opposing armies—those of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand and of General von Pflanzer-Baltin—had met with complete disaster; but the army of General von Puhallo on the Lower Styr, of General von Boehm-Ermolli south of Dubno, and of Count Bothmer


on the Upper and Middle Strypa, though by no means intact, still represented a very serious fighting force, and reinforcements were certain soon to make their appearance. Would it have been safe for the Russians to have poured troops through the gaps in the Austrian front, or was it wiser to abstain from an experiment which, if unsuccessful, might have changed one of the greatest victories yet won in this war into a drawn battle?

The answer to this question depended mainly on the chance which the Russians had of reaching vital points or lines behind the enemy's front without dispersing their own forces and without placing them into positions fraught with difficulties or dangers in view of the imminent German counter-offensive.

There were behind the Austrian front three centres of vital importance: Kovel, Lvoff (Lemberg), and Stanislavoff (with the Dniester crossings at Nizhniöff, Jezupol, and Halitch). On the Russian side the main centres were Rovno and Tarnopol, and to a minor extent Tchortkoff. The Russian force which broke through the Austrian front near Butchatch could not have made its pressure felt in the



AUSTRIAN TRENCHES AND DUG-OUTS
Captured by the Russians



THE VOLHYNIAN THEATRE OF WAR.

direction of Lvoff until it had reached and conquered the Dniester crossings. But this was under any circumstances a formidable task, and was rendered still more so by the fact that it would have had to guard against Bothmer's army on its right. Outflanking cuts both ways: a Russian force advancing past the unbroken Austro-German front on the Middle Strypa might have outflanked the enemy or might itself have suffered that fate. But whereas a successful Russian movement to the west would have still left Bothmer the possibility of falling back on to the Halitch-Podhaytse-Denysoff line, a failure of our Allies would have thrown them back on to the "belt

of the Dniester," a region devoid of practicable lines of communication. Hence an advance on the northern bank of the Dniester west of Butchatch would have been an extremely risky enterprise as long as Count Bothmer continued to hold his part of the front, and in any case could not have affected within reasonable time the position in north-eastern Galicia and Volhynia.

A Russian army advancing through the Volhynian gap could therefore have relied only on its own forces. But what were the main lines of advance in front of it? The two railways from Rovno to the west (the Rovno-Rozhishche-Kovel and the Rovno-Brody-Lvoff

lines) open out into an angle of about 60°. An advance to the west would, therefore, have had to follow divergent lines and would have spread out like a fan. Such a movement, risky under any circumstances, was rendered dangerous to an extreme degree by the fact that in the course of the war Kovel had been linked up with Lvoff by the railway which, between Vladimir-Volynsk and Sokal, connected the older Kovel-Vladimir and Lvoff-Sokal lines. In other words, at the base of the triangle formed by Rovno, Lvoff, and Kovel the enemy possessed a lateral line of communication (reinforced, moreover, by the Lvoff-Kamionka-Stoyanoff railway), whereas our Allies, advancing from the east, would have had no such assistance for quick manœuvring.

The topographical conditions analysed above determined the main outlines of the Russian strategy during the first phase of their summer offensive in 1916.

In the Volhynian area our Allies advanced as far to the west as was compatible with safety and then met the German counter-offensive on a line on which they suffered from no disadvantage in matters of communications. In the district of Butchatch the initial success was not pressed any further than was necessary with regard to the progress made south of the Dniester.

It was in the country between the Dniester and the Carpathians that the advance was pressed most vigorously during the first month of the Russian offensive. Here it was possible to exploit to the full the initial advantage with-



AUSTRIAN MITRAILLEUSE GUN

Captured by the Russians. It was used as an anti-aircraft gun.



AT RUSSIAN HEADQUARTERS.
At work on a tape machine.

out any danger of sudden reverses. The belt of the Dniester, with its cañons and forests, covered the right flank of the advancing Russian Army. By a rapid movement to the south and south-west our Allies reached the foot-hills of the Carpathians and soon even their mountain passes. To the west the advance was carried on to the very neighbourhood of Stanislawoff, where the German counter-offensive was met. To the superficial observer the progress south of the Dniester may appear to have been an advance into a blind alley, or at least into a district of secondary strategic importance. This was not, however, the case. Quite apart from its great and obvious political and economic meaning, the Russian advance south of the Dniester was also of first-rate strategic significance. It cut a possible line of retreat of the Austro-German centre, which elung tenaciously to the line between Brody and Visniovtehyk. Had the district south of the Dniester remained in Austrian hands, the armies on the Tarnopol front would have been far less sensitive to pressure from the northern flank; their retreat would not have been confined to a westerly direction.

The first onslaught, together with the period during which the initial successes were developed and consolidated—the advance of our Allies west of Rovno and the resistance which they subsequently offered to the German

counter-offensive, and their advance south of the Dniester, culminating in the capture of Czernovitz constitute the first phase of the great Russian offensive. It coincides roughly with the first month of active operations. The first days of July, in which General Lechitsky carried forward his advance to the west beyond Kolomea, and General Lesh opened his offensive north of Kolki, on the right flank of General Kaledin's Lutsk salient, can be regarded as the beginning of the second phase of the Russian advance in the summer of 1916.

On June 1 and 2 the Germans attacked the Russian positions north-east and also south of Krevo; they continued their onslaught during the night of June 2-3. The fear of approaching events in the southern theatre of war was the explanation of this sudden belated burst of German activity north of the Marshes. On June 4 the Austrian official *communiqué* reported a violent Russian bombardment of different parts of the Austrian front, especially of the line held by the army of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, and closed with the following significant statement: "Everywhere there are indications that infantry attacks are imminent." The German diversion came much too late to influence in any way the Russian offensive which was now commencing in the southern area.

For months our Allies had been studying the enemy positions and working out the details of the coming advance. Everything for the big attack had been arranged beforehand, and on June 4 the Russian guns began slowly and methodically to place their shells on previously selected points of the enemy line. It does not appear that any attempt was made to wipe out the enemy trenches themselves; the object was rather to cut avenues in the wire entanglements through which the Russian infantry could proceed to attack the enemy positions. The artillery preparation in the different sectors lasted 12 to 30 hours. Then followed the Russian bayonet attacks. As soon as the Russians entered the Austrian front trenches the Russian artillery developed a curtain fire which precluded all communication with the rear. The Austrians were trapped; their fine deep trenches, covered with solid oaken timbers, fastened with cement, and surmounted by thick layers of earth, once the Russians had reached them, were cages, and death or surrender were the only alternatives for their occupants. During the first

hours the enemy infantry, especially the Hungarians, fought furiously. Thousands were killed. Then their resistance began to slacken, and they began to surrender. On the first day alone the haul of Austrian prisoners amounted to 13,000. On the third day (June 6), by noon, the armies of General Brusiloff had taken prisoners 900 officers and over 40,000 rank and file, and captured 77 guns and 134 machine-guns. Further, 49 trench-mortars were captured, in addition to searchlights, telephones, field kitchens, and a large quantity of arms and material of war, with great reserves of ammunition. A number of batteries were taken intact with all their guns and limbers. As ammunition magazines are usually stationed about 10 miles behind the front trenches, the enormous hauls of the first days by themselves bear witness to the swiftness of the Russian advance.

The shortness of the bombardment preceding the attack and the simultaneous character of the operations along a front of about 250 miles were the novel features of the Russian offensive. The results brilliantly justified these new Russian tactics. "The main element of our success," said General Brusiloff to Mr. Washburn, *The Times* correspondent, about a fortnight after the commencement of the Russian offensive, "was due to the absolute co-ordination of all the armies involved and the carefully planned harmony with which the various branches of the service supported each other. On our entire front the attack began at the same hour, and it was impossible for the enemy to shift his troops from one quarter to another, as our attacks were being pressed equally at all points."

The most important fighting and the most signal victory of those opening days occurred within the triangle of Volhynian fortresses. The original front in that district extended from about Tsuman on the Putilovka, across the Rovno-Kovel railway, past Olyka—half-way between Rovno and Lutsk—and then a few miles east of Dubno across the Rovno-Brody line towards Kremieniets. The country north of the Rovno-Kovel railway is a sandy plain covered with swamps and woods; south of Mlynoff the marshy course of the Ikva and the huge oak-forests, from which Dubno derives its name,* presented a serious barrier to an

* "Dub" means in Russian "oak."



THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE ON THE SOUTHERN FRONT.
Cattle for the Army.

advance of our Allies. The higher and more open country in the centre offered, however, tactical facilities for an offensive movement. On June 3-4 the entire sector between the Rivers Putilovka and Ikva was subjected to a vigorous bombardment, the advance being pressed most vigorously due west from the district of Olyka, along the Rovno-Lutsk road, and from Mlynoff in a north-westerly direction. Thus the attack against the fortress of Lutsk itself was conducted along concentric lines. The brunt of the Russian onset was borne by the 10th (Hungarian) Division and the 2nd Division, composed largely of Slav troops. The attack on the very first day cut clean through their lines and Russian cavalry poured through the gaps. Large bodies of Austro-Hungarian troops between Olyka and the Ikva were cut off from all possibility of retreat, before they even knew that their front had been broken. On June 4, at headquarters at Lutsk, celebrations were held in honour of Archduke Frederick's birthday. The news of the disaster came like a thunderclap on the Austrian commanders. The 13th Division was thrown into the gap to hold up the Russian advance. It fared no better than its prede-

cessors. The speed with which our Allies were moving beat all records. Almost to the last moment the Austrian commanders at Lutsk do not seem to have realized the full extent of their disaster. By June 6, two days after the advance had begun, the Russian forces had advanced more than 20 miles from their original positions. They were approaching Lutsk from two sides. Lutsk itself, in a strong natural position, covered on both wings by the deep and tortuous valley of the River Styr, had been changed in the course of the war into a regular fortress. Defences of enormous strength covered its approaches. Yet such was the demoralisation of the beaten Austro-Hungarian troops that they proved unable to offer any serious resistance. Their lines were broken through near Podgaytse and near Krupy, and on June 6, at 8.25 p.m., the first Russian detachments entered Lutsk, which the commander of the Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, had left only in the afternoon. The ancient town and the ruins of its magnificent old castle—in which the Polish king, Wladyslaw Jagiello, met in 1429 Vitold, Grand Duke of Lithuania, and Sigismund of Luxembourg, Emperor of



RUSSIAN TROOPS HOLDING UP A GERMAN COUNTER-OFFENSIVE.

Germany suffered practically no damage, no serious fighting having occurred within that area. The panic among the enemy troops round Lutsk was such that at one point they left six 4-in. guns without stopping to unload them, and many cases of shell were still alongside the weapons. In Lutsk itself considerable military stores fell into the hands of our Allies. Similarly the Austrians had not had the time to clear out the hospitals, and thus had to abandon thousands of their wounded.

By June 8 the Russians had not merely reached the line of the Styr and the Ikva, but had even crossed it at many points. On the same day German reinforcements began to make their appearance. First to arrive was a scratch division gathered from the region of the Marshes, and including the 57th Landwehr and the 39th and 268th Landsturm regiments. Subsequently the 18th, 81st, and several other German divisions, also from the northern area, were thrown into the Volhynian battle; they were drawn mainly from the Dvina front—*e.g.*, the 22nd German Division—and from the Ninth German Army. Field-Marshal von Hindenburg could hardly dare to weaken his forces in front of Vilna. With the German reinforcements General von Ludendorff, Chief of Hindenburg's Staff, was sent to retrieve the Austrian fortunes. Von Linsingen was put in command of the Volhynian front. Yet it was not until full ten days after the Russian offensive had begun that its advance in Volhynia came to a halt, and then its arrest was due as much to the requirements of the Russian strategy as to the new armies which the Germanic allies had drawn together from all fronts.

On June 8-9 the severest fighting raged round the two main crossings of the Rivers Styr and Ikva—namely, in the districts of Rozhyshehe and Dubno, where the two chief railway lines (Rovno-Kovel and Rovno-Brody) pass over those rivers. Rozhyshehe was, moreover, an important base town containing large military stores and a centre of communications: it was here that the light Austrian field railways to Lutsk and to Kolki joined the main line. The Austrians, vigorously supported by fresh German reinforcements, offered a desperate resistance to the Russians who attacked Rozhyshehe from the south-east. Still, under cover of heavy artillery fire, the Russian troops—recently formed units—crossed

the Styr and drove out the enemy, taking numerous prisoners and booty.

At the southern end of the Volhynian salient our Allies captured on the same day the fort and town of Dubno. Here, however, the work was not as easy as it had been at Lutsk, and the picturesque old town suffered very severe damage. Simultaneously with this advance another Russian detachment captured the Austrian *point d'appui* at Mlynoff (on the Ikva), crossed the river, and occupied the region of the village Demidovka. During the next few days they completely cleared of the enemy the forests which cover this region, thus securing the Lutsk salient from a sudden counter-offensive from the south. On June 13 they reached the village of Kozin, 18 miles south-west of Dubno and 9 miles west of the old battle front on the Ikva.

Due west of Lutsk the Russian advance was, meantime, progressing at considerable speed. A screen of cavalry was thrown out, and detachments of Cossacks were traversing the country in every direction. On June 12 our Allies reached Torchin, 18 miles west of Lutsk. The next day fierce fighting occurred near Zaturtsy, more than half-way from Lutsk to Vladimir-Volynsk. By June 16 the sweep of the Russian tide to the west in the Lutsk salient had attained its high-water mark. Their outposts occupied a wide semi-circle round Olyka, with a radius of about 45 miles. It stretched from about Kolki (on the Styr) in the north, then followed the Stoehod from near Svidniki to the district of Kisielin, reached its farthest extension to the west in the sector Lokatchy-Sviniukhy-Gorokhoff, and then bent back to the east towards Kozin.

It was on the two wings of that salient that the last considerable gains were effected during the first stage of the Russian offensive. The Germans were certain to start soon a counter-offensive. They were bringing up fresh troops not merely from the northern area, but even from France. They had to defend Kovel at any price. Its loss would have meant the cutting of the direct connexion between the northern and southern armies. In view of this strong gathering of the enemy a further advance in the centre towards Vladimir-Volynsk was clearly inadvisable. The enemy forces were being concentrated not only round Vladimir, but also on the wings. The flanks of the salient had therefore been secured.

In the marshy district of Kolki, where so

many pitched battles had been fought in the autumn of 1915, the enemy was offering a tough resistance. Nevertheless progress was made by our Allies, and the village of Kolki itself was captured on June 13. The Austro-German troops were slowly retiring behind the Stochod. On June 16, however, the enemy attempted to counter the Russian advance near Gadomytche, some 6 miles west of Kolki, and also round Svidniki on the Stochod. A violent battle developed in the narrow sector where the courses of the Rivers Styr and Stochod approach within some 6 to 8 miles of one another. The German attacks were repulsed, and in pursuit of the retreating army, a Siberian regiment, under Colonel Kisliy, crossed the Stochod near Svidniki, capturing an entire German battalion. In the same battle the Hussars of White Russia, supported by horse artillery, charged through three extended lines of the enemy and sabred two Austrian companies. In the course of the next few days the counter-attacks of the enemy against Svidniki were repulsed, special mention in the Russian official *communiqué* being earned by a Cossack regiment under Colonel Smirnof.

Whilst the right wing of General Kaledin's Army was thus securing the Russian front round the Rovno-Kovel line, the extreme left, with the help of the adjoining wing of General Sakharoff's Army, was strengthening its positions in the district south-west of Dubno, on the Rovno-Brody railway. On June 15 General Sakharoff's troops conquered the Austrian positions on the River Plashchevka, between Kozin and Tarnavka (the same region in which the famous Third Caucasian Army Corps, under General Irmanoff, won its first victory over the Austrians in August, 1914). One of the newly formed Russian regiments under Colonel Tataroff, after a fierce fight, forded the river, with the water up to their chins. "One company was engulfed, and died an heroic death," says the Russian official *communiqué* of June 16, "but the valour of their comrades and their officers resulted in the disorderly flight of the enemy, of whom 70 officers and 5,000 men were taken prisoners." On June 16 our Allies entered Radziviloff, the Russian frontier-station on the Rovno-Brody-Lvoff railway, whilst to the south-east they reached the line Potchaieff-Lopushno-Alexiniets.



RUSSIAN ADVANCE ON DUBNO.
An Austrian trench under a ruined house.



RUSSIAN TROOPS ENTRENCHED IN A FOREST.

Thus the 12 days of the Russian offensive in Volhynia resulted in an advance of 30 miles to the south-west of the recaptured fortress of Dubno, and of a similar distance to the north-west of Lutsk, the scene of their initial successes. The entire Volhynian triangle of fortresses was again in the hands of our Allies, whilst their outposts approached within some 25 miles of Kovel and reached the north-eastern border of Galicia in front of Brody. In the course of those 12 days the Army of General Kaledin alone took prisoners 1,309 officers, 10 surgeons, and 70,000 soldiers. It also captured 83 guns, 236 machine-guns, and an enormous quantity of war material.

About the middle of June the pressure of the new German concentration was beginning to make itself felt in Volhynia, and resulted in about a fortnight of fierce but more or less stationary fighting. Besides the divisions from the northern area, previously mentioned, the Germans were bringing up reinforcements even from France, whilst the Austrians were withdrawing all available reserves from the Tyrol, the Italian front, and the Balkans, and from their bases in the interior. Naturally parts of these armies were detailed to the Tarnopol front, others were sent to hold the Dniester crossings, still others to guard the Carpathian passes leading into Transylvania. Yet the majority of these reinforcements were directed

to Volhynia, to ward off the danger which was threatening Kovel and to prevent a further Russian advance on Lvoff. The desperate hurry in which these transfers were made is best shown by the fact, which the Russians learned from the note-book of a dead Austrian officer, that a German army corps had been moved from Verdun to Kovel in six days. But the Germans seem to have come soon to the end of their available reserves—and then our Allies resumed their offensive in Volhynia.

“To illustrate the desperate shortage of the German armies,” said General Alexeieff on July 22 to the Petrograd correspondent of *The Times*, “I need only recall the well-established fact that four divisions were hurried here from France soon after June 4, when our offensive began. These were the 19th and 20th, forming the 10th Active Corps, and the 11th Bavarian and 43rd Reserve Divisions. We were expecting the 44th Division, but it did not appear. As usual, the Germans had underrated French powers of resistance. Although 17 divisions remain before Verdun, the enemy found it impossible to move another man hither, and as soon as the British armies advanced all idea of transferring troops had to be abandoned. The units confronting us represent the maximum effort of Germany. They are being moved about along the Russian front, chiefly to the southward, in order to fill



RUSSIAN CAVALRY CHARGING THE GERMAN TRENCHES NEAR SVIDNIKI, ON THE STOCHOD.

up the tremendous gap caused by the overthrow of the Austrians. Not a single fresh unit has been produced by the enemy. Two badly mauled divisions withdrawn from Verdun constitute the strategical reserve of the German Army."

On June 16 the counter-offensive of the enemy against the Lutsk salient began on the entire front. The German operations which had Kovel for their base were directed mainly against the Stochod-Styr sector, whilst the Austrians, supported by some German troops, were fighting in front of Vladimir-Volynsk, Sokal and Stoyanoff, attacking the Lokatchy-Sviniukhy-Gorokhoff line. Before the persistent, violent German onslaughts our Allies had to withdraw their troops from the western bank of the Stochod near Svidniki. Then a furious battle ensued on the front extending from Sokal by Gadamitche, Linievka, Voronchin to Kieselin. On June 19 the fighting resulted in a marked success for our Allies, who captured considerable numbers of prisoners. The engagements continued unabated on the following day. "The village of Gruziatyn (two miles north of Gadamitche)," says the Petrograd official *communiqué* of June 22, "changed hands several times. Yesterday afternoon our troops raided the village, capturing 11 officers, 400 men, and 6 machine-guns. Nevertheless the heavy German fire once more obliged us to evacuate the village." On the same day, German attacks near Voronchin and Raymiesto were completely defeated, and the enemy was compelled to withdraw in haste. The battle was renewed during the next few days, losing, however, gradually in fierceness.

No less violent was the enemy's counter-offensive against the apex of the Lutsk salient. "In the region of the village of Rogovitchi, south-east of the village of Lokatchy (four miles south of the high road from Lutsk to Vladimir - Volynsk)," says the Petrograd official *communiqué* of June 19, "the Austrians attacked our troops in massed formations, and, breaking through one sector of the fighting front, captured three guns of a battery which bravely resisted until the last shell had been fired. Reinforcements came up and routed the advancing enemy, recapturing one gun,* taking prisoners 300 soldiers and capturing two machine-guns."

* The recapture of the other two guns is mentioned in the report of June 20.



GENERAL KASHTALINSKI.

Similar and even more successful fighting was reported under the same date from the Sviniukhy and the Gorokhoff fronts. In those sectors the enemy was put to flight, losing heavily in prisoners.

Further encounters were reported in the course of the following few days. Having inflicted some more or less sensible reverses on the enemy, our Allies gradually withdrew their line in the centre about five miles. The western and south-western front of the salient were slightly flattened out, being withdrawn on to the Zaturtsy-Bludoff-Shklin-Lipa line. Here, also, about June 24, the fighting began to show signs of slackening.

In the last days of the month the Austro-German armies resumed the counter-offensive with redoubled fury. Desperate attempts were made to drive wedges into the Russian front on the Linievka-Kobehi line in the north, near Zaturtsy in the centre, and round Ugrinoff



THE BUKOVINA AND SOUTH-EASTERN GALICIA.

in the south. "During these operations," wired Mr. Washburn from General Kaledin's Headquarters under date of July 1, "the conflict has been ranging over the entire front of this army without the enemy gaining a success anywhere. It is stated that they have never thrown forward such continuous masses of troops heretofore in their efforts to break through." A vast concentration of heavy artillery, up to and including 8-in. calibre, with quantities of ammunition which were stated never to have been equalled in volume within

Russian experience, was used in those battles. Yet the Russian line nowhere wavered, and the enemy's counter-offensive ended in failure.

The meaning of that last desperate attempt at driving in the Lutsk salient is obvious. The Germans undoubtedly must have known of the new Russian concentrations between the big marshes and Kolki, where on July 4 the army of General Lesh was to assume the offensive, and of the near renewal of activities by General Sakharoff, in front of Brody. They also knew that a British offensive was

imminent in the West. They had, therefore, to seek an immediate decision in Volhynia or to give up their attempts at regaining the line of the Styr and Ikva. The fateful day came upon them both in the East and in the West, before they had been able to achieve their design in Volhynia.

The East-Galician front, in June, 1916, fell approximately into two divisions, which might best be described as the Tarnopol and the Butchatch sectors, the frontier between them lying in the district of Burkanoff. North of this boundary the ground is undulating, wooded, the valleys marshy, and the rivers widen out at many points into ponds and small lakes. Round Zalostse and Vorobiyovka, the course of the Sereth and of its tributaries and the intervening hills offered excellent opportunities for defence; south of Kozloff, the Strypa was in the main the front between the opposing armies. Below Burkanoff the aspect of the country changes completely. It rises into a high plateau, cut by many deep river cañons, with steep banks; marshes are

naturally very few, forests cover mainly the sides of the cañons, occasionally extending on to the surrounding plain. These are the natural lines of defence in Southern Podolia. In front and south of Butchatch, the Austrians possessed, moreover, quite exceptionally favourable conditions for defence. On a stretch of about 12 miles the stream Olekhoviets runs parallel to the River Strypa at a distance of only about a mile to the east; the country intervening between these two river cañons lies like a rampart in front of the Strypa line, whilst the wooded, rocky sides of the winding cañons, frequently bordered by stone quarries, offer most excellent opportunities for fortifications, ambuscades, gun emplacements, and enfilading positions. The eastern approaches of the Trybukhovtse-Yasloviets front (as the line of the Olekhoviets was usually called from the two chief localities on its banks) are open fields; there are but few depressions, and no woods on the high plateau which intervenes between it and the cañon of the Dzhuryn. In the extreme south, near the Dniester, south of the Ustsietchko-Shutromintse-Yasloviets road



BURNING VILLAGES ON THE VOLHYNIA FRONT.

To envelope their retreat in smoke, the Austro-German forces set on fire villages and crops along their line.

the ground presents serious difficulties for military operations on a large scale.

On June 4, 1916, the main Russian attacks were directed against the Tschroff-Vorobiyovka sector, the gate on the Tarnopol-Krasne-Lvoff railway; against the district of Burkanoff and against the Trybukhovtse-Yasloviets line, guarding the approaches to Butchatch and the Butchatch-Nizhniyoff-Stanislavoff railway. In front of Tarnopol, in spite of most heroic achievements on the part of the Russian troops, supported in that quarter by a detachment of Belgian armoured cars, under Major Semet, very little ground was gained. The defensive positions of the Austrians were exceedingly strong, and the immediate neighbourhood of the Tarnopol-Lvoff railway, one of the best in Eastern Europe (it was part of the Berlin-Odessa line), offered them many advantages. Whether the leadership of the Bavarian general, Count Bothmer, contributed in any way to the success of the defence—as was hinted by German writers—is a subject which may best be left for discussion to *Mittel-Europa* itself. The story, however, that it was due mainly to the “heroism” of the German soldiers can be dismissed, as there were very few of them on the Upper Strypa, the majority of the troops engaged having been West Galician regiments, especially Polish mountaineers from the Tatra and Beskid Mountains. In the Burkanoff-Bobulintse sector, as a result of a series of battles which proceeded throughout the first ten days of the Russian offensive, our Allies drove the enemy out of any positions which he held on the eastern bank of the Strypa and even gained on a considerable front the opposite side of the river. The most signal success attended, however, the operations of General Sheherbatieff’s Army in the region of Butchatch. As the result of an intense artillery preparation, followed by infantry attacks, our Allies had carried, by June 7, the entire line of the Olekhoviets and reached the ridge between that stream and the Strypa. After further bitter fighting the Russians, at dawn on June 8, entered Butchatch itself, and, developing their success, captured the same day the villages of Stsianka and Potok Zloty, a few miles to the west of the Lower Strypa. In Potok Zloty our Allies seized a large artillery park and considerable quantities of shells; near Ossovitse (north of Butchatch) a complete battery of 4.4 in. howitzers; they also took in the same neighbourhood many prisoners, including the staff

of an Austrian battalion. After a week’s progress their advance in that region came, however, to a halt, for reasons explained in our general strategic survey of the first phase of the Russian offensive. It was not resumed until the first days of July, in conjunction with the very considerable conquests of ground south of the Dniester.

The problem with which General Lechitsky was faced in his attack against the Bukovina was by no means an easy one to solve. From the north, where the Russian positions extended about 40 miles farther west than in the Bukovina, that country is protected by the belt of the Dniester. Of the three bridge-heads across it, only the most westerly, that of Ustsietchko,* was in the hands of our Allies; it was the least important, as the topographical configuration of its surroundings hardly admits movements of any considerable forces across the river at that point. It could serve as gate for cavalry or minor detachments, not as an opening for an invasion by a whole army. The most important bridgehead of Zaleshehyki, where both a road and a railway cross the Dniester, was entirely in the possession of the Austrian army; the enemy held also the strong defensive positions which on the northern bank cover the approaches to the river. There remained the bridgehead of Ustsie Biskupie, where the river separated the opposing armies. At this point, however, the Russians had a decisive advantage: the southern bank (held by the Austrians) is low, and can be dominated and taken under cross-fire by artillery posted on the high northern bank of the Dniester loop.† This sector was indeed to play a most important part in General Lechitsky’s offensive against the Bukovina.

Towards the east between the Rivers Dniester and Pruth the northern corner of the Bukovina borders for about 20 miles on Bessarabia; south of the Pruth Rumanian territory protected the flank of General von Pflanzer-Baltin’s Army. Most of what appears on the map like a gap between the two rivers is in reality blocked by a range of hills, called the Berdo Horodyshe, and rising 300–800 feet

* At Ustsietchko both banks of the Dniester are Galician ground. There has been some confusion among British writers concerning the western frontier of the Bukovina, and it may therefore be worth emphasising that the towns of Horodenka, Sniatyn, and Kutyna are all three in Galicia, and that Kolomea lies no less than 35 miles west of the Bukovina border.

† A description of the Okna-Onut depression was given in Chapter LXXXV., p. 142.



THE RE-OCCUPATION OF RUSSIAN TERRITORY.

New recruits passing through a town to join the Russian Army.

above the valley of the Pruth.* Only in the northern corner, between Dobronovtse and Okna, in the valley of the Onut, does the range drop into a small plain. This plain, which was to become the opening for the Russian offensive, is almost isolated on the southern and south-eastern sides, where, on Russian ground, the wooded hills extend to the very cañon of the Dniester. Not even a secondary road approached Okna or Dobronovtse from that direction. An advance from Bessarabia seemed, therefore, to be fraught with almost insuperable difficulties. Yet, having found during their operations on the Toporovtse-Rarantche front in January, 1916, that the defences of the Berdo Horodyshe could not be forced to any appreciable extent by a frontal attack, our Allies decided to attempt the seemingly impossible, and to open their offensive by a concentric attack against the north-eastern corner of the Bukovina. It must be accounted one of the most extraordinary achievements of the Russian troops in that district that they were able to carry out their vast preparations in that difficult region without being noticed by the enemy. From the west the access to that sector is extremely easy, and even if the depression of Okna could not have been held,

with reasonable foresight the Austrians ought to have been able to offer effective resistance on the Toutry-Yurkovtse-Dobronovtse line. But they seem to have been caught by surprise.

On June 2 the Russians began to bombard the Austrian positions at Okna; in the afternoon of the following day the fire increased considerably in violence, and on June 4 the first infantry attacks were launched across the river. The Austrian troops withdrew about 3 miles south of the Okna position on to Hills 233 and 238. About the same time our Allies opened their attacks against Dobronovtse. As soon as the plan of the Russian offensive had been disclosed, it became clear that an absolutely decisive battle was being fought in that secluded north-eastern corner of the Bukovina. Some of the best Hungarian troops were sent against the Russians; some of the best Magyar blood was shed in this desperate contest on the ramparts before the gates opening into Transylvania.* After four days of fighting the

* Among the casualties of the battle of Okna was Count Julius Esterhazy, the third member of that family to be killed in the war. He was a man of 47, yet had volunteered for the army as a private. Whatever one may think about Magyar policy and the heavy burden of guilt which it bore in this war, their patriotism deserves the fullest praise. Whilst the Viennese aristocracy from the very beginning left the hard work of fighting to evidently less precious members of society, and whilst the Prussian Junkers for the most part discreetly withdrew from the front and busied themselves, for instance, with guarding the Dutch border, the Magyar aristocracy continued to fight and bleed for their country.

* Cf. the description of that sector given in Chapter CX., pp. 114-116.

defence of the enemy began to weaken. By June 9 his position was practically hopeless. "In spite of a desperate resistance on the part of the enemy," says the Petrograd official *communiqué* of June 11, "a violent flanking fire, and even curtain fire, and the explosions of whole sets of mines, General Lechitsky's troops captured the enemy's position south of Dobronovtse, 14 miles north-east of Czernovitz. In that region alone we captured 18,000 soldiers, one general, 347 officers, and 10 guns, and at the time this report was sent off prisoners were still streaming in in large parties."

On the same day the Austrians blew up the railway station at Yurkovtse. A wedge had been driven into the enemy front between the Rivers Dniester and Pruth, the positions of the Berdo Horodyshche were turned, the bridgehead of Zaleshchyki, one of the proudest re-conquests of the Austrian armies in that region—dearly paid for in blood—had suddenly lost all strategic value; the Russians were now in possession of the ground both north and south of Zaleshchyki. By June 12 our Allies held the bridgehead itself, and even the village of Horodenka, the junction of six first-class high roads (including one leading by Ustsietehko to Tehortkoff). All

gates into Northern Bukovina were now wide open and safe against any counter-attack by the enemy. The greater part of the defeated army of General von Pflanzer-Baltin had to seek safety beyond the Pruth; his front now extended east and west, thus leaving only weaker detachments north of the Pruth, on the road towards Kolomea. Our Allies made the fullest use of their opportunities. They were advancing rapidly. The following is the account of those days given in a Polish paper by a landowner from the neighbourhood of Sniatyn: "During the night of June 12-13, terrific artillery fire was heard in the town. Somewhere near a battle was raging. For the third or fourth time since the beginning of the war we were passing through that experience. I went to the army-command to ask advice. A staff-captain had just arrived with news from the front. The Austrian troops were resisting. Still, after the front between the Dniester and Pruth had once been broken there was no other natural line for resistance. According to the accounts of the Austrian officers, the Russian artillery was, with magnificent bravery, driving up to new positions, thus preventing our men from entrenching and preparing a new line.

"'How long can we hold out?' was my



THE ADVANCE IN THE BUKOVINA.

A Russian patrol reporting at Headquarters after a raid.



A RUSSIAN TROPHY.

A gun captured from a regiment of Prussian Grenadiers.

question. The old general looked at me and answered: 'Only our rearguards are now engaged; our forces are gathering a few miles from here. If our flank near Horodenka holds out overnight we shall not evacuate the town.'

"I returned to Sniatyn. . . . Small groups of inhabitants were standing about the streets, commenting on the news. Artillery and ammunition were at full speed passing through the town for the front. A few regiments of infantry marched through at night. . . . The horizon was red with the glow of fires. For the third time our poor villages were burning. Whatever had survived previous battles was now given up to the flames. Homeless refugees, evacuated from the threatened villages, were passing with their poor, worn-out horses and their cows—all their remaining wealth. In perfect silence; no one complained; it had to be. . . . Mysterious cavalry patrols and despatch-riders were riding through the streets. No one slept that night. . .

"In the morning the first military transports passed through the town. The retreat had begun. Questions were asked. The Magyar soldiers quietly smoked their pipes; there was no way for us of understanding one another. Only one of them, who knew a few German words, explained 'Russen, stark, stark, Masse'

('Russians, strong, strong, a great mass'). . .

The approaching violent fire of heavy guns was even more enlightening. Our trained ears could distinguish their voices. Like a continuous thunder was the roar of the Japanese (Russian) guns; at intervals they were answered nervously by the Austrian artillery.

"Suddenly the gun-fire stopped and the expert ear could catch the rattling of machine guns. The decisive attack had begun. All a-strain, we were awaiting news. Some soldiers appeared round the corner of the road, slightly wounded. . . . Then a panic began. Someone had come from a neighbouring village reporting that he had seen Cossacks. Soon refugees from the villages outside were streaming through the town. General confusion. Children were crying, women sobbing. A mass flight began. Again cavalry and despatch-riders. Then a drum was heard in the square. It was officially given out that the situation was extremely grave and that whoever wished to leave the town had better do so immediately.

"We had to go. As I was mounting the carriage I perceived in the distance, near the wood on the hill, a few horsemen with long lances—Cossacks from Kuban. They were slowly emerging from the forest and approach-



CHARGE OF RUSSIAN CAVALRY.

ing one town. 'Drive ahead!' I shouted to the coachman."

On June 13 the Russians entered Sniatyn for the third time in the course of the war.

The Austrians soon came to see that, at least in this part of the country, the game was up. Near Niezviska, north-west of Horodenka, on the Kolomea-Butchatch road, in the biggest of the Dniester loops, they had been constructing a new bridge across the river. It was meant to become one of the most important bridge-heads, safely covered against attacks from the north by the two narrow necks of the river loop. Once the Dniester line had been turned from the south the position at Niezviska lost all value, just as had that of Zaleshchyki. The bridge, a structure some 40 feet high, was now destroyed by its builders. Farther back to the west, at Tlumatch, Ottynia, and Kolomea measures were taken for the evacuation of the civilian population. The Austrian officials were leaving the towns, and all men of military age were compelled to join in the flight; in many cases their families followed them, and a new wave of refugees was rolling towards the west. To many of them, with characteristic egotism and heartlessness, Hungary closed its doors.

No less hopeless, in the long run, was the position of the Austrians south of the Pruth. The strong line of the river made it possible for them to hold up the Russian advance for a few days. Yet no illusion could be entertained concerning the ultimate issue of the struggle for Czernovitz. On Sunday, June 11, at 6 a.m., an official proclamation, signed by Herr von Tarangul, Chief of the Czernovitz police, was posted on the walls announcing that on the same day the town was expected to come under the fire of the Russian guns. What a sudden change! After a break of a year and a half, the University of Czernovitz, the farthest outpost of German Kultur in the East, had just resumed its work.* Its Pan-German Professors, who in the summer of 1915 had been celebrating noisy festivities of "brotherhood in arms" (*Waffenbruderschaft*) with German officers, had now shown their sure military instinct by appointing Archdukes Frederick, Eugene and Joseph

* German was the language at the University of Czernovitz, although 40 per cent. of the population of the Bukovina are Little Russians, 35 per cent. Roumanians, 13 per cent. Jews, 3 per cent. Poles (mainly of Armenian extraction), and only about 9 per cent. Germans. These Germans are concentrated mainly in the town and direct neighbourhood of Czernovitz.



RUSSIAN TROOPS PASSING THROUGH LUTSK.

The principal street, through which the troops are passing, called Emperor Nicholas Street, was renamed by the Austrians Emperor Franz Josef Street.

Ferdinand, and also General Conrad von Hoetzendorf, "honorary doctors" of the University. Even the fatal day of June 4 was still meant to be at Czernovitz a day of festivities. The town was beflagged as "an Imperial Eagle in Iron" (*ein Reichsaar in Eisen*) was unveiled at the *Rathaus* "in memory of the time of Russian occupation" (*zur Erinnerung an die Russenzeit*). The wide town-square was filled with people, and General von Pflanzer-Baltin himself was expected. But then in the afternoon, whilst the artillery fire in the north, in the direction of Okna and Dobronovtse, was getting louder and louder, a despatch-rider arrived with the following message, which was read out to the expectant crowds in the square: "His Excellency General von Pflanzer-Baltin is prevented from taking part in the festivities of to-day, and gives notice of his absence."

Six days later crowds were again filling the town-square—no longer to "commemorate" the Russian occupation of Czernovitz. "On Saturday, June 10, at 6 p.m.," wrote a correspondent of the Polish daily *Gazeta Wieczorna*

(Lvoff), who spent in Czernovitz the fatal ten days in June, "military transports began to traverse the main streets of the town, moving from the direction of the bridgehead of Zhuchka towards Starozhyniets. It was an interminable chain of all kinds of vehicles, from huge, heavy motor lorries down to light gigs driven by army officers. The waves of war were rolling through the city.

"As if at a given sign the town-square filled with people. Frightened, searching eyes were asking for an explanation. Terrifying news began to circulate, the excited imagination of the crowd was at work. Mysterious information was passed from mouth to mouth, yet no one knew anything definite. A fever got hold of the town. . . . With bags, boxes and baskets people were hurrying to the railway station. 'Is an "evacuation-train" leaving, and when?' they were asking with the persistence of desperation. The hours were moving slowly, and the night came over the city, full of despondency and gloom.

"And still the endless military transports were traversing the streets. But no longer was



THE RUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF CZERNOVITZ: A DESPERATE FIGHT AT THE FORDS.

any notice taken of them. . . . The guns were playing, the excitement was growing. At 7 p.m. the civilian authorities received the order of evacuation. Everything was to be ready for the train at 6 a.m. which, besides Government property, was to carry off the railway employees and their families.

"The coffee-houses were filling with people. . . . All Government officials put on their uniforms, all Government authorities, even the police, granted leave to their employees, demanding no more than a show of the performance of official duties. The town corporation paid out to its officers two months' salaries and sent them off to Sutchava, where all the evacuated Government authorities were going. No official was, however, to leave the Bukovina without permission. (The fact which naturally is not mentioned in this account is that, before leaving the town, the Austrian authorities arrested a number of prominent citizens of Russian or Rumanian nationality—among them the Greek-Orthodox Archbishop Dr. Repta—and carried them away to Dorna Vatra, and subsequently farther on to the interior.)

"The command of the army corps from Sadagora (4 miles north of Czernovitz, on the opposite side of the Pruth) took up quarters at the 'Black Eagle' Hotel.

"Suddenly—no one knows how—the news spread that the army-group of General Papp had evacuated its positions and was retreating. Even the hour of the event was known. The information was correct. . . . The greatest optimists now gave up all hope. . . . The safety of the Bukovina was closely connected with the name of General Papp. . . .

"The grey dawn found the city in full flight. . . . The streets were filled with crowds, the tramcars were carrying wounded soldiers, as at the order of the army-command the evacuation of the military hospitals had been started. The square before the railway station was closely packed with people, but the police were admitting only railway officials. The women were begging, crying, lifting up their children. They had to wait—that train was not meant for them.

"At 8 a.m. the first evacuation train left the city. The next was due at noon, or at 3 p.m. Many people preferred to fly by foot, as the prices of cabs and cars had risen to an incredible height. The artillery fire was drawing closer and closer, and above the heads of the crowd

appeared a Russian aviator. Their hearts were shaking with fear. . . .

"The prices of goods in the town were falling rapidly. Tobacco and cigarettes, which previously were hardly to be had anywhere, were offered at half-price without any restrictions. Women from the suburbs who, not knowing what had happened, had brought their vegetables to the market, were selling them for a third of the usual price, only to be able to return to their homes and children. For the merchants in Czernovitz the evacuation was a catastrophe. As they had been supplying the army with goods, they had gathered stores valued at millions of crowns. None of them could be carried away; only Government property was being removed.

"The news that the town would soon come under fire led to a sheer panic. The crowd in front of the station was seized with frenzy. Against the resistance of the officials it forced its way into the station and invaded a half-empty military train. The same happened in the case of the next train, and to all the following ones. In the course of Sunday 6 to 8,000 people left Czernovitz. . . ."

By June 13 our Allies had reached the Pruth on the entire front from Nepokoloutz to Boyan. The Austrians had evacuated Sadagora, and, withdrawing across the river, had blown up the bridge at Mahalla. They effected their retreat, not without very heavy losses both in men and material. At Sadagora the Russians seized a large store of engineering material and an aerial railway. Reviewing the entire captures made by the army of General Lechitsky since the beginning of the operations, the Russian official *communiqué* of June 13 stated that his troops alone had taken prisoners 3 commanders of regiments, 754 other officers, 37,832 soldiers, and had captured 120 machine guns, 49 guns, 21 trench mortars, and 11 mine-throwers.

For three days the Austrian forces were holding up the Russian advance across the Pruth. They were considerably favoured by topographical conditions. On the southern bank a range of hills rises above the flat Pruth valley; they command all the passages across it. Hence the forcing of the river was by no means an easy task: it was achieved by our Allies on June 16. The same night the Austrians began the first military evacuation of Czernovitz, and on June 17, at 4 p.m., Russian troops entered the town, and were received with joy by

their own compatriots and the Rumanians (in so far as they had not been "evacuated" by the Austrian authorities). As a matter of fact, the town had suffered very little; although it had been for almost a week within the range of the Russian guns, it had not "come under their fire." Only the main railway station had been shelled and destroyed (to the "Volksgarten" station the Austrians themselves had set fire after the last "evacuation train" had left it on June 17, at 2.30 a.m.), and some streets near the Pruth had been slightly damaged during the battle for the river crossings. The Vicar-General of Czernovitz, Herr Schmid himself, in an interview with the Vienna *Reichspost*, denied the stories about the destruction of Czernovitz circulated by certain German and Austrian journalists. "The tales about the residence of the Greek-Orthodox Archbishop and the centre of the town having been shelled and destroyed are inventions. Altogether six civilians have been wounded during the bombardment." One sincerely wishes a similar account could have been given of Reims or Ypres.

On the occupation of Czernovitz, Colonel Bromoff was appointed commander of the city, whilst Dr. George Sandru, the Greek-Orthodox vicar of the Paraskieva Church—a native of Czernovitz of Rumanian nationality—was entrusted with its civilian administration until the return of Dr. Bocancea. (The latter, a local Rumanian barrister, had been mayor of Czernovitz during the second Russian occupation, November 27, 1914–February 22, 1915, and had then withdrawn with the Russian troops.)

The piercing of the Dniester-Pruth front had knocked out the keystone of the Austrian defensive system in the south. It had practically cut off the army of General von Pflanzer-Baltin from that of General Count Bothmer. Then the forcing of the Pruth line threw back the troops of Pflanzer-Baltin on to the Carpathian passes; the forces gathered in front of Kolomea,

Stanislavoff, and the Dniester crossings passed henceforth under Bothmer's command.

The line of the River Sereth (not to be confused with another river in Galicia bearing the same name) was the only one south of the Pruth on which the Austro-Hungarian troops might have held up the advance of our Allies, had they been given time to organize their defences. But the Russians allowed them no respite. On June 18 they had already reached Starozhyniets, south of which the so-called "Transylvanian road" crosses the Sereth. On the same day our Allies captured also the town of Kutchurnare. On June 19 they crossed the Sereth, and on the 21st they entered Radautz, 30 miles south of Czernovitz. At the same time other Russian detachments were advancing to the west, up the valley of the Tcheremosh (a confluent of the Pruth) past Vizhnits, towards Kutuy. Retiring in haste before them, the Austrians set fire to the new big bridge over the river. On June 22 our Allies entered Kutuy, and during the next few days hacked their way through past Kossoff to Pistyn. From three sides, from the north-east, the east, and the south-east, they were now closing in on Kolomea.

In the Bukovina itself the Russian advance was, meantime, continuing with amazing speed. Within 24 hours of the capture of Radautz, our Allies entered Gora Humora, some 20 miles farther to the south. By the evening of June 23 they had taken, after a fierce struggle, the town of Kimpolung, capturing about 60 officers and 2,000 men, and 7 machine-guns. Thus practically the whole of the Bukovina had passed again into the hands of the Russians. As the result of a three weeks' campaign, they had conquered a province more than half as large as Wales, a province dearly loved by the Austrian-Germans as a reputed outpost of *Deutschum* in the East, highly valued by the Magyars as a rampart covering Transylvania.



CHAPTER CXXXVIII.

THE BATTLE OF VERDUN (III.).

POSITION AT END OF APRIL, 1916—THE FOURTH MONTH OF THE BATTLE—POLITICAL SITUATION IN FRANCE—A SECRET SESSION OF THE CHAMBER—M. BRIAND'S POSITION STRENGTHENED—FIGHTING ON THE LEFT BANK OF THE MEUSE—AVOCOURT WOOD, HILL 304, AND THE MORT HOMME—FRENCH ATTACK ON DOUAUMONT—CHANGES IN COMMAND—GENERAL NIVELLE—GENERAL MANGIN—DESTRUCTION OF GERMAN OBSERVATION BALLOONS—HEAVY FIGHTING DESCRIBED—THE MORT HOMME AGAIN—GERMAN PROGRESS AT THE END OF MAY—ENORMOUS LOSS OF LIFE—THE FALL OF VAUX—MAJOR RAYNAL'S HEROIC DEFENCE—FRESH GERMAN ASSAULTS—SITUATION AT FLEURY—CO-ORDINATION OF ALLIED STRATEGY—PREPARATION OF THE FRANCO-BRITISH OFFENSIVE ON THE SOMME—EFFECT ON THE VERDUN BATTLE.

THE issue at Verdun, once the first German plan of overwhelming the Meuse fortress by weight and by surprise had been abandoned as being impossible of attainment, was mainly a question of time.

The Germans sought feverishly to rain blow after blow upon the French; to attract to the Meuse front the French general reserves, and so to pound the French Army as to render it incapable of giving any really solid assistance to the British offensive on the Somme which in June, to the knowledge even of the man in the street, was inevitably imminent. The months of May and June, 1916, were in this respect decisive. The French by the valour of their infantry, by the skill of their leadership, by the growing strength of their heavy artillery, were able during this period, not only to defend Verdun and gain time for their British Allies to bring the weight of their mobilized resources to bear upon the northern front, but also to avoid the extensive loss, the utter crippling, which their enemy sought to inflict upon them. Not only was Verdun, or what remained of it, still in French hands when the British began their great offensive on the Somme, but in that offensive the French triumphantly showed that their reserves of men and of material were

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still capable of supporting the double action of defence on the Meuse and offence on the Somme. This result was not achieved without great labour, without stern heroism.

The fourth month of the battle for Verdun was ushered in by some of the fiercest fighting of the war. Worn-out troops—or rather men who, according to all the tests of human resistance, should have been worn out—were called upon to furnish an effort of resistance greater than any up till then demanded of an army. There was more than that. The enemy at the outset of the war had clearly shown by the nature of his propaganda, by the tone of his Press comment, that he still possessed a notion of French psychology dating from the terrible year of 1870. He still imagined, as was shown in a hundred ways, that the French were incapable of bearing defeat. This idea he extended both to the army and to the civilian population. Especially was it a firmly-fixed idea of the Germans that when every other ally played them false they would be able to count upon the passionate blindness of the French politician.

There can be no mistake about the Verdun battle. It cost the French very dear. There was hardly a village throughout the country which had not contributed to the glory of its



THE COMMANDER OF THE VERDUN ARMY.

General Joffre visits General Nivelle (on right), who in May, 1916, succeeded General Pétain.

defence. In spite of a censorship which at times and in certain ways took too timorous a view of the character of the French civilian, the country as a whole knew only too well what was the price of glory on the Meuse. It may be easy for a demagogue to declare from the comparative safety of a public platform that a country prefers death to slavery, but when the icy fingers of death seem to be feeling at the heart of everyone in a country, only true courage, only the purest patriotism, can support the strain. The strain placed upon the French by the continuance of the Verdun fighting was manifold. There were moments when all seemed lost. It became a commonplace both in France and in Great Britain to say that the peoples of the two countries had shown themselves infinitely superior to their Governments. Great though were the services of the French Parliament to the common cause, it is equally true to say that the French Parliament in its

main manifestations did not adequately represent the courage and steadfastness of the constituencies. There were occasions when Parliament, which knowing little feared much, seemed likely to leap the barriers of common-sense and embark upon political and military adventures of an extremely hazardous nature. That temptation became increasingly strong during the months of May and June, when the nature and conditions of the early part of the Verdun battle became generally known.

The whole of France knew more or less directly that mistakes had been committed. It was but natural that there should be a clamour for enquiry and for remedy. It is to the honour of French Parliamentarism that this demand never went outside the limits of common-sense. The French Deputy showed the enemy clearly that all his calculations founded upon political internal disruption were based upon false premises.

There was another and more subtle strain. British propaganda—a propaganda destined to inform France of the real nature of British effort and achievement—had been singularly ineffective. It seemed as though the British Government was unable or unwilling to attempt to set on foot any adequate machinery for supplying the friendly French Press with a proper service of British news which would give to the bulk of the country a real notion of the extent of the wholehearted cooperation of Great Britain in the war as well as of the value of the services already rendered by the British Fleet.

The ordinary Frenchman of 1916 was able to converse with complete fluency and with some intelligence about a number of Continental problems which had never tired the brains of his British colleague. But when it came to an understanding of British conditions, of British character, and of the unvarying nature of British foreign policy, there was as much ignorance in France as was displayed in those circles in England—fortunately limited—which before the war feared the recrudescence of a jingo France. The French had been told of the efforts made to recruit the British Army. They had followed with sympathy, but, be it said, without compre-

hension, the dying compromises of the Voluntary system. They admired our voluntary effort without in the least understanding its magnitude. There was no one to point out authoritatively to them that Great Britain, perhaps alone of the three great Powers of the Entente, had furnished the means of defence promised at the very outbreak of the war. There was none to draw French attention to the fact that in the preparation of the defensive league of the Entente it was never contemplated that Great Britain should furnish an army on the Continental scale. We were to represent the sea and finance force of a defensive combination, the soldiers of which were France and Russia. None had shown them that our first duty to ourselves and to our Allies had been to see to the Fleet; that therefore the first call upon our industrial resources was naval. There was none to remind the French peasant of the actual mathematical problems of war equipment. It was, therefore, but natural that while the French were bearing alone the great blood drain of Verdun there should have been a hopeful field for German propaganda directed towards creating bad blood between the Allies. Now and again indeed, in moments of depression, a



A FRENCH GUN.
In an improvised emplacement for indirect fire.

few Frenchmen exclaimed, "What are the English doing?" And yet it was proved ultimately that a few frank words from British Ministers declaring that the British Army had placed itself completely at the disposal of General Joffre from the very start of the Verdun operations almost sufficed to remove this feeling.

The effect of Verdun upon the internal political situation in France was more marked, and indeed at one time seemed likely to be considerable. Throughout the war the rôle of the French Chamber of Deputies and of the Upper House,



WAR'S ALARM BELL.

A bell removed from a ruined village church and fixed up in a trench to warn French troops against the German asphyxiating gas attacks.

the Senate, had been one of great delicacy and difficulty. At the outbreak of the struggle Parliament in a fine expression of the country's feeling decided at once to bury the political hatchet and to leave the Government unfettered by criticism to grapple with the many problems of national defence. In the first months of the war there was in France a series of problems to be settled similar to those which arose in England. The French had their shell shortage to meet. They had many gaps in their heavy artillery to make good, and towards the end of the first six months of war it became apparent that in

some respects at least the Government had not displayed the requisite energy in dealing with these matters nor the necessary foresight in arranging for heavy gun construction. Parliament, therefore, felt it to be its duty to resume the functions of control conferred upon it by the Constitution. The exercise of that control brought about no small amount of friction between Government and Chambers. The Ministers attacked defended themselves with tenacious vigour, and already in 1914 there were Parliamentarians who wondered whether in the machinery of secret sittings of the Chamber the Government might not be forced to reveal all and to deliver peccant Ministers to Parliamentary judgment.

When the first accounts of the early days at Verdun became known, the clamour for a secret sitting at which the House could be informed of all the documents bearing upon the conditions of the defence of Verdun increased. The agitation had the support of M. Clémenceau in the Senate, and in the Chamber of Deputies a large body of opinion favoured the demand, which, after much Parliamentary fencing and skirmishing, was finally accepted by M. Briand, the Prime Minister, and the first secret sitting of the Chamber of Deputies was held on June 16. The main purpose of secrecy was to enable private members to inform themselves fully as to the steps taken by the Higher Command to place Verdun in a proper condition of defence before the beginning of the German offensive on February 21. A subject of this nature was quite evidently not proper matter for public comment. A Parliamentary debate upon the Higher Command during the very height of battle was evidently full of danger. M. Briand determined that a debate restricted to this military subject would be more dangerous than a general discussion of the whole of the Government's war policy. The proceedings were marked by one or two incidents, notably by a speech by M. Delcassé on foreign policy, which failed to obtain the approval of the House. The final result of the secret sittings in the Chamber, as well as of those held later in the Senate was to strengthen the Government's hands and to increase the prestige of its leader. No other result was, indeed, possible at a time when the whole future of Europe was still under public and violent debate in the fighting on the Meuse.



A CORDUROY ROAD ON THE FRENCH FRONT.

Trees destroyed by the enemy bombardment.

Meanwhile, the French nation as a whole admirably resisted all the pressure placed upon them by events, and the attitude of the population, civil and military, was a model for futurity. They passed through weeks of strained anxiety. It was a time of severe test

for the General Staff, for people, and for Parliament. The French war spirit emerged triumphant from these tests, and the enemy failed to reap any permanent moral or political advantage from the blood poured out upon the Meuse slopes in the continuance of the great



FRENCH TROOPS

Leaving their billets to take their place in the fighting-line.

effort begun against Verdun at the end of February.

The growing activity of the Germans on the British front, the aerial activity over the British Isles, the attempted Irish rising, and signs of fresh naval activity in the North Sea led many persons to imagine at the end of the month of April that the German had learned his lesson, was about to accept defeat at Verdun, and was getting ready to turn his attention to the once "contemptible" army in the north. There were, indeed, not a few General Officers in France who were inclined to share this view, which, indeed, found expression in a semi-official statement issued in Paris. At the General Staff, however, there were no illusions, and when after a prolonged pause the battle flamed up again there was no weakening in the French armour. The next great outburst of activity began in the first week of May.

The course of the fighting was extremely simple. On the left bank all German progress had been stayed by the resistance of the Mort Homme, and the fighting here consisted throughout May and the greater part of June in a series of tremendous thrusts, some aimed directly at the Mort Homme positions of the French, while others bore upon the flanking bastions of that great natural fortress.

On the right bank of the river the enemy proceeded to bring all his effort to bear upon one point after another, his attacks being centred mainly upon Thiaumont work and the region of Douaumont and Vaux.

During the first week of May, under cover of heavy preliminary bombardment, the enemy completed his new concentration of troops. The battle began again upon the left bank, where, at the close of April, the French had begun to make local progress in the neighbourhood of the Mort Homme.

A characteristic feature of the strategic course of the Battle of Verdun was the tendency of the German attack to displace itself ever farther westwards and away from the main objective. They had begun in February with the vain attempt to batter straight through the northern front. They were stopped by the Douaumont defence and tried to find a vulnerable spot in Pepper Ridge. Here, also, they were foiled, and were forced to carry the battle over to the left bank of the Meuse, trying to get through Crows' Wood, Cumières Wood, and Goose Ridge. This also proved impossible, so long as the French held the Mort Homme, which, in its turn, became the centre of attack. Frontal



FRENCH TROOPS

On their way to the trenches.



TO STEM A COUNTER-ATTACK.
French advanced party waiting for the Germans.

assault upon the Mort Homme had proved altogether too costly a plan to be followed, and at the beginning of May the front spread farther west again to Hill 304 and Avocourt Wood.

The Mort Homme was the culminating point of a long, undulating plateau, running almost due north and south from Forges Stream to the Bois Bourrus. East of it lay the broad valley of the Meuse. On the west the plateau sloped more gradually down to the little stream of Esnes, which divided the Mort Homme from Hill 304. The ground here rose rapidly through a fringe of thin woods to a bare, C-shaped plateau, about two and a half miles long and a few hundred yards wide. For three days and three nights the whole of this ridge was swept by artillery fire. The French were driven out of their first-line trenches, and the enemy got a footing on the ridge. Using fresh troops with great prodigality, the enemy made almost superhuman efforts to develop this small success, but on May 10 he was forced once again to withdraw his shattered divisions, and, following the logic of the battle, to prepare for a further effort, and to seek for some means of turning Hill 304. Thus the enemy had attacked the Mort Homme in order to turn the Bois des Corbeaux (Crows' Wood), he had attacked Hill 304 in order to turn the

Mort Homme, and he next attacked Avocourt Wood in order to turn Hill 304.

The French artillery posted in Avocourt Wood had proved itself extremely irksome to German progress on Hill 304, as it was able to pour an enfilading fire upon the German troops which debouched from Haucourt. Operations here began with an assault upon Avocourt Wood at 6 p.m. on May 17. Very great preparations had been made in order to ensure success. French airmen flying behind the German lines had reported growing activity along the roads and at the rail centres behind the German lines; fresh troops and fresh guns were being brought in from the east and from other portions of the line in France. The action begun at Avocourt spread eastwards until it embraced the whole of the western half of the Verdun battle-front from Avocourt to Cumières. The most desperate fighting was in the immediate neighbourhood of the Mort Homme. On May 18 the volume of normal artillery fire rose to the fortissimo of battle, and reached its culminating point at about one o'clock on the afternoon of May 20. Over sixty German batteries concentrated their accelerated fire upon the French positions along the north-western and north-eastern slopes of the Mort Homme, and almost immediately afterwards the in



THE MORT HOMME AREA.

fantry moved out to the attack. The tactical idea of the German plan was to cut in behind the hill-top of the Mort Homme from the north-east and north-west. The troops of a fresh division were told off to push through the attack from the north-east, to carry Crows' Wood, and Les Caurettes, and to join up with the thrust made from the north-west.

The eastern attack met with but slight success. The first-line trenches of the French had, as was inevitable, crumbled away under the preliminary bombardment, but with their splendid tenacity the men of the French machine gun sections did not lightly abandon their positions. The Germans were received by a vigorous fire, but pressing forward in ever-growing numbers, they swept on across the first trench line, and advanced in strength upon the second line of defence. Here they were met by concentrated and combined machine gun and artillery fire. Their losses were extremely heavy. They fought with great vigour and determination, and at one time succeeded in getting right into the second line of trenches. Here progress was stopped. In vain did the Germans fling a neighbouring division into the battle in the hope of consolidating the first positions captured, and of driving through to the rear of the Mort Homme; they were quite unable to make any headway.

On the western slopes the enemy fared a little better. At the cost of heavy losses he gained possession of the French trenches on the south and south-west slopes of the ridge. The result achieved by the operations was small in geography, but large in promise. The Mort Homme

was no longer a French position. Its summit was swept by the fire of the guns on both sides. The French had been driven down into the slight depression separating the top of the Mort Homme from the next eminence to the south.

The exact price paid for this progress will never be known, but there was enough in the evidence of the battlefield and of prisoners to justify the belief that about three-quarters of the total number of troops engaged on the drive from the north-east were killed or wounded. The attacks were not, however, carried out in the most deadly formation, but were entrusted to seven and in some cases eight successive waves of infantry, separated one from the other by between fifty and a hundred yards. The whole of the Bavarian brigade engaged, which took part in the fighting at this point, was caught in the curtain fire of the French machine guns, and ceased to exist as a useful unit. The desperate nature of the fighting can well be imagined from the account given of it by an officer who was engaged. He had seen Ypres, Souchez, and Carency, and declared that even after Ypres and Carency, even after the first onslaught in the Verdun sector, he could not have believed that a battle could reach such a pitch of fury.

"Nothing that the manuals say, nothing that the technicians have foreseen, is true to-day. Even under a hail of shells troops can fight on, and beneath the most terrific bombardment it is still the spirit of the combatants which counts. The German bombardments outdid all previsions.

"When my battalion was called up as reinforcements on May 20, the dug-outs and trenches

of the first French line were already completely destroyed. The curtain fire of the Germans, which had succeeded their bombardment of the front lines, fell on the road more than two kilometres behind these. Now and then the heavy long-distance guns of the Germans lengthened their fire in an attempt to reach our batteries and their communications. At eight o'clock in the evening, when we arrived in auto-buses behind the second or third lines, several shells reached our wagons, and killed men. The excellent spirit of the battalion suffered not at all, and this is the more to be noted, since it is far easier to keep one's dash and spirit in the heat of actual battle than when one is just approaching it. I have read a good many stories of battle, and some of their embroideries appear to me rather exaggerated; the truth is quite good enough by itself. Although they were bombarded beforehand, my men went very firmly into action. The cannonade worked on the ears and the nerves, getting louder with every step nearer the front, till the very earth shook, and our hearts jumped in our breasts.

"Where we were there were hardly any trenches nor communication trenches left. Every half-hour the appearance of the earth was



IN THE TRENCHES.

A deep and well-constructed trench.




COMMUNICATION TRENCHES.

A stairway leading from one French trench to another.

changed by the unflagging shell fire. It was a perfect cataract of fire. We went forward by fits and starts, taking cover in shell-holes, and sometimes we saw a shell drop in the very hole we had chosen for our next leap forwards. A hundred men of the battalion were half buried, and we had scarcely the time to stop and help them to get themselves out. Suddenly we arrived at what remained of our first-line trenches, just as the Boches arrived at our barbed wire entanglements—or, rather, at the caterpillar-like remains of our barbed wire.

"At this moment the German curtain fire lengthened, and most of our men buried in shell-holes were able to get out and rejoin us. The Germans attacked in massed formation, by big columns of five or six hundred men, preceded by two waves of sharpshooters. We had only our rifles and our machine-guns, because the 75's could not get to work.

"Fortunately the flank batteries succeeded in catching the Boches on the right. It is absolutely impossible to convey what losses the Germans must suffer in these attacks. Nothing can give an idea of it. Whole ranks are mowed down, and those that follow them suffer the same fate. Under the storm of machine-gun, rifle



AFTER A GERMAN BOMBARDMENT: SCENE ON A ROAD NEAR VERDUN.
Showing the rain-filled shell-craters, battered trees, and shattered transport vehicles.

and 75 fire, the German columns were ploughed into furrows of death. Imagine if you can what it would be like to rake water. Those gaps filled up again at once. That is enough to show with what disdain of human life the German attacks are planned and carried out.

"In these circumstances German advances are sure. They startle the public, but at the front nobody attaches any importance to them. As a matter of fact, our trenches are so near those of the Germans that once the barbed wire is destroyed the distance between them can be covered in a few minutes. Thus, if one is willing to suffer a loss of life corresponding to the number of men necessary to cover the space between the lines, the other trench can always be reached. By sacrificing thousands of men, after a formidable bombardment, an enemy trench can always be taken.

"There are slopes on Hill 304 where the level of the ground is raised several metres by mounds of German corpses. Sometimes it happens that the third German wave uses the dead of the second wave as ramparts and shelters. It was behind ramparts of the dead left by the first five attacks, on May 24, that we saw the Boches take shelter while they organized their next rush.

"We make prisoners among these dead during our counter-attacks. They are men who have received no hurt, but have been knocked down by the falling of the human wall of their killed and wounded neighbours. They say very little. They are for the most part dazed with fear and alcohol, and it is several days before they recover."

The flame on the left bank spread the next day (May 22) to the whole Verdun front, and the French in a brilliant dash upon the Fort of Douaumont opened one of the most glorious chapters of the defence upon the right bank.

Douaumont had long been one of the white-heat points in the furnace. When the Germans announced throughout the world on February 26 that their "doughty Brandenburgers" had captured the position they doubtless piously believed that they had in fact won command of the key of the whole Meuse position. As has been explained in previous chapters, the course of modern warfare had completely altered the kind of services which the ring of old-style forts around Verdun was called upon to play. While the positions which had been crowned by forts naturally retained



GENERAL JOFFRE AT VERDUN.
Congratulating the General in command at
Hill 304.

their former importance in relation to the terrain, they became from a fortification point of view nothing but extremely strong links in the wide scheme of field works. Douaumont Fort, therefore, while completely changed by the development of war, while it had lost its old meaning, nevertheless kept its old importance as an observation point and as a position from which the approaches to Vaux and Bras Fort could be swept by fire.

Moreover, the Germans who first entered the fort on February 26 were few in number, and for many a long day the chief preoccupation of the enemy at this point of the line was to hang on like grim death to the slender hold he had acquired without a thought of any advance towards Paris. Having with difficulty consolidated his position, the enemy then sought to improve it. After much hard fighting he pressed the French down the southern slope of Douaumont, but he was never able to make his position there entirely sure.

The French, on their side, had here as at



LOADING A FRENCH MORTAR.

other points along the line the fixed principle of profiting from every opportunity to hinder the enemy's progress and upset his calculations with vigorous local counter-attacks. It was the settled policy of steady defensive with occasional flashes of aggression. When Douaumont Fort fell, its work devolved upon Vaux Fort, and with this point of resistance as a sort of base behind them the French in March and April worked steadily if slowly back towards Douaumont.

While the Germans were getting more and more heavily engaged upon the left bank of the river in their effort against the Mort Homme, the French pushed up east and west of Douaumont towards Thiaumont Farm and Caillette Wood as a preliminary to a direct attack upon the Douaumont position itself.

The Germans devoted their picked troops to the capture of Douaumont in February, for only solid troops could be expected successfully to carry a position of its strength. The French, in their turn, entrusted the execution of the operations to the Fifth Division under General Mangin, one of the most dashing of our Ally's leaders.

The preparation of the French attack was carried out with a secrecy which had been noticeably absent from the planning of other operations of this importance. Directly responsible for the plans was General Nivelle, who from the beginning of May had been placed in direct command of the Verdun army in succession to

General Pétain. General Pétain had taken the place of General Langle de Cary, who at the beginning of the Verdun offensive was in command of the Central Group of the French Armies and included in his front the Verdun area. General Langle de Cary was appointed to an Inspectorship in the rear in the early stages of the Verdun fighting.

Pétain's successor had a long record of pre-war service in the Colonies. He was an old Polytechnique man, and had specialized in the use of artillery. His career was in many respects similar to that of Pétain. The war found him in command of the Fifth Infantry Regiment. In October, 1914, he commanded a Brigade. In February, 1915, he was acting Commander of the Sixth Division and then as General of Division took over the Third Army Corps.

Invention had placed in General Nivelle's hands a very useful means of ensuring tactical secrecy, so difficult to obtain with the development of the Air Services and the swarms of kite sausages which floated above the Meuse Hills. A new type of bomb for destroying these balloons, which was used with such effect later in the opening stages of the Somme offensive, was introduced in the preparation of the French attack upon Douaumont, and before General Mangin's men were set in motion the enemy was partially blinded by the destruction by aircraft of six of his observation balloons.


The great interest of the Douaumont battles

is that the study of no other portion of the operations gives so clear an idea of the real cause of German failure to break through. The great factor which the Germans had completely underestimated was the fighting spirit of the French soldier. And at Verdun the French showed that however great might have become the importance of artillery the infantry were still, and perhaps more than ever, the Queen of Battle.

The troops allotted to the recapture of Douaumont were no strangers to Verdun. Upon the Fifth Division had fallen the brunt of the enemy onslaughts in the Vaux-Douaumont region at the beginning of April. They suffered heavily, but before they left to refit in the rear General Mangin, addressing his men, said: "You are going to reform your depleted ranks. Many among you will return to your homes and will bear with you to your families the warlike ardour and the thirst for vengeance which inspires you. 'There is no rest for any Frenchman so long as the barbarous enemy treads the hallowed ground of our country; there can be no peace for the world so long as the monster of Prussian militarism has not been laid low. You will therefore prepare yourselves for further battles, in which you will have the absolute certainty of your superiority over an enemy whom you have seen so often flee or raise his hands before your bayonets and grenades. You are certain of that now. Any German who

gets into a trench of the Fifth Division is dead or captured. Any position methodically attacked by the Fifth Division is a captured position. You march under the wings of Victory.'" A month later they were back, burning to justify the confidence of their chief.

The "methodical" preparation of the assault was thoroughly well carried out. For two days the French poured high explosive upon the already battered ruins of the Fort. An officer who took part in the attack thus described the operations: "On the horizon the top of Douaumont was crowned with sombre smoke. It looked like a volcano in full eruption, and under the formidable fire of the French artillery our infantry was getting on with its preparation for attack, was digging its attacking trenches and making all its last dispositions. Shortly before eight o'clock on May 22 one of our air-squadrons flew up and went over the enemy lines. A few minutes afterwards six of the sausage balloons of the enemy on the right bank of the Meuse exploded. Our pilots had carried out their task, they had deprived the German artillery of its best means of observation, and had considerably interfered with its efficiency for a part, at any rate, of the day. One of our soldiers, who was struck by the fact that the enemy shell was falling far from the zone normally swept by their guns, said to his colonel: 'We've put a bandage round the Boche's eyes.'"



GETTING READY TO FIRE.

Nevertheless, the Germans, feeling the imminence of the attack and the approach of danger, flooded our first lines with a storm of shrapnel, while our artillery increased its speed, and was vomiting shells with all its strength. As an officer said, there was a perpetual moan such as had never been heard before. The hour of attack drew near. All our men knew the price of it. They knew the fighting at Neuville St. Vaast, the offensive in the Champagne, the hand-to-hand struggles in the Bois des Caillettes; they knew the work of German artillery and of the enemy in front of them. Their respective duties were carefully laid down. The centre had the big job allotted to it, to carry the ruins of the fort; the right and the left were to take the enemy trenches east and west, and endeavour to surround the position. Each one of them knew his duty, and appreciated the value of the effort demanded of him.

Soldiers such as these would not be denied. At 10 minutes to 12 they all dashed forward. There was no singing, and they did not form a battle picture. They bounded from shell hole to shell hole, from obstacle to obstacle, lying down, disappearing, rushing forward again, some falling never to get up again. A splendid flame burned through them. At noon the staff aeroplane reported that a Bengal fire was burning on Douaumont fort. The 129th Regiment had taken 11 minutes to carry three lines of enemy trench, and to reach its objective.

On the left, all the German trenches on the west of the fort as far as the road from Douaumont to Fleury had fallen into French hands: the 36th Regiment had carried out its part of the task. At the same time detachments of infantry and sappers got inside the fort, and covered the operations of those entrusted with the destruction of flanking positions, and with the blocking of exits from the fort. Bengal fires going up one after the other showed what progress was being made. It was reported to the staff of the Tenth Brigade that the surrounding movement was being effected in excellent conditions. The north-western and the northern angle were reached, and mitrailleuses were put in place.

Meanwhile, east of the fort, the progress of the 74th Regiment had met with great opposition. The left had pushed forward rapidly, but the right had been under heavy fire from the enemy's communication trenches

which commanded their flank. In spite of all efforts this break slowed down progress. The north-eastern angle of the fort was still in German hands. We held over two-thirds of the whole position, and sent back many prisoners to the rear. Half an hour after the staff aeroplane signal had been received—that is to say, less than 50 minutes after the beginning of the assault—two German officers, some non-commissioned officers, and about 100 men arrived as prisoners at the command post of the Tenth Brigade. Our men were wildly enthusiastic, and had but one thought, to push on to their success. Before the troops started out on these operations orders had been issued in which it was said: "The Germans will make every effort to prevent us from getting into Douaumont Fort. Consequently, if we do get in, don't think that you're going to have a second of rest."

It was certain that the reaction of the enemy would make itself felt; it was of almost unheard-of violence. That night masses of infantry collected east of Haudromont Wood, and towards ten o'clock at night a violent bombardment was begun upon the French positions west of the fort. It was followed by a very vigorous infantry attack, which forced us to yield a little of the line we had won in the morning. In the fort, throughout the night, the struggle turned to our advantage. We kept all we had got, and even slightly increased our gains. At dawn the next day, the 23rd, our positions in the fort were subjected to an appalling bombardment. Although the trench organization which had been successively tumbled and turned by French and German artillery seemed absolutely untenable, the 129th Regiment, in spite of the losses which had weakened its ranks, hung on to the ground gained with a tenacity that was perfectly extraordinary. It was in vain that the enemy multiplied his infantry attacks, and resumed and reinforced his bombardment. He met with an indomitable resistance. Nowhere was there any faltering, nowhere did the German manage to get his teeth in; and when, during the night of the 23rd and the morning of the 24th, the 10th Infantry Brigade was relieved, it had not lost an inch of the ground it had captured.

Heroic episodes in this desperate fight were legion. All ought to be quoted, they all resemble each other; and yet how many will remain unknown! There are the Grenadiers,



LEAVING A BALLOON BY PARACHUTE,

The balloon had broken loose and was drifting towards the enemy's trenches during a storm. The French airman landed safely behind the French lines.



SCENES IN THE TOWN OF VERDUN.
Buildings reduced to a heap of ruins by German
artillery fire.

they were all laden with splendid booty, they were real warriors, and I adore them."

The fighting at Douaumont was not only a fine episode and a glorious episode in the history of the French army; it contained a lesson for the enemy. The lesson for the Germans was that the spirit and dash of the French infantryman was still as great as ever. The enemy, even in operations in which their best troops were engaged, had been obliged frequently to resort to close formation in attack. The French infantry streamed out of its trenches in open order and advanced faultlessly upon the plateau. There was no faltering of any sort and the men stood the strain of advance in open order with complete success. Once they had got inside the fort their troubles were in some respects only beginning. The garrison made the most determined stand and hung on to its positions in the north and north-east of the fort with grim tenacity, waiting for the counter-attack to come to their relief. They had not long to wait, and the rest of the day and the following night were filled with the roar of battle as fresh counter-attacks followed one after the other at short intervals. Fighting was carried out right along the Douaumont front, and the fort itself was attacked time after time by strong bodies of infantry who were launched against it from west, east and north. The efforts of the two fresh Bavarian divisions were finally triumphant, and on May 24 the ruins of Douaumont were once again in enemy hands.

who pushed forward into perilous positions, right into the German lines, and did great killing before they rejoined their comrades. They even went the whole round of the fort, throwing their grenades, and yet managed to get back to their regiment. It was good to hear the officers talking of their men. "I've been in twenty-five campaigns," said a colonel who commanded a brigade; "I've never seen anything finer than this assault. My men have really moved me into a surprised admiration. There is nothing finer than our French soldiers. They are better than they were a year ago, better to-day than they were yesterday. They are always surprising. I watched them coming back from the lines, both young and old were the same. There was one carrying a German helmet, another moved slowly but gloriously along upon a long stick;

The whole Verdun front was now ablaze, and from Avocourt to Vaux the Germans hurled

regiment after regiment of new troops upon the French lines in a supreme endeavour to break through. They re-entered Douaumont, as we have seen, on May 24, and the same day they made progress of greater significance on the left bank sector of the field of battle. On May 23 the situation on the left bank was extremely critical—the whole battle of Verdun was an unending series of critical days. Here, as upon the right bank, the Germans had somewhat antedated their victories. They had announced the capture of the Mort Homme, and they had followed this example by declaring that Hill 304 was in their hands, at a time when from a military point of view they were still far from undisputed mastery of these positions. With regard to Hill 304, it is clear that on this day, May 23, the French still held the military crest and the western slopes. It is perhaps necessary to explain that, owing to the development of modern artillery, hill-crests in the geographical sense of the term possessed no military value whatever. The tops of the hills and ridges of the Meuse were so pounded with high explosive as to be untenable by either side. What happened in

most cases was that the defending party held on to the military crest as long as possible. This military crest consisted of trench positions, situated a few hundred feet below the sky-line, and screened from direct artillery fire by the geographical crest of the hill. In many cases there existed a complicated system of tunnels which led right through from behind the peak to the slope exposed to the observation of the enemy. Here on this exposed surface artillery observation posts were established, protected and strengthened by a few machine-guns. The top of the hill itself ceased therefore to possess any value. This use of what the French call the *contre-pente* had first been introduced into general practice by the Germans in the course of the Champagne offensive in the autumn of 1915. It was indeed mainly these positions with their large fields of barbed wire, which lay hidden from direct artillery destruction, which held up the French in their onslaught upon the last German lines in the neighbourhood of Tahure.

The situation at the Mort Homme at the beginning of May may be described roughly as



ANOTHER VIEW OF THE TOWN
After the German bombardment.



CAPTURED GERMAN PRISONERS CARRYING THEIR MACHINE-GUN TO THE FRENCH LINES.

follows : The enemy had crept a short way up the northern face of the ridge, and had formed a salient in the French positions established upon the eastern and the western slopes of the hill, the summit of which had been converted into a shell-swept No Man's Land, upon which occasionally ventured an absolutely essential artillery observation officer. On the *contre-pente* French infantry were as solidly entrenched as was possible, and in the horse-shoe round the base of the hill the French held hastily-constructed trench defences. The opening of the horse-shoe was represented by the German salient on the northern side.

On the neighbouring position of Hill 304 the state of affairs was not exactly similar. There the Germans had pushed through the stubble of shell-shattered woods which lined the base of the ridge, and had occupied positions which were almost exactly the opposite of the relative situations of the two armies upon the Mort Homme. Here it was the German Army which had placed a horse-shoe at the base of the hill, and it was the French from the western slopes who formed a salient.

The general plan of the enemy on May 23 was to turn the whole Mort Homme plateau by cutting through the trench organizations which linked it up in the west with Hill 304. The enemy had pushed the French down to the base of the Mort Homme, and endeavoured to swing themselves up to the crest of Hill 287, the next eminence on the road to Verdun. At the same time the Germans endeavoured to cut through to the east of the Mort Homme plateau, and into the combined operations, which were launched after a bombardment of great fury, the enemy launched at least two army corps. Fortunately the French had in this sector of the front troops of well-tried valour ; the new systems of liaison and fire control were becoming perfected ; the infantry had but to press a button, so to speak, to have an almost instantaneous curtain fire from the artillery in the rear.

It was one of the curious things of the war that for long the unquestioned changes wrought in tactics, and in the use of artillery, had failed to affect the general organization of the French armies. The divisions employed could have, at this stage of the war, no general or individual strategic mission, which is another way of saying that for the divisional general the tactics had almost entirely vanished, or were applied upon a minute scale involving the capture of a cellar,



BEHIND THE FRENCH LINES AT VERDUN.

Reinforcements leaving motor wagons to relieve their comrades in the trenches.

or the flanking of a ditch, and strategy had completely disappeared. For the army corps this was even more the case, yet, until an advanced period of the battle for Verdun, the old almost watertight army organization had remained intact. The general commanding a division still had under his direct control the same amount of artillery as at the opening of the war. Heavy artillery was almost entirely the special property of the army corps commanders, to whom requests for barrage fire had to be addressed through time-wasting and circuitous routes. General Pétain was the first French army commander to introduce a system which was already employed in both the British and German armies. He abolished, partly at any rate, the iron-bound system of divisions of army corps, massed large numbers of divisions together, and gave to each of them their proportionate quota of heavy artillery. The importance of this change is quite evident when it is realized that in all the later stages of the Verdun battle the curtain fire was, in the majority of cases, carried out by heavy artillery. Curtain fire, to be effective, had to be instantaneous. Immediately the forward artillery observation officer saw the enemy's bombardment slacken, and the "war-grey" forms of the enemy appear above the trench-line, he had to telephone at once, or, as was frequently the case when telephones had ceased to work, to signal with rockets, for an immediate curtain fire. The shell of the 75's had proved itself quite unable to stop the massed rushes of the enemy, and unless what at the beginning of Verdun was the Corps Artillery, that is to say the heavy guns, could pour its thousands of pounds of melinite upon the advancing waves, the attack was almost certain to succeed.

It was through a curtain fire of this tremendous density that the German infantry advanced on the left bank front on May 23. The scene was described by one of the band of American airmen who did such excellent work in the Verdun sector, in words which conjure up, as do all the aerial photographs, and particularly those of the assault upon Douaumont, a battle picture painted in completely novel perspective. This airman had been sent out as artillery observation officer at the beginning of the German assaults in the Mort Homme region. His mission, he declared, was absolutely fruitless. Although he flew at an extremely low altitude, only some few hundred feet above the earth, nothing whatever could be seen, except a tremendous pillar of smoke; the ground itself was completely hidden from his eyes. There was not even a flash. A column of smoke 600 feet high covered the whole position. In this smoky inferno wave after wave of Germans fell blasted to pieces by high explosives, or were dropped in their rush by the savage chattering machine guns. On the east of the Mort Homme the enemy was unable to get through the horrible zone thus formed, and his dead lay in patches in the shell area, and in long swathes where the machine guns had mown them down.

Between Hill 304 and the Mort Homme, however, greater progress was made. For a time here too the enemy spent himself in unavailing dashes at the curtain of bursting shell; but, as there were ever more and more men pressing forward to take the places of those who fell, towards the close of the day the Germans managed to sweep through the danger zone, and to install themselves close enough to the first trench lines to render the use of French



FRENCH TROOPS CHARGING ENEMY'S TRENCHES

With fixed bayonets, and led by a bomb-thrower.

high explosive impossible, without there being a certainty of killing as many French as Germans. Here for a time the enemy hung on, and meanwhile the special detachment of flame-fighters who had just arrived in this region were sent forward. There is no mask against fire, and with their diabolical flame-throwers the Germans succeeded in burning the French out of their first lines. Before nightfall the French came back at them again—it was one of the constantly hopeful features of the Verdun fighting that at no period did the French infantry fail to react—and after half an hour's fighting the Germans had been driven out of the ground they had purchased at so high a cost,

and were filtering in isolated disorder back to the trenches from which they had begun the attack.

Dastardly and despicable though German methods of fighting were, it would be foolish to deny that in the whole effort they made against Verdun their men displayed the most formidable doggedness. Time after time they stormed to the assault of the most forbidding positions, over the corpses of hundreds who had failed before them; time after time regiments which had reeled and melted beneath the deadly sputtering of mitrailleuses formed up again, and again returned to obvious destruction. The French were not long left in



ENTRANCE TO A DUG-OUT.
French troops in a village near Verdun.

possession of their recaptured line, but had, before night fell, to withstand again the counter-attacks of the enemy. This night effort was most pronounced to the west of the Mort Homme, a section of the front which had seen some of the most desperate fighting in the whole history of the battle. The Caurettes Wood and Cumières Wood, which formed the first cover of Cumières village, had, as has been related in earlier chapters, been the scene of desperate and bloody fighting. They had been captured and recaptured several times, and when this climax was reached, the French were still hanging on by the skin of their teeth to a portion of these woods. The day attacks had

failed to get home; at night the sluice-gates of Germany were open, and horde after horde of infantry rolled down in the effort to force a passage to the east of the Mort Homme—down the valley of the Meuse itself.

In spite of the explanations furnished by the German General Staff there can be no question whatever that this great drive was intended to bring the Germans into position from which they could begin the direct attack upon the main defences of Verdun on the left bank. It is to be noted that in this area of the front the Germans were still battling with the advance work defending the Meuse capital. They had not here even reached the same point on May 22



A FRENCH TRENCH IN THE MEUSE SECTOR.

Showing the method of construction, and the white lines of the communication trenches in the distance. Smaller picture: Poste de Commandant at a French Brigade Headquarters near Douaumont.

of the Mort Homme and the country west of it as far as the Meuse. The village of Cumières was the immediate objective of this resumed attempt. It had long before been ruined. Lying as it did in the valley at the extreme western point of the great loop formed by the Meuse between Samogneux and Bras, its strategic value was doubtful. The whole place was covered with shells, and reduced by the most elementary and, be it added, effective methods of warfare. After every few hours of bombardment waves of infantry were sent up to it. When they returned, broken and depleted under the fire of undestroyed machine guns, the big guns again took up the story. By this alternate battery and assault the Germans on May 24 smashed the line, drove the French right out of the village of Cumières, and, profiting by their disorder and disarray, pushed their infantry right down to the neighbourhood of Chattancourt railway station.

Once again the French automatic counter-attack, at any rate partly, re-established a balance. The infantry went at the advancing Germans with all their old dash and bite, and drove them back into Cumières village, where, throughout the night of the 24th, they held out in trenches on the southern outskirts of the ruins. This hold enabled them to start methodical operations for the recapture of the rubble heap. Getting into the bushes and tree trunks east of the village, bombing parties made good progress during the next few days, while the enemy was having an all too brief breathing space. While the infantry were at work in the east, the artilleryman was

as they had attained on February 26 on the right bank by the capture of Douaumont. The French still had to protect their whole Verdun salient, the formidable line of wooded hill and dale constituted by the fort of Bras, Bourrus Wood, and the Esnes position. It was to the piercing of this second line of defence that the great attacks of May 23 were devoted.

As was frequently the case in the long battle, the enemy very nearly succeeded. He felt the cup between his lips, but could not drink. During the night of May 23-24, profiting by his gains on Hill 304 and the Mort Homme, which, although slight in measurement, were capable of great strategic profit, he pushed forward upon the second line of Verdun defences. Once again troops which had hitherto been spared the horrors of Verdun were gathered in strength upon the restricted front

pounding the German positions in the village and to the north-west of it. On May 27 the progress made by these two arms was deemed sufficient and the two assaulting columns, which had been brought up east and west of the village, were launched at sundown. On both flanks progress was made. The great landmark of Cumières, the mill, was carried by the eastern column, and at dusk the French were engaged in the especially desperate business of cellar fighting, in the attempt to strengthen their hold upon the village.

The western column made sufficient progress to cause the Germans to fear that the whole village would be surrounded, and vigorous counter-attacks to the strength of a brigade and a half were launched upon this one point. It is interesting to note, at this stage in the battle, what tremendous effort in effectives had been demanded from the Germans. It is also interesting to note the first definite instance of large co-ordination between the western Allies, which is to be found in the relief of the French Tenth Army by British forces.

The Germans at this stage of the battle began a great artillery demonstration in Alsace and elsewhere along the front, with a view to preventing the free handling by the French of their reserves. The Paris Correspondent of *The Times*, commenting upon this on May 28, said :


The French, it would be puerile to deny, have paid, and are paying, the price which their heroic resistance at Verdun demands. Their losses during the last week's fighting have probably been proportionately greater than at any other time throughout the Verdun fighting. It would, nevertheless, be folly to imagine that the bulk of the French general reserves has been flung into battle. The relief given by the British in taking over the front of the French 10th Army, liberating it for service elsewhere, is an indication of the method by which the Allied effectives in the West are constantly growing and the heavy losses at Verdun constantly being made good.

The fact that the enemy, for the continuance of his tremendous drive upon the Verdun bulwarks, has been forced to scratch together fresh divisions from Russia, from the Balkans, and from the northern front, is the



A FRENCH TRENCH IN A STREET IN CUMIÈRES.

Smaller picture: A trench and barricade.



A FRENCH OBSERVATION BALLOON AT VERDUN.

best evidence of the price which the French are exacting for every yard of advance made by the Germans towards the eastern gate. Some indication of that price is contained in the *Echo de Paris* in a telegram from the Verdun front. The writer of this dispatch says:

"It is proved that from May 20 to May 25 seven different divisions were flung into the battle on both sides of the Meuse. Four of these were brought from other points of the Western front—two from Flanders, two from the Somme.

"On the left bank alone four divisions were employed in the last week-end fighting. Without a thought of the enormous losses caused by our curtain fire and machine guns, the German Command threw them one after the other into the boiling pot east and west of Mort Homme. On May 22 alone, before the capture of Cumières village, which has now been retaken, the enemy made no fewer than 16 attacks upon the front from the Avocourt Wood to the Meuse. Over 50,000 men sought that day to climb the slopes of Mort Homme and the plateau of Hill 304. The great charnel heap had 15,000 fresh corpses flung upon it without the French lines having yielded."

All estimates of losses must naturally, at the present moment, remain estimates, but, according to all the information available, it seems to be established beyond question that there is a great disproportion between the losses of the French and Germans. The battle of Verdun throughout its development seems, indeed, to have shown that the French have reached a watershed of victory. In other words, that their artillery equipment and shell consumption have almost, if not entirely, reached a point of equality with that of the Germans. Under the conditions of modern warfare it is inevitable, with such equality of armament, and with, at the very least, equality of *moral* between opposing men, that the attackers should suffer more heavily in the casualty lists.

There is good ground for the belief that in the first six weeks of the Verdun battle the Germans were losing very nearly three to one.

Losses seemed, however, to be of no importance whatever to the enemy in the pursuit of his aim. The hundredth day of the battle of Verdun was marked by a tremendous upward swoop of the curve of bloodshed, by another and even more vehement blow, delivered no doubt with a full and considered appreciation of military requirements, but aimed also at affecting the course of internal affairs in France. The agitation, briefly summarized at the beginning of this chapter, for a full and free discussion of the conditions of defence at Verdun, was taking a more and more alarming shape.

This great blow at the military might and civilian moral of France was begun on May 28. The Sunday was passed in what in Verdun constituted quiet—that is to say, the whole countryside shook and trembled under the fire of thousands of guns. In the evening the German infantry moved out of Crows' Wood and delivered an assault upon the French trenches between the Mort Homme and Cumières. This effort was shattered beneath French curtain fire, and it was not until mid-



BEFORE VERDUN.

The German Crown Prince with his Chief of Staff.

night that the enemy again got going. But this second attempt met with no greater success. The casualties sustained in this fighting had clearly shown the Germans that, intense though their bombardment had been, it had not been heavy enough to obliterate the French defence. The artillery once more took up the story, and for some 12 hours over 60 heavy batteries of enemy artillery poured shell upon the Avocourt-Mort Homme-Cumières line. At three in the afternoon the next assault was launched. In these attacks no less than five fresh divisions took part. Two had been drawn from the front of the Sixth Army, while the main reserve of the German Army in the West at Cambrai had been called upon to furnish the other two. To give these fresh troops backing and aid in the tremendous task which lay before them, the greatest concentration of artillery seen up till then on the Western front was carried out with speed and secrecy. Each hour of battle saw the establishment of a fresh record in shell consumption. There had been nothing like it in the world's history, and nothing which even the most imaginative writers of war fiction had said in forecasting the conditions of modern war in any way approached the storm of horror unloosed in this stage of the great struggle for Verdun. The German attacks, broken and

shattered as they were by constant curtain fire, were repeated with tremendous rapidity along the front. It was, as one officer put it, as though the whole German Army had been converted into a machine-gun, and was delivering a series of blows in which each bullet of the machine-gun was represented by a regiment.

The enemy's losses were gigantic, and at one time it seemed as though success might have been within his grasp, but the toll taken of the Germans as they advanced in wave after wave upon the French positions was too great for any army to withstand the drain. The objective of all this fighting was the reduction of the salient formed by the French lines in the Mort Homme-Cumières section of the front; the results obtained were scanty. The big blow of their guns was delivered upon the French centre, and right along this portion of the battlefield the French first-line trenches were obliterated. But what the artillery had shattered the German infantry was unable to seize. The enemy found himself much in the position of a man, anxious to increase his bag, who has brought down his bird, but whose retriever is quite unable to bring it back. At the end of this stage of the fighting the French positions on the Mort Homme had been greatly weakened, but they still were holding out in trenches to the east, south and west. The village of Cumières had been captured, but there also none of the expected fruit of the German victory had been gathered. The attempt to storm through and begin the direct attack upon the great second line of the left bank defences of Verdun had failed, and in spite of the strenuous and constant striving of the enemy to accomplish his object in the month of June, he was still occupying the positions on the Mort Homme, was still fighting for Hill 304, was still far from the Bourras-Esnes line of positions when the joint Anglo-French offensive in the Somme burst with its fury on July 1.

It cannot be definitely stated whether the next move of the enemy was due to the recognition of his failure on the left bank, or whether it was due to an almost incredible exaggeration of the effects of the small success achieved. The main cause of the left bank operations was that operations on the right bank in the neighbourhood of Douaumont had been impeded by the enfilading fire of the French batteries posted farther north upon the left bank. The Mort Homme position had proved to be particularly

disturbing. It may be that with the practical reduction of this bastion the Germans felt that they could afford to concentrate once more upon the northern front of Verdun, and once again attempt to pierce straight through to the city.

The Paris Correspondent of *The Times*, telegraphing on June 1, was able to report that "so far the German blows have only dented the French defence, and there seems no reason to suppose that the enemy will ever succeed in driving right through it." Telegraphing earlier in the day the same correspondent said: "On the right bank the bombardment, which has become almost chronic, was continued yesterday along the whole front from the Meuse to Vaux. . . . During the night the bombardment both east and west of Fort Douaumont attained an intensity which can only precede great infantry operations on one side or the other."

Such indeed was the case. The French first and second lines during 26 hours had been subjected to a constant bombardment, of a violence seldom seen even in the course of this battle. All the heavy quick-firing batteries at the disposal of the enemy had been drawn up, and had made it impossible for the French supply and ammunition columns to furnish their front lines. The storm was a prelude to a long and desperate struggle for the Fort of Vaux, the capture of which had been announced by the Germans three months previously, when they had succeeded in getting a footing on the northern slopes of the ridge. The two great efforts of the enemy against this position in March and in April had been very costly, and in no way successful. Throughout those two months they had been constantly pushing in small local attacks, which were equally unavailing. The June fighting, which lasted for a week, gave them the position, but to take it they poured out men in a profusion unequalled in any attack of so small a front.

After the fall of Douaumont, Vaux had taken up the duties of that position, and had become the advanced bastion of the big Souville fort to the south-west. Its fire swept the ravine through which the ground rose from the Woevre plain to Souville. The line of attack, as in the case of the Mort Homme, was from the north-east and north-west, through the Fumin Wood and Caillettes Wood. On June 1 the enemy, advancing from the north-west, captured the Caillettes spur, and advanced through Vaux village, and on the following day began the direct assault upon the fort.



RUINS OF VAUX FORT.

After seven days' desperate fighting against assaulting troops the enemy occupied the work, which had been completely ruined by furious bombardment.

An official account of the fighting round Vaux said: "It is impossible to retrace in detail the movements of such fighting. A modern battle is too fragmentary and too complicated

for even approximate reconstitution to be possible. Nevertheless among the episodes there are some which give a good idea of the nature of the whole fighting. Among these is

the defence of Trench R.I. by the 101st Infantry Regiment. R.I. was a small trench north-west of Vaux fort, about halfway between the fort and the village. In front of it, about 40 yards away, the Germans were entrenched, and they also occupied positions to the right and left. It was a difficult spot, but it had to be held, as it interfered with the plan of encircling the fort, which the enemy had been trying to carry through for many weeks. In this part of the country, where 280 mm. shells were flung in packets of 10, everything was topsyturvy, all trenches were level, and there was not a shelter or dugout which offered security against the artillery, which was firing with such intensity as to prevent all work of repair.

On June 1 at eight o'clock in the morning, after a short struggle, the Germans managed to carry a small length of French trench, which jutted out west of R.I. They were then seen advancing in single file along the lake, trying to filter through towards the slopes of Fumin Wood. Two French machine guns at once stopped their progress. R.I. was not attacked; there was nothing but an exchange of shots and grenades with the trench opposite. The bombardment continued throughout the night. Food and drink could not get up to the trench, where the men were beginning to suffer from thirst. No one complained about it. Each man had an ample provision of grenades by his side, and packing cases full of them were dotted about close up to the trench. At 5.30 in the evening the rain of 105 and 130 shells was tropical. At eight o'clock the enemy left their trench and advanced on R.I. They were met with a hail of grenades, and streamed back to their trench in disorder. The order was given to send up a rocket asking our artillery to throw

out a curtain fire in front of R.I. By bad luck, before the rocket was got off, it burst and set fire to all the stock of rockets. Fire and smoke filled the trench, and red and green flames rose above it. Those at a distance could not understand what had happened, and wondered whether the enemy was attacking with liquid fire, or had turned the French position. In the trench everyone was calm, officers and men joining in the work of placing the stock of grenades out of danger. At 10 o'clock the fire was mastered, and at the same time a reward arrived; 16 pints of water were brought through from Fumin Wood, and divided immediately—one mouthful to each man.

There was a pause until half-past two on the morning of June 3, when the enemy again attacked. "This time," said the captain who commanded the trench, "we must be more patient. Last time we were too quick." The enemy were allowed to come within about 15 paces, before they were struck down by grenades and rifle fire. One German, who had got up to within three yards of the trench, received a grenade right in his face, and fell on the parapet. The officers were throwing bombs with as much zest as their men. By a last effort the Germans were beaten back, and at half-past three all was over.

The trench, however, was still isolated by the enemy's curtain fire, and the men suffered more from thirst than from the enemy. Luckily it began to rain. Canvas was spread out, and in other receptacles water was gathered. Throughout the day the bombardment continued, and the Germans, who had succeeded in advancing in the trenches on the right and on the slopes of the fort, got a machine gun into position, and opened enfilading fire upon R.I.



FRENCH GUNS IN THE ENVIRONS OF VERDUN.




WAITING TILL THE SHELLS HAVE CLEARED THE WAY.

French troops in a trench getting ready to advance.

Another machine gun in Fumin Wood swept the left of the trench. After a further burst of bombardment, between 1.30 and 7.30, German waves again rolled up to the French line, and were again thrown back. The night was passed under intense bombardment, and at three o'clock in the morning the enemy again came on; but the French had acquired complete

confidence in their grenades during the three days' fighting, and gave them a warm reception. By dawn the Germans had once more been repulsed. The first light of day lit up an extraordinary picture in the French trench. Every stone was splashed with blood; the ground was littered with all kinds of *débris*, shell splinters, and more ghastly evidences of battle. For 24



A FRENCH CANNON DATING FROM 1881.

Gun of 155 mm. (6 in.) calibre which did excellent duty in the defence of Verdun.

more hours the bombardment continued, but the enemy was mastered, and at nine o'clock on June 5 the gallant garrison of the trench was relieved. The Colonel of the 101st, in reporting to the General commanding the 124th Division, during the thick of the fight, had said: "We are fighting to the end. Both men and officers, who have shown the most splendid devotion and self-sacrifice beyond praise, are determined to fall to a man in the defence of their trench."

While both east and west of the fort fighting of this nature was going on all along the line, the attack upon the fort itself was developing. The Germans knew that it was beyond their strength to carry the fort by direct assault. They had got a footing on the slopes in March, and although they had done their utmost

they had been unable to progress. In the weeks which followed they endeavoured to invest the position. Their infantry held the north and pushed down east and west, but their constant efforts to close the circle in the south had failed. Their artillery accomplished what their infantry had been unable to effect. The whole southern slope of Vaux was covered with a curtain fire of heavy shell, which formed a wall of steel and high explosive and completed the encircling of the fort.

It was estimated that since March the Germans had flung no less than 8,000 heavy shells a day on to this position. During the latter days of the defence of Vaux this figure had greatly grown. The fort itself was torn and twisted by explosion. The usual entrance was completely blocked up, and for long the



IN A VILLAGE NORTH-WEST OF VERDUN.

German shell exploding and destroying a small station in the line of fire.

only way into the fort was through a wicket in the north-western corner. It was through this gate that, in spite of tremendous difficulties, communications had been maintained and supplies kept up.

Mr. Warner Allen, the special representative of the British Press, in an account based upon official information, wrote :

The fort itself was completely demolished by the explosion. In this hell-hole a little garrison under Major Raynal continued to resist.


Around the fort all work was impossible. Trenches were demolished while they were being dug. A man had to wait for hours and choose his moment if he was to have the slightest chance of passing. On June 1 the enemy began a terrific attack. Under the violence of their fire certain elements of the French advanced line retired. A few men, slightly wounded, seeking for some shelter against the rain of shell, made their way into the ruins of the fort, and were an embarrassment to the garrison rather than a reinforcement.

The next day the German advance made it impossible

to use the north-western postern. Henceforth the fort was deprived of the only communication with the French lines. Since it was impossible for dispatch bearers to get through an attempt was made to communicate by signals. Signallers were posted at a window to communicate with other signallers just over a mile away. But the scheme did not work satisfactorily—Vaux could not see the signals distinctly. A volunteer came forward to carry the news through the zone of death. He managed to escape the German fire, though not a movement passed undetected by the Germans. The signaller's position was changed, and he returned to his post in the fort, his object accomplished. A young officer named Bessett succeeded in leaving the fort with a report, and then went back to encourage his comrades, whom he refused to desert.

A private in the 124th Division, Stretcher-bearer Vanier, worked untiringly with the wounded, hiding them among the ruins, and bandaging their wounds. When he had no wounded to tend he went out to fetch water, for water was the most serious problem of all.

Throughout the battle of Verdun thirst has been one of the most terrible trials to which the soldiers have been submitted. Letters captured on German prisoners continually refer to it. Troops were entirely isolated



FRENCH REINFORCEMENTS ON THE WAY TO THE FIGHTING FRONT.

by curtains of shell fire on a narrow front, making all movement impossible. Darkness was the only protection; but in June the nights are short, and star-shells were continually blazing.

Isolated men succeeded in passing, but at terrible risk, with a tiny supply of water. But the task of providing 150 men with water, to say nothing of 400 more who had taken refuge in the fort, was beyond human power. From outside attempts were made to send water into the fort, but not one was successful. Yet the fort was held, and held for four days more.

The enemy advanced on the higher ground, but the French organized the ruins of the buildings inside the fort. At every window, at every opening, behind the *débris* of a wall machine-guns were placed, picked shots took refuge, and every German who reached the courtyard of the fort was shot down. Barriades were raised at every corner, and piles of German corpses lay before them.

The Gerinans tried the experiment of letting down at the end of a cord baskets full of grenades, and, when these baskets were on a level with the windows held by the French, they dropped into them a grenade with a time-fuse and swung them in through the opening to explode inside. But still the garrison fought on.

There is, however, a limit to human endurance. The last message sent by Major Raynal ran as follows:

We are near the end. Officers and soldiers have done their whole duty. Vive la France!

June 6 was the final day. In the morning Vanier, with a few wounded who were determined not to be taken alive, escaped through a grating. They crawled towards the French lines, but several of them were killed. Those who won through were full of joy. When his colonel congratulated him, Vanier, who already holds the Military Medal and the War Cross with two palms, replied, "Mon Colonel, I would rather be killed than be taken by the Boches." This is the last definite news received concerning the Fort of Vaux. The same day our aeroplanes observed thick columns of smoke and explosions in what was once the fort.

The defence of Vaux was one of the finest examples of French doggedness, and the French Government, departing from a rule which up till then had always been observed, for the first time mentioned an officer by name in a *communiqué*, and held up to the admiration of the world Major Raynal, the commander of the fort. Before the fort fell it was announced that he had been promoted to the rank of commander in the Legion of Honour. He was one of those French officers who had won their way up from the ranks in a life of steady hard work. He was severely wounded on September 14, 1914, and mentioned in dispatches as follows: "Commanding the advance guard of his regiment, and having come into close contact with strongly entrenched enemy forces, immediately placed his battalion on supporting points, and maintained it there under the fire of infantry, machine guns, and heavy artillery. Severely wounded in the afternoon, he retained the command of his battalion, staying in the first line, in order the better to control the fighting in difficult and covered country, until he was obliged by loss of blood to go to the rear."

Before his wounds were healed he was clamouring to get back to the fighting, and as the medical board refused to pass him for service in the field, he asked for a fortress command, and was given Vaux.

The gallantry of Major Raynal's defence moved the enemy to admiration, and he was permitted by the German Crown Prince to retain his sword, on his removal to Mainz. It was from the Germans that he learned of the honour bestowed upon him by the French Republic, and in special recognition of his gallantry, the insignia of his new rank in the Legion of Honour were conferred upon his wife at a special review at the Invalides.

The effect of the fall of Vaux in its moral aspect was merely to strengthen French determination, and the effect upon the enemy of the resistance put up there was shown in the German Press. The special correspondent of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, after paying a tribute to the heroism and tenacity of the Vaux garrison, thus related a conversation he had had with a French soldier captured in Caillettes Wood: "I said, 'We've got Vaux Fort.' The Frenchman calmly said, 'Well?' and then, with a smile full of irony, added, 'Perhaps you've got Souville also?' This extraordinary optimism of the French makes one really despair."

The value of Vaux in the general reduction of Verdun proved to be small, but its fall was the necessary preface to the beginning of a direct operation against Souville. The front formed after the fall of Vaux, going from west to east, ran through Hill 321, north of Froide Terre Ridge, Thiaumont work, Fleury village, and the woods of Chapitre, Fumin, Chénois, and La Laufée, which formed the approaches to Souville and Tavannes. The only road open to the Germans lay down the valley which separated Froide Terre Ridge from the tableland upon which were the forts of Souville and Tavannes. The entrance to this valley was blocked by Fleury village, but before the enemy could hope to carry this they had to obtain possession of Thiaumont work.

After a prolonged pause, following the fall of Vaux Fort, the systematic attack upon this line was begun. From June 19 to June 22 this attack bore down in three main directions, upon Ridge 321, Thiaumont work, and Fleury. The main assault was delivered on June 23, when nearly a hundred thousand men were flung upon a front which measured barely three miles. In the first sector in the west


Thiaumont work was the main objective. Between ridges 321 and 320—that is to say, on a front of just over a mile, no less than three divisions were engaged. The attack began at eight o'clock in the morning, and it was not till the afternoon, when fresh troops had been brought up to strengthen the shattered divisions, that the first small breach was made in the French line. The point of this break was just east of Thiaumont Work, and at two in the afternoon the Germans flung a tremendous concentration of men upon the spot, burst right through the line, and poured right over the Thiaumont position.

Upon Fleury their action was not so rapidly successful. At one moment in the day they managed indeed to reach the village, but were flung out of it again with very heavy losses. By June 25, after further murderous assaults, the enemy had succeeded in driving a wedge between the two main positions of the French, and had gained possession of Fleury village. For a moment matters had looked very black indeed, and it had seemed as though the German General Staff had been able to profit by the critical moment which follows retreat to push forward and complete the disorganization of the defence. The French counter-attacks at Fleury, however, upset their calculations, and the Germans were destined for long to remain unable to exploit their possession of Fleury village.

While Fleury was still the scene of hotly contested grenade fighting, already in the north, on

the British front, a prolonged bombardment foreshadowed coming events. The time was at hand when the patient, if belated, efforts of the Allies to ensure co-ordination, to have—as M. Briand, the originator of the Allied conferences, put the matter—unity of action upon unity of front, were to come to fruition. Away on the Eastern front the Russians were striding from victory to victory. On the Southern front the Italians had stemmed the threatened Austrian invasion, and were preparing a vigorous reaction. On the Western front also, the initiative was about to be wrested from the enemy's hands.

The Allies, in dealing with this question of co-ordination, were at a disadvantage, as compared with their enemies. The Entente alliance was one of free and great peoples, proud of their independence, and jealous of their heritage in history. It was impossible for one of them to impose his will, his policy, and his leading upon all the others, as Germany did upon Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Nevertheless, much had been accomplished in the series of conferences held in France and in England, and the most complete unity of view had been obtained. The rumours which were spread about by men of little faith in France, as to the unwillingness of Britain to take up her full share of the burden pressing on the French, spread very naturally owing to the anxiety of the moment throughout the country and across the Channel. As day after day the Germans slowly pressed in upon



GERMAN PROGRESS IN THE BATTLE OF VERDUN.

The first week and the first four months.



“ILS NE PASSERONT PAS.”

The spirit of France at Fleury.

the Meuse capital, the waiting for relief from the British placed a great strain upon the judgment and the faith of all. A good corrective to this anxiety was delivered by Mr. Bonar Law on his arrival for the Economic Conference in Paris, when he said that on two occasions the British Army had been placed at the disposal of General Joffre, and was ready, and had long been ready, to carry out all that might be asked of it. The whole world waited on the tip-toe of expectation for the striking of that hour.

It was everywhere realized that the French at Verdun had been fighting for time. As

Sir Edward Grey pointed out, they were fighting not for France alone, but for the whole alliance. If the French had failed there the whole arch of allied cooperation would have tumbled to the ground, the machinery of victory would have been flung out of gear, and many a long month added to the duration of the war. The enemy failed, and the extent of his failure can only be appreciated by a rapid survey of events since the beginning of his offensive on February 21.

The original aim of the offensive had been the capture of Verdun. The first few days of the battle brought the Germans to Douaumont,



FRENCH INFANTRY COUNTER-ATTACKING
Amid the ruins of Fleury.



THE FORT DES PAROCHES.

and within sight of Douaumont they were still fighting when the joint offensive on the Somme began on July 1. When, after the first two months of the battle, it became clear that Verdun was not to be captured, except at appalling cost, the objective was changed. The Germans were told that the offensive was purely defensive in character, that it aimed at destroying the military power of France, at preventing any possibility of co-ordinated action on the Western front. The magnificent dash made by the French south of the Somme in the first days of July proved how complete had been German defeat in this direction. General Joffre declared on the occasion of the second anniversary of the war :

The great sacrifices which France has supported at Verdun have given our Allies time to build up their resources, have enabled us to mature our plans and carry them out with perfect appreciation of the necessities of all fronts. We are now able to employ all our resources simultaneously in a thoroughgoing way. I desire to pay homage to the manner wherein all the Allies are fulfilling their part.

Drawing on her inexhaustible resources Russia has been afforded time to bring forward men in ever-increasing numbers, and is now deploying her huge armies with telling effect in Galicia, Volhynia, and Armenia. Great Britain, too, has had time in the past two years to show the world the extent of her varied resources. Her troops are proving their splendid valour on the Somme, showing what a determined nation can do in such times as these. No doubt Italy has a difficult and limited part to play in a more restricted sphere of action, but her troops are fulfilling their rôle splendidly. The Serbian Army is beginning at this moment to enter the firing-line anew.

After this brief review of the position of the Allied armies General Joffre outlined the German situation in a few crisp sentences :

We know positively that our enemies, although fighting as desperately as ever, are drawing on their last reserves. Up to now they have followed the policy of transferring their reserves from one place to another, but in face of the Allies' united effort they now find it impossible, and will find it increasingly impossible in future, to pursue such methods. All our sources of information confirm that.

It is not for me to say how long this struggle is going to last, but the question matters little. We know that the rupture is coming. You, no doubt, feel as well as we do, that we have reached the turning point. The five months' resistance of the French troops at Verdun has shattered the plans of the German Staff, and brought us round the corner, heading for victory. Don't, however, imagine that there is yet a marked weakening of the German effort on the western front. Two-thirds of their finest troops are still opposed to us on this side. The English and French face 122 of their best divisions. On the Russian front the Germans have 50 divisions to which must, of course, be added the Austrian Armies.

I won't go into details on the condition and temper of the French Army. You cannot do better than avail yourself of the facilities to see our troops in the field with your own eyes. You will see the Army as it is after two years of the hardest fighting. You will see an Army of which the spirit and energy have been vastly increased by this bitter struggle. To that I can add that the number of our troops at the front is greater now than at the beginning of the war. I can think of no more eloquent fact than that as illustrating France's capacity for waging a just war. The country is determined to see the war to a victorious conclusion. The Allies are fighting not merely for the respective interests of their countries, but for the liberty of the world, and will not stop till the world's liberty is definitely assured.

The magnificent spectacle of French heroism at Verdun had robbed the Germans of that

moral victory which, to judge from their campaign of lies, they held most dear. The doggedness of the *poilu* aroused the admiration of the world. Everywhere, even in Germany, Verdun was regarded as symbolizing the whole fighting spirit of France—the spirit which found itself admirably translated in Orders of the Day issued by General Joffre and General Nivelle.

On June 12 the Generalissimo, in informing the troops of the Russian successes in Galicia, wrote: "The plan elaborated by the councils of the coalition is now in full course of execution. Soldiers of Verdun, this is due to your heroic resistance, which has been the indispensable condition for success. All our future victories are based upon it. It is your resistance which has created throughout the whole theatre of the European War a situation from which will be born to-morrow the final triumph of our cause."

On June 23 General Nivelle in Army Orders said: "The hour is decisive. The Germans, feeling themselves hunted down on every hand, are launching furious and desperate attacks upon our front, in the hope of reaching the gates of Verdun before themselves being attacked by the united forces of the Allied Armies. You will

not let them pass, my comrades. The country demands this further supreme effort. The Army of Verdun will not allow itself to be intimidated by shells, and by German infantry, whose efforts it has destroyed during the past four months. The Army of Verdun will keep its glory intact."

At a later date General Nivelle, in acquainting his men with the address of praise sent to them by the French Academy, added: "It is one of the greatest sources of pride for the Verdun Army to have earned the testimony of the great assembly which incarnates and immortalizes the genius of the French tongue and the French race. The Army of Verdun has had the good fortune to answer to the appeal addressed to it by the country. Thanks to its heroic tenacity the offensive of the Allies has already made brilliant progress . . . and the Germans are not at Verdun. But their task is not yet finished. No Frenchman will have earned his rest so long as there remains a single enemy upon the soil of France, of Alsace, or Lorraine. In order to enable the allied offensive to develop in freedom, and later on to lead us to final victory, we shall continue to resist the assaults of our implacable enemies, who, in spite of the sacrifice



BEFORE DOUAUMONT.

French Officers watching effect of Artillery fire.



BEFORE VERDUN : TAKING SOUP TO THE FIRING-LINE.

of the half-million men which Verdun has already cost them, have not given up their vain hopes. And, soldiers of the Eleventh Army, you will not be content with resistance ; you will go on biting in order to keep in front of you by a constant threat the largest possible number of enemy forces, until the approaching hour of the general offensive has struck. The past is a guarantee of the future ; you will not fail in your sacred mission, and you will thus acquire further claims upon the gratitude of your country, and of the allied nations."

The effect upon Germany may be clearly indicated in a few quotations from the German Press, which towards the middle of June, with the Russian victories in process of development, looked at the great gamble of Verdun with somewhat melancholy eyes. The *Kölnische Volkszeitung*, for instance, the chief organ of the Roman Catholic Centre party, which had distinguished itself from even the rest of the German Press by the virulence of its hatred of France, published towards the end of June an article headed "The Goal Not Yet Reached,"



THE ENTRANCE TO FORT ST. MICHEL.

in which, after expressing its astonishment at the colossal Russian attacks in Galicia and Vollandia, it said: "On their side, the French, in spite of the considerable sacrifices they are making at Verdun, are continuing a resistance which will take its place among the great military feats of all ages. They are proving that they will shrink from nothing in order to deprive us of the benefits of our past victories. No one knows when or how this war will finish, nor whether certain past hopes will be realized. It is better not to speak about it."

The *Hamburger Fremdenblatt*, in the same strain of censored melancholy, said: "It does not matter much if Verdun fall or not. Possession of this or of that fortress is of little value. What we must know is if the war is going to be of profit to one of the belligerent Powers, and if that profit is worth the price it will cost."

Neutral opinion summed up the situation created by the splendid defence of Verdun in the words of a Spanish paper: "In no sector of the vast front which they defend will the Germans be able to make a finer effort than that of Verdun, and, if they are not victorious in front of the great Lorraine fortress, the Empire

is lost, for it will not have the necessary elements for defence against simultaneous attack."

Perhaps the most striking testimony to the value of the stand at Verdun is to be found in a study of the disposition of the Allied troops in France. Apart from the relief of the French trench army by the British the German offensive had led to no considerable change. The Germans had every advantage to gain by forcing on an attack by the British, by obliging Britain to carry out big operations before the training of her new Armies and the provision of her new artillery rendered such operations advisable. They failed in this, as they had failed in driving home every one of their partial successes in the field.

The fighting at Verdun was by no means over. It was destined to remain for long an open sore. Both Germans and French saw in it a means of relieving pressure on the Somme, but as will be seen, the whole aspect of the struggle before Verdun was changed when the French and British leapt from their trenches on both sides of the Somme, in the great offensive that began on July 1.

CHAPTER CXXXIX.


AUSTRIAN OFFENSIVE OF MAY, 1916, IN THE TRENTINO: ITALIAN POLITICS.

THE WINTER OF 1915—SITUATION IN THE SPRING—THE COL DI LANA—CAPTURE OF THE ADAMELLO GLACIER—AUSTRIAN CONCENTRATION IN THE TRENTINO—ANALYSIS OF THE MAY OFFENSIVE—INADEQUATE ITALIAN PREPARATIONS—DESCRIPTION OF THE AUSTRIAN GAINS—THREAT TO THE VENETIAN PLAIN—GENERAL CADORNA'S PLANS—THE NEW FIFTH ARMY—THE TURN OF THE TIDE—AUSTRIAN RETIREMENT—RESULTS OF THE CAMPAIGN—THE POLITICAL SITUATION—DECLINE AND FALL OF THE SALANDRA GOVERNMENT—ITALY AND GERMANY—NATIONAL DEMAND FOR MORE VIGOROUS PROSECUTION OF THE WAR—A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT UNDER BOSELLI.

THE first months of 1916 saw an inevitable lull on the Italian front. Our Allies had carried on offensive operations right up to the turn of the year, well beyond the limit which had seemed to be set by weather conditions, but winter could no longer be defied. Deep snow covered the mountains and all the upper valleys, and mist began to lie thick on the lower ground, especially on the Isonzo, preventing accurate artillery preparation and support. By Christmas men were coming South on leave, and they continued to be sent home in relays throughout the winter and early spring.

There was a lull during these months, as far as heavy fighting went, but all winter through the opposing armies were feeling for each other, worrying each other, testing each other's lines for weak points, harassing communications by long-range artillery fire, and, above all, working to make ready against the coming of spring. Only to keep the line on the mountain front meant bitter and ceaseless toil, for the snow and the Alpine storms imposed an effort and a strain greater than in any other theatre of war. To get food and fuel and clothing up to the front lines, at anything from 5,000 to 10,000 feet

above the sea, implied a struggle that can have no parallel in warfare. The Austrians were no longer the chief enemy. Frostbite threatened continually, and the rigours of a winter at extreme altitudes found out any weakness in physique. On the whole the health of the troops was wonderful. The dangers of frostbite were minimized by the provision of special foot-gear and by insistence upon proper precautions, while the well-equipped encampments that were huddled among the snows gave adequate shelter against the terrible driving tempests that sweep the Alps in winter. The task of furnishing supplies was made difficult and dangerous by frequent avalanches. A number of supply trains were buried on their way to the front lines, and a loss of this kind was a double disaster. Not only was the convoy destroyed, but men at the front had sometimes to go hungry and cold for lack of food and fuel, for it took time to re-open communications. The problem was eventually solved, or nearly solved, by the construction of *teleferiche* or *filovie* (they went by both names at the front)—aerial cable railways that carried a load of nearly half a ton. In this way supplies and munitions were rapidly conveyed to the highest points, and



AN ITALIAN SIEGE GUN.

where this method of transit was possible the danger from avalanches was largely avoided.

All along the front the work of fortification and preparation went on. The hard-won positions on the Carso were made much less "unhealthy" by the construction of main and communication trenches cut deep in the rock, and by the excavation of dug-outs which were really "blasted-outs." The task of the Italians in this sector had been made much more arduous owing to the difficulty of constructing and adapting trenches as they advanced, and by the lack of cover for supporting troops. Their lines were greatly strengthened during the winter, and while this ensured smaller losses in the event of an Austrian attack, they also provided a much better "take-off" for a forward movement.

Military and political conferences at Paris in March, 1916, following upon M. Briand's visit to Rome, showed that the idea of united and simultaneous action had finally been accepted by each member of the Quadruple Entente, and in Italy, as elsewhere, the day when all the Allies should strike together was eagerly expected. At the end of March, when the tremendous pressure brought against the French lines round Verdun seemed almost to go beyond

human resistance, there was a considerable movement in Italy in favour of sending direct assistance to France. Senator Humbert's appeals in the French Press were backed by various Italian newspapers and found special support among the "Interventionists of the Left," who looked with favour on any step which should associate Italy more closely and clearly with her Allies. As the military authorities, and those who were *au fait* with the general situation, realized, and as events were later to prove, such a step would have done no service to the common cause. But the desire for united action was growing ever stronger, and when the Italian guns began to thunder on the Isonzo, at the end of March, there was a general feeling of satisfaction throughout the country. The heavy bombardment which took place, and the infantry actions which followed, were in fact only a "bluff," though considerable losses were incurred on both sides. No general attack was intended; the increase of activity was due to the news that Austrian guns were being sent to France, and it was essential to prevent any such movement.

During April two actions of special interest, if not of first-class importance, took place on the mountain front. It has been explained in

Chapter CIX.* how after the taking of Col di Lana on November 9, it was found impossible to hold the summit so gallantly won by Colonel "Peppino" Garibaldi. The Italians held the greater part of the mountain, but the Austrians still clung to the far slope of the main peak. It was decided to tunnel through the peak during the winter months and blow the Austrian garrison off its last foothold on the mountain which had seen so much hard fighting. The operation, which took three months to complete, was entirely successful. A fortnight before the work was finished the Austrians realized their danger and drove counter-mines into the mountain. One of these was exploded, but its direction was wrong, and on the night of April 17 the vast Italian mine was touched off, and the fragments of the Austrian position were rushed by an infantry attack. The mine crater was 150 feet wide and nearly 50 feet deep. For some days the Austrian artillery fire from the west made things very uncomfortable for the Italians, but the new lines were soon firmly established, and a further advance was made along the ridges of Monte Sief and the Settsass.

* Vol. VII., p. 76.

About the time that the Col di Lana mine was nearing completion, the commander of a "group" of Alpini, Colonel Giordana, was preparing an attack that stands alone in the history of mountain warfare. On the western frontier of the Trentino, the Adamello range, with its vast glacier, seemed to oppose an impassable barrier between the Italians and the valleys that run down from it towards the Adige. In the summer of 1915 small raiding parties had fought on the glacier, and on the dreary rocks that rise above it, but Colonel Giordana believed that by this seemingly impossible route the Austrian lines might be seriously invaded. His plans were compromised by the necessity of detaching the greater part of his command to another sector of the front, but he determined to carry out the first portion of his scheme, the seizure of the Austrian positions on the far side of the glacier, with the lessened forces that remained to him.

The huge Adamello glacier is cut by three rock ridges running roughly parallel, north and south. The eastern and western ridges are almost on the edge of the glacier, and these were lightly held by Austrian and Italian posts. But



ACROSS A MOUNTAIN TORRENT.
An Italian surprise-attack across a river.

early in April the Austrians sent forward outposts to the central ridge, which runs from Lobbia Bassa by Lobbia Alta and Dossen di Genova to Mont Fumo. They were not long left in peace. On the night of April 11, 300 Alpini, clothed in their white winter uniform, left the Rifugio Garibaldi on skis and reached the glacier by way of the Brizio Pass. Here, at 10,000 feet above the sea, they entered a region that is polar in its aspect—and in its severity, for here they met with a wild Arctic storm. They lost their way in the turmoil of wind and snow, but kept going all night to escape the death that would have gripped them if they stopped. The morning found them scattered over the glacier. All hope of surprise was gone, and the Austrians had machine guns on the central ridge. They



THE ADAMELLO RANGE.

divided into two columns, and in spite of their weariness and heavy losses, succeeded in storming the Austrian positions on Lobbia Alta and Dossen di Genova. The Austrians were nearly all killed or captured. But this was only the first step. Seventeen days later, on the evening of April 29, 2,000 Alpini set out from the Rifugio Garibaldi. It was a very clear, starry night, and by 5 o'clock in the morning the Alpini, who were in three columns, found themselves under the eastern ridge. The central column had the easiest work. The Austrians had left the highest point, Crozzon di Lares, to shelter on a lower saddle. When they sighted the Alpini beneath them it was a race for the peak, but the Alpini outpaced the enemy and were first by a few minutes. By the occupation of the Crozzon di Lares the lower saddle and the Passo di Lares were completely domin-

ated, and the Austrians made no attempt to attack, retiring eastwards along the ridge that runs to the Crozzon del Diavolo. The northern column had a stiff fight before it could gain possession of the Topeti Pass and the peak to the north of it, the Crozzon di Fargorida, but here, too, the Austrians were driven back. The southern column had a harder task. The approaching march, by way of "the Englishmen's Pass," between the highest peak of the Adamello and Corno Bianco, had been longer and more difficult, and the ridge that faced the advancing troops seemed to make a frontal attack impossible. The men were very weary; one or two actually died of exhaustion and cold as they moved to the advance. A small flanking party was sent out under a volunteer officer, and while the main body advanced slowly and drew the Austrian fire, this handful of men scaled a rock pinnacle north of the Passo di Cavento and turned the enemy's position. When the flanking party, after a two hours' climb, reached their goal, the main body attacked furiously, and after a struggle that lasted many hours the position was won. Most of the Austrians were killed or taken prisoners; only a few succeeded in making their escape across the Lares glacier. A fortnight later the Italians completed their occupation of the eastern ridge and also occupied the Crozzon del Diavolo, the highest point of the ridge that divides the Fargorida and Lares glaciers. The accounts of the undertaking emphasize the support given by the Italian artillery, which had been hoisted into impossible places. Even a battery of six-inch guns had been brought up to the western edge of the Adamello glacier.


These are only the barest facts. It is impossible to convey in a few words a just idea of the skill and toil and hardship involved in the conduct of the operations. A volunteer subaltern who was with the southern column found the right word: "epic." Imagination must do the rest, and even imagination can only serve those who know the glaciers of the high Alps, not in the tourist season, but when the year is changing from winter to summer.

As a result of the operations the Italians dominated the heads of the valleys which run down to the Val Giudicaria, and particularly the Val di Genova. The occupation of the new positions enabled the Italians to threaten from the flank the Austrian lines opposing the Italian advance in the Val Giudicaria, and it was hoped



LOWERING A WOUNDED SOLDIER FROM THE MOUNTAIN HEIGHTS.

An Italian method of lowering the stretchers in a sling along a guiding-rope. On the lower level Red Cross orderlies, at a hospital tent, control the descent.



THE AREA OF THE AUSTRIAN OFFENSIVE.

that the operations might be fruitful of result as the season became more favourable.*

It has been said that Colonel Giordana had to see the withdrawal of the greater part of his command at the very moment when he was preparing his arduous enterprise. This withdrawal was due to the expectation of an Austrian offensive on an important scale to the east of the Adige valley. The Italian Intelligence Department was aware of a very large concentration of men and material in the neighbourhood of Trento, and it was evident that the Austrians were preparing for operations on a scale quite different from anything that had been hitherto seen on that part of the front. In view of the *terrain*, the greatest possible number of Alpine troops were dispatched to the scene of the expected fighting, and Colonel Giordana's men were sent to the Eastern Trentino.

* Colonel Giordana was promoted Major-General, and transferred to the Eastern Trentino, where he was shortly afterwards killed.

The Austrian concentration had been carried out very gradually. The Trentino front had been reinforced at the end of November, 1915, and all through the winter troops and guns were being quietly conveyed from the Russian front, or from the depôts and munition factories within the Empire. It was certainly the belief of the Austrian Command that the Russians would be incapable of any important offensive action in the early summer, and they had every hope that they would be able to carry out what the heir to the Habsburg throne, in an address to his troops, termed a "*Straf-expedition*," before any danger could threaten from the East. The Italian Command, of course, knew what the enemy did not know, the real condition of the Russian armies, and they doubtless assumed that the enemy Intelligence Department was better informed than it actually was. Doubtless, also, they were misled by the gradualness and secrecy with which the Austrians carried out their preparations. In any event, they miscalculated the extent of the coming Austrian

effort. They believed in a hard push, and took measures to meet it, though on certain parts of the line the local commanders had not realized the absolute necessity of unlimited spadework, in the literal sense. But the Italian Command was not prepared for the hammer-stroke that came in the middle of May.

On May 14 the Austrians began a very heavy bombardment along the whole front from the Val Giudicaria to the sea, but it was quickly evident, even if it had not already been foreseen, that the enemy's offensive was to be concentrated upon the comparatively short front between the Val Lagarina and the Val Sugana, and particularly upon the sector between the Val Lagarina and the Upper Astico. On May 15 the Austrians followed up the initial bombardment by massed infantry attacks all along this sector.


Here it will be well to recapitulate the information given in Chapter CLIX. regarding the positions which the Italians held in the Eastern Trentino, and to add a further description of the *terrain* which was to be the scene of a long and desperate struggle.

When the Austrian attack began, the Italian line east of the Val Lagarina ran from just south of Rovereto up the Val Terragnolo north

of Col Santo (6,830 feet), which is the northern ridge of the great *Pasubio massif* (highest point 7,335 feet), as far as Monte Maronia (5,540 feet); thence in front of the Folgaria group of fortifications to Soglio d'Aspio (4,375 feet). From Soglio d'Aspio it went back eastward. The Italians had made no impression on the fortified lines of the Lavarone plateau and their positions followed a line not far west of the old frontier as far as Cima Manderiolo (6,665 feet); whence they ran northward across the Valle Maggio and the Val Sugana to Monte Collo, a point north-west of Borgo; thence north-eastward to the Val Calamento. There were other advanced posts outside this main line, but they were of little importance, and indeed it is misleading to term this the main line, though it was all effectively occupied by Italian troops. There were certain positions, the occupation of which formed part of an offensive scheme, which were obviously untenable in the face of an Austrian attack in force. Zugna Torta and the slopes leading down to Rovereto formed a dangerously exposed salient, commanded from the west by the Austrian positions on Biaena, on the north by Monte Ghello, and on the north-east by the fortified lines of Finonchio. The lines in the Val Terragnolo were very much exposed, and Soglio d'Aspio, flanked by the



ITALIAN TROOPS IN THEIR FIRST-LINE TRENCHES.



AN ITALIAN COUNTER-OFFENSIVE IN THE TRENITINO: THE RECAPTURE OF ASIAGO.
Italian troops driving the enemy through the burning streets, which were set fire to by the retreating Austrians.

great Lavarono-Luserna plateau on the north, was practically in the air. The real Italian defensive line ran from Serravalle in the Val Lagarina by Malga Zugna across the Vallarsa to Pasubio; from Pasubio by the Boreola Pass to Monte Maggio (5,730 feet), and thence, leaving the exposed frontier, by Monte Toraro (6,175 feet), and Monte Campomolon (6,030 feet) to Spitz Tonezza (5,512 feet); thence along the highest part of the Sette Comuni plateau to Cima Portule (7,510 feet), and thence across the Val Sugana to the slopes east of the Maso stream.

But this line was not satisfactory, especially the sector between the Val Posina and the Upper Astico. Experience had shown that massed infantry attacks, if preceded by a sufficiently shattering artillery fire, can generally win a footing in the first-line system of defences. In level or nearly level country the various lines of defence may follow one another at very short intervals, and the breaking of a section of the front line need not very greatly affect the position as a whole. In hilly country the lines of defence are conditioned by the nature of the ground. A second line may have to be a considerable distance from the first, in order to give its defenders a fair chance of resistance, and the occupation of one dominating point in a line has a greater effect than it has in level country. Good positions in a mountainous country make the best line a defender can hope for. A bad mountain position leaves him much worse off than in the plains.

Between the Val Posina and the Upper Astico the Italian position was bad. It has already been explained how the main defences of the Arsiero plateau had to run along the line Monte Maggio, Monte Toraro, Monte Campomolon, Spitz Tonezza. But this defensive line had nothing to back it. The ground falls away south-eastwards in a long glacis that drops steeply at last to the Posina valley on the south and the Astico on the east. The position was bad by nature, and only the most careful and complete preparation could have made it a really stout bulwark against a determined attack. And that preparation was lacking.

In the first place, the Italians were short of guns. This shortage had handicapped them in their attacks on the Isonzo line, and it had not yet been made up, though great progress had been effected in the output of war material, and France had supplied some heavy howit-



GENERAL PECORI-GIRALDI.
Commanded the First Army.

zers of a new type. In the second place, the dispositions taken by the general commanding the First Army, and by some of the local commanders, were not only insufficient, but, as far as they went, unskilful.

In Chapter CIX. it was said that in their gallant offensive actions on the Isonzo in 1915 the Italians had suffered from a lack of technique in trench warfare. But the armies on the Isonzo, officers and men, had been gradually hammered by the stress of hard fighting into splendidly efficient weapons, well able to deal with the new conditions of war. In the Trentino it was otherwise. There had been a good deal of desultory fighting and a great deal of artillery work throughout the year that had elapsed since the beginning of the war. But no serious offensive had been undertaken by the Italians, and the enemy had never even tested the Italian lines. It seems certain that General Roberto Brusati, the General in command of the First Army, had failed to realize the nature of a modern offensive on the grand scale, and that some of his officers were equally lacking in insight. It is understood that General Brusati fully believed in the imminence of the Austrian offensive, unlike some of his subordinates, who declared it to be practically impossible. If this be true, there is the less

excuse for the condition of unpreparedness in which a part of the front under his command was found to be.

It has been said that the Italian Command miscalculated the extent of the coming offensive. General Cadorna was correctly informed of the number of enemy troops concentrated in the Trentino, and he had detailed sufficient reinforcements to cope with the attack which he expected. He did not expect, however, the immense weight of artillery which was massed upon the front between the Val Lagarina and the Val Sugana. It would appear, too, that he did not exactly anticipate the direction of the Austrian attack. The Austrian concentration at Trento, and the excellent system of roads which branches south and south-eastwards through the Eastern Trentino, permitted an attacking force to be thrown at any point on the Italian line. The Italian lateral communications in the uplands were not favourable. A great deal had been done in the way of making roads, but the lie of the country complicated the problem. General Cadorna's strategic reserves had to be concentrated in the plain, and from the course of the fighting which followed it seems that he had rather expected the main Austrian efforts to be directed against the wings of the Italian forces in the Eastern Trentino, along the parallel highways of the Val Lagarina and the Vallarsa on the west, and the Val Sugana on the east. He had good grounds for such a calculation. There is a railway both in the Val Lagarina and in the Val Sugana, and the *terrain* in the centre is very difficult for heavy artillery. An enveloping movement seemed on the whole more likely than a drive at the centre.

Towards the end of April General Cadorna transferred his quarters to the First Army. It may be deduced that he was not satisfied with the dispositions taken, for within a few days General Brusati was deprived of his command,* and General Pecori-Giraldi was appointed to the First Army. General Pecori-Giraldi had been under a cloud when the war began. He had been sent home in disgrace from Tripoli at the end of 1911, on grounds which it was difficult to recognize as adequate, and there is too much reason to believe that political considerations led to his recall. General Cadorna


had always held a very high opinion of General Pecori-Giraldi, and when the war broke out he was given a division in reserve. He was soon transferred to the front line, where his work earned him promotion to the command of an army corps. He was now to be tested very severely. He took over the First Army too late to be able to repair the deficiencies in the preparations made by his predecessor, and before he had time to grip his command the enemy blow fell.

The bombardment which opened the Austrian offensive came as a very unwelcome surprise to the defending army. It was at once evident that the amount of heavy and medium-calibre artillery at the enemy's disposal was very large in proportion to his numbers, and the storm of high explosive which was directed against the Italian lines soon found out the weak spots. The concentration of Austrian artillery was certainly formidable. Well over 2,000 guns (one detailed account which should be correct put the number in the Trentino at 2,400) were collected on a front of less than 30 miles. Of these nearly 800 were of medium or large calibre. There were not less than 40 12-inch Skoda howitzers on the narrow front, and in addition there were three, or possibly four, German 420's, and a couple of 15-inch naval guns. At least eighteen Austrian divisions were concentrated in the Trentino, and the attacking force which was thrown against the front between the Val Lagarina and the Val Sugana consisted of 15 divisions, all of them picked first-line troops. In all some 350,000 men were launched upon the *Straf-expedition*.

It was soon clear that the main drive was to be in the centre. No fewer than 30 of the 305's were massed on the Folgaria and Lavarone plateaux. In this sector, too, were the 420's, and the big naval guns. One of the latter was placed at Cost' Alta, near the road that runs from Monte Rovere to Vezzena under the old fort of Busa di Verle. From this point 15-in. shells were flung into Asiago, 11 miles away. A torrent of high-explosive was poured unceasingly on the main Italian positions, and the roads leading up to them on the Asiago and Arsiero plateaux were subjected to a very severe *tir de barrage*.

As the Austrian infantry attack developed the Italians withdrew from their advanced positions, taking heavy toll of the enemy before they went. The first forward movements took place on the wings, against Zugra

* General Brusati was placed *a disposizione* on May 13. On May 25 his case was deliberated by the Cabinet, and he was retired from the Army by a special Government decree.



INFANTRY ADVANCING UNDER HEAVY SHRAPNEL FIRE.

A concealed Italian machine gun assisting an advance. The advancing infantry, on all fours, are carrying bags filled with sand on their backs to protect them from the flying bullets.

Torta and the Armentera ridge (south of the Brenta, between Levico and Roncegno). The Italians lost a good many prisoners in the outlying positions near Rovereto, where they counter-attacked several times, but the enemy paid dearly for the ground won. On

May 17 five separate infantry attacks on Zugna Torta were repulsed with heavy loss, but the following day Zugna Torta was evacuated, the Italians retiring upon their prepared positions at Malga Zugna. The Armentera ridge was evacuated two days later. Mean-



COUNT OF TURIN (on right)
In Command of Italian Cavalry.

while the Austrian advance in the centre was developing under cover of a ceaseless fire from guns of every calibre. On May 18 the line running northward from Monte Maggio to Soglio d'Aspio was abandoned, in accordance with expectation, but the following day a very serious loss befell the Italians, who were driven off the Monte Toraro—Monte Campomolon-Spitz Tonezza line. This was the sector of the Trentino front where preparation had been specially necessary and where it had been notably lacking. The troops, without adequate cover against the storm of heavy shells, had little chance, and they were further handicapped by a shortage of field and mountain artillery. The position seems to have been arranged as though the Italians were on the offensive. The big guns were well forward, and there were not enough field and mountain guns to hold back the advancing masses of the enemy. One brigade broke under the tremendous strain: the Austrians gained a footing on the main Italian line before reinforcements could arrive, and took a very considerable number of prisoners. The Italian centre was now practically gone, and the Austrians were pressing hard on the left. The Italians had fallen back from Col Santo upon Pasubio, and both here and against Coni Zugna a very strong attack was developing. Between the

Astico and the Val Sugana the fighting was now equally furious. The Italians were holding their own, and had succeeded in winning back various points that they had lost in the first onslaught. But the whole position was prejudiced by the loss of the only line that could defend the Arsiero plateau, and our Allies were outgunned in the Sette Comuni as well as farther south. On May 20 the Austrians pushed farther forward through the hole in the centre, occupying the Cimon dei Laghi and the Cima di Mesole. They also occupied the Boreola Pass. The Alpini on the Coston dei Laghi, between the Boreola and Monte Maggio, repulsed a determined infantry attack, but their position was quite untenable, and they were withdrawn.

On May 20, after the break in the centre, General Cadorna, who had assumed supreme control of the operations, decided to withdraw his whole centre line. His plan involved a considerable sacrifice of territory, but he had little alternative. A counter-attack upon the Campomolon-Spitz Tonezza positions, delivered by reserves who had been hurried to the spot, had failed, and it was essential to find favourable positions for further resistance. It has been explained that the plateau falls right away from the Campomolon line until it drops into



THE DUKE D'AOSTA
With his son, Prince Amadio, at the front.



ENTRANCE TO AN ITALIAN GENERAL'S UNDERGROUND QUARTERS.

the Posina and Astico valleys. It was to the south of the Posina and east of the Astico that General Cadorna traced his new line. But this retreat implied a corresponding withdrawal in the Sette Comuni, and the line chosen ran from Cima Portule, east of the Val d'Assa, and east and south of Asiago.

On May 21 the withdrawal began, and it was conducted without much interference from the enemy, who had suffered very heavily, and were engaged in consolidating the positions they had won. By May 24 the Italians were, for the most part, south of the Posina and east of the Astico and the Assa, leaving only skeleton rearguards to contain the enemy's advance as long as possible. But the situation was still far from satisfactory. There was no time to dig in deeply on the new positions; the Austrians had a great preponderance in artillery, and it was clear that in a few days at most the second phase of the attack would begin, with the Austrians coming downhill. Moreover, everything hung upon the wings holding firm, and the Austrians were attacking Pasubio and the Coni Zugna ridge with very large forces and many guns. Pasubio was now a salient, for the Austrians had pushed up the Vallarsa

towards the old frontier between Pasubio and Monte di Mezzo. They were hurling infantry attacks up the eastern slopes of the Coni Zugna-Cima Mezzana ridge, and it was clear that even more determined efforts were still to come both here and at Pasubio, which was under a very heavy bombardment. The troops that had withdrawn to the south of the Posina depended absolutely upon Pasubio standing fast, and if any serious progress were to be made by the enemy in the Vallarsa, Pasubio was gone.

The position was critical, and General Cadorna had to contemplate the possibility of the Austrians reaching the Venetian plain. On the morning of May 21 he gave the order to draw up plans for the formation of a new Army, to be concentrated in the Vicenza district, and by midday on May 22 the plans were finished and approved and the necessary orders given. The formation of this new Army will be described later on; for the moment it is enough to say that it was in place, and ready, by June 2.

But meanwhile things were going badly on the Italian right, or rather on the right of the centre, in the highlands of the Sette Comuni. On the extreme right, in the Val Sugana and among

the hills to the north, the Italians had retired slowly and methodically to the positions chosen on the hills east of the little river Maso, which falls into the Brenta near Strigno. They had dealt the enemy some shrewd blows as they retired. But by May 24 the Austrians were pressing hard upon the Italian positions to the east of the Val d'Assa. On the following day they succeeded in advancing to the north of the valley, breaking the Portule line and occupying the height of Corno di Campo Verde (6,815 ft.). Owing to a misunderstanding the Alpini evacuated the practically impregnable positions of Cima Undici (7,140 ft.) and Cima Dodici (7,610 ft.) before the Austrians attacked; but the mistake was of little consequence, for on May 26 the Austrians, attacking to the east of the Val d'Assa, succeeded in driving the Italians back from the whole range running down from Corno di Campo Verde to Monte Meatta, between the Val d'Assa and the Valle di Galmarara. Owing to this success of the enemy Cima Undici and Cima Dodici would have had to be abandoned in any case. The fighting on May 26 was very stiff, and both sides lost heavily, but the Italians were still completely outgunned. They retired across the Galmarara, leaving behind them a number of prisoners who were cut off from retreat, and it was clear already that they would have to go farther still. On May 27 the enemy crossed the lower waters of the Galmarara torrent and occupied part of Monte Mosciagh (or Moschicce). A very fierce struggle took place on this mountain on May 27 and 28. The Italians fought very stubbornly, and before they finally withdrew farther east a brilliant counter-attack by the 141st Regiment (Catanzaro brigade) succeeded in bringing away two batteries which had been isolated.

But the word was still: "Go back." General Cadorna required time for the assembling of his new army, and General Pecori-Giraldi had to gain it for his chief. He had to hold the Austrians for a fixed time, but he had always to be able to extricate his troops. He had to keep his lines intact in order to permit the formation of the new lines behind him. When too hard pressed he had to fall back as long as there were positions left for him to fall back upon; the time had not yet come for his men to die where they stood on the uplands of the Sette Comuni.

On the left, and on the left of the centre, that time had already come. On May 24, after a very heavy bombardment, the Austrians attacked all along the line from Coni Zugna to

Pasubio. They came forward in masses, in the early morning, against both sides of Coni Zugna, against the Pass that divides Coni Zugna from Cima di Mezzana—the Passo di Buole—and against Pasubio; but they were everywhere repulsed with heavy loss. Before midday they renewed the attack against Passo di Buole, but were again flung back, and the Italians, counter-attacking, occupied the position of Parmesan, south-east of the Pass, on the northern slope of Cima di Mezzana. The artillery thundered all day, and on the following morning the enemy came again to the assault, in compact masses. A brigade which was sent against the Passo di Buole was literally exterminated. None went back. For six days the fighting continued, practically without ceasing. The enemy showed the utmost bravery, but nothing could shake the resistance of the 37th Division (Sicilia and Taro brigades—61st, 62nd, 207th, 208th regiments) who occupied the Zugna ridge. It was old-fashioned fighting, except for the guns, for the trenches were makeshift affairs, where they existed at all, and when the enemy approached the Italians leapt at them with the bayonet. On May 30 the Austrians made their last attack in mass on the Passo di Buole. Again and again they came up the slopes, but the 62nd and 207th regiments, who held the Pass, never moved a yard, except when they dashed forward to finish their work with the bayonet. On this day alone it is calculated that 7,000 Austrians were killed, and during the six days' fighting they lost some 40 per cent. of their infantry effectives in this sector. After their failure on June 30 their efforts slackened and their methods changed. They came forward in lines instead of in masses, and it almost seemed as though their attacks were rather directed to keeping the Italians occupied than inspired by any real hope of success. Stubborn fighting still went on, but the fury and intensity of the enemy's onslaught were dulled.

The resistance at the Passo di Buole was more than a splendid feat of arms. It saved Pasubio, and on the fate of Pasubio depended the fate of the Italian line south of the Posina. All the weight they could bring to bear was flung by the Austrians against this bulwark. For weeks the heavy guns thundered against the Italian positions, and wave after wave of massed infantry was dashed to pieces against those granite lines. The Austrians advanced from Col Santo along the great ridge; they came up from the Val Terragnolo by the Boreola Pass, from Anghebeni and



ITALY'S MOUNTAINEERS.

Alpini scaling the rugged mountain sides on the Austrian front.



ASPHYXIATING GAS CYLINDERS AND GRENADES

Captured by the Italians.

Chiesa in the Vallarsa. For three weeks they outnumbered the Italians by four to one in this sector, and their artillery superiority was immense, as all along the front. But neither massed men nor massed guns, nor both together, could break a way through. The conditions were terrible for both sides, for in May and June snow still lay deep on the high ridges. Italians and Austrians struggled in the snow, but the Italians had also to sleep in the snow, and there were often 200 cases of frostbite in a day. The defenders knew the immense importance of their task. They knew that if the Pasubio angle were smashed in the Austrians would almost inevitably roll up the Italian line south of the Posina, and find two good open roads to the plain by way of Valli di Signori, while the Lower Astico would also be freed for the enemy's advance. They knew what depended upon their standing fast, and they stood—stood like the everlasting hills upon which so many earned a glorious grave. When the details of the fighting in the Trentino are forgotten by all save those who make a study of military history, Italians will remember, and Italy's Allies should remember, how the troops on Zugna and Pasubio blocked the advance of the Austrian right and so held up the tide of invasion.

It has already been said that on May 24 the Italians had practically completed their withdrawal from the region between the

Posina and the Astico and were concentrating south and east, respectively, of these two streams. On the same day the Austrian artillery opened fire from the positions on the Monte Maggio-Campomolon line, from which the Italians had been driven five days before, and the infantry were already pouring down the slopes of the tilted plateau. On May 25 the enemy entered the hamlet of Bettale on the Upper Posina, and occupied the south-eastern limb of the Tonezza plateau, that rises sheer-sided, like an immense battleship, between the Rio Freddo and the Astico, and ends in the peak of Monte Cimone (4,031 ft.), completely dominating the Arsiero basin. The next day they were down in the Astico valley and close upon Arsiero. On May 28 the Austrians crossed the Posina in force, and on the following day battle was joined all along the slopes to the south of the stream. Particularly heavy fighting took place beneath Sogli di Campiglia and Pria Forà (5,415 ft.), and the Italians fell back on the mountain line, which they had orders to hold at all costs. This line ran from Forni Alti (the extreme eastern section of the Pasubio *massif*) by the Colle di Xomo (3,438 ft.), Monte Spin (4,630 ft.), and Malga Vaccarezze (4,730 ft.) to Pria Forà; it was practically the last line of defence in



IN THE TRENCHES.
Firing a big Italian gun.

the mountains. Behind Malga Nomo and Monto Spin lay the Val Leogra. Behind Malga Vaccarezze and Pria Forà the line Monte Cogolo (5,390 ft.), Monto Novegna (5,046 ft.), and Monte Brazome (4,028 ft.) formed the very last bulwark. Beneath lay Schio and the Venetian plain.

The Italians withdrew from the valley on the evening of May 29, and the troops that were ordered to occupy Pria Forà lost their way in the dark. Instead of reaching the main height they struck too far to the south and halted on Monte Ciove, the ridge that runs towards Novegna and Brazome. When dawn came Pria Forà frowned on them from the north, and the Austrians were in possession. Pria Forà is only about 200 ft. higher than the southern ridge, but the drop is almost precipitous, except for a narrow approach, and the enemy was already in force, having come up the easy northern slopes. A desperate attack failed to win the main height and the Italians were thrown back on Monte Ciove.

The position looked bad. Monte Ciove lay bare to the Austrian fire from Pria Forà as well as to the heavy artillery across the Posina, and it seemed almost untenable. But reinforcements were sent up and the order was given by the general commanding the sector



ITALIAN TRANSPORT
In a Mountain Pass.

that there must be no going back. June 1 seemed a happy date for the Austrians. Pria Forà not only commanded the Italian positions to the south; it looked down upon the Lower Astico from the west, and Monte Cengio on the other side of the valley was already threatened by the troops coming down the Upper Astico. Punta Corbin had been evacuated by the Italians two days before, and the enemy were spreading over the south-western corner of the Asiago plateau, north-east of Arsiero. On June 1 the Austrian Command issued an Army Order to the troops in the Posina sector, saying that only one mountain remained between them and the plain.

The Italian line ran across the Lower Astico, just below Arsiero from Monte Brazome by Quaro, Velo d'Astico, Seghe, and Schiri to the slopes of Monte Cengio, and here, too, the fight was soon raging. Only four miles from where the valley gives on to the Venetian plain. On June 1 a furious storm of shells was hurled against the whole Italian line from Colle di Nomo to Rocchette, at the entrance to the plain, and determined infantry attacks were delivered against Monte Spin and the Seghe-Schiri line. They were thrown back with heavy loss. The Italian artillery, particularly



AN ITALIAN PATROL,
With machine gun, in the Trentino.

the field artillery, had been strongly reinforced, and shrapnel fire wrought havoc among the dense columns of the enemy. But Cengio was being hard pressed from the north, where the Austrians occupied Monte Barco.

In the Sette Comuni the Italians were still falling back. Asiago had been evacuated on May 28, and the retirement across the Galmara was followed by a further retreat across the parallel valleys of Nos and Campomulo, the Austrians occupying Monte Baldo (5,450 ft.) and Monte Fiara (5,815 ft.) on May 30, though the Alpini still retained a footing on the latter mountain. Farther north, on June 1, the enemy advanced eastwards from Monte Mandrielle (5,100 ft.) on to Austrian territory. The move sounds peculiar, but it is explained by the fact that here they entered one of the strategical wedges secured by the frontier of 1866—a wedge thrust forward down the Brenta. The enemy were now less than four miles from the Val Sugana at a point well behind the Italian main line of defence in that valley. But communications were bad in this region, and they were to make little more progress here. Nor was the Graz Army Corps, which had pushed back the Italians across the Val Campomulo, to gain many further laurels.

More to the south, however, the position still seemed critical for the Italians. Desperate fighting was going on below Asiago. A brigade of Sardinian Grenadiers was clinging to Monte Cengio, attacked from north and west, and on the plateau to the north-east, a little west of the steam-tramway line that runs to Asiago from the plain, the hill of Belmonte was taken and retaken several times. It seemed as though the Italians must be driven eastward across the Val Canaglia, as, indeed, they were on June 3, but on that very day General Cadorna announced that the Austrian offensive had been stopped all along the line. His new Army was ready, and he had taken the measure of the enemy. A fortnight's heavy fighting had shown him that his troops and their leaders could do what he asked them, and he expressed his confidence in them by the *communiqué* which he issued to the world. There were many days' bitter defensive fighting in front of the Italians. They were still to fall back a little way in the Sette Comuni, but no position of first-class importance was to be lost. Where they withdrew there was ample room for retreat, and it was now General Cadorna's game to draw

and hold the enemy well inside the salient that their great drive had made.

The southern half of the final line, from which there was to be no withdrawal, has already been indicated. It ran from Zugna to Pasubio, thence eastwards to the Val d'Astico, crossing the valley near Velo d'Astico; thence bending backwards to east of the Val Canaglia. Here it ascended the rim of the Asiago plateau and ran by Monte Pau (4,515 ft.) and Magnaboschi (4,420 ft.), south of the Asiago basin, to the Val Frenzela; thence north-eastwards to Monte Lisser (5,310 ft.). From here the line turned north-westward, along the edge of the high, bleak tableland that drops to the Val Sugana, to beneath the line that the enemy had established along the frontier peaks. In tracing this line General Cadorna had issued the following Army Order: "Remember that here we defend the soil of our country and the honour of the Army. These positions are to be defended to the death." His troops did not fail him, and while they stood and died he prepared his counter-stroke.

The Fifth Army was assembled on the plain, complete in all its details, by June 2, exactly ten days after the order for its formation was given. Great reserves had been concentrated in the war zone; between the Tagliamento and the Isonzo in readiness for the offensive that was being prepared against Gorizia and the Carso; east of the Tagliamento, on central positions that allowed a quick move to any part of the front; and in the permanent dépôts of the north. By the night of May 22 the whole of the Venetian plain was amove with troops and their transport—the immense transport required by modern war. In 10 days more than half a million men, with guns, ammunition, and provisions, with countless motor *camions* and endless trains of mule-transport, were ready in the plain to meet the enemy. It was a magnificent feat of organization and energy.

But by June 2 General Cadorna knew that the enemy would never reach the plain, if, indeed, that was their real objective. In addition to forming the Fifth Army he had been able to draw on other reserves to reinforce the lengthening line in the uplands, and fill the gaps. For days the wonderful motor transport of the Italians was moving men and machine-guns and ammunition up to the mountains, while behind them, more slowly, came artillery, and more artillery. The most amazing

fact, or at least the most spectacular, was the transference of an entire division by motor, in a single night, from the Carnic Alps to the Pasubio district. These reinforcements were enough to hold the enemy, and the duty of the Fifth Army became offensive, not defensive.

On June 2 the Fifth Army was ready in the plain, but to prepare the forward move took 10 days more. The difficulties of transport were enormous. The Asiago plateau in particular is very scantily supplied with water. The troops already there had suffered much from thirst, and it was essential to assure an adequate water supply for the greatly-increased forces which were soon to be thrown against the Austrians. And new roads had to be made for transport, or old tracks widened, for the existing roads would not serve General Cadorna's purpose. This purpose was to take the enemy on both flanks—to come up to the Asiago plateau on the right, and drive at Col Santo on the left. The plan required minute and careful preparation, and during the interval between plan and action the Austrians hammered unceasingly at the Pasubio, Posina, Astico and Asiago lines.

For fifteen days the fighting in the Posina sector was heavy and continuous. Every morning the Austrian guns opened fire at 6.30 precisely, and the bombardment never ceased as long as daylight lasted. On June 2, 3 and 4, the enemy delivered massed infantry attacks



ITALIAN CAVALRY PATROL IN THE MOUNTAINS.

Top picture: An officer studying the surrounding country.



THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE HIGH ALPS.

on various parts of the front, from Colle di Nomo to Schiri in the Astico valley, but they were unsuccessful everywhere. On the night of June 4-5, while a violent storm was raging, a furious attack was thrown against Monte Ciove and Monte Brazome, supported by a hail of shells. The Italians never moved, though they were very highly tried, and a similar attack on the night of June 5 had a similar result. The next three days were quieter, and on June 9 the Italians were able to push forward a little and improve their positions in the Monte Novegna sector of the line. June 10 and 11 were comparatively quiet days, but a terrific bombardment began on June 12, and the Austrians attacked all along the line. Their efforts were especially directed against Monte Ciove, and at one time it seemed as though the position could not be held. It was swept and torn by shell, the enemy were advancing in mass, and the brigadier in command sent back word that the pressure was likely to be too strong. The reply of the general commanding the sector was stern and peremptory, and it had the necessary effect. But they were anxious hours. All telephonic communications had been destroyed by the storm of shells. Nearly all the divisional staff were killed or wounded by an unlucky direct hit. Orders had to be given entirely by megaphone or bugle. Battalions and regiments had all but passed out of the general's direction, and he could only trust to officers and men fulfilling his orders to stand fast. His orders were obeyed, and at nightfall the Austrians retreated.

Next morning, under cover of the usual bombardment all along the line, the Austrians made one more attempt upon Monte Ciove. About 11 o'clock, after a furious preliminary shelling, they lifted their fire to the rear of the Italian positions and launched a powerful infantry attack. Nearly all the Italian officers were put out of action, and it was almost impossible to get supporting troops through the curtain fire. The general could not see how the defence was going, so a colonel of the staff climbed to a point of vantage and called through a megaphone to his waiting chief. His voice came through a lull in the storm of fire: "They are holding marvellously." They did not cease to hold, and at 3 o'clock the Austrians fell back. That evening the Cagliari brigade (63rd and 64th regiments), which had held Monte Ciove so gallantly, was relieved by rein-

forcements which had arrived the previous night. The brigade came out of action with only 30 per cent. of its original strength. It had lost 4,000 men on Monte Ciove.

Further attacks were made on Monte Brazome early in the morning of June 14, and again on the evening of the same day. They were easily repulsed, and it was now clear that the Austrian bolt was shot. Even the daily bombardment was soon to slacken, and on the evening of June 23 the 12-inch shell in the direction of divisional headquarters, which had always closed the day's work, came over for 'the last time.

Meanwhile a desperate struggle had been going on in the Sette Comuni, particularly on that part of the plateau which lies to the south of the Asiago basin. On the night of June 3 the Austrians, attacking in greatly superior force, drove the Sardinian Grenadiers off Monte Angio, but not until the brigade had lost far more than half its effectives. They retreated across the Val Canaglia, but the Italians still held the south-western slopes of Cengio, above Schiri, and on the following day they gained some ground in this direction. An attempt to retake the mountain failed, however, and the Austrian pressure grew very heavy, both here and to the north. There were two danger-points: the uplands between the lower Astico and the Asiago basin, and the head of the Val Frenzela, where the Austrians were little more than three miles from Valstagua, low down in the Brenta valley.

From June 4 to June 8 a long and stubborn battle took place on the line running east of the Valle di Campomulo to the head of the Val Frenzela. The Austrian losses were enormous, and they were driven back repeatedly, but on the evening of June 8 the Italians retired a short distance to the eastward, leaving the summit of Casteigonberto (5,928 feet) in the hands of the enemy. At this point the Austrians now came under direct fire from Monte Lisser, and the limit of their advance was reached. Masses of artillery were now being placed in the Monte Lisser sector, reinforcements were arriving daily, and the preparations for the Italian counter-offensive were well under way. Persistent artillery duels followed, but the enemy made no further infantry attacks.

South of Asiago the Austrian effort was more prolonged and more violent. On the evening of June 6 a furious attack was delivered on the Italian positions. The battle raged all



ITALIAN INFANTRYMEN
Carrying anti-aircraft guns.

night, and the enemy were driven back, but on the following afternoon they came again, only to be repulsed once more. They had, however gained a footing on Monte Lemerle, and two days later the Italians were driven off their positions on the summit of the mountain. But the Forli brigade (43rd and 44th regiments), which remained on the south-eastern slopes of Lemerle, yielded no more ground. They were attacked by greatly superior forces on June 10, but they did not move until the moment came for a bayonet charge, when they counter-attacked and scattered the Austrians, pursuing them for some distance before returning to their positions. From June 9 to June 15 they were subjected to repeated attacks and unceasing artillery fire, but, magnificently supported by the new field guns which had now been put in position, they defeated every attempt to overcome their resistance. On June 15 they were reinforced by the 149th regiment, and at 5.30 p.m. their brigadier sent them forward in an irresistible rush which captured the summit of Lemerle. A counter-attack came

at once, but was repulsed. Next day the enemy attacked again and again. Late in the evening they swarmed down over the summit upon the Italian positions, which had been withdrawn 100 yards for the sake of cover. The defenders feigned a retreat, but returned at the moment when the Austrians were triumphantly establishing themselves on the abandoned line. None of the enemy escaped. On June 17 the attacks continued, being directed especially on the line between Lemerle and Magnaboschi. The Forli brigade lost many officers and fell back, but they were reinforced by the 33rd regiment, and their positions were regained. A further desperate onslaught was made on June 18, but it ended in failure. The Austrian situation had become critical. The enemy had realized the development of the Italian counter-offensive, and they staked everything in an attempt to drive a wedge between the Lemerle-Magnaboschi line and the positions east of the Val Canaglia. On a narrow front, well under two miles, they sent in an attacking force of over 20 battalions (the 43rd division, the 24th and 41st infantry, the 20th and 22nd Landwehr). On June 15 the Austrian command had issued an army order to the troops saying that Lemerle would fall in two days, and that afterwards only three mountains lay between them and Milan. But in the four days' fighting they did not gain another yard, and the attack on June 18 was their last effort. These four days tried the Italians very highly. No further reinforcements were available for the moment, and the Forli brigade suffered terrible losses. Only their indomitable courage and the splendid work of the field artillery saved the position.

Farther west, on the Val Canaglia line, the struggle was no less grim, and here the Liguria brigade won for itself a glorious name. This brigade, one of the new formations created during the year of preparation, was territorially recruited and consisted almost entirely of Genoese. They were stationed at an angle where the Italian line bent north-eastward from the Val Canaglia to Magnaboschi and Lemerle. The summit of Monte Pau lay behind them to the south, and to the west and north the Austrian positions faced them in a curved line, running from the eastern slope of Monte Angio, by Monte Barco, Panoccio and Belmonte to Cesuna, with the height of Busibollo thrust forward as a bastion on the near side of the road, and the steam-tramway line running up

the Val Canalgia. The point they held, Zovetta, is not marked save on the largest-scale staff maps, but it is a shoulder of the Monte Pau-Magnaboschi range.

When the Liguria brigade took up its position bad news was coming in both from north and south. The Grenadiers had been driven off Cengio; the Austrians soon gained a footing on Lemerle, and farther to the north Castelgom-berto was evacuated. The Genoese of the Liguria brigade were first attacked in force on the evening of June 6, simultaneously with the attack on Lemerle. They were heavily engaged in the battle of June 10, when they suffered severely from artillery fire. The Austrians had nearly 200 guns on the curved line described above, and the greater part of their fire was directed against the Monte Pau positions. The Italians had not yet placed all their fresh artillery, and the main support of the Genoese was two batteries of mountain guns on Monte Pau. Their heaviest trial, like that of their comrades of the Forli brigade, was to begin on June 15. On that day and the two following the Austrian infantry attacked in force. They were able to concentrate in dead ground, protected from artillery fire, in the valley beneath

Zovetta, and their attacks were persistent. By this time the Genoese had fallen back some 150 yards from the edge of the hill, to a road that crossed the shoulder from the north, and here they waited and mowed down the enemy as they came over the brow of the slope. The defenders suffered very severely. After one onslaught had been repulsed no news came to brigade headquarters from an outlying company on the right. When a supporting party was sent out the message came back that the entire company was dead or disabled. On the evening of June 17 the remnants of the Liguria Brigade* were replaced by fresh troops, but no further attack was to come from the enemy.

The next few days saw an intense artillery bombardment from both sides, and all along the line from the Adige to the Brenta the Italians were beginning to test the ground for an advance. The Austrian offensive was over. Three out of the four reserve divisions concentrated at Trento had either been brought already

* The various units mentioned by name in this brief account are far from exhausting the list of those who greatly distinguished themselves. They have been selected by the writer because the fighting in which they earned renown was specially important in the story of the Trentino operations.



ON THE LOOK-OUT.

An anti-aircraft gun sentry in winter garb.



FACING THE ITALIANS IN THE ALPS.
An Austrian 35.5-cm. howitzer in action.

into the front line or sent in haste to Galicia; the fourth division was formed of second-line troops, of doubtful value, and there was no more reinforcement possible. The smashing blows dealt by the Russians on the eastern front showed that the Trentino attack had been based on a very grave miscalculation, and instead of being able to bring more troops against Italy the Austrian command had now to study the problem of removing a part of those which were already engaged.

On June 16 the Italian right wing had made useful progress. The Alpini astonished the enemy by climbing the steep cliffs of Castelloni di San Marco (6,033 ft.), on the frontier above the Val Sugana, and by this move they prepared the way for the occupation of Monte Magari and Malga Fossetta, positions which were very strongly held by two infantry regiments (70th and 76th) and eight battalions of Bosnian *Feldjäger*. On the following day the Alpini pushed westward and captured the Cima d'Isidoro (6,270 ft.). The whole right wing was now moving forward, and the left wing was also under way, in the Vallarsa and at the head of the Posina valley. Guns and men were massed on the Italian centre. The time had nearly come for the Austrians to go.

For a week the Austrians opposed a firm resistance to the Italian pressure, but on June 25 the retreat of the invaders began. Their position was becoming untenable. The Alpini were recapturing the high peaks on the right, and on the left Col Santo was being seriously threatened. Attacking on June 25 the Italians rapidly occupied the Austrian positions immediately confronting them. They met only a rearguard resistance, the main body of the invaders being in full retreat. Within three days the Italians were attacking the mountains east of the upper waters of the Galmarara, and they had already occupied Monte Interrotto and Monte Mosciagh, to the north of Asiago. Farther south they were on the line of the Assa, as far as its junction with the Astico, and to the west they had crossed the Posina and were attacking Monte Majo. In the Vallarsa and Pasubio sector they were making progress against Col Santo. They were picking up a good many prisoners and machine-guns, and finding a good many unburied dead, but the Austrian retreat had been planned and was being conducted with great skill. Above all, the guns were being got away. General Cadorna's counter-offensive was to have only

partial results, for the enemy realized it in time. On the other hand, it never fully developed; the retreat of the enemy from the salient they had made changed the circumstances, and consequently the plan.

The line that the Austrians intended to hold was clearly indicated, for as they approached it their resistance stiffened. It ran from Rovereto by Col Santo to Monte Maggio via the Borcola Pass; thence along the rim of the Arsiero plateau, north of the Posina and east of the Upper Astico; thence across the Upper Astico north of the Assa to where the valley turns northward, and thence, crossing the river, by Monte Meatta and the Portule line to the frontier. This was an immensely strong defensive line, backed as it was by the heavy guns of the Folgaria and Lavarone plateaux, and everywhere looking down on the Italian positions. General Cadorna had no intention of letting things be in the Trentino. It was his business to keep as many Austrians as possible pinned on the line, and he worried the enemy by continual strong pushes on various parts of the Trentino front. But he had equally no intention of knocking his head against the stone wall of the enemy's lines, and wasting men who might be better employed elsewhere. At three points only he hastened to press the attack home—east of the Galmarara, Monte Cimone (immediately north of Arsiero) and in the Pasubio sector. In each case the attacking troops were successful. The east side of the Galmarara valley was solidly occupied, Monte Zebio being brilliantly carried by the Sassari Brigade (151st and 152nd regiments) and the Bersaglieri, the Italian lines on the Pasubio *massif* were pushed forward so as to give more breathing-space at this all-important position, and Monte Cimone was taken. The capture of this peak deserves a special word. Its position and formation have already been described, and it will be clear that it was an ideal spot to defend. Several times the Italians endeavoured to climb its steep sides, both from the Rio Freddo and the Astico valley, but machine-gun fire mowed them down, and it seemed impossible to reach the plateau. As the steep sides were apparently impracticable, it was resolved to give the Alpini another chance of showing their special qualities. They were sent against the southern end of Cimone, a wall of rock rising 350 feet above Monte Caviojo, a spur already occupied by the Italians. Before dawn on July 23 they scaled the rock face by the aid of ropes and after a long and bloody struggle



HAULING A FIELD PIECE TO THE FIRING-POINT—

Under a roof to hide the gun from enemy airmen.

bombed the Austrians off the summit. The bombs had to be passed up from below by a chain of men, roped on the cliff. By the evening they had extended their occupation sufficiently to cover the advance of the infantry from the Rio Freddo and the Val d'Astico, who came up the steep paths and established themselves solidly on the plateau north of the summit. This victory took from the Austrians a very useful observatory, and gave the Italians a firm footing on the Tonezza plateau. Farther west they were firmly entrenched on the hills north of the Posina. They had occupied Monte Majo and were threatening Como del Coston and the Borcola Pass. And near the border of the Trentino and Tirol a new movement had been started from the Val Cistron and the Val Pellegrino, which threatened the Val d'Avisio and the great highway that runs down by Cavalise to the Adige.

The Italians were carrying out their task very successfully, and despite all their efforts the Austrians had not been able to detach more than three divisions, or possibly four, to the help of their routed armies in Galicia. The Trentino adventure had come to a disas-

trous end. The invaders had inflicted heavy losses on the Italians, both in men and guns, and had made a rapid and brilliant advance on to Italian soil. But they had not the necessary staying-power, and their effort died out. They lost at least 150,000 in two months' fighting, and though they were better placed strategically than before their offensive, the price they had paid was far too high for what they gained. It might perhaps have been worth paying if it could have paralysed the Italian preparations for a big movement on the Isonzo, and many critics consider that this was the real purpose. But while the echoes of the heavy guns in the Trentino were still resounding, General Cadorna smashed through the iron fortresses of Sabotino, Podgora and San Michele, occupied the entire western segment of the Carso, and drove the Austrians headlong from Gorizia.

The Italian Army won immortal honour by its resistance in the Trentino, and, like his troops, their leader gained laurels that will not fade. Yet a greater title to renown will be that he could dare to hold back the invaders with his left arm and keep his right ready for a blow elsewhere

When the Austrian offensive in the Trentino began the Italian Parliament was not sitting. It was not until June 6 that the Chamber of Deputies reopened, and by that time the advancing tide of invasion had been stemmed. Three days before, General Cadorna's *communiqué* had stated that the Austrian forward movement had been definitely arrested along the whole front. The Government, therefore, was assured of a more favourable reception than it would have had a fortnight earlier, when the issue of the fighting still seemed uncertain, and many people feared that the enemy might win their way to the Venetian plain. But it was generally felt that the Cabinet could hardly hope to escape a storm, for the conviction was widespread that the Austrian successes in the Trentino were due, in part at least, to lack of foresight and preparation on the Italian side.

The temper of the Chamber was critical and everything depended on the way in which the deputies were handled. In point of fact, the Salandra Government, and particularly the Premier himself, had for a considerable time been losing in popularity. So far back as the autumn of 1915 it had been said, with some

justice, that Signor Salandra not only took no trouble to keep in touch with the leaders of opinion in Parliament and in the country, but seemed actually averse from contact with anyone outside his own immediate political circle. This attitude of extreme reserve was understood and appreciated during the difficult period of Italian neutrality, and at the moment of Italy's entry into the war. Signor Salandra's position in the country was very strong. Perhaps he reached the highest point of his popularity after his speech at the Capitol on June 2, 1915, when he answered the attack made upon Italy in the Reichstag by the German Chancellor. At that moment Signor Salandra held a place in the political life of his country that no Italian statesman had occupied since Cavour. It lay with him whether he could keep that place. His task was not easy. Italian public opinion is difficult to hold, difficult to manage, and it cannot be ignored. And in Parliament his position was not satisfactory. His Government was formed upon a narrow and not too stable foundation. The party to which he belonged, the Liberals of the Right, counted comparatively few votes in the Chamber, and the great



AN ITALIAN TRENCH IN THE MOUNTAINS.
2,000 metres high.

majority of the deputies were political opponents. The Giolittians had voted for Italy's intervention because intervention had been clearly demanded by the country. The "Interventionists of the Left"—Radicals, Republicans and Reformist Socialists—who had worked unceasingly for war, were antagonistic to Signor Salandra and his party on every question save that of the part that Italy should play in the European struggle.

The situation, therefore, required specially skilful handling. To assure the position of his Government it was necessary that Signor Salandra should keep in close touch with feeling in the country, and that he should take steps to assure the support of those who were not his natural political allies in Parliament. The first task was one which is the duty of every politician who aspires to power in a democratic country; the way was cleared for the second by the special circumstances of the time. The name of Salandra stood for Italy's entry into the European war, and the adherents of the war policy were ready to forget all domestic differences and lend their loyal support to the man who had led Italy in the great choice. The sympathy of the Interventionist Left was increased by the appointment of Signor Barzilai as Minister without portfolio. All Italy approved the inclusion in the Cabinet of the recognized leader of the Irredentist movement, himself a native of Trieste, as a symbol of the national aspirations which should be fulfilled by the war; but to the Left the appointment was especially welcome. Signor Barzilai had fought many parliamentary battles under the Republican flag, and though he had ceased to be identified with a party which seemed now to have little *raison d'être* in Italian politics he continued to be one of the leaders of "the democracy" in the Chamber. His inclusion in the Cabinet stood as a pledge for the completion of national unity, but it was also taken as a recognition of the part played by the Interventionist Left in arousing Italian opinion to the necessity of war.

This strengthened Signor Salandra's parliamentary position, but, even allowing for the assurance of added support to the Government, the Giolittians formed a majority in the Chamber. A number of the party, including their leader, were practically vowed to enmity against the Government. They had gone altogether too far in their endeavours to preserve Italian neutrality, and, incidentally, to regain political

power for themselves. They might vote for the Government, but not out of friendliness, and they could as little have dealings with the man who had defeated their schemes as he could have dealings with them. On the other hand, there were many members of Signor Giolitti's majority who were in a quite different position. They had played no part in the backstairs negotiations of May, 1915, and most of them, probably, gave a sincere if not enthusiastic acquiescence to Signor Salandra's war policy. They felt that as Italians their one duty was to collaborate in the work of pursuing the war with the utmost vigour and bringing it to a successful conclusion. Here, too, there was a chance for the Government to win solid support, without any sacrifice of principle or dignity.

The tasks that confronted Signor Salandra, when Italy's decision was finally taken, required abilities of a special kind. Above all they required tact and the gift of handling men. Unfortunately Signor Salandra was not able to display the qualities demanded by the situation. With Baron Sonnino at his right hand he had guided Italy through a long and fateful crisis. He had faced and overcome, with firmness and skill, the most exceptional difficulties, and he had won a remarkable place in the esteem of his countrymen. He was to fail in a task that seemed much less intrinsically difficult, but called for gifts which he could not bring to it. He was to lose a great personal opportunity and see the gradual dwindling of the popularity which he had most justly earned.

In Italy as in most democratic countries, but perhaps more in Italy than in others, the quality of *souplesse* is practically essential to permanent political success. It was for lack of this quality that Baron Sonnino had for so long failed to wield the influence in Italian political life to which his abilities and character had entitled him. He had shown himself lacking in the necessary parliamentary gifts. He had won power but failed to hold it, and until his hour came, the hour so fateful for Italy's future, it had seemed that he would never have the chance of giving to his country what he could give. The chance came under the leadership of the man who had been his close friend and political ally for 30 years, and had served as his lieutenant in two Governments. It was the moment that gave to Baron Sonnino the opportunity of proving himself, but if he had been Premier himself, he could never have carried his programme through.



MOUNTAIN WARFARE.

Alpini hauling a gun up a mountain.

And he could hardly have done his work under another leader, just as Signor Salandra could hardly have led Italy to war if anyone but his old chief had been at the Consulta.

During the period of Italy's neutrality, after the death of the Marquis di San Giuliano, the Salandra-Sonnino combination had shown itself specially suited to the circumstances. Above

all, both men were trusted. They were known to be beyond the suspicion of intrigue, and everyone was willing to admit the necessity of reserve. With the declaration of war the situation changed. It remained to be seen whether the Government could adapt itself to the new circumstances.

The duty of adaptation lay with Signor



ITALIAN TROOPS

Throwing hand-grenades into an enemy trench.

Salandra. No one expected Baron Sonnino to change his spots, to be outspoken with the supporters of the Government, old and new, or to keep in touch with the Press, which counts for so much in Italy. It was hoped that this essential part of the Government's duties would be performed by Signor Salandra, but after a few months it began to be said that he was "worse than Sonnino." Before Parliament met on December 1, 1915, there was a good deal of discontent, which was no doubt accentuated by the fact that things seemed to be going badly for the Allies. It would not have been so hard to be patient and go without information if the progress of the war had been satisfactory, but the *débâcle* in the Balkans made a profound impression in Italy, and men's minds were uneasy. The general uneasiness was accentuated by a doubt as to Italy's exact position in the Entente. When Italy declared war against Austria, the Government and the country expected a declaration of hostilities on the part of Germany within a few days. Signor Salandra's speech at the Capitol was thought to make war finally inevitable, but still Germany did not move. Before relations were broken off with Turkey, on August 21, Naby Bey, the Turkish Ambassador in Rome, warned Baron Sonnino that war with Turkey meant war with

Germany, that Germany had pledged herself to declare war on Italy if Italy declared war on Turkey. Italy's answer to this warning was an immediate declaration of hostilities, but the pledge to Turkey had no more value than any other German promise.

When Serbia was invaded by Germany, Austria and Bulgaria, and Italy declared war on Bulgaria, but not on Germany, Italian opinion, and the opinion of Italy's allies, were further puzzled. The grounds of the declaration published by the official Stefani Agency on October 19, 1915, seemed rather to increase the anomalous nature of the situation. The official statement ran as follows:

"Bulgaria having opened hostilities against Serbia, and having allied herself with Italy's enemies to fight against the Allies, the Italian Government, by order of the King, has declared a state of war to exist between Italy and Bulgaria."

It was at this period that the talk began to go round of a secret agreement between Italy and Germany, signed shortly before the rupture of diplomatic relations and the declaration of war against Austria, which preserved a bridge between the two countries, and provided that they should not come to open hostilities. There was no truth whatever in this suggestion, though it was freely made by some who ought to have known better than to lend their authority to the rumour. The facts were available to those who chose to apply for them, and the story is an interesting comment on the way in which an imposing, if shadowy, edifice can be built up on a slender foundation, or rather on no foundation at all. A special agreement between Italy and Germany was signed before diplomatic relations were broken off, but it was not of the nature insinuated. When Italy's intervention was certain and imminent, the Italian Government proposed both to Germany and to Austria-Hungary that in the event of war each country should (1) respect and protect all private property belonging to the other's subjects within its own borders and (2) should permit the repatriation of the other's subjects. The property clause was to the advantage of Austria-Hungary and Germany, both of whom had large interests in Italy. The clause providing for the departure of enemy subjects was to protect the very large number of Italians, principally of the working classes, who were resident in Germany or Austria-Hungary. The Germans and Austrians domi-

ciled in Italy, who, generally speaking, belonged to the well-to-do classes, had for the most part left Italy before the rupture of diplomatic relations became imminent.

Austria-Hungary refused the Italian proposal; Germany accepted it, and on May 21, 1915, an agreement to the effect indicated was signed by the German Foreign Secretary, Herr von Jagow, and the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, Signor Bollati. It will be seen that the agreement gives no grounds whatever for the most unjust and mischievous suggestion that Italy was endeavouring to keep a foot in the enemy's camp. The agreement was in fact little more than an attempt to re-affirm principles which had seemed to be well established before Germany began to break most of the rules of war to which she had put her signature. The two important points about it, in view of the gossip to which its existence gave rise, are:

1. The terms it contained were offered to Austria-Hungary, upon whom Italy was about to declare war.

2. It deliberately provided for a state of war between Italy and Germany.

The story of a secret agreement was entirely unfounded, and it was at length definitely contradicted by Signor Barzilai, in an inter-

view given in February, 1916, but the fact that it was started, and repeated, and half believed even by many Italians, shows how Italy's position was compromised by the absence of a formal declaration of war from or against Germany.

It has already been said that the omission to take the opportunity of the attack upon Serbia increased the confusion both of Italian and Allied opinion. Some months later, when the question was again arousing lively discussion in Italy, Signor Bissolati stated in the course of a conversation that the Government had missed an excellent chance of regularizing the position, but comment was silenced for a little, in Italy at least, by the announcement that Italy had adhered to the Pact of London,* which pledged its signatories not to conclude a separate peace. This announcement was made by Baron Sonnino, in the Chamber of Deputies, on December 1, 1915, the opening day of the short winter session, and it was then stated that Italy's signature had been affixed to the Pact the day before. It is understood, however, that Italy

* The original declaration was signed in London in September, 1914, by Great Britain, France and Russia, and Japan adhered to the agreement a year later.



A WELL-CONSTRUCTED SHELTER: ITALIAN "DUG-OUT."

had given formal assurances of her adhesion some time previously, and Signor Orlando, Minister of Justice, had prepared public opinion for Baron Sonnino's statement in an important speech delivered at Palermo on November 20. In the course of that speech Signor Orlando had emphasized the impossibility of an "isolated peace," and had already dashed the hopes of those few Italians who thought that Italy ought to confine herself to what had been called contemptuously "a narrow-gauge war."

It was not long before the Government began to come in for fresh criticism. By this time it was well understood that Signor Salandra was not likely to modify his attitude of reserve. And a number of charges were accumulating against the Government, most of which, no doubt, admitted of an excellent answer, but to which no adequate answer was given. Italy, like other countries, was slow to realize the extent of her munition requirements. It began to be known that it was largely owing to lack of sufficient artillery preparation and support that the Italian attacks on the Isonzo had not succeeded in breaking the Austrian lines. Critics were quite well prepared to excuse a shortage of guns and shells, if they felt that every effort had been made to furnish an adequate supply. It was on this point that there was a sense of uncertainty. Those who had to provide the shells showed an undue complacency regarding the output which perhaps they did not feel, but the effect was unfortunate. At the front, at least, there were no illusions. When a representative of the Munitions Department gave the assurance that there was an "abundance" of shells, he received the true and only answer to his easy optimism: "There is *never* abundance." Here was the point. Italy had certainly done marvels in the way of military preparation. The danger was lest it should be thought enough to have done marvels.

Over the question of munitions the Government began to be accused of lack of forethought, and similar accusations began to be made in regard to other deficiencies which were making themselves felt. The question of the supply of coal and grain was becoming acute, owing to the shortage of shipping and the ever-increasing price of freight. It was asserted that the Government had shown a lack of foresight in regard to these problems, and of energy in dealing with them. Not all the

criticisms were justified, but some were fair enough, and the situation was made worse by the isolation of the Government from the leaders of public opinion, which forbade discussion and explanation.

The short winter session (the Chamber sat from December 1 to December 13, and the debates in the Senate lasted only three days, from December 15 to December 17) had not given much chance to those who desired fuller information on the various points that had begun to trouble public opinion. The Chamber was not to reopen till March 1, so that during a period of more than 11 months, except for the historic single-day sitting on May 20, 1915, the elected representatives of the nation had only a fortnight for parliamentary discussion of the situation and its problems. This would not have mattered—many people were against parliamentary discussion altogether—if the Ministry had in the interval maintained a reasonable contact with its supporters. No such contact was maintained, and public opinion soon began to be restless again. The Interventionists of the Left were particularly dissatisfied. They thought with some justice that the part they had played before the war entitled them to consideration, and they were specially concerned over the question of munitions. Moreover, they were still uneasy in regard to Germany. The adhesion to the Pact of London had satisfied them for the moment, but on reflection it did not seem sufficient. Almost from the first they had regarded Germany as the principal enemy, and they realized clearly that the absence of a declaration of war put Italy in a false position. By a Government decree dated November 3, 1915, Italy had requisitioned all German ships in Italian ports, deferring payment "till after the war," and at the beginning of February a further decree was published forbidding all trade between Germany and Italy, direct or indirect. But these measures did not satisfy those who felt that the situation must be cleared of every kind of apparent ambiguity.

Early in February Signor Salandra went to Turin, where he delivered several speeches. In one of these he made what must be considered a serious error in tact, by claiming for the party to which he belonged the credit of having led Italy to war in defence of her rights. This claim was resented by the Interventionists of the Left, and matters were made worse by the suggestion of a Turin deputy (the Parliamentary correspondent of the *Gazzetta del Popolo*)



Tube of explosive being carried across a stream. The men are protected by steel shields.



Nearing their goal.



Mining party taking the tube carefully through the undergrowth.



Explosion of the tube, causing destruction of an Austrian trench.

ITALIAN TROOPS MINING AUSTRIAN TRENCHES ON THE ISONZO FRONT.

that their resentment was due to their wish for Signor Bissolati's inclusion in the Cabinet. This was an unfair criticism. The object of the malcontents was not power, though they did desire to see Signor Bissolati, and others of their number, replace certain Ministers who they considered had not proved equal to their duties. They wished to be assured that the war would be conducted with every possible energy, and they believed that the best guarantee for their aims was the infusion of fresh blood into the Cabinet. An interview granted by Signor Salandra to the Deputy mentioned above, Signor Bevione, did not mend matters. Signor Salandra declared that political crises must always be resolved in Parliament, but that neither newspapers, nor political groups, nor even a Parliamentary majority, could compel the Premier to discard some of his colleagues and appoint new Ministers. This seemed a direct challenge to those who hoped for a reconstruction of the Ministry, and on February 9 a memorial was sent to Signor Salandra by the representatives of the Interventionists of the Left and the Nationalists. The memorial stated that the Interventionist groups had given the fullest support to the Government, but that they felt it their special duty, as advocates of the war, to draw attention to what they considered the shortcomings of those who were directing the policy and actions of Italy. These alleged shortcomings have already been indicated, and need not be repeated here. Signor Salandra replied the following day, in 20 words, promising that the memorial would have all his attention, but no further answer was received. Further discussion was delayed by M. Briand's visit to Rome, which was a symbol of the increased solidarity between the Allies, but the reopening of Parliament was awaited with special interest.

The spring session began well with a speech by Signor Bissolati proposing that a message should be sent to the French Chamber expressing complete unity between Italy and France. He insisted on the unanimity of the Allies, and declared that as on the western front France and England were fighting against Austria-Hungary, so on the Isonzo Italy was fighting against Germany. The speech was received with the greatest enthusiasm, all the Deputies, except the official Socialists, rising to acclaim his words and signify their agreement with the proposed message. But storms were soon to come. Within a week Signor Salandra offended

a large section of the Chamber by the manner in which he refused to accept a proposal to divide the House on an unimportant motion brought forward by the official Socialists. The Extreme Left were certainly displaying an attitude unworthy of the times and had given much provocation, but unruly behaviour on the part of the Socialists is a long tradition in Italian politics, and no Premier can afford to lose patience with the Chamber. Signor Salandra did lose patience, and astonished the House by threatening an appeal to the Crown if Deputies continued to press for votes on all occasions. The Premier's words were taken by all the Left as indicating a lack of proper respect for the rights of the Chamber, and the Interventionists who had hitherto supported him seemed to resent what they termed his "reactionary attitude" as much as did the official Socialists. It was from this date that the movement for a National Government, which had hitherto received little support, began to gain weight. Several stormy sittings followed, but the criticisms which had been expected from the Interventionist Left were not well defined. An interview between the Premier and Signor Bissolati led to an alteration in the attitude of those who were working with the latter, and it seems clear that the Reformist leader received some assurance as to the position of Italy in regard to Germany. The keynote of the Interventionists' argument had hitherto been that the diplomatic situation must be cleared up. Now their chief contention was that the Government must be reinforced, so as to represent all the elements favourable to the war. The debate on the Government's economic policy brought no very satisfactory statements from the Ministers attacked, and before the division an event of first-class political importance took place. The Interventionist groups of the Left, who had been acting together since before the war, formally joined forces under the leadership of Signor Bissolati, and constituted themselves into a *bloc* under the name of the Democratic Alliance. Speaking on the eve of the division in the name of the 140 members who constituted the new party, Signor Bissolati declared that he and his friends were not satisfied with the answers given to the critics of the Government. He said, however, that they were convinced that the Cabinet saw the necessity for complete solidarity between the Allies, and for that reason they had resolved to do nothing that might weaken the Government on the eve of



AT AN ADVANCED POST.

A lonely Austrian sentry on guard in the Dolomites.

the Paris Conference. In the course of his speech in defence of the policy of the Government Signor Salandra had resented the suggestion that Italy had not put her whole heart in the war, declaring that Italy "now holds her place in the front line of the great war, on equal terms with those Powers with whom in full and loyal solidarity of action she is fighting for the defence of human civilization and the law of nations." This seemed a fairly satisfactory statement, and no doubt did something to placate the malcontents. There had been a long discussion between the leaders of the new *bloc* as to whether they should continue to support the Government, and Signor Bissolati had some difficulty in winning his followers to his way of thinking. Indeed, when the division came, the Reformist Socialists, Signori Raimondo and Cabrini, broke away from their friends and voted against the Government, as did the small Nationalist group. The Government majority, however, was sufficiently imposing: 394 votes to 61. Signor Salandra was safe for the moment, but it was realized that the Democratic Alliance, from that time onwards, practically held the Government in their hands. The closing passage of Signor Bissolati's speech, every phrase of which had

been considered by the leaders of the new party, outlined the policy for which they stood. It ran as follows:

The programme, not of this Government only, but of any Government which would not betray Italy, is one only—Victory. A victory which, fortunately for civilization, cannot be the victory of Italy, of France, of Russia, or of England, but is the victory which, being affirmed in the resurrection of Belgium and Serbia, in the liberation of France, in the attainment of Italy's national claims, and in the reconstitution of Poland, will lay the granite foundations of a Europe free and truly civilized, assured against the manœuvres of a military caste, and dedicated to the fruitful works of peace.

The visits of Signor Salandra, Baron Sonnino and General Cadorna to Paris, the resolutions passed at the Paris Conference, and the visit of Mr. Asquith to Rome, combined together to strengthen the position of the Government, which had been badly shaken. There was comparatively little criticism of Baron Sonnino's definite and emphatic refusal, in his speech on the Foreign Estimates, to consider the suggestion that Parliament should be more closely associated with the conduct of Italy's foreign policy. He pointed out that the abandonment of "secret diplomacy" would simply play into the hands of the enemy, and both the Chamber and public opinion saw the force of his argument. The Foreign Esti-

mates were passed by 352 votes to 36, and there seemed no special reason to anticipate a crisis when Parliament reassembled. Signor Salandra was, in fact, ready to include Signor Bissolati in his Cabinet, but the Reformist leader was unwilling to accept office. He felt that it would be difficult to reconcile his ideas with the Premier's methods; and preferred to retain his independence of action, but it was generally hoped and believed that Signor Salandra would learn from the experience of the March sittings that he must modify his attitude towards the Chamber and the country.

The storm blew up very quickly at the end. The Chamber reopened on June 6, and the



MR. ASQUITH AT ROME.
(On the right Signor Salandra.)

first two days of the session were occupied in quiet discussion of the Budget. On June 8, however, a motion was presented by Signor Eugenio Chiesa, a prominent member of the Democratic Alliance, calling upon the Government to make a declaration regarding the military situation. He suggested the holding of a secret session if the Government was unwilling to make a public statement, but he urged that the country was growing restive at the absence of any Government declaration, and resented the discussion of the Budget at a time when all eyes were turned upon the Trentino. Signor Bissolati deprecated the pressing of the motion, but suggested that the Government might find a way of taking the

leaders of the various groups into its confidence. Signor Salandra's reply did not satisfy the Chamber. He appealed for patience, assuring the House that they would have ample opportunity of discussing the general policy of the Government when the time came for the Vote on Account. The Vote was to be taken in four days' time, and meanwhile he asked the Chamber to continue its ordinary work. In obedience to the appeal of Signor Bissolati, Signor Chiesa withdrew his motion, but the Chamber quickly altered the situation to the disadvantage of the Government. When the Debate on the Estimates of the Ministry of the Interior was resumed only one Deputy spoke, and the Estimates went through without further discussion. The Estimates of the Ministries of Finance and the Treasury were disposed of without a word, the Colonial Estimates were passed after the briefest discussion, and the sitting closed early. No fewer than 110 Deputies who were inscribed to speak on the various Estimates withdrew their names, and it was clear that the Chamber meant to answer silence by silence.

The next day's sitting was short, the voting being taken on the Estimates which had been discussed, or rather, not discussed, on the previous day. The Government was far from obtaining its usual war majority; the Estimates of the Ministry of the Interior, for example, being passed by a majority of only 71—191 votes to 120. The small number of Deputies voting was significant.

By the evening of June 9 the situation was fairly clear. Signor Salandra was tired of the Chamber, and the Chamber was tired of Signor Salandra. The Premier had perforce advanced the discussion on the Vote on Account two days, and had indicated that he meant to ask for an unconditional vote of confidence. The Interventionist Left, who held his fate in their hands, were still uncertain. Conciliation would have probably saved the Ministry, but Signor Salandra was in anything but a conciliatory mood. It is believed that he was weary of office. He had lived through two years of exceptional strain, and the sittings of the spring and the summer had seemed to indicate that his nerves were feeling the long trial.

In any event, he had showed himself unyielding to suggestion, and when the moment of crisis came he showed himself equally unyielding to the pressure of circumstances.



BOMBARDMENT ON LAKE GARDA.

Shelling the Austrian trenches to assist the Italian Army in the Trentino.

The speech he made in requesting a vote of confidence was not happily phrased, and he gave the impression of being altogether out of touch with the Chamber. One passage in particular was unfavourably received. He said that better prepared defences on the Trentino front would at least have arrested the enemy at a greater distance from the Venetian plain. This was, of course, perfectly true, and it was typical of the feeling that had grown

up against the Premier that the Chamber strongly resented his bringing the question of the military command into his speech. In answer to criticism, Signor Salandra rose to explain that he was not criticizing the *Comando Supremo*, but merely expressing their considered opinion. The explanation might well have been sufficient, but it was not so considered, and it must be admitted that Signor Salandra ought to have said either more or nothing.




SIGNOR BOSELLI.
Italian Prime Minister.

After his speech it was generally felt that the Premier had already fallen, and the result of the voting—197 to 158 against the Government—caused no surprise.

The majority which defeated the Salandra Government represented almost all shades of opinion. It was composed as follows: Official Socialists, 37; Reformists, 20; Radicals, 35; Giolittians, 50; Right, including the Nationalist Group, 25; Republicans, 10; Democratic Constitutionalists, 20. The important point was that more than half of the malcontents came from those groups which from the first were most strongly in favour of Italy's participation in the war, the groups which had recently been pressing for a declaration of war on Germany and the reconstruction of the Cabinet on a wide basis. The balance was turned by the Democratic Alliance, and it was clear at once that their ideas would count for much in the formation of the new Cabinet.

Signor Salandra was defeated on June 10, and resigned on June 12. The King, who arrived in Rome from the war zone on the morning of June 12, did not at once accept Signor Salandra's resignation, reserving his decision until he had consulted various political leaders. Two

currents of opinion made themselves felt immediately—one in favour of a reconstruction of the outgoing Ministry, still under the leadership of the two men who had led Italy to war; the other supporting a "National Ministry" under the presidency of the veteran Signor Boselli, Father of the Italian Chamber of Deputies. It was soon realized that the "reincarnation" of Signor Salandra would probably lead to a repetition of the difficulties which had caused his fall, and opinion quickly concentrated upon Signor Boselli, who was the first choice of King Victor Emmanuel. Signor Boselli was indicated to the King by Signor Salandra, and also by the Presidents of the Chamber and Senate, and it was felt that he, better than anyone else, might be able to unite a sufficient number of elements in the Chamber to form a Cabinet on a really broad basis. He quickly secured the adhesion of Signor Orlando, Minister of Justice in Signor Salandra's Cabinet, who represented the Liberals of the Left and had recently been spoken of as a possible Prime Minister, and of Signor Bissolati, who brought with him the support of the Democratic Alliance. Signor Boselli's chief difficulty lay in filling the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was anxious to secure the cooperation of Baron Sonnino at his old post, and in this desire he was backed by the great body of opinion in the country. Two obstacles arose. In the first place, Baron Sonnino was not anxious to remain at the Consulta. He was unwilling to sever his political fate from that of Signor Salandra, and he was determined to make it a condition of his remaining in office that adequate reserve should be maintained regarding foreign policy. In the second place, there was a strong movement in Parliament and in the Press in favour of Signor Tittoni, the Italian Ambassador in Paris. Signor Tittoni, however, was not acceptable to the Democratic Alliance, who considered that his career had been too much the creation of Signor Giolitti to allow him to preside at the Consulta at such a period. Baron Sonnino's personal scruples were overcome and his conditions were readily met by Signor Boselli. The opposition to his remaining at the Consulta never took serious form, and on June 15 it was announced that he had consented to retain his portfolio. The construction of the Cabinet progressed quickly after Signor Boselli had assured himself of the support of the three leaders mentioned, and late on the evening of June 18, a list of Ministers was



AN EXPLOIT OF THE ALPINI AT MONTE TOFANA.

Scaling the precipitous peaks of Monte Tofana, where the Italian troops drove the enemy out of the trenches.

published which was practically complete. A day later the last names were added, and the new Cabinet received the approval of the King.

The Ministry was composed as follows :

Signor Boselli, *Prime Minister, without portfolio.*
 Baron Sonnino, *Foreign Affairs.*
 Signor Orlando, *Interior.*
 Signor Bissolati, *without portfolio.*
 Signor Carcano, *Treasury.*
 Signor Meda, *Finance.*
 Signor Ruffini, *Education.*
 General Morrone, *War.*
 Admiral Corsi, *Marine.*
 Signor Arlotta, *Transport.*
 Signor Sacchi, *Justice.*
 Signor Bonomi, *Public Works.*
 Signor Fera, *Post Office.*
 Signor Colosimo, *Colonies.*
 Signor Raineri, *Agriculture.*
 Signor De Nava, *Industry and Commerce.*
 Signor Comandini, *without portfolio.*
 Signor Scialoja, *without portfolio.*
 Signor Leonardo Bianchi, *without portfolio.*

The Cabinet now consisted of 19 members, instead of 13. There were five Ministers without portfolios instead of one, and two new portfolios were created by the establishment of a Ministry of Transport and the severance of the departments of Industry and Commerce from the Ministry of Agriculture.

The new Ministry came very close to the ideal of a National Government. There were six Liberal Conservatives or Right Centre members, Signor Boselli, Baron Sonnino, Signor De Nava, Signor Arlotta, Signor Ruffini and Signor Scialoja. There was one Catholic, Signor Meda. There were five Liberals of the Left, Signori Orlando, Carcano, Raineri, Colosimo and Leonardo Bianchi; two Radicals, Signori Sacchi and Fera; two Reformist Socialists, Signori Bissolati and Bonomi; and one Republican, Signor Comandini.

The announcement of the new Ministry met with as great a measure of acceptance as could be hoped. Naturally there were some disappointments. There was not room, even in a greatly enlarged Cabinet, for all those who had strong claims to office. And some of those whose claims were strong *per se* were not likely to work well with those whose choice was inevitable. The greatest danger attending a Government which included so many different colours lay in the possibility of internal dissension, and it was necessary to avoid

appointments which would clearly lead to friction.

The fall of Signor Salandra was greatly regretted in Italy even by many who had felt bound to criticize his attitude. His name will always be associated with the most important action taken by Italy since her existence as a united country, and if he could have accommodated himself to the requirements of the situation, satisfaction would have been general. Another cause for regret was the retirement of Signor Ferdinando Martini, Minister of the Colonies. Signor Martini was closely associated with Signor Salandra and Baron Sonnino in the policy which guided Italy to intervention. But he, too, was suffering from the long strain. He was approaching his 75th birthday when the crisis took place, and he had earned the right to rest.

The new Government was certainly stronger than the old, as far as *personnel* was concerned, and it commanded a very different measure of support in the Chamber. The moderate Giolittians, who had come to see the absolute necessity of Italy's intervention, could much more readily give their adhesion to a Government of which Signor Salandra was not the head. They were directly represented in the Cabinet by Signor Colosimo, and there were old ties, which they could renew, with Signor Orlando and others. Far the most striking figure among the new Ministers was Signor Bissolati. A Socialist who had parted company with his comrades on the question of the Tripoli expedition, he had from the first stood openly for Italy's intervention against Germany and Austria. From the first, moreover, he had seen that Germany was the prime enemy. He had a great following in the country and was specially popular in the army, which remembered that for many months he had fought as a sergeant of Alpini, and had been wounded in the early days of the campaign.

Signor Boselli was 78 years old, but he brought to his task a fresh and vigorous mind, as well as long Parliamentary experience. And all his colleagues were united in their determination to prosecute the war with the utmost vigour, and to consolidate the alliance with England, France and Russia.



CHAPTER CXL.

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK.

LOOKING FORWARD TO A FIGHT—GERMAN NAVAL POLICY—FIRST NEWS OF THE BATTLE: A MISLEADING COMMUNIQUÉ—OFFICIAL EXCUSES—GERMAN VERSIONS—THE SHIPS ENGAGED ON BOTH SIDES—THE BATTLE-CRUISERS COME INTO ACTION—SIR DAVID BEATTY DRAWS THE GERMANS NORTHWARD—ARRIVAL OF SIR JOHN JELlicOE WITH THE BATTLE FLEET—RETREAT OF THE ENEMY—WORK OF THE LIGHT CRUISERS AND DESTROYERS—BRITISH AND GERMAN LOSSES—TALES OF GALLANTRY.

IN the afternoon and evening of May 31, 1916, an action was fought in the North Sea between the Grand Fleet under Admiral Sir John Jellicoe and the German High Sea Fleet under Admiral Reinhold Scheer. The genesis of the encounter will be discussed later, but its successive stages, with one important difference, followed the normal lines of similar affairs which had taken place during the war. First, the advanced vedettes, the light cruisers and destroyers, got into touch, and then the reconnaissance squadrons, the battle-cruisers, became engaged, just as happened in the Heligoland Bight on August 28, 1914, and at the Dogger Bank on January 24, 1915. Presently, the unusual happened, and the German battle fleet arrived, to support its cruisers, and a little later the British battle squadrons came into the fray. Then the aspect of the conflict underwent an entire change.

For twenty-two months the British public had looked forward almost daily to such an encounter—a pitched battle at sea, as it was called. There was no anxiety as to the result, for although the dire consequences of a naval defeat were well recognized, the nation had entire trust in its seamen, and confidently expected that if a suitable opportunity offered they would win a decisive victory. It had been asserted that the command of the sea

could not be obtained until a fleet action had been fought. The reasoning by which this theory was supported was against the teaching of history, and, moreover, it derived no confirmation from known conceptions of German strategy and naval needs. The conditions in which the two navies faced one another were not such as to give promise of a speedy conflict on a large scale. The enemy's flag had disappeared from the ocean. The oversea traffic of the Allies continued practically unmolested, save by submarines. British naval policy was in the main directed to the destruction of the enemy's commerce and trade and to the enforcement of what in all but name was a blockade. His warships were shut up in port, watched by the British seamen, whose only desire was to draw them out and drub them. So long as the enemy made no attempt to take to the sea in force, it was not easy to see how a decisive engagement could be brought about. Nevertheless, it was hoped that, as the blockade became more stringent, this and other circumstances might operate to force the Germans to risk a battle. The British seamen only waited an opportunity to translate their desires into deeds.

When, however, the battle occurred, neither the manner in which it was made known to the country, the circumstances in which it was fought, nor its results, were exactly what the

nation had expected or the seamen hoped for. By a trick of fortune they were balked of complete satisfaction. The disappointment was not lasting, for with later news came an assurance of triumph, and in any case the faith of the people in the Navy never weakened or abated. The message of congratulation which King George sent to the Commander-in-Chief after paying a visit to the Grand Fleet expressed in felicitous terms their trust and satisfaction. "Assure all ranks and ratings," said the King, "that the name of the British Navy never stood higher in the eyes of their fellow-countrymen, whose pride and confidence in their achievements are unabated."

The significance and import of the battle, however, were not immediately realized, and until all the conditions were known attempts to appraise its strategical value would have been premature. The purpose of the "enterprise directed northward," in which the Germans announced on June 1 that their Fleet had been engaged, remained obscure. The extent of the enemy's success or failure could not be calculated until the precise military object which they were seeking to attain was known. Manifestly, it was not to the advantage of either of the participants to reveal details of the engagement which might be of value to the other side. Reticence was essential so

long as hostilities continued. Even were the war ended, the features of an encounter which illustrated so much that was novel in sea fighting; the relations which certain movements bore to the intelligence of the enemy's position and strength; the manœuvres by which the German admiral saved his ships from destruction; the use of various classes and types of vessels; the efficiency of methods of protection and equipment—these and many other technical problems were likely for a long time to afford subjects for professional discussion. Similar questions concerning earlier naval actions of the era of steam and steel—Lissa, Santiago, and Tsushima—were still debated, and after a hundred years the tactics of Trafalgar were under examination by an official committee of experts.

For nearly two years the Grand Fleet had occupied a position in the North Sea facing the principal bases of the enemy. Behind this guard, the Allies were able to conduct the passage of their trade and troops practically unmolested. Campaigns for the possession of the enemy's colonies, and oversea expeditions, were undertaken; and assistance was rendered to the land forces in three continents without let or hindrance. Furthermore, the Fleet provided a safeguard to these islands from invasion, and enforced what was to all intents and



BRITISH LIGHT CRAFT
Watching for the German Fleet.



ADMIRAL SIR JOHN JELlicOE, G.C.B., G.C.V.O.,
Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet. In the uniform of a Vice-Admiral.

purposes a strangulation of trade with Germany, the stringency of which was only limited by the diplomatic requirements of the Government. All these operations could not have been performed without exertions which imposed a severe test upon those qualities of endurance, resource, patience and skill for which British seamen are renowned. The strain was ceaseless. It necessitated arduous work in all the weathers to be experienced in the higher latitudes. The peril from the mine

and the submarine menace were always present, and the call upon the vigilance of the flotillas and fleets on patrol service unremitting. But every demand was fully met. While, however, the predominant position at sea was thus maintained, there was in being, within a short distance of our shores, the second strongest fleet in the world, manned by courageous and competent officers and men, and controlled by the same wily, unscrupulous, and determined authorities in Berlin whose barbarous methods



THE SCENE OF THE BATTLE,
May 31-June 1, 1916.

of waging war had received shocking demonstration alike on land and sea. Forced by the rigours of the blockade, by the economic pressure which told upon the production of material for the land warfare, and by the restriction of their sources of wealth and prosperity resulting from the loss of sea-borne commerce—this fleet might at any time be flung into the arena to pick up the gage of battle, opportunity for which was always offered and ardently desired by the British seamen. When the opportunity did occur, and the hopes which inspired the latter seemed likely to be fulfilled, their opponents fought indeed with courage and

skill, but they evaded decisive action, and retired to their fortified bases. The Grand Fleet still retained an undisputed mastery of the sea communications; its grip was not weakened, much less broken; while, tried in the test of battle, the prestige of the British Navy, as well as its efficiency, stood on a higher plane than ever.

There was, as always, a moral as well as a material aspect to the battle. Although the Germans were able, owing to the proximity of their harbours, to promulgate their version of the action first, the impression created by their false and misleading announcements was

dissipated when the fuller British accounts were published. The conflict afforded an opportunity to the British seamen for a display of those qualities of courage, endurance, and skill which were confidently expected of them. It is not in mortals to command success, but in this battle there was displayed in the Grand Fleet convincing evidence of readiness to take the initiative, of consummate ability in execution, and of capacity, boldness, and daring which thoroughly deserved to succeed. Great Britain and Germany were the two most formidable of naval Powers, and, despite the material superiority of the former, their navies were in other respects apparently well matched. The Germans were assured that their methods of training, their guns and mechanical equipment, with the armament and armour supplied by Krupp, were better than those of their opponents. Given that they could choose their own time and place for action, they believed that these advantages would more than compensate for a deficiency in numbers. Yet when tried in the stern ordeal of battle, the higher standard of technique was on the other side. Neither in nerve nor in *moral* were the staying powers of the Germans equal to those of their opponents, nor did they prove the better in tactical efficiency, scientific gunnery, or the handling of ships and machinery.

In character and organization the fleet which Grand Admiral von Tirpitz created was designed to serve two purposes. It was to be both a political influence and an instrument of war. In the event of European complications, it was intended that the possession of a fleet of such strength by Germany should force Great

Britain to remain neutral. Not even the mightiest Naval Power would, it was said, dare to incur the risk involved in fighting it. Thus the much-dreaded blockade would be prevented. The other and much older purpose was the use of the Fleet—its inferiority being recognised—for making sudden onslaughts, bolts from the blue, hussar-like strokes, which at little cost to the assailant would inflict damage of a serious character principally on the hostile naval force, but with avoidance of a contested or prolonged action. The first purpose failed when Mr. Churchill and Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg sent the Grand Fleet into the North Sea to its fighting stations, and this country decided on war. Great Britain, thanks largely to Mr. McKenna and Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher, had built up a fleet which was in a position to take the risk of engaging even the High Sea Fleet if required to do so. But in the early months of the war a naval battle on the grand scale was not in Germany's programme. The strategic line imposed upon her by the appearance of that supreme British Fleet in the North Sea was a modification of the two ideas above mentioned. In the outer seas an attempt was made to interfere with British trade, which was to some extent successful, but it came to an untimely end, with no inconsiderable loss of useful cruisers, as a result of the British victory off the Falklands. Nearer home, sallying tactics were tried, with the assistance of the mine and the submarine, in the belief that such damage as resulted might gradually whittle away the supremacy of the superior fleet and provide an opportunity for larger operations. In the



THE GERMAN DREADNOUGHT BATTLESHIP "KAISER,"
which took part in the battle.



VICE-ADMIRAL SCHEER,

Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet.

face of the energy, resource, and ingenuity of the British seamen, this plan also was of little avail.

The new naval policy was thus one of strategic reticence, varied by cruiser raids and submarine adventures. In its defended ports the High Sea Fleet was beyond the reach of our naval forces, while at the same time, by reason of the Kiel Canal, it served to secure the flanks and rear of the armies which on interior lines were operating on two fronts. Nevertheless, it could not protect Germany's foreign possessions or her sea-borne commerce. It could not prevent that naval compression, the strangling effects of which were severely felt, even when minimized to some extent by economic organization, by the help of neutrals, and by the development of internal communications. The new plan offered a striking contrast to Germany's bold campaign on land, but the Grand Admiral quoted with approval Nelson's saying: "Do not imagine I am one of those hot-brained people who fight at a disadvantage without an adequate object." Attempts could still be made against the floating trade of the Allies, and von Tirpitz threw himself with characteristic energy into the enforcement of a "submarine blockade"—a secret, sneaking war, directed alike against neutral and belligerent, merchantman and fishing boat. The "selected

moment," the time to strike with advantage, had not yet come, and before it was thought to have done so von Tirpitz went into retirement.

During the time that the Grand Admiral was at the Ministry of Marine the policy of ruthless submarine activity prevailed, and the cruiser raids which preceded the Dogger Bank action were made against the East Coast. It was said, however, that in regard to the use of the battle fleet Tirpitz counselled prudence and caution, and that he was even opposed to risking the Dreadnoughts in the Baltic. If, therefore, he had a deciding voice in naval strategy, it was assumed there would be no fleet action. Up to September, 1915, when the first rumours of the removal of von Tirpitz appeared, there had only been one mention of a movement on the part of the High Sea Fleet. This was in April, 1915, when the Fleet was said to have advanced into English waters. What exactly was meant by this official announcement was never made clear, but it followed upon the appointment of Admiral Hugo von Pohl as Commander-in-Chief in the place of Admiral Ingenohl, who was supposed to have been relieved in consequence of the failure at the Dogger Bank. It seems likely that von Tirpitz had more to do



VICE-ADMIRAL HIPPER,

Commanded the German reconnoitring fleet.



THE "WARSPITE," ONE OF THE "QUEEN ELIZABETH" SQUADRON,
Engaging the German Battleships.

with the policy of ship construction than with the control of the Fleet. There appears to be some reason for the belief that instead of pressing on the building of heavier vessels he concentrated the resources of the arsenals and shipyards—on the former of which the land requirements must have been making a very heavy call—upon submarine output and perhaps some novel devices. The rumours of changes in the armament of ships, and of the appearance of new and strange craft—"the novel dangers requiring novel expedients," as Mr. Churchill said—were founded to some extent on a phrase in a letter to von Tirpitz from the Kaiser, who thanked him for what he had accomplished during the war "by preparing new means of fighting in all departments of warfare." The composition of the German Fleet in the action of May 31 afforded no support, however, to this theory.

The direction of the operations of the Fleet appears to have been more particularly in the hands of the Naval General Staff, and the appointment in the autumn of 1915 of von Holtzendorff (who had commanded the Fleet himself from September, 1909, to January, 1913) as Chief of that Staff, in succession to Admiral Baemann, apparently coincided with changes in policy. At all events, on

December 19, 1915, the Admiralty Staff at Berlin announced that a portion of the High Sea Fleet in the previous week had searched the North Sea for the enemy, and then cruised on the 17th and 18th in the Skager Rak, searching shipping. Fifty-two steamers were examined, it was stated, and one steamer loaded with contraband was seized. "During this entire period," the announcement concluded, "the English fighting forces were nowhere to be seen." It must have been about this time that von Pohl found himself too unwell to continue the active work of his command, and he was temporarily succeeded by Vice-Admiral Scheer, a division commander. In February, 1916, von Pohl died, and Scheer was confirmed in the appointment, but even before this happened there began to be rumours of increased liveliness, and reports from fishermen and other sources that the High Sea Fleet, or portions of it, were making short cruises. In March, 25 ships were seen off Vlieland, on the Dutch coast, and a little later other squadrons moving in the same locality. Then in April the Yarmouth raid occurred, and both from Holland and Denmark movements at Kiel and Heligoland, as well as unusual activity in the dockyards, were re-



VICE-ADMIRAL SIR DAVID BEATTY,
K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.,
Commanded the Battle-cruiser Fleet.
In the uniform of a Vice-Admiral.

ported. It was widely believed by neutrals that the enemy would attempt some stroke, and that the gun practice continually being carried out behind the mine-fields, with the airships which in fine weather were always patrolling the North Sea, were symptoms of this impending movement. Most certainly there were reflections in various directions of a more energetic hand at the wheel. Simultaneously, all that portion of the Press which derived its inspiration from the Admiralty—Count Reventlow and the naval officers writing for the German papers—appeared to be under instructions to prepare the German people for some development of the war at sea. Moreover, the increasing effect of the blockade, internal discontent and unrest, with the new co-ordinated efforts of the Allies in the land theatres, could not but exercise an influence in this direction.

Although, therefore, the situation was not without indication of the possibility of a coming conflict—and it may be assumed that the signs had been noted and acted upon by the naval authorities—yet the public experi-



[Russell.]

REAR-ADMIRAL O. DE B. BROCK,
Commanded the First Battle-cruiser Squadron.

enced a great shock when the first news of the battle was announced on the evening of Friday, June 2. The nation was disappointed, and the world deceived.

There had been rumours in London of a naval engagement on Wednesday night, but such rumours were of almost daily occurrence, and as no confirmation was forthcoming the story was dismissed as others had been before. On Thursday, the tidings became more circumstantial, and received support from news which leaked out in the dockyard towns and naval bases. As, however, the House of Commons adjourned shortly after nine p.m., in accordance with a resolution moved by the Prime Minister, without any announcement on the subject of a naval battle having been made, there were still doubts as to whether it had taken place. It was afterwards explained by Mr. Balfour, at a luncheon in the week following the battle, at the British Imperial Council of Commerce, that he got his first intimation from the Commander-in-Chief that an engagement between the hostile fleets was imminent on Wednesday afternoon, and from that time, until a telegram was received from Sir John Jellicoe on Friday afternoon, the Admiralty



[Lafayette.]

REAR-ADMIRAL W. C. PAKENHAM,
Commanded the Second Battle-cruiser Squadron.

had no news from him as to the course of the engagement. Such information as they had was mainly obtained from intercepted wireless messages, which included, no doubt, the report by the German Admiralty to Washington on June 1, describing the action and the losses which the British were said to have suffered. It was not until seven p.m. on Friday, June 2, that the following *communiqué* was issued by the Admiralty through the Press Bureau:—

On the afternoon of Wednesday, May 31, a naval engagement took place off the coast of Jutland. The British ships on which the brunt of the fighting fell were the Battle-Cruiser Fleet and some cruisers and light cruisers, supported by four fast battleships. Among those the losses were heavy. The German Battle Fleet, aided by low visibility, avoided prolonged action with our main forces, and soon after these appeared on the scene the enemy returned to port, though not before receiving severe damage from our battleships.

The battle-cruisers *Queen Mary*, *Indefatigable*, *Invincible*, and the cruisers *Defence* and *Black Prince* were sunk. The *Warrior* was disabled, and, after being towed for some time, had to be abandoned by her crew. It is also known that the destroyers *Tipperary*, *Turbulent*, *Fortune*, *Sparrowhawk* and *Ardent* were lost, and six others are not yet accounted for. No British battleships or light cruisers were sunk. The enemy's losses were serious. At least one battle-cruiser was destroyed, and one severely damaged; one battleship reported sunk by our destroyers during a night attack: two light cruisers were disabled and probably sunk. The exact number of enemy destroyers disposed of during the action cannot be ascertained with any certainty, but it must have been large.



[Lafayette.]

REAR-ADMIRAL THE HON. HORACE
L. A. HOOD, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.,
Commanded the Third Battle-cruiser Squadron.
In the uniform of a Captain, R.N.

The wording of this *communiqué*, with its admissions of British losses apparently much heavier than those inflicted upon the enemy, gave the impression that it was the preliminary and guarded announcement of a naval reverse. The evening papers published the news in their later editions, and generally it was taken to indicate that the Germans, in great strength, had surprised a portion of the British Fleet and inflicted heavy loss upon it before help could arrive. The very frankness with which heavy casualties were admitted, coupled with the statement that soon after our main forces "appeared on the scene the enemy returned to port," was sufficient to justify such apprehensions as were created by the news. The early editions of the morning papers, and most of those published in the provinces, contained the same *communiqué*, with comments founded on it. At one o'clock on Saturday morning a further announcement was made which put a slightly better complexion on the affair. This second statement was as follows:—

Since the foregoing *communiqué* was issued, a further report has been received from the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, stating that it is now ascertained that our



THE ARRIVAL OF THE GERMAN BATTLE FLEET.

A Turning Movement by the British Battle-cruisers and their screen of Destroyers.

"Course was altered 16 points in succession to starboard, and I proceeded on a northerly course to lead them towards the Battle Fleet." (Beatty's Report.)

total losses in destroyers amount to eight boats in all. The Commander-in-Chief also reports that it is now possible to form a closer estimate of the losses and damage sustained by the enemy fleet. One Dreadnought battleship of the Kaiser class was blown up in an attack by British destroyers, and another Dreadnought battleship of the Kaiser class is believed to have been sunk by gun-fire. Of three German battle-cruisers, two of which, it is believed, were the *Dorfflinger* and the *Lützow*, one was blown up, another was heavily engaged by our Battle Fleet and was seen to be disabled and stopping, and a third was observed to be seriously damaged. One German light cruiser and six German destroyers were sunk, and at least two more German light cruisers were seen to be disabled. Further, repeated hits were observed on three other German battleships that were engaged. Finally, a German submarine was rammed and sunk.

This was published by the newspapers in their later editions, and the alterations made in the editorial comments showed that it had a reassuring effect. Many people, however will long retain unpleasant recollections of that first Friday night in June, 1916, when they might have been sharing in the satisfaction of a British naval triumph, had the Admiralty acted more judiciously in circulating the news. On Saturday and Sunday, June 3 and 4, a third official *communiqué* and two semi-official announcements were issued from the Admiralty through the Press Bureau. The first-named was, in effect, an epitome of the dispatches from the Commander-in-Chief published a month later, and showed the action in its true light. It finally disposed of the idea that the Germans had won a victory, but even so its encouraging effect was to some extent minimized by the semi-official statements which appeared at the same time. The first of these was an analysis of the British and German losses by Mr. Winston Churchill. After comparing the units of the Fleets alleged to have been sunk on either side, and pointing out that so far from ours having been the greater the balance was the other way about, Mr. Churchill went on to say:—

Our margin of superiority is in no way impaired. The despatch of troops to the Continent should continue with the utmost freedom, the battered condition of the German Fleet being an additional security to us. The hazy weather, the fall of night, and the retreat of the enemy alone frustrated the persevering efforts of our brilliant commanders, Sir John Jellicoe and Sir David Beatty, to force a final decision. Although it was not possible to compel the German main fleet to accept battle, the conclusions reached are of extreme importance. All classes of vessels on both sides have now met, and we know that there are no surprises or unforeseen features. An accurate measure can be taken of the strength of the enemy, and his definite inferiority is freed from any element of uncertainty.

This calling in of Mr. Churchill by the First Lord to give what the former termed "a reassuring interview" was regarded as a weak

stop on the part of the Admiralty, and aroused much criticism. Both Mr. Balfour and Mr. Churchill felt constrained to explain why the latter was asked to intervene, but neither in this matter nor in the attempt to throw the blame for the misleading impression created by the first *communiqué* on to the Press were the excuses regarded as entirely satisfactory.

The other semi-official statement came from "a naval officer of high rank," who had had access, like Mr. Churchill, to special sources of information. It was in the shape of an interview with a representative of the Associated Press of America on June 3, but was issued by the Press Bureau on the following day. The various stages of the battle were described, with additional details and comments on the official reports. To the interviewer, this officer further remarked:

We can only say that we were looking for a fight when our Fleet went out. Stories that it was decoyed by the Germans are the sheerest nonsense. . . . The battle had four phases, the first opening at 3.15 p.m., when our battle-cruisers, at a range of six miles, joined action with the German battle-cruisers. Shortly after, the second phase began, with the arrival on both sides of battleships. The Germans arrived first, but before their arrival our three battle-cruisers had been blown up, supposedly as the result of gun-fire, but there is a possibility that they met their fate by torpedoes.

Such close-range fighting by battle-cruisers might be criticised as bad tactics, but our Fleet, following the traditions of the Navy, went out to engage the enemy. On account of the weather conditions however, it could only do so at short range.

The third phase was the engagement of battleships, which was never more than partial. This phase included a running fight, as the German Dreadnoughts fled towards their bases. All the big ship fighting was over by 9.15. Then came one of the most weird features of the battle, as the German destroyers made attack after attack, like infantry following an artillery preparation, on our big ships: but these onslaughts were singularly futile, not a single torpedo launched by them getting home. With the morning these attacks ended, and the battleground was scoured by Admiral Jellicoe's Fleet, which reported not a single enemy ship in sight.

After a summary of the losses believed to have been inflicted upon the enemy attention was directed to the circumstance that the weather conditions were the hardest bit of luck the Fleet encountered, as shown by the following paragraph in the official report: "Regret misty weather saved enemy from far more severe punishment." This account of the engagement was published in a great number of the British and foreign papers. It formed the basis of much of the comment and criticism that was made by naval officers and others in the United States, where it was doubtless intended to counteract the erroneous impressions created by the announcements which the



[Russell.]

CAPTAIN E. M. PHILLPOTTS,
Commanded the Battleship "Warspite."

German Admiralty were issuing. The Americans got their first notion from a Berlin message which, being sent by wireless to Sayville, escaped the censorship over the cable lines. This was supplemented by the German Admiralty report dated June 1, the text of which was as follows :

During an enterprise directed towards the north, our High Sea Fleet on Wednesday (May 31) encountered the main part of the British fighting fleet, which was considerably superior to our forces. During the afternoon, between the Skaggerak and Horn Reef, a heavy engagement developed, which was successful for us, and which continued during the whole night. In this engagement, so far as is known to us at present, we destroyed the great battleship Warspite, the battle-cruisers Queen Mary and Indefatigable, two armoured cruisers, apparently of the Achilles type, one small cruiser, the new destroyer leaders Turbulent, Nestor and Alcaster (Acasta), a large number of destroyers, and one submarine.

By observations which are unchallengeable, it is known that a large number of British battleships suffered damage from our ships and torpedo craft during the day and night actions. Among others, the great battleship Marlborough was hit by a torpedo, as has been confirmed by prisoners. Several of our ships rescued portions of the crews of the sunk British ships, among whom were the only two survivors of the Indefatigable.

On our side, the small cruiser Wiesbaden was sunk by the enemy's guns in the course of the day action, and the Pommeru during the night by a torpedo. The fate of the Frauenlob, which is missing, and of some torpedo boats which have not yet returned, is unknown. The High Sea Fleet returned to-day (Thursday) to our ports.

A second official message was issued by the Chief of the German Naval Staff on June 3, in which the loss of the Elbing was admitted, and another on June 7, in which was admitted the loss of the vessels Lützow and Rostock—



[Russell.]

CAPTAIN F. C. DREYER, C.B.,
Flag-Captain and Gunnery Director of the Fleet.

information hitherto withheld, it was announced, for military reasons.

The view generally taken by the American Press, from the early British and German reports, even by those papers which sympathized with the cause of the Allies, was that the British had suffered a defeat. As an example, the Philadelphia *Inquirer*, an old-established journal of well-balanced judgment, said in its leading article of June 3 :

In the first great naval engagement of the war, in a conflict for which the British have been wearying, and in which they counted with confidence on success, they have been decisively defeated, and have sustained losses which not the most optimistically inclined can regard as negligible. . . . So far as can be gathered from the information at hand, only a comparatively small section of the British Fleet was engaged, and it is hardly necessary to point out that Great Britain's naval superiority has not been materially affected by the losses it has sustained.

The early reports gave rise to erroneous conclusions by others than civilians. The *Army and Navy Journal*, of New York, in its issue of June 10, stated that in the opinion of officers at the Navy Department, the British battle-cruisers got into a place in the engagement for which they were entirely unsuited.

In some quarters there has been a tendency to criticize the commander of the Battle-Cruiser Fleet, and particularly the commanders of the light armoured cruisers, for impetuously rushing into a struggle where they were at such a disadvantage, but this is explained in part by the suggestion that in all probability the British naval officers had been held in leash so long that when they got an opportunity to get into action they showed more courage than prudence.



[Russell.]

CAPTAIN ARTHUR L. CAY,
Flag-Captain of the "Invincible."



[Maul & Fox.]

CAPTAIN CHARLES J. WINTOUR,
Commanded the Destroyer "Tipperary."

Rear-Admiral Caspar F. Goodrich, after quoting from the statement of "the naval officer of high rank," said :


It would seem from what we are told that over-confidence in the battle-cruisers led to their taking an undue share of hard knocks, and that it would have been more prudent to let them draw the German battleships to within range of the British battleships fast coming to their relief.

Other naval officers expressed similar views. Even Admiral Dewey spoke of the unfitness of the battle-cruiser to play a leading rôle in naval dramas, and Captain W. S. Sims was evidently of the opinion that the Battle-Cruiser Fleet had attacked the main body of the German Fleet on sight. It was not until the dispatch of Sir John Jellicoe and report of Sir David Beatty were published that these mistaken inferences were corrected, and it was made abundantly clear that such conclusions found no warrant in the facts.

On Tuesday, May 30, the ships of the Grand Fleet left their anchorages by instructions from the Commander-in-Chief to carry out one of those periodical sweeps of the North Sea of which the first to be announced was mentioned in an official *communiqué* as far back as September 10, 1914, and many of which had been carried out at intervals since the beginning of the war. Sir John Jellicoe made it clear in his dispatch that every part of the Grand Fleet was under his command, and was operating in accordance with his orders. From the statements of visitors to the Fleet, it was known to

have been in three sections, and a few days earlier the Battle-Cruiser Fleet was reported as being in the Firth of Forth. It is essential to note that the concerted movements of the Fleet were made on Tuesday, because it thus becomes clear that the enemy could have had no certain knowledge that the Grand Fleet was at sea. The location of the sections of the Fleet might have been discovered by Zeppelins in the daytime, but these could not have seen and reported the movements of the ships after dark. Similarly, the survivors of the *Elbing* when landed in Holland stated that the High Sea Fleet had put to sea at 4 a.m. on the morning of Wednesday, May 31. This movement, therefore, could not have been the cause of the Grand Fleet's putting to sea on the previous afternoon. An unusual briskness and stir had, indeed, been reported at Wilhelmshaven and Kiel. Both Fleets were no doubt fully prepared for battle when they left port, but the actual meeting appears to have happened by chance.

The object of the sweeps made by the Grand Fleet was clear. The intention was to meet the enemy, if he could be found, and to engage him. The sole purpose in view was his annihilation as an effective force. The sweeps, it may be said, were made in conformity with the policy adumbrated by Nelson, "The enemy are still in port, but something must be done to provoke or lure them to a battle." It may be asked, on the other hand, whether the Germans had



THE COURSE OF THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK.

any serious undertaking in view in coming out as they did. Probably they had, first, because nothing they had done had lacked purpose, and secondly, they had certain advantages which were denied to their opponents. The fleet which keeps the sea cannot always be at its maximum strength. As Admiral W. H. Henderson pointed out* :—

Refits and repairs require constant attendance, and although our Fleet is superior to that of the enemy it is not possible to count upon all the ships of which it is composed being perpetually on the spot. . . . The Queen Elizabeth and the Australia appear to have been absent from the battle, or over 13 per cent. of the strength of our fast divisions. Can anyone doubt what the addition of those two ships would have meant to the hardily-pressed and splendidly-fought squadrons during the time in which they were engaged with superior force.

The Germans could select the moment to appear when they were at their full strength, and of this they evidently took advantage. It was obviously their correct plan to look for an opportunity to cut off and destroy any unit of the opposed force inferior in strength, and separated so far from its main body as to be dealt with before support could be obtained. By such tactics the material strength of the fleets might be more equally balanced. The semi-official statement from Berlin on June 5 that "the German High Sea forces pushed forward in order to engage portions of the British Fleet which were repeatedly reported recently to be off the south coast of Norway" may well have referred to the "enterprise directed northward" of the first official *communiqué* issued on June 1. It was possible that by means of Zeppelins the Germans had discovered that the periodical sweeps were not always carried out by the whole of the Grand Fleet. When, therefore, the British Battle-Cruiser Fleet was sighted by Hipper's scouts on Wednesday afternoon, it would have been a natural conclusion to draw that a chance had presented itself to attack with their full force a weaker British division, and thus to gain a comparatively easy success. If this was their endeavour, it was completely frustrated by the dogged tenacity of Sir David Beatty, with the effective support supplied by Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, and the decisive stroke of the Commander-in-Chief when he arrived on the scene of action. In any case there was no sign of an intention to seriously contest the command of the sea, of a plan for breaking the blockade, or of an adventure into the Atlantic. Such projects could only be carried



Russell.

COMMANDER SIR C. R. BLANE, BART.,
H.M.S. "Queen Mary" (killed).

out successfully after the British naval forces had been depleted by attrition, and that this was recognized by the Germans was shown by their immediate retirement when it was seen that the battle squadrons of Sir John Jellicoe were joining in the battle. Both sides wanted a fight, but the Germans only on their own terms.

A further advantage would be obtained by the Germans, should an engagement occur, if they could contrive to bring it about nearer to their own ports than to those of the enemy. Although not due directly to their own efforts, it is nevertheless the fact that this happened. The locality in which the battle began was in the vicinity of the Little Fisher Bank, and to the westward of the Jutland Bank, two shoal patches at no great distance from the Danish coast. The approximate position of the British Battle-Cruiser Fleet on sighting the German battle-cruisers was somewhere about 56deg., 50min. North latitude, and 5deg. 30min. East longitude. This position is nearly twice as far from the British coast as it is from that of Germany. When the battle came to an end on the morning of June 1, while the retreating German ships had approached much closer to their own ports, the Grand Fleet was over 400

* *Contemporary Review*, July, 1916.

miles from its main base, and its other bases were all considerably farther away than the German ports. Between the two positions which marked the beginning and the end of the encounter, the Horn Reef projects from the Danish coast about ten miles, its outlying point marked by a light vessel, and the action was certainly nearer to this reef than to the Skager Rak. This explains why the encounter was sometimes called in this country after the Horn Reef, which was much more appropriate than to call it after the Skager Rak, as the Germans did. Apparently they wished to suggest that

they had no advantage from the scene of the battle being in the vicinity of their defended harbours. This, however, was not the case.

Some uncertainty exists as to the identity of all the ships which took part in the action. A note appended to the dispatch of Sir John Jellicoe says: "The list of ships and commanding officers which took part in the action has been withheld from publication for the present in accordance with practice." It was believed that vessels from all the types in the following table were present:

THE GRAND FLEET.

TYPES OF SHIPS.

BATTLESHIPS.						Belt	Sister-Ships.
Name.	Date.	Tons.	Speed.	Armament.	Armour.		
Royal Sovereign	1916	25,750	21	8 15-in., 12 6-in.	13-in.	Revenge, etc.	
Queen Elizabeth (Fifth Squadron)	1915	27,500	25	8 15-in., 12 6-in.	13-in.	Warspite, Valiant, Barham, Malaya.	
Iron Duke (First Squadron)	1914	25,000	21	10 13.5-in., 12 6-in.	12-in.	Marlborough, Emperor of India, Benbow.	
Orion (Second Squadron) ...	1912	23,000	21	10 13.5-in., 16 4-in.	12-in.	Conqueror, Monarch, Thunderer, King George V., Ajax, Audacious, Centurion.	
Dreadnought (Fourth Squadron)	1906	17,900	21	10 12-in., 4-in. or 12-pr.	11-in.	Bellerophon, Temeraire, Superb, St. Vincent, Collingwood, Vanguard, Neptune, Colossus, Hercules.	
BATTLE-CRUISERS.							
Lion (First Squadron) ...	1912	26,350	28	8 13.5-in., 16 4-in.	9-in.	Princess Royal, Queen Mary, Tiger.	
New Zealand (Second Squadron)	1912	18,800	25	8 12-in., 16 4-in.	7-in.	Indefatigable, Australia.	
Indomitable (Third Squadron)	1908	17,250	25	8 12-in., 16 4-in.	7 in.	Inflexible, Invincible.	
ARMoured CRUISERS.							
Defence (First Squadron) ...	1909	14,600	23	4 9.2-in., 10 7.5-in.	6-in.	Minotaur, Shannon.	
Achilles (Second Squadron)	1907	13,550	22½	6 9.2-in., 4 7.5-in.	6-in.	Cochrane, Warrior.	
Black Prince (First Squadron)	1906	13,550	22½	6 9.2-in., 10 6-in.	6-in.	Duke of Edinburgh.	
LIGHT CRUISERS.							
Galatea (First Squadron) ...	1915	3,750	29	2 6-in., 8 4-in.	—	Aurora, Inconstant, Royalist, Penelope, Phaeton, Undaunted.	
Southampton (Second Squadron)	1913	5,400	25½	8 or 9 6-in.	—	Chatham, Dublin, Birmingham, Lowestoft, Nottingham.	
Falmouth (Third Squadron)	1911	5,250	25½	8 6-in.	—	Dartmouth, Falmouth, Weymouth, Yarmouth.	
Calliope (Fourth Squadron)	1915	3,800	30	2 6-in., 8 4-in.	—	Caroline, Carysfort, Champion, Cleopatra, Comus, Conquest, Cordelia.	
Fearless (First Flotilla) ...	1913	3,440	25½	10 4-in.	—	Active, Blanche, Blonde, Bellona, Boadicea.	
DESTROYERS.							
Tipperary	1914	1,850	31	6 4-in.	—	Botha, Turbulent, Termagant, and others.	
Pelican	1916	Particulars unknown.				—	Petard, etc.
Onslow	1916	Particulars unknown.				—	Onslaught, Obdurate, etc.
Nestor	1915	Particulars unknown.				—	Nomad, Nieator, Narborough, Nerissa, etc.
Moresby	1914	Particulars unknown.				—	Manly, Mansfield, Mastiff, Matchless, Mentor, Meteor, Milne, Minos, Miranda, Moorson, Morris, Murray, Myngs, etc.
Landrail	1913	965	29	3 4-in.	—	Lydiard, Lalorey, Lookout, Legion, etc.	
Acasta ("K" type) ...	1912	935	29	3 4-in.	—	Ardent, Fortune, Garland, Ambuscade, Shark, Sparrowhawk, Spitfire, etc.	
Badger ("I" type) ...	1911	780	29	2 4-in., 2 12-pdrs.	—	Defender, Attack, Hornet, Phoenix, etc.	
MISCELLANEOUS.							
Abdiel	—	Particulars unknown.				—	
Engadine	—	Seaplane carrier.				—	



GERMAN SUBMARINES ATTACHED TO THE HIGH SEA FLEET.

With regard to the Grand Fleet, the composition of the battle squadrons was not disclosed, the names of only a few of the vessels being mentioned. Sir John Jellicoe refers to the movements of three squadrons—the First, Second, and Fourth, in the last-named of which his flagship, the Iron Duke, was placed. The Marlborough was the flagship of Sir Cecil Burney in the First Squadron; and the King George V. of Sir Thomas Jerram in the Second Squadron. According to the German account, a squadron of three ships of the Royal Sovereign type was also present. One of these was mentioned by the Commander-in-Chief, who stated that when the Marlborough was partially disabled by a torpedo Sir Cecil Burney transferred his flag to the Revenge, of the Royal Sovereign class. The Fifth Battle Squadron, which supported the Battle-Cruiser Fleet, consisted of four ships of the Queen Elizabeth type, but the name-ship was absent refitting. Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas flew his flag in the Barham.

The nine battle-cruisers present on the British side were organized in three squadrons, commanded respectively by Rear-Admirals O. de

B. Brock, W. C. Pakenham, and the Hon. H. L. A. Hood. The Princess Royal flew the flag of the first-named; the New Zealand that of Admiral Pakenham; and the Invincible that of Admiral Hood. The flag of Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, Commanding the Battle-Cruiser Fleet, was flying in the Lion. The five other battle-cruisers were the Queen Mary, Tiger, Indefatigable, Indomitable, and Inflexible. Admiral Beatty also had under his command the First, Second, and Third Light Cruiser Squadrons, and destroyers from the First, Ninth, Tenth, and Thirteenth Flotillas. With the Commander-in-Chief and the battle squadrons were the First and Second Cruiser Squadrons, the Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron, and destroyers from the Fourth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Flotillas. There were also a number of special and auxiliary types represented, including the Engadine, seaplane-carrier.

There is more doubt about the composition of the German High Sea Fleet, under the command of Vice-Admiral Scheer, which according to the German account consisted of a main battle fleet in three squadrons, and a reconnoitring fleet of five battle-cruisers under



THE GERMAN BATTLE-CRUISER "SEYDLITZ," CAPTAIN VON EGIDY.

Reported to have been seriously damaged in the battle.

Vice-Admiral Hipper, with light cruisers and destroyers attached to both divisions. The heavier vessels were probably of the types in the table below :

presence of which would necessarily reduce the speed and fighting capacity of the whole force.

Admiral Hipper's five battle-cruisers are said,

THE HIGH SEA FLEET.

TYPES OF SHIPS.

BATTLESHIPS.						
Name.	Date.	Tons.	Speed.	Armament.	Belt Armour.	Sister-Ships.
Wilhelm II. (ex-Wörth) ...	1916	29,090	21	8 15-in., 16 5.9-in.	—	"T."
"N" (ex-Salamis) ...	1916	19,200	23	8 14-in., 12 6-in.	10-in.	Unknown.
König ...	1914	25,387	21	10 12-in., 14 5.9-in.	14-in.	Markgraf, Grosser Kurfürst, Kronprinz.
Kaiser ...	1913	24,310	21	10 12-in., 14 5.9-in.	14-in.	Kaiserin, Friedrich der Grosse, König Albert, Prinzregent Luitpold.
Helgoland ...	1911	22,500	20½	12 12-in., 14 5.9-in.	12-in.	Ostfriesland, Thuringen, Oldenburg.
Nassau ...	1909	18,600	20½	12 11-in., 12 5.9-in.	12-in.	Westfalen, Rheinland, Posen.
Deutschland...	1906	13,040	18½	4 11-in., 14 6.7-in.	9½-in.	Hannover, Pommern, Schle- sien, Schleswig-Holstein.
Braunschweig ...	1904	12,907	18	4 11-in., 14 6.7-in.	9-in.	Elsass, Preussen, Lothrin- gen, Hessen.
BATTLE-CRUISERS						
Hindenburg ...	1916	28,000	27	8 15-in., 14 5.9-in.	—	Unknown.
Lützow ...	1915	28,000	27	8 12-in., 12 5.9-in.	11-in.	Derfflinger.
Seydlitz ...	1913	24,640	26	10 11-in., 12 5.9-in.	11-in.	Moltke.
Von der Tann ...	1911	18,700	25	8 11-in., 10 5.9-in.	6-in.	None.
ARMoured CRUISER.						
Roon ...	1905	9,350	21	4 8.2 in., 10 5.9-in.	4-in.	—

Accepting the German statement, the First Squadron of eight battleships would probably be composed of the König and Kaiser types ; the Second of the Helgoland and Nassau types ; and the Third of pre-Dreadnought ships, the Deutschlands and Braunschweigs. There is reason to believe, however, that two new battleships, which were known when building as the Ersatz-Wörth and "T." were present. The former is said to have been named the Wilhelm II. It was on board a new ship of this name that Admirals Scheer and Hipper received the freedom of Wilhelmshaven a few weeks after the battle. It was also suggested that the Pommern, a vessel of which name the Germans admitted was sunk in the action, was not the old pre-Dreadnought ship of this name—which was understood to have been torpedoed in the Baltic by a British submarine in July, 1915—but the much more modern and powerful vessel known as "T." Another possibility is that the vessel named the Salamis, which was building in Germany for the Greeks when the war broke out, took part in the battle under some other name. At all events, it is difficult to believe that the homogeneity of the German squadrons would have been broken by the inclusion of some of the older ships, the

in the German official account, to have consisted of the Derfflinger and Moltke classes, as well as the Von der Tann. The Lützow, in which Admiral Hipper's flag was flying during part of the action, was the sister-ship of the Derfflinger, and the Seydlitz of the Moltke. Some British observers were of opinion that a later battle-cruiser, the Hindenburg, was present, and not the Von der Tann, and this is the more likely, as the inclusion of the latter would have tended to reduce the speed of the squadron.

Thus at about two o'clock on the afternoon of Wednesday, May 31, two large naval forces were approaching one another in the North Sea. Each of these forces consisted of a main body comprising three squadrons of their latest battleships. Each also had an advanced or reconnoitring squadron of battle-cruisers thrown out some distance before the main body. Each, too, was accompanied by satellites, some of which were still more advanced, for scouting purposes, and as a protective screen against submarines. It is characteristic of the sea operations that two such bodies as these, each containing all the latest scientific appliances for sea fighting, although they might be cruising in the same waters, might seldom come into



A SCENE OF THE MIDNIGHT BATTLE.

Engagement of one of the British destroyers with German cruisers, as revealed by German star-shells, and firelight caused by a huge shell which struck the British vessel. Caught between two fires and fighting to the last, the officers and men of the destroyer gave a good account of themselves before she sank. The German vessel was badly damaged by a torpedo.

contact, and that months might elapse without an engagement. Even when they do meet, it does not follow that there is continuity of

fighting, such as may be observed in the clash of armies on land.

It was, as Sir David Beatty tells us, a fine

afternoon, with a light wind from the south-east, the sea calm, and the visibility—that is to say, the range of vision—fairly good. At about 2.30 the satellites of the two bodies sighted one another. Some Dutch fishermen who were present described this first meeting of the light cruisers which were thrown out before the battle-cruiser squadrons.

Now it was that there occurred one of those incidents which illustrate the change in the conduct of sea fighting. Whether the

master G. S. Trewin, as observer, quickly reconnoitred to the east-north-east :

Owing to clouds it was necessary to fly very low, and in order to identify four enemy light cruisers the seaplane had to fly at a height of 900 ft. within 3,000 yards of them, the light cruisers opening fire on her with every gun that would bear.

The information obtained in this way indicated the value of such observations. It may be remarked, however, that in clear weather, and under favourable conditions, observations might be made from Zeppelins for far greater dis-



VICE-ADMIRAL SIR CHARLES MADDEN,
K.C.B., C.V.O., Chief of Staff.

Germans were accompanied by Zeppelin scouts remains uncertain. It was suggested that they might have been present, because of the reference in the official German version of the battle to observations which were indubitably reliable, and because the Danish fishermen reported that they saw two airships near the coast of Denmark. But the British certainly made use of an air scout, for on a report from the *Galatea*, Commodore E. S. Alexander-Sinclair, who with the First Light Cruiser Squadron was scouting to the eastward, Sir David Beatty ordered a seaplane to be sent up from the *Engadine*, Lieut.-Com. C. G. Robinson, and this machine, with Flight-Lieut. F. J. Rutland as pilot, and Asst.-Pay-



COMMODORE LIONEL HALSEY, C.M.G.,
"Iron Duke," Captain of the Fleet.

tances. It has been calculated that the radius of vision of observers in these airships at 10,000 feet is about 90 miles. As the distance by which the battle-cruiser squadrons on either side were separated from their main bodies could not have been more than 40 or 50 miles at the most, a Zeppelin at the above-named height should have been able, on a clear afternoon, to have seen both the approaching battle squadrons. There was nothing, however, to indicate that this knowledge was available to either fleet.

The admirals commanding the battle-cruiser squadrons became aware of the proximity and of the strength of one another at about the same time. Their proceedings illustrated one

[Russell.



THE GERMAN LIGHT CRUISER "ROSTOCK."

Officially admitted to have been sunk in the battle.

of the functions such vessels are built to perform. The purpose of the battle-cruiser was twofold. It was to be a commerce protector, its speed and weight of armament enabling it to catch and overwhelm sea wolves preying on the trade, as was shown by Vice-Admiral Sturdee's victory at the action off the Falkland Islands. Its other purpose was to push home a reconnaissance—to sweep away the protecting screen scouting for the enemy, and again by its speed and power to get near enough to find out the composition of the approaching foe. In this instance, Vice-Admiral Hipper, discovering his force to be inferior to that of his opponent, promptly turned to retire on his main body. Sir David Beatty, not yet aware whether there was any main body behind Hipper, altered course and proceeded at full speed in a direction which would enable him to make the discovery or to cut off the enemy cruisers from their base. There was, therefore, no question of undue risk. Sir

David Beatty, with superior force, was carrying out the primary purpose for which his vessels had been created. It is true that while he was steaming away from his main forces, Hipper was steaming towards *his* friends; but it should be noted that although the distance in the latter case was decreasing at the rate of the combined speeds of the squadrons, the distance between Sir David and the British battle fleet was only increasing by the difference in the speeds of the two bodies. The first stage of the battle, then, took on a similar form to that of the action off the Dogger Bank on January 24, 1915. Hipper's five battle-cruisers were flying back to the south-east, from which direction von Scheer was advancing, while the six heavier and more powerful British vessels were in chase. The latter, moreover, were supported by the four ships of the Fifth Battle Squadron under Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, between five and six miles to the north-westward.



THE GERMAN PRE-DREADNOUGHT BATTLESHIP "POMMERN."

Officially admitted to have been sunk by a torpedo on the night of May 31.

Summing up the position at this stage, Sir David Beatty said: "The visibility at this time was good, the sun behind us and the wind south-east. Being between the enemy and his base, our situation was both tactically and strategically good."

At 3.48 p.m. the opposed forces had closed to a range of about 18,500 yards, and the action began. Both sides opened fire practically simultaneously, steaming on parallel lines. It was a little later that there occurred one of those catastrophic strokes of fortune which have been made possible by the tremendous power locked up in the modern engines of battle. The ships on both sides were vigorously engaged, when suddenly a heavy explosion was caused in the last ship of the British line, the *Indefatigable*. A black column of smoke 400 feet high shot upwards, said the German account, hiding the ship, and when it cleared away a little later the cruiser had disappeared. Out of her ship's company of about 900 officers and men, only two are believed to have survived. The fighting, we are told, was of a very fierce and resolute character, and as the good marksmanship of the British vessels began to tell, the accuracy and rapidity of that of the enemy depreciated. The Fifth Battle Squadron, too, had come into action, and opened fire at a range of 20,000 yards upon the enemy's rear ships. At 4.18 the third ship in the enemy's line was seen to be on fire, but soon afterwards another tragic misfortune befell the British squadron. The magnificent battle-cruiser *Queen Mary* was vitally hit, and with a terrific explosion, which appeared to blow her hull asunder, also disappeared. The loss of life in her case was terrible also, for she had at least 1,000 people in her, and only about a score were saved. In modern warfare seamen have to face perils unknown to their predecessors, for in the old wars ships were more often captured than sunk. Now the sacrifice is demanded with awful suddenness, and in a moment the whole of a ship's company may be added to the list of those brave men who have died at their post of duty.

It was in this run to the southward that the German gunners displayed their best qualities. The manner in which they concentrated the fire of several ships and bunched their salvos on an object was remarkable. With regard to the loss of Beatty's two cruisers, an officer of one of the larger vessels gave in the *Daily*

Mail what appeared to be a possible explanation. He said:

They were purely chance shots which brought about their destruction. The armour would have withstood any amount of shell-fire.

Under the deadly hail from the British ships, however, the quality of the German gunnery fell off, and their fire became far less effective, whereas the result of that from Beatty's ships became more marked every moment. For an hour all but six minutes the engagement continued to the southward, when the enemy's battle fleet, in three divisions, was sighted by the *Southampton*, Commodore W. E. Goodenough, and reported to the Vice-Admiral. Thereupon Sir David Beatty, having attained one purpose, proceeded to carry out another. He had driven in, by superior force, the enemy's advance guard, and had discovered the composition and direction of their main force. At the same time, he had prevented the enemy's scouts from approaching his own main body in order to obtain similar information. This was not falling into a trap, but, if trap there was, he now set it. Turning his squadron round—the ships altering course in succession to starboard—he proceeded northwards to lead the enemy towards his own battle fleet. The Fifth Battle Squadron, following in his wake, but more to the southward, came into action with the van of the enemy's battle fleet, which Admiral Hipper, who had also turned, was now leading on a parallel course to the British squadron's. Possibly the Germans assumed that Beatty and Thomas were unsupported, and that the odds now in his favour offered von Scheer the opportunity for which he had been looking. If so, he was to be disillusioned. Thus ended the first stage of the contest.

With the second stage there came about a change in the conditions of light and visibility. The British ships were silhouetted against a clear horizon to the westward, with the setting sun behind them, while the enemy, obscured in an increasing veil of mist, presented very indistinct outlines. It says a good deal for British *moral* and marksmanship that, despite these disadvantages, during the northward run "the enemy received very severe punishment, and one of their battle-cruisers quitted the line in a considerably damaged condition." Other of the ships also showed signs of increasing injury. Beatty's battle-cruisers had been reduced to four, and at an interval behind them were the four fast battleships of the *Queen Elizabeth*



THE END OF THE DESTROYER "SHARK."

After being engaged about ten minutes, the British destroyer was struck by two torpedoes, which sank her almost at once. But before she settled down the "Shark" fired her last available torpedo. The portrait is of Loftus W. Jones, Commander of the "Shark," who was killed in action.

type, the latter being engaged not only with Hipper's force but with that of von Scheer as well. The range between the two lines was still about 14,000 yards. An officer in Admiral Evan-Thomas's squadron wrote :

We were at this time receiving a very heavy fire indeed, our own battle-cruisers having become disengaged for twenty minutes to half an hour, so that the fire of the whole German Fleet was concentrated on us. Especially unpleasant was a period of half an hour, during which we were unable to see the enemy, while they could see us clearly. Thus we were unable to fire a shot, and had to rest content with steaming through a tornado of shell-fire without loosing off a gun, which was somewhat trying.

It should be borne in mind, however, that at this time Beatty was getting into a position to hustle the Germans over to the eastward, and towards the Danish shore, while help was coming to the sorely tried British force at the rate of the combined speeds of the British battle fleet and the contending forces moving to the northward. That no serious loss occurred on the British side during this, the most critical, phase of the battle, testified alike to the splendid handling of the ships and the excellence of the material and workmanship put into their construction.

The third stage of the engagement was introduced by the arrival of the British battle fleet. Its proximity had already been notified to Sir David Beatty, the speed of whose ships had enabled him to draw considerably ahead of the German line, giving him the advantage of position, and he now turned to the north-eastward, crossing, as it were, ahead of them, and, as he says, crumpling up their leading ships. He notes that only three of their battle-

cruisers were at this time in sight, closely followed by battleships of the König class. They were already turning to the eastward, partly because of Beatty's action, but possibly also because they had realized what they were in for. It has been suggested that it was now that von Scheer ordered the pre-Dreadnought ships to make the best of their way home. Anyway, none of them appears to have taken a part in the subsequent daylight fighting, as should otherwise have been the case had they retained their position as the rear division of the German line.

When, at 5.56, the flagships of the British battle squadrons were seen bearing north, distant five miles, Beatty altered course to the east, bringing the range down to 12,000 yards, and proceeded at his utmost speed. The object of this movement was to give room for Sir John Jellicoe's force to deploy—that is, to open out and extend his divisions from column into line so as to come into action astern of the battle-cruisers. The second purpose of Admiral Beatty had been attained. As the Commander-in-Chief, in a deservedly eulogistic passage in his dispatch, said :

The junction of the Battle Fleet with the scouting force after the enemy had been sighted was delayed owing to the southerly course steered by our advanced force during the first hour after commencing their action with the enemy battle-cruisers. This was, of course, unavoidable, as had our battle-cruisers not followed the enemy to the southward the main fleets would never have been in contact. The Battle-Cruiser Fleet, gallantly led by Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, and admirably supported by the ships of the Fifth Battle Squadron under Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, fought an action under, at times, disadvantageous conditions, especially in regard to light, in a manner



GERMAN WAR VESSELS OUTSIDE KIEL HARBOUR.



AFTER THE BATTLE.

Shell-holes in the side of a British warship. The shell-hole on the left is stopped up with bedding.

that was in keeping with the best traditions of the Service.

Before describing the way in which the German High Sea Fleet was brought to action by the British battle squadrons, it will make the narrative more clear if the subsequent movements of the force under Sir David Beatty are first dealt with. Continuing his course to the eastward, at 6.20 the Third Battle-Cruiser Squadron, commanded by Rear-Admiral the Hon. H. L. A. Hood, which had been ordered to reinforce him, appeared ahead, steaming south towards the enemy's van. Sir David reports :

I ordered them to take station ahead, which was carried out magnificently, Rear-Admiral Hood bringing his squadron into action in a most inspiring manner, worthy of his great naval ancestors.

It was at this stage of the battle that, as the Germans themselves admitted, the increasing mist, particularly in the north and north-east, made itself most unpleasantly felt. Hood, advancing at great speed, to carry out the operation described by Sir David Beatty, swung across in front of the battle-cruisers, and in the mist ran on to within 8,000 yards of the German



line. What followed is thus described by a spectator :

The Invincible, which had sunk a German light cruiser at 5.45 p.m., after an action lasting five minutes tackled a vessel of the Derfflinger class. The German ship was hit by the first salvo, and was getting several knocks to every one she got home on the Invincible, when the shell came that sank the Invincible. There were only six survivors, and when they came up they witnessed the extraordinary spectacle of both the bow and stern of their ship standing vertically 50 ft. out of the water.

As soon as Sir David Beatty realized what was happening he altered course in support of the Third Battle-Cruiser Squadron, and directed its two remaining vessels to take station astern of his squadron and to prolong the line. This was the first occasion on which any of the battle-cruisers engaged at less than 12,000 yards, and Beatty was affording succour to his consorts of Admiral Hood's division. The *Invincible* was sunk, as the *Indefatigable* and *Queen Mary* had been, in action with other battle-cruisers, and there is no evidence in the dispatches that up to this moment our battle-cruisers had been in action with battleships. Any suggestions, therefore, that undue risks were taken in regard to range, or by the engagement of battleships by battle-cruisers, are unsupported by the facts. Nor does the action necessarily show that battle-cruisers cannot fight battleships. Later on, when the German battleships were engaged by vessels of other types, they were admittedly showing signs of demoralization, which had all the disturbing effect of defeat.

The visibility at 6.50 was not more than four miles, and soon after the enemy's ships were temporarily lost sight of. Sir David continued his course to the eastward until 7 o'clock, when he gradually altered course to the south and west in order to regain touch with the enemy. Twice more he was in action, and now with battleships as well as battle-cruisers, at ranges of 15,000 and 10,000 yards respectively. Both times his gunners got home on these retreating vessels. On the last occasion the leading ship, after being repeatedly hit by the *Lion*, turned away eight points, emitting high flames, and with a heavy list to port. The *Princess Royal* set fire to a three-funnelled battleship, and the *New Zealand* and *Indomitable* reported that the third ship hauled out of the line, heeling over and on fire. Then the mist came down again and enveloped them, and the battle-cruisers' part in the engagement ceased. If any vindication of the tactical ability of the Vice-Admiral Commanding the Battle-Cruiser Fleet, or the brilliant manner in which he carried out the duties entrusted to him, was required, it may surely be found in the appreciation and approval of his work and talents by Admiral Sir John Jellicoe :

Sir David Beatty once again showed his fine qualities of gallant leadership, firm determination, and correct strategic insight. He appreciated the situations at once on sighting first the enemy's lighter forces, then his battle-cruisers, and finally his battle fleet. I can

fully sympathize with his feelings when the evening mist and fading light robbed the Fleet of that complete victory for which he had manoeuvred, and for which the vessels in company with him had striven so hard. The services rendered by him, not only on this, but on two previous occasions, have been of the very greatest value.

There remains to describe the concluding phase of the daylight engagement—that between the battle squadrons. It was, however, a very one-sided affair, because as soon as von Scheer recognized what he was up against he turned to the southward, and, under cover of the declining daylight, the thickening mist, and smoke-clouds from his small craft, withdrew from the fight. Before he could get away, however, the three squadrons of the Battle Fleet formed in a single line were hurled across his van, and under a paralysing fire from the British 13.5-in. guns the German formation was shattered and the ships themselves very severely mauled. It was the supreme moment, leading to the climax of the whole battle, when Sir John Jellicoe brought his magnificent Dreadnoughts at their top speed into the *mêlée*. The situation called for the highest tactical skill, calm judgment, and instant and unerring decision on the part of the Commander-in-Chief. His own account of this important phase is singularly brief and modest. "I formed the Battle Fleet in line of battle on receipt of Sir David Beatty's report, and during deployment the fleets became engaged." Picture the circumstances. Flashes of guns were visible through the haze, but no ship could be clearly distinguished. Even the position of the enemy's battleships could not always be determined. So thick was it, in fact, that great care was essential to prevent the British ships being mistaken for enemy vessels. The conditions were certainly unparalleled. Yet, without a moment's hesitation, Sir John Jellicoe, with cool courage, delivered a vigorous and decisive thrust which threw the enemy into confusion and completed their discomfiture. After this, all their tactics were of a nature to avoid further action. How they extricated themselves was not made clear. The fighting between the big ships lasted intermittently for two hours more. It developed into a chase. "During the somewhat brief periods," says Sir John, "in which the ships of the High Sea Fleet were visible through the mist, the heavy and effective fire kept up by the battleships and battle-cruisers of the Grand Fleet caused me much satisfaction, and the enemy's vessels were seen to be constantly hit,



VICE-ADMIRAL SIR DOVETON STURDEE,
BT., K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G..
Commanded the Fourth Battle Squadron.

VICE-ADMIRAL SIR CECIL BURNEY,
K.C.B., K.C.M.G..
Commanded the First Battle Squadron.



REAR-ADMIRAL ARTHUR C.
LEVESON, C.B..
Second in-Command, Second Battle Squadron.

REAR-ADMIRAL ERNEST F. A.
GAUNT, C.M.G..
Second-in-Command, Fourth Battle
Squadron.

VICE-ADMIRAL SIR THOMAS
JERRAM, K.C.B..
Commanded the Second Battle Squadron.



REAR-ADMIRAL ALEXANDER L. DUFF, C.B.
Second-in-Command, First Battle Squadron.

REAR-ADMIRAL HUGH EVAN-THOMAS, M.V.O..
Commanded the Fifth Battle-Squadron.

Photos by Russell, Elliott & Fry, Lafayette, L'Estrange.

some being obliged to haul out of the line, and at least one to sink. The enemy's return fire at this period was not effective, and the damage caused to our ships was insignificant."

The story would not be complete without some account of the operations of the light-cruiser squadrons and destroyer flotillas. It was here that the changes in the conduct of sea fighting since the last time the British Navy was engaged in a fleet action were most clearly marked. In the old wars, over a hundred years ago, ships of the line of battle, unless incensed by some openly offensive act, scorned to throw away ammunition on a frigate or a sloop, and these vessels were left to fight duels with others of their own class. This has been entirely altered by the introduction of the torpedo, and now the smallest boat thus armed may become a formidable antagonist to the biggest Dreadnought. The light craft, therefore, which enter the field of a fleet action must expect a hostile reception if they come within range of any enemy ship. The lighter craft, however, whether cruisers or destroyers, cooperated with their heavier comrades of the line, and engaged with intrepidity and daring. The skilful way in which every type of vessel was used to assist the others bears witness to the development of fleet organization in accordance with modern demands. Sir David Beatty testified to the value of the light cruisers. "They very effectively protected the head of our line from torpedo attack by light cruisers or destroyers, and were prompt in helping to regain touch when the enemy's line was temporarily lost sight of." No higher praise could be given to the destroyer flotillas than that of Sir John Jellicoe. "They surpassed the very highest expectations that I had formed of them."

Although with grim determination and resolute bravery the small craft threw themselves into the fight, no light cruiser was lost, and only eight destroyers were sunk. It may be described as a conflict between egg-shells and sledge-hammers, but the egg-shells did not often get the worst of it. Very many ships were reported to have been seriously damaged by our torpedo attacks. Three times the light cruiser squadrons, carrying no heavier gun than a 6-in., and relying for protection on their own rapidity of fire and movement, attacked armoured ships. The dispatches contain many instances of individual heroism and devotion to duty on the part of those in the destroyers,

and these are only typical of many brilliant feats which, under the conditions of the battle, were unseen and unrecorded officially. Then there is the tragic episode of the destruction of Sir Robert Arbuthnot's squadron. At 6.16 the *Defence* and *Warrior* of this squadron, which had gone into action ahead of the British Battle Fleet, were observed passing down between the engaged lines under a very heavy fire. The *Defence*, flying Rear-Admiral Arbuthnot's flag, disappeared, and the *Warrior* passed to the rear disabled. They had only a short time before been observed in action with an enemy light cruiser, which was subsequently seen to sink.

Says Sir John Jellicoe :

It is probable that Sir Robert Arbuthnot, during his engagement with the enemy's light cruisers and in his desire to complete their destruction, was not aware of the approach of the enemy's heavy ships, owing to the mist, until he found himself in close proximity to the main fleet, and before he could withdraw his ships they were caught under a heavy fire and disabled.

It is not known when the *Black Prince*, of the same squadron, was sunk, but a wireless signal was received from her between eight and nine p.m. The ships' companies of both the *Defence* and *Black Prince* were lost, but that of the *Warrior*, as mentioned elsewhere, was saved by the *Engadine*.

The dispositions of the Commander-in-Chief after nightfall recalled the methods of Togo when he lost sight of the remnants of Rozhdestvensky's fleet after Tsushima. Realizing that Admiral Nicbogatoff would make for Vladivostok, Togo headed in the same direction, and, as is known, found him the next morning and accepted his surrender. Sir John Jellicoe manœuvred to remain between the enemy and his bases, placing his destroyers in a position where they would afford protection to the larger ships and also be favourably situated for attacking those of the enemy. As it turned out, while a heavy toll of the German vessels was taken, not a single ship was touched in the British line. The Fourth, Eleventh and Twelfth Flotillas, under Commodore J. R. P. Hawksley and Captains C. J. Wintour and A. J. B. Stirling, are mentioned by Sir John Jellicoe as having "delivered a series of very gallant and successful attacks on the enemy, causing him heavy losses." The Twelfth Flotilla attacked a squadron consisting of six large vessels, including some of the Kaiser class, which was entirely taken by surprise. "A large number of torpedoes was fired, including

some at the second and third ships in the line; those fired at the third ship took effect, and she was observed to blow up."

Jellicoe, however, was not to experience the good fortune of Togo, for under cover of the darkness of the night, and the thickness of the weather, Vice-Admiral Scheer, with his battered ships, was able to escape. It was not until the following day, after the whole of the large area covered by the fight had been thoroughly searched, without a trace of the enemy being seen, that the British Commander-in-Chief returned to his bases to refuel and refill his magazines. As was officially stated, he was ready again within a very few hours to put to sea.

interviews with a large number of these officers. Sir John Jellicoe compiled a list of the German losses, to which reference will be made later. With the British losses, of course, there was no uncertainty whatever, for at the earliest opportunity the Admiralty published them in full, in contrast to the policy of the German Navy Office, which aimed at concealment as far as possible, only revealing the destruction of those ships whose loss for various reasons had already become known to a number of people.

Of the three battle-cruisers and three armoured cruisers sunk on the British side, the *Indefatigable*, Captain C. F. Sowerby, was the first to be destroyed, followed about twenty



[Russell.]

REAR-ADMIRAL T. D. W. NAPIER,
M.V.O.,

Commanded the Third Light-Cruiser Squadron.



[Russell.]

REAR-ADMIRAL HERBERT L. HEATH,
M.V.O.,


Commanded the Second Cruiser Squadron.

The circumstances of the weather which obtained on the afternoon of May 31, and the approach of night soon after the main battle was joined, made it difficult to obtain exact information as to the losses inflicted on the enemy. As Sir John Jellicoe says, owing principally to the mist, but partly to the smoke, it was possible to see only a few ships at a time in the enemy's battle line.

"The conditions of low visibility," he wrote in his dispatch, "under which the day action took place and the approach of darkness enhance the difficulty of giving an accurate report of the damage inflicted or the names of the ships sunk by our forces."

After a most careful examination of the evidence of all officers who testified to seeing enemy vessels actually sink, and personal

minutes later by the *Queen Mary*, Captain C. I. Prowse. It was at a later stage that the third battle-cruiser, the *Invincible*, Captain A. L. Cay, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral the Hon. H. L. A. Hood, and the armoured cruisers *Defence*, Captain S. V. Ellis, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, *Black Prince*, Captain T. P. Bonham, and *Warrior*, Captain V. B. Molteno, were sunk or disabled. Sir John Jellicoe records at the end of his dispatch how "the hardest fighting fell to the lot of the Battle-Cruiser Fleet (the units of which were less heavily armoured than their opponents), the Fifth Battle Squadron, the First Cruiser Squadron, Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron, and the Flotillas." Of these forces



ONE OF THE GERMAN LOSSES IN THE NAVAL BATTLE.
The last of a German light cruiser. In the background are British destroyers in pursuit of German war vessels.

the Battle-Cruiser Fleet under Sir David Beatty, and First Cruiser Squadron under Rear-Admiral Arbuthnot, each lost three units, as has been shown, but the Fifth Battle Squadron, commanded by Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, and Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron (Commodore C. E. Le Mesurier), escaped without loss, no battleships or light cruisers being sunk at all on the British side. The destroyers sunk were eight in number—the Tipperary, Ardent, Fortune, Shark, Sparrowhawk, Nestor, Nomad, and Turbulent. In the first-named vessel, Captain C. J. Wintour, commanding the Fourth Flotilla, which, said Sir John Jellicoe, he had brought to a high pitch of perfection, lost his life.

The foregoing was the complete toll paid by the British Fleet in driving back the Germans into their ports. It was added to by the enemy, sometimes liberally, with the intention of supporting their claim to a "victory," but the Admiralty on more than one occasion definitely denied these new claims from Berlin. One of the most persistent of the latter related to the battleship Warspite, Captain E. M. Phillpotts, which was declared to have been sunk. In spite of the fact that the Admiralty issued a notice on June 4 saying: "This is untrue, that ship having returned to harbour," the allegation was repeated in an official *communiqué* from the German Fleet Command on the 6th, and again in the long official account published on June 8. On June 10, however, the Admiralty granted permission to a representative of the Associated Press of America to see Captain Phillpotts, who was full of praise for the conduct of his men in the battle and what he termed the amazing powers of resistance of his ship. He said:

I am not surprised that there have been reports that the Warspite was sunk, as from our position, between our Fleet and the German battleships, our escape from such a fate was simply miraculous. Several times we disappeared from sight in the smoke and spray.

The Captain went on to explain that after two hours of action, in much of which the Fifth Battle Squadron, to which the Warspite belonged, engaged the whole German Battle Fleet in an effort to protect the British battle-cruisers until Admiral Jellicoe came up, the steering gear of the Warspite went wrong, and she ran amuck among the enemy. Some six German battleships concentrated their fire on her, but under a worse pounding than the Lion received in the Dogger Bank fight she remained in action without a single vital injury. An

officer in another ship, describing the incident in a letter published in the newspapers, said:

It was at this stage that, owing to some temporary defect, the Warspite's helm jammed, and she went straight at the enemy into a hell of fire. She looked a most wonderful sight, every gun firing for all it was worth in reply. Luckily, she got under control quickly, and returned to the line, and it was this incident which gave rise to the German legend that she had been sunk.

Sir John Jellicoe commended the Warspite's captain for his conduct at this trying moment. "Clever handling," said the Commander-in-Chief, "enabled Captain Edward M. Phillpotts to extricate his ship from a somewhat awkward situation." There was a rather amusing touch at the conclusion of the incident, for the captain told his interviewer that when the defect had been quickly repaired the Warspite wanted to return. But her previous movements had been so erratic that Captain Phillpotts and his crew found that they were not popular! Sufficient battleships were present by this time to fill the line, and the possibility of the vessel's running amuck among her own friends was not welcomed. So she steamed home.

Other ships in the British Fleet suffered the same fate as the Warspite of being sunk on paper. In the official German accounts the battle-cruiser Princess Royal, the battleship Marlborough, the light cruiser Birmingham, and the destroyer Acasta were all consigned to their destruction in this manner, obliging the issue and repetition of a denial by the Admiralty. The cruiser Euryalus was also said to have been set on fire and completely burnt out, but, as the Admiralty stated, she was not even present in the battle. In the case of the Marlborough, Captain G. P. Ross, which flew the flag of Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, Commanding the First Battle Squadron (Second-in-Command of the Grand Fleet), there was some justification. At 6.54 p.m., after having been engaged with a battleship of the Kaiser class, and with a cruiser, and later still another battleship, this vessel was hit by a torpedo, and took up a considerable list to starboard. In spite of this misfortune, as the official dispatch states:

She reopened at 7.3 p.m. at a cruiser, and at 7.12 p.m. fired fourteen rapid salvos at a ship of the König class, hitting her frequently until she turned out of the line. The manner in which this effective fire was kept up in spite of the disadvantages due to the injury caused by the torpedo was most creditable to the ship, and a very fine example to the squadron.

An eye-witness also said that the sight of the gunlayers in the Marlborough calmly and coolly serving their weapons while the vessel was

damaged and in possible danger of sinking was a most inspiring one. It is significant that the Marlborough continued to perform her duties as flagship of the squadron until 2.30 a.m. next morning. Then, as she had some difficulty in keeping up the speed of the squadron, Sir Cecil Burney transferred his flag to the Revenge, and the Marlborough was detached by the direction of Admiral Jellicoe to a base, driving off a submarine *en route*.

Unlike the British losses in the battle, which were known in full all over the world within a few hours of the end of the engagement, those of the German Fleet were only revealed in easy stages. In the first German report, circulated by wireless on June 1, they were alleged to include only three ships and "some torpedo boats." The *communiqué* said:

On our side the small cruiser Wiesbaden was sunk by hostile artillery fire during the day engagements, and the Pommern during the night by a torpedo. The fate of the Frauenlob, which is missing, and of some torpedo boats which have not yet returned, is unknown.

In the second German official message, issued on June 3, the loss of the small cruiser Elbing (Captain Madlung) was added to the list. She was said to have been blown up by her own crew after being heavily damaged by collision with another German war vessel, which made it impossible to take her back to port. The crew were rescued by torpedo boats, with the exception of the commander, two officers and 18 men, who remained on board in order to blow up the vessel, and who were brought to Ymuiden in a tug and landed there. Without a doubt, it was the presence of these survivors in Holland, reported in the Press, which induced the German Admiralty Staff to admit the destruction of the Elbing. According to some accounts, it was the Warrior which put the Elbing out of action.

In a semi-official statement issued on the same day, the loss of the Frauenlob was accepted as a certainty, and the ship was said to have been sunk apparently during the night of May 31 in an individual action. The loss of five "large torpedo boats" was also admitted. On Sunday, June 4, a Berlin telegram, which attained added significance in the light of later events, was dispatched. "Contrary to the British Admiralty report," it said, "it is stated that no German naval units were lost other than those mentioned in the official German *communiqué*." During the next week, however, on Wednesday, June 7, there was issued from the Marine-Amt

a long account of the battle, and in it occurred the following passage:

The total losses of the German High Sea forces during the battle of May 31 and June 1, and subsequently, are:

- One battle-cruiser.
- One ship of the line of older construction.
- Four small cruisers.
- Five torpedo boats.

Of these losses, the Pommern, launched in 1905, the Wiesbaden, the Elbing, the Frauenlob, and five torpedo boats have already been reported sunk in official statements. For military reasons we refrained till now from making public the loss of the vessels Lützow and Rostock. In view of the wrong interpretation of this measure, and moreover in order to frustrate English legends about gigantic losses on our side, these reasons must now be dropped. Both vessels were lost on their way to harbour after attempts had failed to keep the heavily-damaged vessels afloat. The crews of both ships, including all severely wounded, are in safety.

This was as far as the Germans went in regard to the admission of losses. In an enclosure to his dispatch, Sir John Jellicoe compiled a "list of enemy vessels put out of action," in regard to which he expressed the opinion that it gave the minimum in regard to numbers, although it was possibly not entirely accurate as regards the particular class of vessel, especially those which were sunk during the night attacks. In addition to the vessels sunk, added Sir John, it was unquestionable that many other ships were very seriously damaged by gunfire and by torpedo attack. In this connexion it has to be remembered that as the Germans fought nearer home than the British they had by far the greater chance of getting their damaged ships safe into port. They were only about 100 miles from the shelter of the Heligoland forts, and probably less from the minefields in the neighbourhood of the Bight, when the battle finished, whereas Sir John Jellicoe's bases were 400 miles away. The Warrior, after being disabled during the action, was towed by the Engadine for 75 miles from 8.40 p.m. on May 31, all through the night, until 7.15 a.m. next morning, when she foundered. Had the conditions in this respect been equal, the British losses might have been less, or the Germans much higher, according to the position in which the battle was fought. It is fitting to note here, in passing, the tribute paid by Admiral Jellicoe to the artisan ratings in his Fleet. They "carried out much valuable work during and after the action," he said; "they could not have done better." Doubtless the hard and conscientious work of these men contributed largely to the speed with which the Fleet was made ready for sea again within a few hours.



Heath.

COMMODORE CHARLES E. LE MESURIER,
Commanded the Fourth Light-Cruiser Squadron.

There were several ships in the German Fleet which were seen to have received severe punishment, making the chance of their getting back home a small one. As regards the battle-cruiser squadron a Dutch report stated that the Derfflinger sank whilst being towed to Wilhelmshaven, and there was likewise a doubt as to whether the Seydlitz, the stern of which vessel was stated to have been blown off, got into port. A large number of relatives of her crew, residing in Schleswig, were notified of casualties, although this was not in itself conclusive evidence that she had been destroyed. When the Lützow was put out of action Admiral Hipper transferred his



Bacon.

SIR ROBERT ARBUTHNOT, BT., M.V.O.,
Commanded the First Cruiser Squadron.

flag to the Moltke, which seems to have suffered the least of the battle-cruisers. Of other cruisers present on the German side, the Roon, an armoured vessel of an earlier class than the two sunk off the Falklands, was believed to have been sunk. A midshipman in the Marlborough wrote to his parents:

I believe we torpedoed a cruiser which has not yet been claimed. We think it was the Roon, sister-ship to the York. We absolutely did for her with gun-fire before we fired the torpedo. We could see right into her hull. She was a mass of flames inside and had lost a funnel.

In the same way, so many British ships claimed to have disposed of light cruisers that the four in the German list must have been



Russell.

COMMODORE E. S. ALEXANDER-SINCLAIR, M.V.O., A.D.C.,
Commanded the First Light-Cruiser Squadron.



Russell.

COMMODORE WILLIAM E. GOODENOUGH,
Commanded the Second Light-Cruiser Squadron.



[Russell.]

COMMANDER E. B. S. BINGHAM.

Commanded the destroyer "Nestor."

an under-statement of losses in this class. The municipality of Frankfort opened a fund for the relief of relatives of the crew of the light cruiser named after the city.

Then as regards their battle fleet, the Germans only admitted the loss of one unit, the Pommern. Captain Böleke, commanding this vessel, was among those who went down in her. The British official estimate, however, claimed four battleships, three of which were seen to sink. One of these may have been the Ostfriesland, which Dutch accounts stated had been sunk. Her sister-ship, the Thüringen, may have suffered a like fate, and sailors' caps bearing the name of this vessel were found at sea by an Ymuiden trawler. By way, doubtless, of contradicting the report of the loss of the Thüringen, an article appeared in the *Kreuz Zeitung* at the end of June, purporting to be written by an officer of the ship, in which it was said that she was not touched. Three weeks earlier, on June 10, the German Admiralty had allowed the publication of an account of the battle alleged to have come from a midshipman of the Ostfriesland, which was given a rather suspicious prominence in the German papers, and in which occurred the sentence:

"The Ostfriesland did not receive a single hit."

In their revelation of the fine spirit shown by the officers and men of the Royal Navy, the details and incidents of the battle were most inspiring. The confidence which the whole Fleet had in its commanders, Sir John Jellicoe and Sir David Beatty, had never been excelled at any period in our naval history. Of the Commander-in-Chief, the Archbishop of York had written:


I left the Grand Fleet sharing to the full the admiration, affection, and confidence which every officer and man within it feels for its Commander-in-Chief, Sir John Jellicoe. Here assuredly is the right man in the right place at the right time. His officers give him the most absolute trust and loyalty. When I spoke of him to his men I always felt that quick response which, to a speaker, is the sure sign that he has reached and touched the hearts of his hearers. The Commander-in-Chief—quiet, modest, courteous, alert, resolute, holding in firm control every part of his great fighting engine—has under his command not only the ships, but the heart of his Fleet.

As for the officers and their relations with one another, the Archbishop said he never heard one word of criticism, never felt the slightest breath of jealousy. In manner, in word, in spirit they justified the boast of one of the Vice-Admirals: "We are all a great band of brothers."

As for Sir David Beatty, every incident in his career, and they had been both many and glorious, had pointed him out as one of the men to command the fleets of England if ever she was engaged in a great naval war. The affair in the Heligoland Bight, the action off the Dogger Bank, and other episodes had inspired feelings which were amply confirmed by the great action off the Jutland coast. What his men thought of him was well typified in the answer of a sailor who was asked, just after the battle, if the seamen had full confidence in their leader. "Confidence in David?" he replied; "why, we would all go to Hell for David."

This implicit trust in the officers in command was reciprocated to the full. Sir John Jellicoe says in his dispatch:

The conduct of officers and men throughout the day and night actions was entirely beyond praise. No words of mine could do them justice. On all sides it is reported to me that the glorious traditions of the past were most worthily upheld—whether in heavy ships, cruisers, light cruisers, or destroyers—the same admirable spirit prevailed. Officers and men were cool and determined, with a cheeriness that would have carried them through anything. The heroism of the wounded was the admiration of all. I cannot adequately express the pride with which the spirit of the Fleet filled me.




THE DESTROYER "SPITFIRE"

(Lieutenant-Commander C. W. E. Trelawny) torpedoing a German warship

Moreover, the one thought in all ranks after the contest was that it might be renewed and completed on a future occasion. Sir David Beatty, in a message to Admiral of the Fleet the Hon. Sir Hedworth Meux, said: "We drew


the enemy into the jaws of our Fleet. I have no regrets, except for the gallant comrades, all pals, that have gone, who died gloriously. It would have warmed your heart to see the gallant Hood bring his squadron into action. We are



TYPES OF GERMAN WARSHIPS

ready for the next time. Please God it will come soon." The officers' tributes to the conduct of the men vie with those which the seamen paid to the leading and example of the officers. One officer, a lieutenant-commander in a vessel which got into action a little after 5 p.m. on the 31st, said in a letter: "I am very glad the men have had their baptism of fire. They were simply splendid. Everything went just as if we had been at target practice. Two young boys in an exposed position were extremely good. I do not think either of them is seventeen yet, but these boys never turned a hair." Sub-Lieutenant G. A. Nunneley, of the *Warrior*, testified, in a letter quoted in the *Yorkshire Post*, to the coolness of the men in that ship when she had been disabled. They did not see how they could possibly escape, as the *Warrior* was on fire amidships and aft, but "the spirit of the men and the heroism displayed were wonderful; everybody was cheerful and nobody lost his head." This fine display of true discipline had its reward when the whole of the crew, in most difficult circumstances, were taken off by the seaplane carrier *Engadine*. It was during the transshipment, on the morning of June 1, that Lieutenant F. J. Rutland performed the gallant feat for which he received the Albert Medal of the First Class from the King. A severely wounded man from the *Warrior*, owing to the

violent motion of the two ships, was accidentally dropped overboard from a stretcher and fell between the vessels, which were working so dangerously that the commanding officer of the *Warrior* had to forbid two of his officers from jumping overboard to the rescue of the wounded man, as it was considered that this would mean their almost certain death. Before he could be observed, however, Lieutenant Rutland went overboard from the forepart of the *Engadine* with a bowline, and worked himself aft. He succeeded in putting the bowline around the wounded man, and in getting him hauled on board, but it was then found that the man was dead, having been crushed between the two ships. Lieutenant Rutland's escape from a similar fate was miraculous. "His bravery," as the official account of his gallant deed stated, "is reported to have been magnificent." He had already distinguished himself at the beginning of the battle by his work as pilot of the seaplane which, as indicated elsewhere, was sent up from the *Engadine* for scouting purposes. Lieutenant Rutland was one of the few officers in the battle who had been promoted from the lower deck. He was among the first group of candidates selected in 1912, in accordance with the new Admiralty scheme, to qualify for commissions, by courses of training at Greenwich and elsewhere, and by a period of service afloat in the grade of "mate." He



WHICH TOOK PART IN THE BATTLE.

was appointed to torpedo boat No. 35 when war began, but in December, 1914, transferred to the Royal Naval Air Service as an acting flight sub-lieutenant, afterwards being promoted flight-lieutenant. The action of May 31 thus produced, as it were, the first-fruits of the decision, taken when Mr. Churchill was First Lord; to open the commissioned ranks of the Navy more widely to the petty officers and seamen.

In a striking speech when introducing the Navy Estimates in the House of Commons on February 15, 1915, Mr. Churchill, after reviewing the salient features of the first six months of naval war, and the lessons of the victories off the Dogger Bank and the Falklands, said: "It is my duty in this House to speak for the Navy, and the truth is that it is sound as a bell all through. I do not care where or how it may be tested; it will be found good and fit and keen and honest." Demonstration of the correctness of this estimate is to be found in the performances of all ranks and ratings in the Jutland Bank action, wherein the various branches of the Service vied with one another in efficiency. If two may specially be singled out where all did so well, it is the engineering and medical branches. The prelude to action, said Sir John Jellicoe, is the work of the engine-room department, and "during action the officers and men of that department perform

their most important duties without the incentive which a knowledge of the course of the actions gives to those on deck. The qualities of discipline and endurance are taxed to the utmost under these conditions, and they were, as always, most fully maintained throughout the operations under review. Several ships attained speeds that had never before been reached, thus showing very clearly their high state of steaming efficiency. Failures in material were conspicuous by their absence, and several instances are reported of magnificent work on the part of the engine-room departments of injured ships." Most praiseworthy also was the devotion to duty of the surgeons. "The work of the medical officers of the Fleet," Sir John records, "carried out very largely under the most difficult conditions, was entirely admirable and invaluable. Lacking in many cases all the essentials for performing critical operations, and with their staff seriously depleted by casualties, they worked untiringly and with the greatest success. To them we owe a deep debt of gratitude."

The confidence of the men in their officers was indicated in many ways; and there are numerous letters and incidents which show how real and deep it was. Reference is made by Sir John Jellicoe to the fact that in the Onslaught, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander A. G. Onslow, D.S.C., Sub-Lieutenant H. W. A.

Kemmis, assisted by Midshipman R. G. Arnot, R.N.R., who were the only executive officers not disabled, brought the ship successfully out of action and back to her home port. A stoker petty officer, in an interview, described how the *Onslaught* was swept pretty clean of everything, and on her way back could not get into touch by wireless, because both the operator and signaller had been killed. The bridge had been



JOHN TRAVERS CORNWELL,

Of the "*Chester*." The boy, who was under 16½ years old, although mortally wounded, remained standing alone at a most exposed post, quietly awaiting orders till the end of the action, with the gun's crew dead and wounded around him.

The gallant lad died from his wounds.

carried away by a shell, and therefore the charts were gone, and so was the compass. He added :

I would like to say something of Sub-Lieutenant Kemmis, who took us home. We had a rare time of it, because we had to pick our way as best we could, and there was the sub-lieutenant sticking to the wheel for over forty hours. He refused to be relieved. He kept on saying that the men had quite enough to do to look after themselves, and nobody was to bother about him. We thought a lot of him, I can tell you.

Naturally, in the circumstances, the men in the destroyers had, if anything, an extra share

of thrilling and trying experiences. The stubborn and splendid episode of the *Shark*, which went down fighting to the very last, may be cited. She formed one of a small division, led by the *Tipperary*, which was caught and overwhelmed. With about half of the crew killed or disabled, the *Shark* continued to maintain the action with only one remaining gun. The captain, Commander L. W. Jones, is said to have had one of his legs shot away, but he continued the fight, and himself helped to serve the gun to the last, when he was swept into the sea as the vessel foundered. Some survivors from the *Shark* sprang on to a raft, where they stayed for no less than five hours watching the battle. They kept their blood in circulation by jumping overboard and swimming round the raft, all doing this in turn and being hauled in afterwards by those on the raft. A similar experience was shared by the seamen from some of the larger ships. Commander Dannreuther, one of the six survivors of the *Invincible*, was shot into the sea when the battle-cruiser exploded, and went down 20 feet or 30 feet. Coming up, he found himself near a raft, and clambered on to it. In a few minutes he saw a broad, black, smiling face, covered with grease and soot and oil, appear at the side of the raft. "I'll bet that's Sandford," said Commander Dannreuther to the visitor. "An Irishman would be sure to smile after an experience like this." "You're right," replied Lieutenant C. S. Sandford, as he limbed on to the raft. Both were picked up half an hour later by a torpedo boat. It was of this handful of *Invincible* survivors that a midshipman related an incident which he said he should never forget, as it was the pluckiest thing he had ever seen. As the ship he was in steamed ahead into action, he saw four men on a raft, and at first thought they must be Germans. But as the ship passed by, "the four got up on their feet and cheered us like blazes. It was the finest thing I had ever seen."

Three other destroyers of the same division as the *Shark* were the *Ardent*, *Fortune* and *Sparrowhawk*, and Sir John Jellicoe records that when the waters from the latitude of the Horn Reef to the scene of the action were thoroughly searched next morning, some survivors from each of these boats were picked up, and also from their flotilla leader, the *Tipperary*. The *Sparrowhawk* had been badly injured in collision, and was no longer seaworthy, so she was sunk after her crew had been



“FOR YOUR SPLENDID WORK I THANK YOU.”

King George V. inspecting some of the seamen who fought in the battle. The King taking the salute during his visit to the Battle Cruiser Fleet, June, 1916. On the King's right is Admiral Beatty.

taken off. A petty officer of Neath, who was in the *Fortune*, related how 23 men of that destroyer got on to a raft when she was sunk, 15 minutes after going into action, but only seven of this number survived the terrors of the night. All the officers were lost. One of them clung to the rail until exhausted; then his hold slipped, and he went down. It was the saddest sight of all, related this petty officer, to see comrades slipping off when those who remained alive were so numbed and cramped that they could give them no help. Yet, in spite of their sufferings, the men were amazingly

cheerful; and it was related by another petty officer how a seaman, who was the possessor of a good bass voice, helped to keep up the spirits of 26 other men from the *Tipperary* who were stranded on a raft by singing to them, even though he himself had been wounded in the leg and had had two of his fingers shot away. These men were afterwards rescued by the disabled *Sparrowhawk*, and had not been long in her when—insult added to injury!—a German submarine appeared on the starboard quarter. But the two remaining guns were quickly brought to bear on her, and she dived

at once and made off. Besides the 27 men saved from this particular raft, there was a sub-lieutenant who was swimming alongside, with one hand clutching the ropes hanging around. He had been swimming thus for some hours, having refused to board the raft, as it might have capsized with his additional weight. In the end, he was in better condition than several of the men who were on board, many of whom suffered from the cold and exposure. When on board the Sparrowhawk, much amusement was caused by one survivor who, dressed only in a piece of serge round his loins, was anxiously drying a number of £1 Treasury notes which he had saved, explaining as he did so that he was to be married on his next leave. To his relief, the notes dried out all right, and then he was able to take an interest in his own miraculous escape.

There was one episode which, more than any other, stirred the popular imagination when the official dispatches were published, and that was the deathless story of Boy Cornwell, who remained at his post of duty to the end of the fight, faithful to the last, and then died of his wounds. Sir David Beatty says :

A report from the Commanding Officer of the Chester gives a splendid instance of devotion to duty. Boy (1st class) John Travers Cornwell, of the Chester, was mortally wounded early in the action. He nevertheless remained standing alone at a most exposed post, quietly awaiting orders till the end of the action, with the gun's crew dead and wounded all round him. His age was under 16½ years. I regret that he has since died, but I recommend his case for special recognition in justice to his memory, and as an acknowledgment of the high example set by him.

The body of the brave lad was at first buried in a common grave, but on July 29, having been exhumed, it was reinterred with full naval honours in a private grave in Manor Park Cemetery, when the Bishop of Barking and Dr. Macnamara, the latter of whom was the bearer of a wreath from the Royal Navy, delivered eloquent tributes to Cornwell's heroism. A movement for a national memorial was set on foot, in which the Navy League and Sir John Bethell, M.P., among others, were interested, to endow a ward for disabled sailors in the Star and Garter Home, to provide cottage homes for disabled and invalided sailors

and their families, to institute naval scholarships for deserving boys, and to erect a suitable monument on the grave.

It is unnecessary to emphasize the fact that the spirit which animated little Jack Cornwell was displayed in numerous other deeds of courage and valour on May 31, and it would be true to say that what he did so splendidly many others were ready to do if the need had arisen. One case of the kind was that of a commander, who, despite his wounds, continued to issue orders, and remained in charge of the ship till she had finished fighting. When he reached port, this gallant officer, before allowing himself to be removed to hospital, insisted on being taken round his ship to inspect the damage inflicted by the enemy's fire. Rather a touching narrative was told of the chaplain of another vessel, who, as he lay dying from a shattered spine and leg, prayed for victory for the British Fleet.

Another incident among the many glorious and inspiring deeds on this memorable day is that of a very heroic action which affords an opportunity for giving to the gallant Corps of Royal Marines the praise which is its due. An officer of the corps is said, in his last moments when mortally wounded, to have used his remaining breath to issue instructions which prevented a catastrophe and possibly the loss of his ship. For obvious reasons, neither the name of the officer nor of the vessel were publicly disclosed, but at some later date the esteem and honour in which his memory is now held by his comrades and friends within the Service will also be accorded him by all his fellow-countrymen.

On this note the relation of the Battle of Jutland Bank may be concluded. The loss of life was indeed serious, both to the Navy and the country. Sir John Jellicoe, in his dispatch, pays a tribute to the officers and men whose death was mourned by their comrades in the Grand Fleet. "They fell," he added, "doing their duty nobly, a death which they would have been the first to desire." The sorrow which the Navy felt at the loss in action of so many gallant seamen was fully shared by the nation.

CHAPTER CXLI.

THE WESTERN FRONT IN MAY AND JUNE, 1916.

DESULTORY WARFARE IN MAY—POISON GAS AND ITS USES—THE ANZACS IN FRANCE—ANALYSIS OF THE FIGHTING—A THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES—THE GERMAN ATTACK—THE CANADIAN COUNTER-ATTACK BETWEEN HILL 60 AND HOOGE—THE SOUTHERN END OF THE BRITISH LINE—A SERIES OF RAIDS—EVE OF THE GREAT FRANCO-BRITISH OFFENSIVE ON THE SOMME.

FROM the end of April until the beginning of the Franco-British offensive on July 1 the warfare on the Western front partook of the same character as that described in Chapter CXXXVI.; that is to say, the fighting was continuous, but yielded no important results.

On May 2 the Germans delivered one of those assaults in the Verdun region, west of the Meuse, which had now become routine, and, as usual, without any practical gain: there were also encounters in the Argonne. Thus affairs went on from day to day, until the 8th, when a bombardment of great violence was directed against Avoecourt Wood and the region round about it. A German infantry attack, which followed the fire, was brought to a standstill by the French curtain fire and that of their machine-guns.

On the 11th, in the Champagne region, the French demolished a German trench for a length of 100 yards near Tahure, otherwise there was comparative calm along the whole front except north-east of Vermelles, where the enemy seized about 500 yards of the British front trenches. Part of the lost ground was, however, quickly regained by a counter-attack. It was the first endeavour that the Germans had made on this part of the British line since April 26–29.

A heavy bombardment during the night of May 12–13, between the river Somme and

Maricourt, was followed by a German attack in three columns, of which one only succeeded in penetrating our line, and even this was at once driven out again. In the neighbourhood of Ploegsteert Wood the enemy attacked our lines, and here also he succeeded in penetrating at one point, but was rapidly expelled. At another his troops were met on the parapet by some of the Scots and forced to retire in confusion.

This, from the German point of view, highly irregular proceeding on the part of our men came as a great surprise to the enemy, who did not think that after the severe artillery fire they would be equal to any such resistance. Generally along the line there was considerable artillery activity, but very little else to note. Mining operations were also carried on.

An ordinary day at the front was somewhat as follows: What our men called the “morning *strafe*” (one side might commence it or the other) was followed by the ascent of observation balloons and aeroplanes scouting to ascertain what was going on behind the enemy’s front line, taking photographs of his works or disturbing his movements. When the enemy’s aeroplanes were noted in the air the anti-aircraft guns got to work at them. In the middle of the day there was sometimes a lull for dinners, and later on the fire would begin again. In the course of the night the enemy sometimes attempted to raid our lines, and we did the

same with us. These incursions were made either for the purpose of gaining information or in order to keep the other side alarmed and induce the belief that a larger attack was imminent. There were always patrols to send out to reconnoitre over "No-Man's Land," and sometimes covering parties were pushed on ahead of our trenches to cover the working parties, both dangerous duties.* Again, when it was ascertained, or surmised, that there was a considerable accumulation of German troops opposite a British trench, a heavy artillery fire would be brought to bear to make them keep close under cover. Then the guns would suddenly lift their fire, and a bombing party, rushing over the intervening distance of "No-Man's Land," would hurl death and destruction among them. In addition to all this there was the usual repair work to be executed, both on the trenches and on the wire entanglements.

When a raid was determined on from either side the artillery set to work to prepare the way, that is to say, it smashed as much as possible the enemy's entanglements which protected the part selected for attack. When the destruction was deemed sufficient, and as the points where raids were made were not far

* "No-Man's Land" was the name given to the dividing space between the opposing trenches.


distant from the assaulting side's trenches, the attacking infantry advanced to the assault. The guns then turned their energies to making a curtain fire behind the selected part to prevent the enemy sending up supports to it. The opponents meanwhile were engaged in much the same manner, endeavouring to stop the assault, or, if they could not do this, in throwing a barrier of their shell-fire behind the attacking party to prevent reinforcements reaching it.

This procedure caused a considerable loss of men to both sides, as the lists of casualties issued from time to time showed. From our point of view the results obtained were commensurate. We wanted detail knowledge of the enemy's works so as to make proper plans for the grand advance which was to be made at the right and proper time.

Throughout the operations since the Second Battle of Ypres the Germans had made use of all their brutal auxiliary weapons—poison gas, lachrymatory shells and flame jets. When gas had been used at Ypres it came as a surprise and enabled the enemy to gain some success, but it soon became only a small factor in warfare, and for all the good it did might have been withdrawn. We were fully armed against it. Every man carried a helmet which filtered out the noxious gas and enabled him



EFFECT OF A GERMAN HOWITZER SHELL
Bursting behind the British lines.



BLOWING UP BARBED-WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS.

Circle picture: British troops stacking wire.

to breathe the air, which, passing through the chemicals, was rendered fit for human respiration.*

One of the latest developments was the introduction of "stink" gas, so called from its disagreeable odour, but not in itself dangerous. This was sometimes mixed with poison gas. Until this little dodge of the gentle German was understood many accidents occurred to our men. They were apt to remove their protected helmets on account of the smell which penetrated through them and then fell victims to the poison. The lachrymatory shells, as their name implies, produced a copious flow of tears. To guard against this goggles were introduced




which in the latest pattern helmets form part of them.*

It will be easily conceived that the combination of stink, poison, and tear-provoking gases would be very deadly if proper means had not been introduced to render nugatory their deleterious effects. Occasionally it happened that a change of direction of the wind blew

* Originally, chlorine was the gas the Germans made use of, but others were subsequently employed. Chlorine produced the long and agonising death that was so common with our men when first they met it. Later it had become possible to treat all but the very bad cases and to nurse them back to health. Some of the later kinds of gases employed were more subtle in their action, and while not instantly incapacitating, had the property of developing acute illness. The gases were kept under pressure in steel cylinders, and let out when the wind was favourable and blew towards the Allied trenches.

* The material, usually benzyl-bromide, was fired in 5.9 shells from howitzers. Each shell held about six pints of it, and being opened out by a small bursting charge on impact, scattered the liquid about, which slowly vapourised. It had a very irritating effect on the eyes, making them smart severely and producing a flood of tears.



GENERAL GOURAUD INSPECTING RUSSIAN TROOPS AT MALLY.

General Lokhtitsky.

back the poison gas among the Germans, which may be looked on as a providential arrangement.

Against the flame jets the only defence was to avoid them, which was not always possible. But fortunately they were very local in their effects, and had also the disadvantage of destroying the wooden revetments of trenches (planks, brushwood, gabions, or hurdles), and therefore making it difficult for the Germans to occupy them. On the defensive, to stop an attack of the Allies, they proved of some utility, but always had the disadvantage of thoroughly rousing the temper of the troops against whom they were employed, with a resulting reluctance to take prisoners when the German position was gained.

On May 6 the Anzaes, who had arrived at the front but a short time previously, had their first encounter with the Germans. The latter had sent a reconnoitring party to penetrate our trenches, which gave them the desired opportunity. Nor did they wait on the pure defensive. On the contrary, when they saw the Germans approaching, and that they were within a short distance of their trench, they rushed over the parapet bayonet in hand to meet them. A fierce hand-to-hand conflict took place, in which the Germans were pressed back; reinforcements were sent up to help them, and the Australians were also strengthened. Once more the two sides came to handy-strokes, and again our men, plying bomb and bayonet, drove back their opponents with substantial losses in killed and wounded. It was a pretty little fight, one in which the Anzaes showed their mettle, and for which they deserved good credit. Thus, within a fortnight of their landing in France they had got their hearts' desire, and had showed the Germans what they could do with them. The change from the trying conditions of Gallipoli or the great heat of Egypt was an agreeable one, and they thoroughly appreciated it.

The fighting went on continuously in the Argonne and Champagne region, and at many little points the French had straightened their line. One of these incidents may here be described. The Germans at the particular point held a position of vantage which was a source of considerable annoyance to the opposing French trench only some ten yards distant from it. As a preliminary the French infantry were quietly withdrawn unperceived by their opponents. The retirement was necessary because otherwise the French shells might have struck their own

men. Once it was accomplished, the French proceeded to overwhelm the Germans with a storm of 15 cm. (6 in.) shells. These heavy projectiles pulverized the selected point while a number of 75 cm. field guns cut off access to it from either side by barrier fire. The operation was completely successful, the French infantry advanced and overpowered the defenders without difficulty, and then set hard to work to reconstruct the enemy's position and connect it with their own front line. Curious to relate, this was acquiesced in by the Germans without any attempt to reconquer it.

On May 14 there was a renewal of activity against the British during the evening and



AN IRISH V.C.
Private Morrow, 1st Royal Fusiliers.

night between Loos and the Béthune-La Bassée Canal. To the east of the former place the enemy selected a small section of our trenches for a particularly severe bombardment, and a party of their infantry succeeded in entering it, but was not able to make good its footing. On our side, the German trenches near the Hohenzollern redoubt were severely bombarded, as were those north and just south of the canal. The enemy sprang a mine 25 yards from our trenches and seized the crater, but after a short dose of shells from the British trench mortars our infantry captured it, driving back its garrison. This was about the only infantry fighting. Both sides exploded



BRITISH HEAVY GUN READY FOR ACTION.

mines near Hulluch, and our artillery fired with success on the enemy's posts opposite Fauquissart, and silenced his trench mortars near St. Eloi. While this was going on the German artillery plastered their shells on the English position with a stern disregard of the results of their fire. Thus the ruined villages of Souchez, Ablain, St. Nazaire and Neuville St. Vaast all received a great deal of useless attention.

On the night of May 15, on the Vimy Ridge, the Lancashire troops, including the Loyal North Lancashire and the Lancashire Fusiliers, with whom were a company of Royal Engineers and some Welsh Pioneers, who rendered most valuable assistance in the assault, advanced and seized the enemy's forward line over a length of 250 yards, and inflicted considerable loss on the Germans.* The Vimy Heights were important to the Allies, as they dominated the ground to the east of them over which we should have to pass in any future advance.†

This attack was the first serious offensive movement against the Ridge since the portion of the old French line at this part had been taken over by the British. The enemy here occupied a series of craters, six in number, in two groups of three, separated from each other by an interval of 40 yards. The craters formed

* This appears to be a moderate estimate; some observers rate the length at 360 yards.

† It will be remembered that at the Battle of Loos the French made a great effort to secure this ground, but failed to do so.

a curve convex to the trench held by our troops. From them a powerful fire could be brought to bear on our line, which was dominated, while they also facilitated the observation of our trenches, and it was, therefore, desirable to turn the Germans out of them.

For the two previous days the weather had been wet and cloudy, so that the enemy could see but little of our preparations. Among these were two series of mines, one directed against the left group of the German craters, the other against the right. At the determined moment our heavy artillery deluged the German position with powerful shells to send the Germans back into their dug-outs, and then our two groups of mines were fired in succession, throwing dead and living up into the air. The explosions blew up four out of the six German craters, and knocked out a machine-gun which had been very destructive to us. On the German left there was, however, still one crater untouched, and against this went forward the Loyal North Lancashires. The German energies had already been shattered by the explosion so close to them, and our men had little trouble in seizing the position, and disposing of its garrison. At once, aided by the working parties and the Sappers, they set to work to occupy the crater lip, and to dig back communication trenches from it.

Simultaneously with the Loyal North Lancashires the Lancashire Fusiliers had advanced

to assault the right group of craters and the interval of open ground between this and the others, and they, too, were successful. Lights went up from the German side, and then their gunners began to overwhelm the position just won with every species of projectile. But the men of the Red Rose held firm to the position they had gained, and reinforcements of men and bombs were sent up to aid them. By 9.30 p.m., one hour only after the attack began, the whole five German craters, or what had been German craters, were occupied by our troops. The scene was one of cruel anguish, for many of the troops, both British and German, were half-buried beneath the mass of earth which our guns and mines had thrown up. We offered to cease fire if the Germans would do the same, so that the wounded might be rescued, but the only reply was a volley of bombs. The fighting and the working, therefore, went on, and our men managed to consolidate their position and hold it.

On May 16, in the Champagne, the Germans tried to surprise a French post near Mesnil, but were driven off by bombs. In the Argonne there was a heavy artillery contest near the Four-de-Paris, the Courtes Chaussées, and Vauquois. Two raiding parties of Seaforth Highlanders entered the German trenches north of Roelincourt and succeeded in killing many of the enemy and in bombing three


dug-outs, one of which was blown up. Our own casualties were slight, and both parties returned safely to the trenches.

Opposite Auchy a patrol raided the enemy's trenches, which had been disturbed by a mine explosion, and penetrated towards the second line, exchanging some bombs with it.

On May 17-19 the usual artillery and trench-mortar actions took place along the British front. The Germans exploded a mine south-east of Roelincourt, but we seized the near edge of the crater; on the other hand, we fired a mine near Calonne, and effectively bombarded the enemy's position there. In the Western Argonne the Germans sprang a mine and tried to seize a salient near St. Hubert, but were stopped by curtain fire.

On Saturday, May 20, the enemy, after a heavy bombardment, raided our line to the south-west of Loos. For a time he managed to seize our front trench, but was quickly driven out again, and on the Vimy Ridge the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment recaptured a crater which the enemy had taken on the 18th; we also blew up a mine near Hulluch and occupied the crater.

In Lorraine the Germans succeeded in penetrating one of the French trenches to the west of Chazelles after a violent bombardment, but the artillery and machine-gun fire soon obliged the Germans to evacuate the position.



READY FOR ACTION.

A British heavy howitzer on a railway mounting.

On May 21 the Germans determined to recapture the position at the north end of the Vimy Ridge. After a heavy bombardment, which lasted well on into the afternoon, their infantry came on and succeeded in penetrating our front line of trenches on a front of 1,500 yards, and a depth of 100 to 300 yards. According to the Germans, several lines of the British position over a length of a mile and a quarter were captured, and during the night counter-attacks were repulsed and 8 officers and 220 men, with 4 machine-guns and 3 trench-mortars were taken. On the next day our guns, in their turn, subjected the enemy to a heavy bombardment, but nothing more was done. We again sprang mines near Roclin-court, the Hohenzollern Redoubt and the Quarries, while vigorous mining was carried on near Neuville St. Vaast and south of Fleurbaix. There was also considerable artillery firing at Loos and east of Ypres.

May 24 being Empire Day, the following telegram was sent to the King by General Sir Douglas Haig :

" On Empire Day, on behalf of your Majesty's Armies now in France, representative of every part of your Majesty's Dominions, I respectfully submit the assurance of our loyal devotion to your Majesty and to the principles of freedom and justice which are symbolized for us by the Crown and flag of the British Empire."

His Majesty replied as follows :

" I warmly appreciate the assurances of loyal devotion which you send me to-day in the name of the Armies of the British Empire serving under your command. Tell them with what pride and interest I follow their fortunes and of my confidence that success will crown their efforts. May the comradeship of the battlefield knit still closer together the peoples of the Dominions and Mother Country in the age of peace which, please God, will be the fruit of this long and arduous war.

" GEORGE, R.I."

In his reply to an Empire Day message of congratulation and goodwill from President Poincaré the King expressed his confidence in the victory of the Allies, and declared the solidarity of all his Empire with the noble French nation.

During May 27 the British bombarded the enemy's trenches to the south-east of Neuve Chapelle, and destroyed some stores at Guillemont. The enemy for their part directed a

heavy bombardment lasting 20 minutes west of Fricourt, and then about Serre. The British sprang five mines, three about Hulluch and two south-east of Cuinchy. The enemy also exploded one near the Hohenzollern Redoubt and another on the Vimy Ridge, of which our troops occupied the crater. On the whole the Germans displayed rather more activity than during the previous few days and expended a large amount of ammunition, and the enemy's mines south-east of Neuville St. Vaast, south of Loos and east of Souchez, did some damage to the British trenches, but inflicted no casualties.

On May 28 there was considerable activity in Alsace, when the Germans attempted to push home an attack on Belschweiler (north-west of Altkirch), but it was stopped by the French fire, and in Champagne the French guns blew up an ammunition depôt in the region of Ville-sur-Turbe.

On May 28 and 29 the German artillery delivered a heavy but intermittent fire against the British front between the La Bassée Canal and Arras, against our trenches near Loos, and as far north as Neuville St. Vaast. On our right the re-entrant in our line about Mametz and Fricourt also formed a target for German artillery fire, and from Zillebeke to Hooze and near Elverdinge the British position was also shelled. By way of reply our artillery breached the hostile parapet just north of Hooze and destroyed a machine-gun emplacement, and generally along the whole line our guns did considerable damage to the enemy's works, as well as to the hostile batteries. There was no infantry activity.

On May 30 the enemy continued his general bombardment. That about Neuve Chapelle was particularly heavy. It lasted for 80 minutes, and was followed by an infantry attack which penetrated our trenches, and took some of our men prisoners. A counter movement drove the Germans back. The Germans sprang a mine north of Béthune, and our troops occupied the near lip of the crater. There was also some mining activity near Loos.

On May 31 the artillery duel went on uninterruptedly. British and German guns of all calibres were engaged near the Vimy Ridge, and from time to time the fire became intense. The activity of the guns extended also, in a lesser degree, northwards in the direction of Loos and near Ypres, and also near the Somme the same occurred, but beyond this there was no serious engagement.




A MISSILE USED IN TRENCH FIGHTING.

The rifle-grenade about to leave the rifle (on left).

It will be remembered that round Ypres there had already been two severe battles. The first lasted from October 20 until November 11, 1914, the second April 22-May 13, 1915. On June 2, 1916, a series of engagements commenced which may be fittingly described as the third battle. The ground over which the battle was fought was roughly confined between the Ypres-Menin road and the Ypres-Comines canal. It was in the main an open, rolling

country with no very pronounced feature; but the culminating portion of the ridge which swept round Ypres had an average height of about 120 feet above that town and was of sufficient elevation to make its possession of importance to the British, for it overlooked the ground in front of it. Equally was it desirable to the Germans, because if our line were forced back here it would be difficult to construct a continuous barrier behind it, and Ypres would



THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES.

have fallen into the enemy's hands. It must not be forgotten that our trenches in "the Ypres salient" had all the disadvantages which that geometrical form possesses, in the liability of the flanks to enfilade fire; but still the possession of Ypres was considered to be of sufficient importance to justify hanging on to it, because if it fell into German hands it would have been necessary to draw back our front line of trenches, both north and south of it, for some considerable distance. North of Hoogledele was Bellewarde Farm, a mass of ruins, while to the right of it might be seen the German lines behind their wire entanglements. Hoogledele and the trees round it existed no more, but the Sanctuary Wood and the copses along the main ridge running south from Hoogledele to Zwartelen and Hill 60 still afforded cover. From Hill 60 to the canal the ground slopes gently downward. From the hill, and running in a north-easterly direction parallel with the railway, is a minor spur, at first fairly flat and then descending more abruptly to Zillebeke and the lake to the west of it, which is 110 feet below the main crest. This spur afforded a secondary position for the British, secured on its left flank by the lake, but somewhat open to enfilade on the

right. Plainly, for the reasons given above, the line from Bellewarde to Hill 60 was of great tactical importance for the British to stop an advance on Ypres, for the Germans to command the ground which led to that ruined city. The German attack was delivered against our front between Hoogledele and the neighbourhood of Hill 60, Zwartelen.

At 9.15 a.m. on June 2 the enemy's gunfire reached an intense development, which was continued without intermission until noon. It was directed not only against the front line of trenches, but the ruined village of Hoogledele was especially favoured, also the ground behind, particularly towards Zillebeke and Ypres, forming a barrage to prevent reinforcements being sent to our men. Although the British gunners replied to this they were unable to subdue the fire of the enemy, which seriously damaged our trenches and the communications to the rear. The Canadians, who garrisoned this part of the position with British divisions to the north of them, fought well and stood the pounding without flinching, although their losses were heavy. Their troops included the Canadian Mounted Rifles, the Royal Canadian Regiment, Princess Patricia's Light Infantry, and Canadian

infantry from all parts of the Dominions. Of these the Patricia's, with some battalions of the Royal Canadian Regiment, held the northern end of the line south of Hooze and in the Sanctuary Wood. More to the south were the Canadian Mounted Rifles and various other units.

Shortly before one o'clock the artillery fire against our front line was lifted and used to form a barrier to prevent reinforcements coming up. Masses of hostile infantry, nine or ten battalions, were now seen approaching it on a front of less than two miles, crossing the intervening spaces between the two lines, which was often not more than 100 yards wide. By half-past two the enemy had succeeded in penetrating the front line at many points, as he greatly outnumbered the defenders. A desperate hand-to-hand struggle took place, which was particularly fierce in the neighbourhood of Sanctuary Wood and on the rising ground a little to the north of Hill 60, many of the Canadians refusing to yield to superior numbers, and preferring death to surrender. But the enemy gradually overpowered the brave defenders, and during the afternoon our troops fell back to a position about 1,000 yards in rear of the original line.

In the wood, and in Maple Copse close to it,

it was a fight to the death. Twice were the assailants driven back with heavy loss. Reinforcements were brought up but suffered severely from the enemy's barrier fire. During the night the action was not so intense, but parties of the enemy penetrated to a depth of some 700 yards in the direction of Zillebeke, and here and there infantry encounters took place, while the artillery on both sides continued in action. That of the British gradually increased in vigour during the early morning.

The position the Germans had gained afforded them very little defensive capability, for it had been destroyed by the previous artillery fire which they had directed against it, and which our men had withstood for 24 hours before they fell back. Our guns also executed barrier fire to prevent further reinforcements from reaching the enemy. At 7 o'clock in the morning the Canadian counter-attack commenced. By about 8.30 they had driven back the German centre and penetrated the lost trench at several important points. Thus near Hooze a long stretch was carried at the first attempt, and in a more southerly direction in the middle of the disputed line and at two or three points lower down the Canadians won a footing, and then proceeded systematically to bomb their



LISTENING POST

Established in the crater formed by the explosion of a shell.



CHARGE OF CANADIANS NEAR YPRES.
The Dominion troops retaking lost trenches.

way right and left until the whole of the trench had been recovered, including the high ground a little to the north of Hill 60. The advance was very difficult, especially on the right, as the attackers were taken in reverse by machine-gun fire and suffered from a murderous artillery bombardment, and this prevented them holding on to the ground they had regained. Still the outcome of the counter-attack was that part of the Germans, especially in the centre of the ground they had captured, were pushed back and the limit of their advance was reduced to some 350 yards. Our troops proceeded to throw up cover in the new position. This was concave to the salient position we had previously held, the left horn resting on the old trench about 1,000 yards south of Hooze, while the right was on a point 800 yards north-east of Hill 60. The German attack was in the nature of a surprise, and they managed to capture Major-General Mercer and Brigadier-General Williams of the 3rd Canadian Division, who were inspecting the front trenches at the time of the assault. According to German accounts the former violently resisted capture and struck a sergeant across the face with his sword. He was then bayoneted and died of his wound. The losses of the Canadians were severe, especially during the commencing defensive of the battle, but the Germans in their alternative rôles of assailant and defender also suffered heavily.

On June 4 there was no material change in the situation ; we maintained the recaptured ground and the fighting was limited to the artillery.

The next day the lull in the infantry operations continued, though the artillery was still very active on both sides. On June 6 the Germans directed a heavy bombardment to the north and south of Hooze and also towards Ypres-Comines railway and canal. Between 3 and 4.30 p.m. the enemy sprang a series of mines over a front of 2,000 yards to the north of Hooze and he succeeded in capturing the front trench of the British position where it passed through the village. Attempts against other portions of the line farther north were repulsed by the British holding. There was also another attack directed against our trenches west of Hooze ; but thereafter the struggle died down again into an intermittent artillery fire only.

The fight now became of normal and quieter character, chiefly artillery fire and

occasional small raids of no very great importance ; but on the 10th the German bombardment against our Ypres position became much more violent, our trenches north of the Ypres-Comines railway, between the hours of 1 and 3 p.m., being severely punished, as was the ground we held south of Hooze ; but there were no infantry engagements. The next day, Sunday, June 11, during the morning, there was a further bombardment of Ypres and the ground to the south of it, also of our trenches north of the Menin road, while in the afternoon the main attention of the enemy's guns was directed against the Canadian position from Hill 60 to the north for a distance of 1,500 yards. But



IN THE TRENCHES.

An Australian amusing himself with a toy aeroplane.

again there were no infantry attacks of importance.

Monday, June 12, was an uneventful day, with only a heavy bombardment between Hill 60 and Hooze by both sides ; but the 13th saw a vigorous counter-attack delivered by the Canadians to regain the ground lost on June 2-3.

Our artillery had been very active during the previous days against the part of the enemy's position selected for assault—viz., that portion of the ground the enemy had won between Hill 60 and Hooze, the ridge dominating from the east the valley down to Zillebeke. From 12.45 p.m. on the 12th it was raised to the highest possible intensity, and lasted to 1.30 a.m. on the 13th. The night was very cold, wet and dark, and indeed the weather for the past week had been extremely unpropitious. But this had



SNIPERS ON THE WESTERN FRONT.

Practising.

Circle picture: A Sniper at work.

shell-fire had prevented the enemy from properly digging himself in and that he could not hold the line effectually. At one point he had even failed to discover certain stores and ammunition hastily covered in by the Canadians before their retreat.

Our men at once set about consolidating their position and, although subjected to very heavy artillery fire during the next 24 hours, clung bravely to the position they had gained. Once the enemy massed his infantry for attack, but it was met by such a hail of fire from our guns that no attempt to advance was made.

The advance of the main attack had been much facilitated by two flank attacks or raids, one on the left by British troops against the German trenches north of Hooge, and another, on the right, made by the Anzacs. These were covered by gas to cause the enemy to believe they were serious, and both were successful and with slight loss. They served to prevent the concentration of more German infantry and to safeguard the Canadian assault from flank attack.

Particular interest attached to certain documents belonging to a German Grenadier Regiment that were captured in the Ypres salient by the Canadians during the course of their successful counter-attack of June 13.

Stress is laid in these documents upon the necessity to collect all the *débris* after a fight.

in nowise affected the ardour of the men, who burned to retake the position they had lost 10 days before. At half-past one our fire lifted and the infantry dashed forward. The enemy poured out a severe barrier fire to prevent the approach of our men, but so great was their impetuosity that they pushed through it and quickly gained their objective before the sun rose. The resistance of the Germans was but feeble; they seemed thoroughly cowed by the previous artillery preparation, and groups of them surrendered at sight, and seemed glad to do so. Over 150 prisoners were taken. One German officer who surrendered with 132 men said: "I knew how it would be. We had orders to take this ground and took it, but we knew you would come back again. You have done so. So here I am." * It was plain that our continued

* *Daily Telegraph*, June 16.

It is urgently enjoined that search shall invariably be made for the recovery of

“boots of all kinds, all sorts of weapons and parts of them, entrenching tools, steel helmets, leather equipment, pouches, all kinds of weapons for close fighting, belts, tents, material of all kinds, haversacks, tunics, trousers, and sandbags. These goods are of most decisive importance to the final success of our great cause.”

This did not sound as if the Germans were too well provided with equipment. This was emphasized by the instruction “The enemy’s dead will be divested of articles of woollen clothing and boots.” Special instructions are given to guard against the deterioration of German fighting material :

“This must be brought back from the first position and its communication trenches as soon as possible. The exceeding disorder of the second line must be at once thoroughly cleaned up.”

One sentence conveys what the Germans really thought of the men opposite to them in the Ypres salient more eloquently than even a column of typical Teutonic abuse : “In view of the enemy’s characteristics, we have to expect a strong attack at any time.”

Six days after this opinion was written down the attack came in good sooth, with the result already described.

June 15 was marked by no special activity. The artillery fire continued on both sides, but there were no infantry actions. Nor were any further serious attempts made to turn us out of the position gained during the remainder of the month. Artillery fire there was, and some small minor operations, but no serious effort to dispute our position.

Let us now return to the southern end of the British line. The principal efforts during June 7 were made by the enemy against the sector comprised between the Vimy Ridge and the La Bassée Canal. The artillery fire was active and several mines were exploded. Near the Hohenzollern Redoubt we sprang a mine which laid bare the hostile defences and enabled our snipers to shoot down nine of the defenders. At Souchez our artillery did good work, and just south of the canal a successful raid drove out the Germans from one of their trenches and inflicted considerable loss on them. At this southern end of our position, just as at Ypres, after June 13 the fighting, while costing us

considerable losses, was not productive of any great tactical results.

When, so to say, two hostile forces engage one another at very short distances, often not twice the length of a cricket pitch apart and rarely over 100 yards, it is plain that daily casualties must be incurred on no light scale, and it speaks volumes for the troops on either side that they stood this ever-present danger without flinching. By this period, however, we had attained a superiority in artillery, and from time to time overwhelmed the Germans at points where we wished to press forward. Then it was usually found, as in the case of the Canadian counter-attack from Hooze to Hill 60, that the Germans were shattered morally as well as physically. In the ordinary routine of reciprocal shell and trench-mortar fire, of sniping and patrolling, they still maintained their reputation. But it became clearer and more clear as the result of our experience, both in raids and larger attacks, that they did not relish the close-quarter combat with bomb and bayonet.

To these methods of destruction were added the constant danger from mines, which were used by both sides to an extent hitherto undreamt of in battle fighting.

On the early morning of June 22 the Germans sprang a very large mine in the neighbourhood of Givenchy, just north of the La Bassée Canal. This they followed with a heavy barrage fire behind the British line, under cover of which they penetrated our front on a narrow space. The Welsh Fusiliers were guarding this part of the line, and were deceived by the calm into thinking the Germans had no intention of disturbing the quietude of the locality. Suddenly there was a terrible roar, the earth opened, and a huge mass of timber, soil and sandbags was upheaved and fell back with a crash into a vast crater, 120 feet across, and the trenches in its neighbourhood, destroying the parapets and replacing the well-ordered constructions by a cleared space and a deep pit. Then came the hostile artillery fire, pounding the position and seeking by a veil of shells to cut off all access to it. It was followed by three distinct assaulting parties, who rushed forward to occupy the mine-pit. But the Welshmen were equal to the situation. Some had been blown up, others dazed by the shock, yet right and left of the riven ground there were others eager for revenge. They closed on the flanks of the raiding party and drove them



LIEUTENANT JEAN NAVARRE,
The French airman, steering through a sea of clouds.



IMMELMANN.

The German airman, killed in June, 1916.



LIEUT. MCCUBBIN.

Who brought down Immelmann.



BOELCKE.

The German airman, who claimed his nineteenth victory, June, 1916.

back, fighting hard, into the crater, out of it, and back to their own trenches. The Germans had captured a machine gun and tried to take it with them, but the men dragging it were all shot down, and after lying in the open till Saturday morning it was recovered by the Fusiliers.

A pleasant incident in this little fight was the gallant conduct of a pioneer battalion working in the vicinity. The men rushed forward with their spades and dealt shrewd blows with them on the astonished Germans.

During the night of June 24-25 there was an attempted raid by the enemy on our trenches north-east of Loos, which was easily driven back. All day long on the 25th our artillery were very active along the whole front, and at places there were considerable replies by the enemy, who also exploded four mines—two opposite Hulluch, one south of the Béthune-La Bassée line, and one north of Neuve Chapelle. None of them caused any casualties; nor did one sprung on the 24th near the Hohenzollern Redoubt. On the other hand, we destroyed six kite balloons out of 15 which we attacked.

On the night of the 25th-26th we executed ten successful raids, which inflicted considerable loss on the enemy, who also lost prisoners, while our casualties were slight. Our artillery, too, fired with great effect, damaging the hostile lines in many places, and causing four heavy explosions among the rearward part of the German position.

The preparatory bombardment of the enemy to pave the way for the great advance of July

had begun. From Ypres to the Somme his position was subjected to a hail of projectiles, generally distributed, but also concentrated at various points, so as to leave the enemy in doubt as to where the attack, which he quite appreciated was coming, would really be delivered. The German reply, except for short intervals and against a few places, was feeble and ineffectual.

Our fire was one of pure devastation intended to destroy the Germans, their batteries and trench defences, blow up their ammunition depôts, and bombard far back their resting places and lines of communication. This was all effectively done. Nor was the infantry idle. Raids were made on the enemy's trenches, inflicting heavy losses on him, but with few casualties to ourselves. Some of these attacks were covered by gas, and at one place where this had been employed the trenches when entered by our men were full of German dead. No less than a dozen successful raids were made by our men on June 28-29, in which the Liverpool Regiment, the Lancashire Fusiliers, the Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry, the Highland Light Infantry, and the Australians all took part.

The prologue of the play was coming to an end, and in a couple of days the grand drama would commence. All this time the battle raged round Verdun and in the Champagne. Further away, in Alsace, there had been more or less continuous fighting. The German was everywhere held; the Allies were about to begin their offensive.



THE Y.M.C.A. IN EGYPT.
Australian troops refreshing themselves at the tea rooms at Alexandria Docks.

CHAPTER CXLII.

THE WORK OF THE Y.M.C.A.

WORK FOR TERRITORIALS AND VOLUNTEERS IN PEACE TIME—BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR WORK—ORIGIN OF THE Y.M.C.A.—TRAINING CAMPS—MARQUEES AND HUTS—THE Y.M.C.A. IN FRANCE—HOSTELS FOR SOLDIERS' RELATIVES—RAILWAY STATION WORK—THE SHAKESPEARE HUT—ESTABLISHMENTS IN LONDON—WORK FOR THE NAVY—H.M.S. CRYSTAL PALACE—MUNITION WORKERS—TROOPS FROM THE DOMINIONS—THE Y.M.C.A. IN INDIA.

SIR GEORGE WILLIAMS, the Founder of the Young Men's Christian Association, took a keen interest during the closing days of his life in the experiment made by one of its auxiliaries at the time of the South African War. This included the provision of marquees for the use of the troops as reading, writing and recreation centres, and also as meeting places for religious services. It was thus that the National Council of Y.M.C.A.'s entered upon its first connexion with the soldier in actual warfare, and the modest beginning proved a great success. Before this period the Association had established relations with the Volunteers, and then later with the Territorials, during their fortnight's training in camp, by setting up its marquee equipment in the centres marked out for summer training camps and providing a place where the men could write their letters—usually it was the official post office—and purchase tea, coffee and light refreshments.

When the war began these two experiences decided the Y.M.C.A. to prepare similar services for the new Army. It had the machinery ready and its work with the Volunteers and Territorials inspired confidence as to the results. Mr. A. K. Yapp, the General Secretary of the National Council of Y.M.C.A.'s, suggested an immediate appeal for £25,000. The appeal was launched by a special War Work Committee,

of which Sir Thomas Sturmeoy Cave was chairman, Mr. A. K. Yapp secretary, and Mr. F. J. Chamberlain assistant secretary. Somewhat later Sir Henry E. Procter became acting treasurer. In a few weeks' time the £25,000 appeared to be totally inadequate and another £25,000 was required immediately. Before this second amount was received it was seen that even £50,000 would not meet the demands which poured in from all parts of the United Kingdom. Extensions often proceeded before the money was in hand, owing to the urgent character of the work, but in the first two years of war the subscriptions amounted to £830,000—a total which included donations from the King and Queen, Queen Alexandra, and other members of the Royal Family, as well as gifts from rich and poor alike. As the war advanced many gifts were made in order to perpetuate the memory of sons and brothers, and in France, at home, and elsewhere there soon were many memorial huts. Children in the elementary schools raised over £16,000 by gifts from many thousands of schools. Harrow in the second year of war gave a complete building, and other public schools rendered help in a most generous spirit. Livery companies and railway, banking and commercial undertakings added their share to the funds, while humbler people brought their shillings.

To appreciate the significance of this assistance, the beginnings of the Y.M.C.A. have to



A HUT FOR SOLDIERS AND SAILORS.

The Duchess of Argyll opening the Rest and Refreshment Hut at King's Cross.
Left to right: Duchess of Argyll, Major-General Sir Francis Lloyd, Mrs. Joy and Mr. Alexander Joy, the donors of the Hut.

be remembered. The movement, as originally started in England—from whence it spread throughout the world—came from an evangelical source. Its creed of membership contained evangelical doctrine, and the Paris Conference which determined its international character set forth the following basis:

The Young Men's Christian Associations seek to unite those young men who, regarding Jesus Christ as their God and Saviour according to the Holy Scriptures, desire to be His disciples in their doctrine and in their life, and to associate their efforts for the extension of His Kingdom among young men.

The founders were good men, for the greater part trained in a somewhat narrow mould. At the commencement, in 1844, the object was described as "the improvement of the spiritual condition of young men engaged in the drapery and other trades by the introduction of religious services among them." Membership was confined to those possessing a definite religious experience. One of the rules stipulated "that no person shall be considered a member of this Association unless he be a member of a Christian Church, or there be sufficient evidence of his being a converted character." In the early 'sixties a severe rebuke was administered to Archbishop Trench and Dr. Dale, the well-known evangelical theologian of Birmingham, because they had "trailed their Christian priesthood in the dust to offer homage at the

shrine of a dead playwright" at the Shakespeare tercentenary celebrations. There was also a reference to "the oratorio of the 'Messiah' wherein, as John Newton once said, roughly but pointedly, 'the Redeemer's agonies are illustrated on catgut.' Masquerade and sermon, pageant and oratorio!—it is very mournful." Nevertheless, and largely owing to the indomitable enthusiasm of the founder, Sir George Williams, the branches increased at home, in France, and other parts of the Continent, and eventually in the United States and our Overseas Dominions. Its social features were developed cautiously—if not jealously—because its leaders feared that the religious side of the work might be jeopardized. Smoking was prohibited in Y.M.C.A. buildings and the members were advised to abstain from athletic contests. Naturally such points were criticized by the younger men who gradually came into their own on the committees, and presently a broader and more catholic policy found expression. According to current opinion, the Association created a particular type of young man supposed to be addicted to personal introspection and lacking virility and commonsense. In some quarters the Y.M.C.A. provoked satire and derision, and in both Church of England and Nonconformist circles there did not appear that measure of cooperation that might

have been expected. The general situation with respect to the establishment and progress of the Y.M.C.A. and its limitations up to the time of the war need to be remembered in connexion with what was afterwards accomplished.

Neither barracks nor temporary buildings were sufficient at first to house the hundreds of thousands of recruits who joined the new armies. Away on lonely commons, under canvas, in barns, halls and schools, billeted in private houses, or in many cases occupying empty ones—often without beds, blankets, chairs, forms or tables—their accommodation taxed all resources to the breaking point. Moreover, coming straight from civilian life, many from middle-class families, the men found the social amenities in camp less than those usually enjoyed by the soldier in barracks. It was at this point that the Y.M.C.A. came to the assistance of the New Army. The methods adopted appeared exceedingly simple. In the early days of the war marquees were erected in every camp to which commanding officers gave permission. Tea, coffee and refreshments were supplied during the soldier's off-duty hours. He could obtain an early cup of tea before going on duty at six o'clock on an

autumn morning, and when he returned after a night march he usually found hot refreshments before he turned in for the night. Cigarettes, matches, boot-laces, buttons and other sundries could be obtained at the Y.M.C.A. counter. The Association never coveted the position of haberdasher and tobacconist to the troops, but when the camp was situated miles away from a town the soldier appreciated this service.

Concerned with the social benefit of the soldier the leaders did not disguise their definitely religious objects when they undertook this war work. They appreciated the fact, however, that religion cannot be forced on men. They did not therefore attempt either religious button-holing or cross-examination. An undenominational service was arranged on Sunday evenings, but in the mornings the marquee could be used by Church of England, Roman or Free Church chaplains. This hospitality on the part of a religious organization with deeply embedded Protestant traditions received grateful thanks in due course from Cardinal Bourne and from the Rev. M. Adler, the chief Jewish chaplain.

At the start the service of nearly every available Y.M.C.A. official in the country was



INSIDE A HUT AT WIMBLEDON CAMP.
Soldiers writing to their friends.

requisitioned. So great was the pressure owing to the rapid extension of the agencies that the leaders gladly availed themselves of the help of teachers, undergraduates and others who were free from their ordinary duties during the holiday period that followed the outbreak of the war. Some mistakes occurred here and there, and men unfitted by temperament and lack of knowledge for such positions were found in places of trust, but on the whole these instances were comparatively few. The enthusiasm of the undertaking and the splendid spirit of the new Army carried the helpers along, and it was not unusual for them to keep at their duties in the marquees during 16 or 18 hours of every day in the week.

From the first the work won the approval of the Army authorities. They smoothed away difficulties, provided facilities for transport, and detailed orderlies for pitching the marquees and other heavy work. The marquees were usually within the camp boundaries, and became a part of the life of the camp. This recognition by the military authorities proved a great asset.

The winter of 1914 settled the policy of the Y.M.C.A. A brilliant autumn was followed by

an exceptionally wet winter. Even high and exposed country like Salisbury Plain resembled a morass, while the roads in the district were covered with water four or five inches deep. The autumnal gales wrecked scores of marquees, and it became necessary, instead of the marquees, which were comparatively cheap and portable, to embark on the erection of huts, costing on an average £600 to £700. Some of the first to be erected accommodated the Canadian troops just arrived in England. Many improvements were subsequently made in the interior arrangements of the huts. An auditorium was provided at Crowborough, for example, to seat 2,000 men. Satisfactory cooking arrangements were possible in the hut, which enabled the helpers to prepare more expeditiously the hot refreshments required by the men. In large camps a double hut was built, which contained a special room for concerts, lectures and services apart from the common room used for games, correspondence, and the serving of refreshments from the counter.

In addition to marquees and huts, public halls, mission rooms and other suitable buildings were hired in centres occupied by thousands



DINING HALL AND RECREATION ROOM FOR SHELL-MAKERS AT WOOLWICH.
Munition workers going to dinner.



FOR CIVILIANS AND SERVICE MEN.

Mr. Lloyd George visits the dining-room for munition workers at Ponder's End, while Mrs. Lloyd George (smaller picture) distributes chocolates and cigarettes to soldiers at the Temperance Hut at Hampstead Heath.

of troops. One of the most notable enterprises was the transformation of a huge shell-like building in the White City at Shepherd's Bush, formerly occupied by Bostock's menagerie, for the use of 10,000 Territorials in training there during the winter of 1914. The usual activities were here supplemented by the establishment of a lending library and the organization of war lectures. Both agencies justified themselves, and as the war progressed this department received increasing attention not only at home, but, as will be shown later, in the British camps overseas.

Whether in hut, marquee or elsewhere the effort was made to provide club facilities. Apart from the officers' quarters the Y.M.C.A. centre was the only place that boasted chairs and tables for the men. The Bishop of London, one of the few English Bishops who had practical experience of the camps (having spent a month under canvas at Crowborough), in recording his impressions of camp life, stated that marquees where the men could write letters home were immensely appreciated, and that was the reason why the Y.M.C.A. was so popular with the men. From the commence-



ment notepaper and envelopes were supplied free, and this distribution involved many million sheets of paper and envelopes at a considerable cost.

The soldier's love of music was recognized in the provision for the Territorial camps. Every marquee had its piano. A penny edition of "Camp Songs" sold in hundreds of thousands. This little book contained a selection of humorous, sentimental and patriotic songs that are always favourites with men, and proved of considerable service in promoting the success of the "sing-song." After a long and tedious day the camp "sing-song" gave that happy relief to a large body of men which cannot be found in any other way. The "sing-song" closed a few minutes before the men had to be in their quarters for the night, and almost



THE LATE SIR GEORGE WILLIAMS,
Founder of the Y.M.C.A.

invariably the majority remained for a hymn and short prayer, followed by the National Anthem. No one was forced to stay, and the whole service lasted but a few minutes.

Neither at the period of the commencement of the war nor in its later days were the soldiers, speaking generally, subject to the conditions of a religious revival, such as was claimed in some quarters. They were, however, eager listeners and interested in unconventional religious services with plenty of singing. Here they showed preferences of a striking character. They loved to sing Dr. Monsell's "Fight the good Fight," Charles Wesley's "Sun of my Soul" and Cardinal Newman's "Lead Kindly Light." The Sunday evening service was addressed by a chaplain or one of the Y.M.C.A. helpers, and frequently when this closed the men continued another hour singing further hymns. An attempt to measure the religious influences would be misleading, but thousands of signatures were secured for the Y.M.C.A. War Roll.

Trained to a strict observance of the Sabbath, the Y.M.C.A. leaders perforce modified their opinions and opened the huts and marquees during the whole of the seven days. The majority of the centres were not closed, except at night, from the time they were first opened. Several huts kept open doors both night and day. Sunday trading naturally presented a difficult proposition. Some people severely criticized the policy adopted, but the large majority who knew the conditions recognized the necessity of the course that was followed. The Association had to decide whether the sale of hot refreshments should be prohibited on Sundays and the men driven to the wet canteen. Whilst replying in the negative, they limited Sunday labour as far as possible and restricted amusements, but necessities could be purchased at the counter as on other days.

Soon after the war commenced the necessity became evident of establishing in France similar agencies for the troops to those that had been provided at home. Lord French, then in command of the British Expeditionary Force, expressed complete sympathy with this desire though unable owing to the nature of the military operations to suggest an immediate beginning. By November, 1914, however, the Y.M.C.A. was permitted to start its work in some of the base and rest camps as an experiment, on the implied understanding that if successful it would be allowed to make extensions. This cautious policy was probably wise in the absence of previous experience, for the fact had to be determined to what extent voluntary agencies could be associated with the British Army in the war zone. Many questions were involved, including the difficulties of transport and the exact relation of a civilian organization to military discipline which was necessarily stricter than at home. The tentative period proved the value of the work. Writing on November 23, 1915, after a full year's experience, Viscount French testified to "the fine work done by the Y.M.C.A." Continuing he said :

The problem of dealing with conditions, at such a time, and under existing circumstances, at the rest camps has always been a most difficult one; but the erection of huts by the Young Men's Christian Association has made this far easier. The extra comfort thereby afforded to the men, and the opportunities for reading and writing, have been of incalculable service, and I wish to tender to your Association and all those who have assisted, my most grateful thanks.

The history of European wars contains no experience similar to that of this large and organized enterprise for assisting soldiers in the field with social and religious agencies. Military commanders naturally placed such efforts outside their sphere of action, and neither churches nor other bodies previously realized the necessity and value of these undertakings. The Salvation Army and the Church Army followed the British soldier into France on more or less similar lines, but the Y.M.C.A. deserves the honour of the start as well as recognition for the completeness of its organization.

From November, 1914, the agencies in France were gradually extended, until by the time the war had been two years in progress 180 centres had been established. The majority of these were huts, built, so far as later editions were concerned, in 5 ft. sections, so that they could be easily moved. Various kinds of buildings were also requisitioned, including an old church, a convent, a cinema, a winter garden and theatre, a mayor's parlour, and farm buildings and structures of various descriptions, upon all of which the sign of the Red Triangle was affixed—an indication of a warm and constant welcome to the British troops. At the earnest wish of the Y.M.C.A. leaders, the generals commanding divisions at length permitted them to go up to villages where the men in the trenches had their billets. The Heath Harrison Hut, for instance, was situated near cross roads $3\frac{1}{2}$ or 4 miles from the German lines and exposed to shell fire. From early morning until late at night a continuous queue passed to and from the refreshment counter, and indicated the benefit of the place to these trench heroes. Again, the Threapwood Hut was situated within a mile or

so of the enemy, and before it was destroyed by the German fire, fifty evidences of the damage by bursting shell or shrapnel were to be seen in the building. The safety of the workers had been ensured to some extent by the provision of a dug-out by the military authorities, and when the Germans managed to drop a shell upon it the leader and his helpers, warned of the danger, were able to escape.

By permission of Her Majesty, the first Y.M.C.A. building erected in France was named the "Queen Mary Hut." This was situated a short distance from the quay of one of the French harbours, being largely used by the men who came from the Port of London Authority to unload the transports. Though dressed in khaki, they ranked as non-combatants and did the work of ordinary dock labourers. Hanging in the Queen Mary Hut was a framed copy of the Queen's letter expressing warm sympathy with the Y.M.C.A. work in France. Other members of the Royal Family exhibited similar interest. Princess Victoria of Schleswig-Holstein rendered great service by accepting the post of President of the Ladies' Auxiliary Committee for the Y.M.C.A. base camps in France. The Princess paid visits to France and inspected the whole of the arrangements in order to effect improvements and modifications. Her committee collected parcels of comforts, footballs, cricket sets, musical instruments, and other articles for the use of the men. The same committee also organized lady helpers, who gave their services and thus saved the necessity of employing men required for the fighting line. These ladies, to the number of 300, performed arduous duties in an admirable manner and to the complete advantage of the work.



MR. J. J. VIRGO,
Field Secretary, Y.M.C.A.



LORD KINNAIRD,
President of the National
Y.M.C.A. Council.



MR. A. K. YAPP,
General Secretary, Y.M.C.A.

The whole of the operations in France were controlled on the spot by Mr. Oliver McCowen, LL.B., who was originally Y.M.C.A. secretary in Burma. He gradually built up a large organization, which by August, 1916, consisted of a staff of 700 workers. Only a small proportion were men of military age, for whom exemption had been claimed, and these principally took the places of ladies who were naturally prohibited from serving near the firing line. Many of Mr. McCowen's assistants were active clergy and ministers who obtained leave of absence from their home duties. Many well-known people gave their services for special duties. Professors from the Universities lectured on war or literary subjects and found eager audiences. Miss Lena Ashwell organized concert parties, which brought keen enjoyment and pleasure to the men in the huts and in the hospitals. One and all roughed it with no thought for the discomforts of wind, rain, and heat, and the long hours.

The British camps in France not only permitted the usual features of the work at home—such as the religious services, letter-writing, games, and “sing-songs”—but afforded many

interesting additions. When a British battalion arrived at a French port, tired, unwashed and unshaven after a rough passage across the Channel, they found hot refreshments awaiting their purchase. Wearied by the long journey over land and sea, they had the chance of a rest, and relieved their home-sickness—a feeling common to many lads on first landing on a foreign soil—by writing home. On such days thousands of communications passed through the letter-box.

Under normal conditions a great stream of men started daily from the trenches on their seven days' furlough. They arrived at the railhead laden with their kit and with the mud of the trenches thick upon them. Here they found the sign of the Red Triangle and secured a wash, food and sleep until the leave train passed on its way. At the principal stopping-places hot refreshments and other necessaries could be purchased.

Another boon was a series of hostels for the use of relatives of wounded soldiers. The Y.M.C.A. gradually increased the number of these hostels to eight, and further arranged to meet the soldiers' friends at the boat's side and motor them direct to the hospital where



A REST HUT IN THE LITTLE THEATRE, ADELPHI.
In the reading and writing room.




HUTS IN LONDON.

A building in Euston Square erected for soldiers. Sleeping accommodation was also provided for twenty-three men. Circle picture: In a rest hut in the Little Theatre, Adelphi. Bottom picture: The Dormitory at the Earl Roberts Rest Home, King's Cross.

their husbands, brothers, or other relatives were to be found. This assistance was provided without a penny of charge to friends of non-commissioned officers and men. A beautiful villa was rented for the use of officers' relatives, where similar accommodation was provided at moderate charges in order to cover the cost.

In various impromptu directions the Y.M.C.A. rendered acts of kindness to the wounded. The service shown to the Australians at a clearing station after one of the "pushes" supplied an illustration of the help that the Y.M.C.A. was only too eager to offer:

When we arrived the sight which presented itself to us beggars description [wrote a Y.M.C.A. secretary]. Hundreds of men were lying about everywhere with head, leg, and arm wounds, all of which had been attended to by the medical staff, the work of which is beyond all praise. The men were now waiting the arrival of the train which was to convey them to a hospital outside the range of guns. They were a cheerful crowd, though bearing the unmistakable marks of battle, and many of them carried trophies captured in the fight. . . . The men soon recognized and welcomed the Y.M.C.A., and we were immediately invited to write postcards and fill in field cards acquainting the people at home of the wounds of which all of them were proud. One of the Australian secretaries hastened to the Tynemouth hut for cigarettes, as there was a sad lack of smokes and money in this company of wounded, heroes. . . . When the train arrived our work was by



no means finished; men with leg wounds gladly availed themselves of the Y.M.C.A. man's shoulder in treading the painful path to a carriage door. Postcards had to be written even here on the footboards of the train and many times a comrade was heard to remark to some poor fellow who was struggling with a borrowed pencil and field card, "Oh, there is a Y.M.C.A. man there, he'll do it for you."

Both the British and the French authorities gave all possible assistance. The former facilitated transport and the latter removed hindrances harassing the workers. A French admiral in charge of a port gave instructions that the Y.M.C.A. was to be afforded every help and not to be delayed by restrictions, even though generally necessary. French sentries on the roads outside towns became so accustomed to the red triangle on cars that they rarely demanded the production of cards of authorization. Those high in authority in France watched the enterprise with much interest and commenced in an experimental manner something similar for their troops. It should be remembered that the French Y.M.C.A. carried on a small but excellent work for the French troops in the Vosges.

When the King was in France he inspected the Y.M.C.A. huts and expressed his great pleasure concerning its arrangements. In a more formal but equally expressive manner he sent the following message to Lord Kinnaird on May 26, 1916:—"His Majesty congratulates the Association on the successful results of its war work, which has done everything conducive to the comfort and well-being of the armies, supplying the special and peculiar needs of men drawn from countries so different and so distant. It has worked in a practical, economical and unostentatious manner, with consummate knowledge of those with whom it has to deal. At the same time the Association, by its spirit of discipline, has earned the respect and approbation of the Military Authorities."

If space permitted, a story full of daring and adventure could be told of the Y.M.C.A. work on the shell-strewn shores of Gallipoli, of its less exciting but equally useful services in Malta, and of its much-needed help in Mesopotamia and East Africa.


As people realized during the first year of war that men on furlough arrived home in the early morning at Victoria laden with their complete kit, and with nowhere to go before the trains some six to eight hours later conveyed them to their destination, an immediate demand arose for more satisfactory arrangements. In the majority of cases these soldiers lay about

the station precincts or tramped right across to the northern stations, there to wait until the morning. The Y.M.C.A. organized a staff of workers who met the leave trains at Victoria and conducted the men to a disused brewery in Westminster, where they could secure bed and refreshments at moderate charges. The building did not provide luxurious fittings amidst its cavernous depths, but served its purpose. The King permitted the use of the Royal Mews at Buckingham Palace for the entertainment of the men. Refreshments were supplied from the Palace kitchen on arrival, and in the morning, after a substantial breakfast, the royal carriages conveyed them to the various railway stations. The King's practical sympathy encouraged various developments. The beginnings of this service in the Metropolis developed into a network of agencies, coordinated in a wise and statesmanlike manner, in order to cater for the wants of the incoming and outgoing soldier. The railway stations became the strategic points. Not only did the soldier depart from London, but he arrived there at all hours of the day and night on his way back to France or the home camps, and frequently had long and wearisome intervals between his journeys. To provide shelter for the thousands of men—sailors as well as soldiers—using the route to the north, or vice versa, the first station hut was erected at Euston on ground placed at the disposal of the Y.M.C.A. by the directors of the London and North-Western Railway. This provided sleeping accommodation at moderate prices, so that for sixpence a man could obtain a bed with clean sheets and everything comfortable. If all the beds were engaged, he could secure blankets and a shakedown on the floor for twopence. In the morning he purchased his food on an equally economical basis, and the advantages of the club, including books, papers and writing materials, were open to him without charge, while for a few pence he could enjoy a game of billiards. Very often the police brought in men the worse for drink who were a danger to themselves and who invited punishment. By tactful handling the Y.M.C.A. secretary got them to bed, and in the morning they were sober once again and ashamed of the trouble they had occasioned. Such services explained in part the popularity of the Y.M.C.A. amongst the men.

Similar huts were in due course established at King's Cross, Victoria, Waterloo, and Paddington. As these buildings increased in num-



Miss Lena Ashwell's concert-party
behind the firing-line in France



An entertainment in a Welsh camp. Smaller picture: At a concert in London.
THE Y.M.C.A. ENTERTAINING TROOPS AT HOME AND ABROAD.



PASTIMES IN THE HUTS.

Lady Askwith watching a billiard match at a hut in Horseferry Road, Westminster.

Circle picture: A game at draughts.

bers, various improvements and additions were made, such, for instance, as the provision of hot baths. This boon proved welcome to the soldier from France who had been subject to insect-infested billets. Another addition of a practical character was the annexe erected at Waterloo for the use of soldiers' wives, who frequently came to meet their husbands or to witness their departure.

At Victoria, in addition to a large hut for non-commissioned officers and men, a hostel was erected in Grosvenor Gardens, only a few yards distant from the railway station, for the use of commissioned officers. Its control was undertaken by the Y.M.C.A., but its erection and equipment owed everything to the generous cooperation of Mrs. Charles Tufton and her friends. This building was a comfortable club, where young officers could secure bed and breakfast and other meals. It was opened by Queen Alexandra.

Linked up with the station huts the Y.M.C.A. presently established still more commodious

buildings with a greater claim to architectural fitness in the inner circle of the Metropolis. At Aldwych, abutting on the Strand, an exceptionally bright and convenient structure was erected at a cost of between £7,000 and £8,000. This was designed primarily for the requirements of overseas troops, but was open to men of other units.

A later enterprise was the Shakespeare Hut at the rear of the British Museum, which owed its inspiration to the Shakespeare Memorial Committee and the Tercentenary Committee. Naturally it was impossible to devote any portion of the Shakespeare Memorial Fund to the building or equipment, but £1,000 was collected for the purpose from the Dean and Chapter of Westminster, the Temple Church, University College and Bedford College for Women. Towards the £7,000 or £8,000 required £2,000 was also received from the New Zealand Y.M.C.A., and substantial subscriptions came from the boroughs of Westminster, Kensington and Marylebone. The Shakespeare Hut was admirably designed with canteen, billiard room, quiet room, verandah and sleeping and bath room accommodation. It was probably the best of its kind, and the fittings and colouring were planned in memory of the great dramatist who, as already indicated, did not receive honour from some of the members of the Y.M.C.A. in its early days.

The Y.M.C.A. also transformed the Little Theatre in John Street, Adelphi, generously placed at its disposal by the landlord, Mr. Coutts, into a more or less similar rendezvous. Its size and proximity to Charing Cross enabled large numbers of men to enjoy the advantages.

Another development deserves mention here because of its effect upon the internal organization of the Y.M.C.A. and the coordinated facilities for entertaining the soldier in London. Practically speaking, from the start of the Y.M.C.A. movement the Central Y.M.C.A. provided the metropolitan headquarters. Originally this central branch possessed Exeter Hall, and whilst using a portion of the building for club purposes let the halls for religious and philanthropic gatherings. After the death of Sir George Williams a new and more convenient building was proposed as his fitting memorial. Exeter Hall was sold, and at a cost of £100,000 an island site was purchased in Tottenham Court Road and a new Institute was erected. This provided the features of a young men's club—including lounge, swimming baths, shooting gallery, gymnasium—besides being thoroughly equipped as an educational and religious centre for men. Its management was undertaken by Mr. J. J. Virgo, who was specially invited to accept the post of secretary because of his Australian experiences. The Central Y.M.C.A. was entirely responsible for its erection and management and the National Council did not share either liability or control. The latter body had its own headquarters in Russell Square in a house (called the Sir George Williams' House) presented to it by the family of Sir George Williams. When a large addition to the clerical staff proved necessary the adjoining house was secured and in this enlarged building the National Council pursued its work until the autumn of 1915. Just before this period the two organizations had conducted their operations in separate channels, but the exigencies of the war suggested cooperation, and the respective officers and committee considered and approved fresh arrangements for wiser and ampler provision on behalf of the soldiers. Under this scheme the Central Y.M.C.A. transferred the Tottenham Court Road centre to the National Council. This arrangement not only coordinated existing agencies but provided adequate accommodation for the National Council staff and enabled this handsome and commodious building to be utilized day and night for the war work. From this

period Mr. Virgo became Field Secretary to the National Council and later started on a world tour for the advancement of Y.M.C.A. interests.

With Tottenham Court Road, its station huts, and other metropolitan centres, the Y.M.C.A. accommodated on an average 7,500 men every week in its cubicles. The whole of these huts and buildings were connected by the military authorities at their request with the telephone, so that pressure at one place could frequently be relieved by vacant beds at others—each and all bearing the description of "ever-open" huts. With the assistance of scouting parties supplied with motors the streets were scoured for soldiers stranded late at night.

From the headquarters flowed a perennial stream of new ideas and activities. Enquirers from all parts of the world desired particulars of husband, son, brother or friend who had been missing in such and such engagement. Usually it was the story of an officer, non-commissioned man, or private who was last seen in attack and no record could be obtained concerning his whereabouts. Through the good offices of the American Y.M.C.A. in Germany, to whom the official list of British prisoners in Germany was available, immediate steps were taken to get in touch with the facts. Again there were difficulties with the prisoners' letters, and in many cases it was possible to secure an avoidance of delay. On other occasions the Y.M.C.A. obtained news respecting men who through various reasons had not communicated with their friends. An oft-repeated request was for a photograph of the grave where loved ones lay buried.

Disabled soldiers turned to the Y.M.C.A. after their discharge from the Army for assistance in securing suitable employment. These inquiries suggested an Employment Bureau, and through its agency hundreds of men were brought into touch with employers and saved from the necessity of tramping about in search of work.

A novel method of bridging over the period of separation between soldiers and their friends was initiated by the Y.M.C.A. through its Snapshots League. With simple but efficient machinery 11,000 amateur photographers were enrolled who secured 500,000 snapshots illustrative of the sailor's or soldier's family and friends. This work was performed without charge. Men of H.M. Forces were supplied with forms upon which they stated that they desired photos of their wife, parents or sweetheart living in the place specified. These

were returned to the Y.M.C.A. Snapshots League, Tottenham Court Road, and forwarded to the nearest voluntary helper. When the photos were prepared the photographer dispatched copies in special weatherproof envelopes to the soldier in France, Salonika, Egypt or elsewhere. The enterprise cost about £10,000, which was subscribed privately by those who recognized its value and significance. It was also adopted by the Y.M.C.A. organizations in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Bermuda in order to perform for their troops serving under the British flag a similar service to that enjoyed by the home armies. Throughout the Commonwealth the necessary forms of application could be obtained in the Post Offices.

Through the cooperation of the General Council of the Bar and the Council of the Law Society arrangements were made for providing in the Y.M.C.A. huts free legal advice to non-commissioned officers and men in H.M. Forces. This help was given by barristers and solicitors on active service and confined absolutely to civil matters. The Y.M.C.A. stipulated that litigation would not be undertaken either at its

expense or with its help. In special cases the men were put into communication with the official department at the Royal Courts of Justice established under special rules of Court.

The Navy required the assistance of the Y.M.C.A. as much as the Army, though the circumstances of its work did not present the same opportunities. To serve the sailor on board ship was not yet practicable, and therefore the Red Triangle greeted him when he came ashore on leave. At places like Portsmouth, Chatham, Harwich, Newcastle, Rosyth, Cromarty and Invergordon—to name a few such centres—the National Council, in conjunction with the Scottish Y.M.C.A. (of which Sir Andrew Pettigrew was chairman and Mr. Jas. Mackenzie secretary), which was responsible for the agencies in the north, made provision for naval men. In all essential respects the naval and military departments were organized on kindred lines. The appreciation of officers and men of all ratings in the Navy testified to the value of the work. Admiral Jellicoe and Admiral Beatty gave



A "CABBAGE PATCH" IN LONDON

Turned to good account: A hut erected on an old building site in Kensington.



AT THE LITTLE THEATRE.

Lady helpers preparing a meal for a number of Barbadians and recruits from Trinidad.

every possible facility and supported the undertakings both privately and in public.

During the early days of September, 1914, the Y.M.C.A. commenced operations at the Crystal Palace for the benefit of lads training for the Royal Naval Division. At certain periods nine to ten thousand were at the Crystal Palace, before being drafted to other spheres of action. They were enlisted from the North of England, from Wales and the Midlands and from many quiet villages, east and west, as well as north and south. The opportunities for service in this H.M.S. Crystal Palace, as it was styled, were therefore considerable. For its accommodation the authorities granted the use of a large amount of floor space, including the Egyptian, Grecian and Roman Courts in the centre transept, and later placed at the disposal of the Y.M.C.A. the Morocco and Alhambra Courts, as well as the North Tower Gardens and theatre. The services were varied and interesting and included quite unconventional agencies. Owing to necessity the organization acted as washerwoman to thousands of these naval men in training. The laundry business developed into a great concern and necessitated a large staff and a careful methodical system in order to avoid confusion and delay, but its



sole genesis was the comfort and convenience of the men.

In ordinary course the naval postman delivered the various mails as these arrived at the Palace, but in such a huge building the men could not be easily found, especially when on duty, and letters were frequently delayed in consequence. Times of great pressure prevented the naval authorities from employing a special staff to deal with "dead" letters or parcels. To the men, however, these communications from their friends were all-important, and much relief was experienced when, at the request of



INSIDE THE EUSTON HUT.

the officers, the Y.M.C.A. undertook an important share of the postal service. During twelve months the Y.M.C.A. dealt with 1,000,000 letters and parcels; the sale of stamps in that period was valued at £3,000 and postal orders were purchased by the men to the amount of £9,000. The Savings Bank possessed, on an average, between two and three thousand depositors with a substantial amount standing to their credit.

By request also of the officers the Y.M.C.A. published a little book at the price of one penny enabling particulars to be recorded concerning the man's pay, the amount he had received and, where necessary, the amount due to the Division. It was of a size made for his cap—the best of pockets for a sailor. Concerts and lectures were regularly organized in the theatre, and on certain evenings, as well as on Sundays, services arranged of a definitely religious character. Help of a more personal nature was rendered on behalf of wives and mothers, who unfailingly turned to the Y.M.C.A. in times of necessity. Two or three workers attended specially to such cases. Parental anxieties were relieved, and when the wives of married men did not receive regular letters, a tactful word frequently pulled them up to the scratch. Thousands of men signed temperance and purity pledges, and every effort was made by the Y.M.C.A. to assist the men of the R.N.D. to keep sober and healthy for the campaign on which they would enter when the period of training was completed.

The Scottish National Council of Y.M.C.A.'s, whose executive worked in conjunction with Tottenham Court Road, devoted considerable care and thought to the sailors in the northern part of the kingdom, and established naval centres at Rosyth, Invergordon, Cromarty, and elsewhere. The places at which sailors put in for a few hours were but ill provided with reasonable means of recreation or entertainment, and were not designed for a crowd of men anxious to make amends for a fairly long spell at sea.

The presence of the Fleet off the coasts of Scotland changed the social conditions of many northern towns. Little Highland burghs were caught up in the machinery of war, and accommodated themselves and their institutions to thousands of men passing to and from the ships, and to the large staff of artificers engaged on repairs and refittings. At one small town, when the trains were usually late on the journey up, hundreds failed to reach their ships, and had to wait until the morning. These situations provoked the despair of the provost and leading townsmen. Every public building sheltered the men, and on occasions even the small lock-up with its one or two cells was utilized for the purpose of affording relief from the streets, and as a protection from the weather. In this emergency the Y.M.C.A. came to the rescue. Plans were designed for a permanent building and obtained the approval of the Admiralty, who made a grant for its immediate erection, as

well as that of the Admirals on the Division. Experience quickly showed that the institute was too small, and in the course of a few months a substantial addition became necessary. Like the Y.M.C.A. station huts in the metropolis, which were equally open to the sailor, it provided rest, refreshment and recreation, and gave much satisfaction to the sailors.

When the cry went up for shells and big guns and labour became mobilized in a way never before witnessed in England, occasion arose for meeting the bed and breakfast requirements of battalions of men posted to districts already crowded with workers. Even where the question of lodgings presented few difficulties, the midday meal for thousands of men had to be met adequately by outside agencies so that localities concerned could be relieved of the impossible strain. From the circumstances of its foundation the Y.M.C.A. had not received the support of Trade Union members to any considerable extent. Until the war its operations were assigned principally to the shop assistants, clerks, buyers and managers of retail and wholesale houses. It possessed a sprinkling of professional men, but the working classes were uninfluenced. Some of the Y.M.C.A. leaders sought the co-operation of the industrial workers, but they held aloof and the gulf seemed wide and insurmountable. Temperament and outlook probably accounted for this division of interest, which grew deeper and wider as the years advanced.

When the abnormal situation created by the enlargement of munition factories became acute in various parts of the country the Y.M.C.A. had already made good on its war work. To the Y.M.C.A., therefore, people turned for help on behalf of the munition workers, and the Red Triangle responded eagerly and willingly. As a rapprochement had been established with soldiers and sailors, the Y.M.C.A. leaders gladly embraced the opportunity of another and unexpected extension of their activities. The Munition Workers' Auxiliary Committee was established by Mr. A. K. Yapp, the General Secretary, and Princess Victoria of Schleswig-Holstein accepted the office of president, attending the committee meetings with almost invariable regularity, and showing the keenest interest in the various undertakings. Lord Derby, who had recognized the necessity for special voluntary efforts in order to deal with the problem, became chairman of the committee. Mr. R. H. Swainson was organizer. Some of the committee became responsible for the operations organized in important areas. Lady Henry Grosvenor, for instance, had charge of the Y.M.C.A. services for munition workers at Woolwich, Crayford, and the adjoining districts; Mrs. Winston Churchill superintended the agencies at Enfield Lock and Waltham Cross; Countess Fitzwilliam supervised the arrangements at Sheffield; Lady Hugh Grosvenor was responsible for work in Cheshire; Mrs. Williams (of Miskin)



MIDNIGHT AT THE WATERLOO HUT.

performed a similar duty in connexion with the munition centres in South Wales; and the Scottish National Council undertook the arrangements in Scotland.

Everything had to be evolved and co-ordinated as the circumstances demanded. The lady superintendents were responsible for securing lady workers and for equipping their district centres, even to kitchen utensils, cutlery, crockery, and the details incidental to supplying heavy meals and sleeping accommodation. Within a short time they organized 3,000 ladies who did not receive a penny in salary, and where they lived at the hostel paid for their own board and lodging. These voluntary helpers performed a variety of work, necessitating in many instances night shifts or early morning duties. To their tact, womanly qualities, and arduous work were due the attractiveness, cleanliness and good management of the establishments in munition centres.

At Woolwich, owing to the large influx of workers, the question of supplying meals became urgent. During the dinner hour every public house and refreshment shop was crowded, and men often waited in long queues to be served. The Y.M.C.A. did not desire to compete with legitimate trading concerns when these met the need, but an impossible situation was created, and men and women who worked long hours in munition factories could not secure nourishing food at moderate prices served with some degree of comfort. The supply of guns and shells suffered as well as the workpeople, and employers and employees equally rejoiced when the Y.M.C.A. organized a great undertaking. When in full working order Lady Henry Grosvenor organized 20,000 meals every day, the majority of which consisted of the heavy midday order. For the highly paid operative the popular demand was a shilling three-course dinner, of excellent quality. An orchestra was provided and the diners enjoyed their meal whilst listening to a capital musical programme. Later it became necessary to meet the requirements of those who preferred something less expensive on the à la carte basis. The men who went on night shifts also found their wants studied, and in order to serve them a staff of ladies worked through the night. Inspection of the Woolwich centre satisfied the conditions of cleanliness, quality of food, and the attractiveness of the general surroundings.

In the London Dock centres, where Lady Askwith was in charge, the labourers appreciated a sevenpenny dinner of hot meat and potatoes supplied in liberal quantities. They were accustomed to large portions and did not require sweets or coffee. But for the Y.M.C.A. Hut they would perforce have had to make shift with the helping of cold meat and bread carried with them from home in the typical red handkerchief.

Similar provision was made in the provinces for the labourer or artisan on war work. Thus at Liverpool, where the need existed for canteens on the dock premises, the Dock Board and Shipowners' Association formed a company with a capital of £10,000 for the erection of huts, which were handed over to the Y.M.C.A. Originally the Dock Board subscribed £5,000, but when the first two or three buildings proved successful the Board immediately doubled the capital. Absolute necessity demanded these places of rest and refreshment for the dock labourer. Some of the eating houses previously frequented by the men were extremely dirty, and they had to be content with indifferent food and unpleasant conditions. In the huts by the Liverpool Dock side the equipment was clean and the sevenpenny dinners well cooked and of the best quality. The result must in the majority of instances be credited to the lady workers who volunteered from some of the best middle-class families in the city of Liverpool, and took a regular share of the duty, some giving one or two days every week while others attended during the whole of the six days. The test of the pudding is in the eating. These ladies when the dinners were served were content to purchase a cut off the joint from which the customers had been supplied or a helping from the same make of puddings. Those competent to judge of the effect of the arrangements stated that the men performed their heavy work under improved health conditions, while its volume was greater and there was less heavy drinking or striking. The opinion of the Liverpool Dock Board and Shipowners' Association may be gathered by the readiness with which the capital was doubled.

At Sheffield, Newcastle and elsewhere the committees under lady presidents met the needs of the workers according to local conditions. Cast-iron plans were avoided and the locality allowed to determine the best way of meeting the emergency. At Newcastle, for instance, with the cooperation of the firm of



THE SHAKESPEARE HUT IN GOWER STREET, LONDON.

Opened by Princess Victoria of Schleswig-Holstein (in smaller picture) August 11, 1916.

Sir Wm. Armstrong, Whitworth & Co., the Y.M.C.A. served midday meals in a building in close proximity to the firm's works. Special provision was established for the women, who came at 12 o'clock and retired from the building in time to permit of the male workers obtaining their meal. One general rule obtained in all these Y.M.C.A. dining rooms—cleanliness, quality of food and reasonable prices.

A more ambitious scheme included hostels for the workers where they could not only obtain meals but sleeping accommodation and the usual recreative and other attractions. Owing to the abnormal conditions lodgings were difficult if not impossible to obtain by the man suddenly dumped down in a district many miles from his home ties. Where obtainable the bedroom often proved unsatisfactory owing to the crowded state of the dwelling. Scores of cases occurred of landladies letting the bedroom in turn throughout the whole 24 hours. Men had either to endure such places or seek quarters several miles distant from the factory. The latter course involved



tiresome journeys after long hours and an absence of comfort or home life during the meal-times. To meet an unquestioned need the Y.M.C.A. initiated an experimental scheme at Enfield by which the workers could live under healthier and pleasanter conditions. This developed in many other districts. At Enfield it provided for the erection of wooden huts within easy distance of the factories as sleeping quarters, so that the worker could secure a small but clean and convenient cubicle to his own use. He had a comfortable bed, clean

sheets, a box for his clothes, the use of baths and other necessaries. In close proximity to the cubicles a common hall was erected for meals, recreations and letter writing. The food was well cooked and served by lady helpers on dainty-looking tables always bright with freshly cut flowers. For an inclusive sum (averaging usually about 20s.) per week the munition worker secured full board, lodging and washing. Moreover, he enjoyed many club facilities impossible in the ordinary private lodgings. Without leaving the common hall he could play billiards, listen to the concert or write his letters.

Employers recognized the advantages offered by the hostel and in many instances contributed liberally to its equipment. According to the conditions for the assessment of war profits the Exchequer sanctioned the payment of a certain proportion to schemes for the betterment of their employees. Advantage was taken of this arrangement, for instance, by Messrs. Stewart & Lloyd, of Glasgow, who financed the whole requirements of a hostel for their workers situated close to their factory.

Lady Hugh Grosvenor undertook the charge of a small garden city in Cheshire which developed through the generosity of Messrs. Brunner, Mond & Co., who were engaged on war work. In order to meet the needs of their employees, many of whom had been brought from the front, provision was made for 500 cubicles erected in blocks and fitted with baths and washhouses. The club accommodation for meals, games, lectures and concerts was excellent, whilst the kitchen equipment was equal to that of a first-class restaurant. Lady Hugh Grosvenor and her staff of lady workers made an innovation at this centre by the supply of hot midday meals carried to the works two or three miles distant for those residents who could not return to the hostel for dinner. Those who visited this large hostel were delighted with the artistic fittings and the bright and attractive curtains which guarded the place from any suspicion that it was a poor-law institution or an ordinary philanthropic home.

The munition worker received his money's worth, plus sympathy and cooperation, and whilst he was a customer he had a personal relationship to the whole undertaking. The Y.M.C.A. did not attempt to pauperize him, but ran the enterprise on business lines, charging against it a fair interest on capital expenditure.

The profits were not devoted to the general work of the Y.M.C.A. but placed to a fund for the betterment of the institute itself. Moreover, he was not badgered with religion. It was there all the time, and probably he remained conscious of the fact, but its influences were pervasive rather than aggressive. He was taught to realize that Christianity was making its contribution to the requirements of the war by the provision of the hostel. Mr. Lloyd George, who was then Minister of Munitions, visited several of the Y.M.C.A. hostels, and expressed his warm approval of the arrangements. By friendly arrangement, the Young Women's Christian Association undertook the provision of huts and equipment for the women workers, and places started by the Y.M.C.A. were later handed over to this organization in order to create a proper division of labour between the two Associations.

The linking up of the Mother Country and the Overseas Dominions to face a common foe showed the necessity for fresh efforts. The first contingent to reach England preparatory to service in France was that from Canada. Thirty thousand strong, it proceeded to Salisbury Plain for training. The Canadian Y.M.C.A. obtained permission from the Canadian Militia Department for seven secretaries to accompany the Expeditionary Force. With the idea of facilitating military discipline, they received honorary rank as captain and wore officer's uniform, but did not perform military duties, and were quite free in carrying on social, religious and recreational work amongst the Canadians. When the first division proceeded to France in 1915 it was accompanied by five secretaries. The second Canadian contingent arrived in the spring of the same year with six secretaries, five of whom crossed to France when the training of this division was completed. Another five secretaries came over with the third division and the whole of these went to the front. Fifteen Y.M.C.A. secretaries were therefore in association with the Canadian Divisions in France, and later a score of secretaries arrived from Canada to meet the requirements of Dominion soldiers in English camps, whilst retaining fifty Y.M.C.A. centres in Canada for the troops still under training.

Opinions varied concerning the honorary rank of the Canadian Y.M.C.A. secretary and whether he could perform his duty with greater success than the British Y.M.C.A. worker who remained a civilian. The rank possessed some compensations mixed with disadvantages. But,

officer or civilian, British or Canadian, the Y.M.C.A. methods remained much the same.

Reference should here be made to the connexion between the Canadians and the Y.M.C.A. at home. When the first Canadian Division reached Salisbury Plain the parent branch prepared for their entertainment some of the earliest huts used in this country. Their letters for home were written in these buildings. At night they gathered round the piano and sang "The Maple Leaf." Far away from shops, they besieged the counter for necessaries, including cough mixtures and oil stoves. By this time the Plain was soaked with the late autumn rains, and they required much ingenuity to keep the bell tents dry and no little persistence and patience to exorcise the colds and coughs that infected almost the whole division. The Y.M.C.A. hut was the one warm, light and cheery place in the whole camp, and the Canadian appreciated the contrast. Lord Roberts wrote to the Y.M.C.A. on the day he left England for France—four days before he passed away—as follows: "Lord Roberts hears nothing but praise for what the Y.M.C.A. is doing at the various camps. The latest tribute he has received is from the Canadian contingent, who, when he inspected the men on Salisbury Plain, said that they did not know what they would have done without the facilities afforded them by the accommodation provided by the Y.M.C.A." On behalf of the 13th Battalion Royal Highlanders of Canada the captain and adjutant wrote as follows: "Allow me to express our appreciation of the hospitality shown by the Y.M.C.A. to us as individuals and as a regiment. Many members of the regiment

have benefitted by hours spent in your tents, and the accommodation granted us by you has made our weekly church parade possible."

By September 1, 1914, 70 to 80 transports were on their way from Australia and at frequent intervals during the progress of the war continued to arrive. In January, 1915, these troops took part in the defence of Egypt and in April proceeded to Gallipoli, where with the New Zealanders they performed brilliant and daring feats which brought them deathless renown. Their own Y.M.C.A. secretaries were permitted to accompany the troopships, and later were asked to go forward to Gallipoli, where they experienced similar adventures and dangers to those of the men. Australia and New Zealand always encouraged the Y.M.C.A. movement. The large buildings erected in the principal cities and the confidence shown in this enterprise by the governing and commercial classes evidenced that the Y.M.C.A. before the war represented something that was more important and essential to the Commonwealth than the Y.M.C.A. at home appeared to the British people. Even at the period of the Boer War the Australian Y.M.C.A. secretaries accompanied the troops to South Africa, and during peace times met the needs of the Volunteers in their annual encampments much in the same manner as in Great Britain.

The stay of the Anzacs in Egypt, however, revealed the weakness of the Y.M.C.A. territorial divisions during a great emergency. The Australian and New Zealand secretaries, in the absence of mutual arrangements, kept naturally to their own patch until the situation was reviewed in the light of new circumstances.



THE Y.M.C.A. HUT AT ALDWYCH.

From that period Australia and New Zealand, the American Y.M.C.A. at Cairo, and the British Y.M.C.A. joined hands and promoted a National Y.M.C.A. Council for Egypt. This fact indicated the trend of events and proved one of the strongest arguments for the interdependence and cooperation of the whole Empire Y.M.C.A. movement. When in the beginning of 1916 the Anzaes were fighting on the Western Front they enjoyed the hospitality of the British Y.M.C.A., who by that time were pushing their huts and marquees nearer to the firing line. Later on thousands came over for training in the home camps, and at places like Salisbury Plain found large centres organized for their comfort and recreation as well as for moral and religious assistance. During this stage no fewer than 4,000 Anzaes poured into the Metropolis for week-end furloughs. To a great extent it was an aimless throng with little idea of the whereabouts of notable or historic sights and buildings and yet desirous of seeing something. By combination of the home and overseas Y.M.C.A. staffs, a system of personally conducted tours was arranged, which avoided dangers to the health of the men and worked to their pleasure and advantage.

In staff and policy the Indian Y.M.C.A. National Council always maintained a high level. This was due partly to cosmopolitan environment and in some measure to the conditions under which it commenced operations. It sought, for instance, to influence the highly-educated young Hindus and Mahomedans to an appreciation of Christianity as well as to make provision for the Englishman in the Civil Service or engaged in banking and commercial houses. Many of the Indian Y.M.C.A. secretaries were University men who had studied Indian thought and literature. They engaged in notable social experiments, and whilst remaining true to their primary religious aim endeavoured to introduce improved methods of agriculture, seed-growing, and the better breeding of cattle amongst the agricultural classes. They also sought the advancement of cottage industries and the development of the cooperative credit movement. In these objects considerable success followed their

efforts, so that on the outbreak of hostilities the Indian Y.M.C.A. enjoyed a position of confidence and appreciation on the part of the authorities.

For the purposes of the war the Indian National Council set free some of its trained secretaries, including Mr. Oliver McCowen, LL.B., who, as already mentioned, took charge of the Y.M.C.A. operations in France and Mr. Wilson who went to Salonika. Others served in France, Mesopotamia, and British East Africa. A section of the men devoted themselves to the social necessities of the Indian troops who arrived in France, having accompanied them from India. This arrangement was made on the distinct understanding with the authorities—and duly and strictly observed—that proselytizing should not be attempted. These Indian Y.M.C.A. secretaries rendered a variety of personal services, such, for instance, as visiting wounded men in hospital, writing letters to their homes, the erection of huts or marquees for games, the arrangement of tea parties—an innocent form of pleasure much enjoyed by the Indian soldier—and similar acts of sympathy and hospitality.

The depletion of staff in India which followed, received compensation by the services of Rev. Dr. Moulton of Manchester, Dr. T. R. Glover of Cambridge, and several clergymen, ministers and young Divinity students from England and Scotland. Some of these men delivered lectures on religious and other subjects, with reference to the war and its lessons, for the benefit of the highly educated Hindus and Mahomedans. Others devoted themselves to the ordinary Y.M.C.A. organization. Not the least valuable part of the war contribution made by the Indian National Council was its endeavour to afford the thousands of Territorials, sent to India on the outbreak of war, an opportunity of visiting some of its historic sights and of appreciating the material and social advantages of British rule in the Great Dependency. For the most part these Territorials were untravelled, and their stay in India, through the assistance of the Y.M.C.A., became educational and formative in its character and influence.



CHAPTER CXLIII.

THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE OF 1916 : SECOND PHASE.

SURVEY OF THE SECOND PHASE OF GENERAL BRUSILOFF'S OFFENSIVE—GENERAL LESH'S ADVANCE ON THE LOWER STYR—THE BATTLE ON THE STOKHOD—GENERAL SAKHAROFF'S ADVANCE SOUTH-WEST OF LUTSK—THE BATTLE OF MIKHAILOVKA—THE BATTLE ON THE LIPA—THE BATTLE FOR BRODY—THE ADVANCE AGAINST THE LVOFF—TARNOPOL RAILWAY—GENERAL LECHITSKY'S CAMPAIGN—ITS OBJECTIVES—THE CAPTURE OF KOLOMEA AND THE CUTTING OF THE STANISLAVOFF-MARMAROS SZIGET RAILWAY—THE FALL OF STANISLAVOFF AND THE CAPTURE OF A DNIESTER CROSSING—COUNT BOTHMER'S RETREAT AND GENERAL SHCHERBACHEFF'S ADVANCE IN THE CENTRE—CHANGES IN THE HIGHER COMMANDS OF THE AUSTRO-GERMAN ARMIES SOUTH OF THE MARSHES

ON June 4 the Russian armies had broken through the enemy lines in Volhynia and on the Bukovinian frontier. What the first phase of the great Russian offensive in the summer of 1916 accomplished was to develop these successes within the districts in which they had been achieved. Lutsk and Dubno were recovered; the battle-line was advanced within some 40 miles of Kovel and Vladimir-Volynsk, and within less than 10 miles of Brody. Almost all the ground gained in Volhynia between June 4-15 was maintained against a most violent Austro-German counter-offensive carried on throughout the second half of the month. South of the Dniester our Allies conquered in not quite three weeks practically the whole of the Bukovina, and extended their lines into south-eastern Galicia, beyond Sniatyn and Kutyn. These territorial gains were accompanied by crushing military defeats of the enemy: two Austro-Hungarian armies, that of Archduke Joseph-Ferdinand in Volhynia, and that of General von Pflanzer-Baltin in the Bukovina, lost more than half their effectives, and also the other three Austro-German armies operating south of the Pripet Marshes (the Third Austro-Hungarian Army, Vol. IX.—Part 110.

under General Puhallo von Brlog on the Lower Styr; the Second Austro-Hungarian Army, under General von Boehm-Ermolli, on the Brody-Tarnopol, and the Army of General Count Bothmer, on the Tarnopol-Butchatch front) suffered very severe losses. The Petrograd official *communiqué* of June 27 stated that the prisoners and trophies captured by the armies of General Brusiloff between June 4-23 amounted to 4,031 officers, 194,041 men, 219 guns, besides 644 machine-guns, 196 bomb mortars, 146 artillery ammunition wagons and 38 searchlights.

The enormous importance of the Russian victories of June, 1916, as a step in the attrition of the enemy forces was patent; the losses suffered by the enemy on the Eastern front during those three weeks were about equal to those he had suffered at Verdun in 130 days of fighting. Still, all that the Russians had accomplished so far in the field left more to be done. The Austro-German front south of the Marshes had been pierced, but it was not as yet broken up to the extent of necessitating a general retreat. In the course of the War both sides had had to learn that where the greatest nations of the world are fighting, it takes much to render a victory final and a



NEAR THE DANGER ZONE.

Russian Officers and peasants watching a battle.

decision irreversible. Each side had passed through defeats and recoveries. Was a new recovery on the Eastern front still possible for the Central Powers? This was the question which had to be answered by the second and third phase of the fighting between the Pripet Marshes and the Carpathian Mountains. Generalship and available reserves were the factors in its solution. In the first phase of the offensive our Allies had gained two salients—in Volhynia and in the Bukovina. But as much as “nature abhors a vacuum” the strategy of railway and trench warfare abhors salients. Was the approximately straight line to be regained by the flattening out of the Russian salients or by a completion of the Russian advance? The battles on the Lower Styr, on the Loshnioff-Zalostse and the Tlumatch lines, the fall of Brody and Stanislavoff, and finally the retreat of Count Bothmer’s Army in the centre supplied the answer to that question. They constitute the second phase of the great Russian offensive of 1916.

Towards the end of June, four divisions could be distinguished south of the Marshes:

(1) In the extreme north, on the Lower Styr, between the Pripet Marshes and the

district of Kolki, the enemy front had remained practically intact.

(2) Between Kolki and Novo-Alexiniets (on the Galician border), on a stretch of about 80 miles, the enemy front had been knocked in, the line now forming an enormous salient toward the west, in some sectors as much as 45 miles deep.

(3) Between Novo-Alexiniets and Visniovtchyk, on a front of about 40 miles, the enemy lines were again practically intact, and even in the sector between Visniovtchyk and the Dniester, the regression of the Austro-German forces was as yet slight.

(4) South of the Dniester the defences of the enemy had been completely broken up and our Allies were advancing in full force to the west, against Kolomea and the Carpathian passes.

The centre in the Sereth-Strypa sector formed the pivot of the Germanic defences south of the Marshes. It was based on a strong river line, on which like beads on a string one might see numerous villages and manors, each of them transformed into a small fortress. On a stretch of about 50 miles it was connected with the west by no less than four railway lines. Its right flank was covered by the Dniester, and

although our Allies had crossed the Lower Strypa round Butchatch and were approaching the line of the Koropiets, Bothmer's position in the centre was not really outflanked as long as he maintained his hold on the Dniester crossings. Below Nizhniouff the difficult nature of the Dniester belt prevented the Russian Army on the southern bank of the river from making its pressure seriously felt in the right flank of Count Bothmer's Army. The left flank of the Austro-German centre on the line Brody-Zalostse was protected by an exceedingly strong front of hills, marshy rivers, ponds and thick forests. Finally the existence of a series of excellent lines of defence in the rear of the Strypa front, along the many parallel northern confluent of the Dniester, allowed Bothmer to hang on to his original positions to the last moment; he knew that he could always effect his retreat by short and quick movements without any danger of being cut off. His position would then resemble that of the Russians in the late summer of 1915 when they slowly retreated through Eastern Galicia, fighting stubborn rearguard actions, after they had already been outflanked in all appearance both south of the Dniester and in Volhynia.

But as long as the centre held out, all hope of

a recovery on the Eastern front was not lost for the Central Powers. Their first effort to re-establish their line was by a counter-offensive against the northern flank of the Volhynian salient, in the region between the Stokhod and the Styr. An attempt was made by the Germans to cut in at its base in the sector where they were still holding the line of the Styr or its neighbourhood. A successful thrust across the river in that region would have forced a general Russian retreat in Volhynia. The German counter-offensive, which was developed and defeated in the second half of June, was followed up by the Russians by an attack against the German positions on the Lower Styr. In the course of June the Army of General Lesh had been brought south, across the Marshes, thus enabling General Kaledin to concentrate his forces in the Lutsk salient. On July 4 General Lesh opened a brilliant advance on both sides of the Kovel-Sarny railway. The line of the Stokhod, in that sector some 30 miles to the west of the Styr, was reached in the course of a few days. The northern flank of General Kaledin's Army was now completely covered. The longitude of Lutsk was passed by the Russian troops and the Volhynian triangle of fortresses ceased to form



AFTER THE RUSSIAN BOMBARDMENT.

View of the Austrian entanglements showing the effects of artillery fire.



THE 7TH REGIMENT OF CHASSEURS.

a salient. North of it "the problem of the straight line" was thus settled in favour of our Allies. The enemy was definitely thrown back on to the defensive, and the battle for Kovel now developed on the entire Stokhod line, from Kisielin to Stobychva.

The next attempt at a counter-offensive was planned by the enemy against the southern flank of the Volhynian salient. Big forces were collected north of the Galician frontier, between the Upper Styr and the Bug. The attack was timed for July 18. It was forestalled by General Sakharoff, who on July 16 opened a new offensive against the Austro-German lines. In a week's fighting he dashed all chances and hopes of the enemy of being able to regain the initiative in that region. Then, after a few days' lull in the fighting, General Sakharoff opened in full force his own offensive. On July 28 his troops entered Brody. The Lutsk salient was thus being extended to the south, its left wing was moving forward. Then, in the first days of August, followed an offensive against the right flank of the German centre. The Russian troops were approaching the first-class railway leading from Lvoff by Tarnopol to Odessa, the most important line of communication of Count Bothmer's Army. By August 9 the Russians stood within striking distance of that railway. The problem of the Lutsk salient was solved also on its southern flank. A straight line was being gradually established at the expense of the enemy.

In the southern theatre of war, between the Dniester and the Carpathian Mountains, General Lechitsky continued after the fall of Czernovitz his rapid advance to the west. On June 29 his troops entered Kolomea, on July 4 they cut the Stanislavoff-Vorokhta-Marmaros Sziget railway in the district of Mikulitchin. Then after a month's lull in the fighting, in the beginning of August, General Lechitsky's Army entered Stanislavoff and captured the Dniester crossing at Nizhnioff.

Count Bothmer's Army in the centre was thereby effectively outflanked from the south. Its communication with the west by the so-called Transversal Railway (the line which runs through Galicia east and west at the foot of the Carpathians and is the base of the lines across those mountains) was cut, whilst General Sakharoff had got within reach of the Lvoff-Odessa railway. The retreat of the "German Army of the South" could not be delayed any

longer. Two days after General Lechitsky's troops had entered Stanislavoff, those of General Sheherbacheff's Army were in possession of the whole length of the Sereth-Strypa front which the Austro-German armies had held for the last 11 months and which they had defended with the most desperate stubbornness during the preceding 10 weeks of the Russian offensive.

With the retreat of the enemy on to the Zlota Lipa the last sector of the original front south of the Marshes passed into the hands of our Allies. A new approximately straight line was established. North of the Dniester it extended about 20-45 miles east of the original positions; south of the river the Russian progress reached an average of over 60 miles. As in the Russian retreat of 1915, so also in their advance of 1916, the movements were slowest in the centre in Podolia, more rapid in Volhynia, quickest of all in the corridor between the Dniester and the Carpathians. Of the three vital centres behind the original Austro-German front—Kovel, Lvoff and Stanislavoff—only the last was captured by our Allies. Still, that capture was of capital importance. For during the lull which intervened between the second and the third phase of the offensive, a new Ally joined Russia in the attack against Transylvania. On August 27 Rumania declared war on Austria-Hungary with a view to liberating her kinsmen from a foreign yoke.

Whilst north of the Marshes the great battle was raging round Baranovitcho, and on the northern flank of the Lutsk salient the Germans were exhausting their forces in fruitless attacks against the Gruziatyn-Rozhyshehe front, in his own unmistakable style General Brusiloff carried out another offensive stroke. This time the blow was delivered on the Lower Styr, in the southern Poliesie, between the Pripot Marshes and the Volhynian theatre of war. Carefully prepared beforehand, and executed with the suddenness and vigour characteristic of General Brusiloff's strategy, the advance from the Styr to the Stokhod, on a front of 35 to 40 miles, and to a depth of about 25 miles, was achieved in four days, across ground which before the war would have been considered altogether impracticable for big military operations. In the gigantic drama which unfolded itself on the Eastern front in the summer of 1916, these operations tended to sink to the level of a minor episode; before the



THE KOVEL FRONT.

attention of the public had had time to concentrate on the activities of General Lesh's army, its advance had been completed. And yet this battle in the southern fringes of the Pripet Marshes marks one of the strides of the Russian giant-nation on its path to victory.

Only the barest outlines of General Lesh's offensive can be gathered from the Russian official *communiqués*. The Petrograd report of July 4 gave the first intimation of a new battle developing on the Lower Styr. It recorded Russian gains on both sides of the Kovel-Sarny railway, in the districts of Vulka Galuzyiskaya and of Kolki, the one about twelve miles to the north-west, and the other about the same distance to the south-west of Tchartoryisk. The advanced angle which the enemy positions formed in this district was thus subjected to a concentric attack. The next day further progress was reported in both directions. "In the region of Vulka Galuzyiskaya," says the Russian *communiqué* of July 5, "we broke through three lines of barbed wire entanglements

fitted with land mines. In a very desperate fight on the Styr, west of Kolki, we overthrew the enemy and took over a thousand prisoners, including 170 officers, together with 3 guns, 17 machine guns, 2 searchlights, and several thousand rifles. The bridging detachment lent the troops most useful aid, keeping pace with the fighting units and working close to the firing line."

The report of July 6 enumerated further captures of men and material effected in the fighting, which by then had reached the region of KostiuKhnovka in the north, and had extended beyond Raznitse on the southern side of the Tchartoryisk salient.

Whilst from the direction of Kolki the advance was carried on due north, the Russian troops which had crossed the Styr below Rafalovka were changing their direction from west to south-west. The Petrograd *communiqué* of July 7 reported the capture of the villages of Grady and Komaroff south of the Kovel-Sarny railway, and the forcing of organized enemy positions on the Galuzya-Optova-

Voltesk line north of that railway; finally an advance of Russian cavalry resulting in the occupation of the railway-station of Manievitche. These operations, carried out on concentric lines with extraordinary speed and precision, led to the capture of thousands of prisoners and of numerous guns (*e.g.*, near Voltesk the Russian cavalry took an entire Krupp battery of six guns which had fired only a few shots). By July 7 the two concentric movements resulted in a junction of the forces. The Russian *communiqué* issued early on July 8 marks the re-establishment of a straight front facing west; the line mentioned in the report runs from Gorodok and Manievitche in the north, through Okonsk and Zagarovka to Kolki. Simultaneously with the news of this advance towards and beyond the Kovel-Sarny railway, the first mention was made of another offensive developing almost in the thick of the Marshes. As a matter of fact, this was not a new movement; on the same day on which the first enemy positions had been forced near Volka Galuzyiskaya and near Kolki, our Allies had begun to advance also on the Yeziertsky-Novo Terevishche line. These operations now resulted in the capture of Griva and Leshnevka. The important road which crosses the River Stokhod at Novo Terevishche

and leads by Manievitche to Kolki, was now, west of the Stokhod, in the hands of our Allies. "General Brusiloff's troops," says the Petrograd *communiqué* issued on the night of July 8, "are approaching the Stokhod, routing the enemy everywhere, in spite of his desperate resistance." In the next few days they not merely reached but even crossed the river. The three days' battle between the Styr and Stokhod was terminated, the subsequent operations of General Lesh's Army merging with those of General Kaledin's right wing and centre into the battle for Kovel.

The Russian *communiqué*, published on the night of July 8, summarizes in terms of captures the results of General Lesh's advance: "According to an approximate estimate in the course of fighting between the Styr and the Stokhod from July 4 to 7 we took prisoners at least 300 officers, including two regimental commanders, and about 12,000 unwounded men, and we also captured not fewer than 45 guns, heavy and light, about 45 machine-guns, and a large quantity of shells, cartridges, arms, supplies and forage." Nor could the enemy any longer hide the fact of his defeat. "The angle projecting towards Tchartoryisk, owing to superior pressure on its flank near Kostiuhnovka and west of Kolki was given up and a



WITH GENERAL BRUSILOFF'S TROOPS.
A halt to examine wounds.



A CORNER OF THE BATTLEFIELD

Wounded Russians and Austrians waiting for the ambulances. Smaller picture: Lady Muriel Paget working at a field hospital on the Russian front.

part of the line which the Germans had left mainly in the care of their Austrian allies was gone! Their elaborately embroidered version of the three disastrous days in the southern Polésie ran as follows: "The troops fighting in the Styr salient, north of Kolki, which through four weeks have been holding their own against enemy fighting forces which increased to a superiority of from three to five-fold, received instructions yesterday to withdraw their first lines, which were exposed to being surrounded on two sides. Favoured by the arrival of German troops to the west of Kolki and by the self-sacrificing attitude of the Polish Legion near Kolodye, the movement was carried out without any disturbance on the part of the enemy."

The Russian official reports, in their extreme, matter-of-fact brevity, yielded but the dry bones of the events and even so supplied only parts of the skeleton; published whilst the struggle was still in progress, they had to be most particular in the choice of information to be given out to the world. Knowledge recalling these events to a new life has to be gathered from other sources.

shorter defensive line was chosen," ran the Berlin report of July 7—brief, harsh and unpleasant. Vienna on the other hand showed terrified courtesy for its allies, more pity for itself, and even less regard to truth. Another

In the course of June, whilst General Kaledin was first advancing, and then defending his gains in Volhynia, the army of General Lesh, which had previously stood north of Pinsk, was transferred across the Marshes, taking over from the Eighth Russian Army the sector on the Lower Styr. It was faced by the Third Austro-Hungarian Army of General Puhallo, which included, among others, the army corps of General von Fath and the Polish Legions under General Puchalski round Kolodye, opposite Rafalovka. In the early days of the Russian offensive only feint attacks had been made by our allies on the Lower Styr, below Kolki. Spring was very late in 1916, and in the first days of June the ground and roads were not as yet sufficiently dry to admit of any important operations in that classical land of birch and pine forests, bogs and marshes. In the few encounters which occurred in it in June the percentage of "missing" was unusually high on both sides; most of these were the men, very often wounded men, who found their death in the treacherous swamps.

The enemy reserves in the East were never abundant from the time when, in disregard of the requirements of the Russian front, the

Germans had begun to squander their divisions at Verdun, and the Austrians had concentrated all their available forces on the Italian front. Whatever reinforcements had been brought up after the disastrous defeats in Volhynia and in the Bukovina were used to fill the gaps caused by the mass surrenders or were formed at chosen points into phalanxes for counter-offensive movements.



WOUNDED RUSSIANS AND AUSTRIANS.

Russian Cossacks outside a dressing-station waiting for attention. Smaller picture: Austrian prisoners carrying a wounded comrade.



RUSSIAN STAFF OFFICERS.
Watching the fighting near Dvinsk.



AFTER THE BATTLE.
Bringing in the Russian Wounded.

In the first days of July the attention of the German commanders was concentrated on Baranovitche and the Middle Styr. The district on the Lower Styr below Kolki was to some extent neglected. Its reserves consisted of a single Bavarian division; and even the disposition of whatever forces there were, seems to have been made on a wrong assumption. Russian attacks were expected on the higher ground round Tchartoryisk, in the vicinity of the Kovel-Sarny railway. Once more the military intelligence of our Allies and their skill in masking their own movements and hiding their intentions from their opponents proved superior to those of the enemy, much of the superiority attained in reconnoitring in the Poliesie being due to the self-sacrificing devotion of the Little Russian peasantry inhabiting these regions.

Between Komaroff and Vulka Galuzyiskaya extends a wide, low, sandy plain, so flat as to hamper observation. Whenever observations could not be made by means of balloons the direction of the artillery fire proved very difficult. Across the plain the opposing fronts formed continuous lines, although their organization could hardly be described as equal to the average obtaining under normal topographical conditions. In many parts the wet, sandy soil did not admit of deep earthworks and dug-outs.

North of the plain traversed by the Kovel-Sarny railway, between Galuzya and Nobel, the positions no longer formed a continuous front, most of the ground being completely impassable during by far the greater part of the year. "Here in the Poliesie," wrote M. Sumskey in the *Russkoye Slovo* of July 17-30, "there is no continuous front, but merely a series of forts, scattered almost as on a chess-board. And each such fort by itself represents an entire history of technical craft, containing a number of ingenious devices calculated to render them strong with the smallest possible use of human force." Each isolated fort was dressed in "shirts of iron and steel," surrounded by barriers, obstacles and pitfalls such as no imagination had ever invented in ancient legends of enchanted, unapproachable castles. The forts were naturally placed on higher ground, the only spots capable of bearing human habitations. The tracks leading to them across the marshes were limited in number. The approaches were protected by strong barriers lavishly covered with barbed wire. In some places even a peculiar kind

of net was used, incandescient when cut, and thus at night signalling movements of the enemy. As far as weapons were concerned, here, as everywhere in the Austro-German lines, machine-guns, cleverly placed and carefully hidden, played the most important part.

Inside the settlements everything had been re-arranged by the Germans, who garrisoned most of the ground in the thick of the Marshes, so that the Russians should not be able to direct their artillery fire by their previous knowledge of the country. But it was not merely for their safety that the Germans took careful thought. Nice little gardens,



MAJOR-GENERAL PUCHALSKI.

pleasure-grounds, and even tennis-courts were laid out in those settlements; whatever fields there were around, were tilled. The scattered forts were connected with one another by a well-developed net of telegraph and telephone lines, and the whole system had light field-railways for its backbone. Most of the native population had left with the Russians; yet a certain number had remained behind, many of them without the knowledge of the German invaders. They were roaming about the forests, across paths and by means known only to themselves. They were slipping through the meshes of the network of enemy forts and carrying informa-



AUSTRIAN PRISONERS
 Captured on the Galician front

tion to the army which was to reconquer for them their homes and liberate their country from the invader. In some places they formed themselves into bands, conducting guerilla warfare. The services rendered by these men to the Russian intelligence service were simply invaluable. Raids in this district had been proceeding throughout the winter, and some were carried out even in May and June, 1916. Yet the actual Russian advance through the region of forts could only be effected as an operation subsidiary to the main movement across the Manievitche-Tchartoryisk plain, of which the milestones are named in the official Petrograd reports

Hot, dry weather had prevailed throughout June. The shallow ditches, rivulets and swamps in the plain were slowly disappearing, filling the air with the awful stench of drying slime. Everywhere one could see those hotbeds of innumerable swarms of midges, flies and mosquitoes which were feeding on the rapidly-decaying corpses and carcasses, and harrying those who dared to live in this usually forlorn region. In the close heat of a July night in the low-lying marshes, our Allies opened their bombardment of the sectors singled out for attack. Striking the

sandy soil, the shells raised up a wall of dust; the sun rose that morning over the battlefield not in the white mist usually spreading above the waters, but in a ruddy cloud composed of dark smoke and yellow, burning sand. It was a live cloud, shaken by the violent explosions of shrapnel and illuminated by fiery lightnings. If ever hell was revealed on earth it was on the battlefields of the Southern Poliesie. Parapets were razed, villages stood in flames, forests were breaking under the weight of the bombardment; the defence was being disorganized: in the shallow trenches lateral movements were becoming increasingly difficult, the telephone wires were being torn, different sectors were getting isolated. The living were buried in their trenches and on the old battlefields the dead were raised from their graves. In the forests the trees themselves seemed as if paralysed in the agonizing expectation of death. Not a sound, not a movement, but the fearful screeching and howling of shells and shrapnel, and the sound of bullets hitting the mighty pine trunks. The crowns and branches of the trees were breaking, and a rich shower of their green needles was filling the air and covering the ground. Below the dying giants human beings were moving like

shadows, inaudible in that cataclysm of destruction.

And then, in the midst of that orgy of horrors, the Russian attack began, both near Kolki and on the Rafalovka front. Across the plain affording but scanty cover, and into the forests carefully fortified by the enemy, the Russian infantry was advancing with the usual heroic equanimity of the Slav peasant. What were they thinking, those quiet, kindly ploughmen on that day which saw so many of them die? Individually, of things which matter only to the individual; as a mass, they, with their unequalled instinct of the living community and crowd, were dreaming, in the midst of visions of horror, the great mystic, shining dream of their nation.

"We stormed a fortified position" or "we broke through three lines of barbed-wire entanglements fitted with land mines" were the short, business-like announcements from Russian Headquarters. How much was there in those events which no reports can ever express! Before the frontal impact of the Russian attack the Austrian defences broke down, their forces fell back wherever a retreat was still possible. The only troops

that held out in their sectors for two days, until outflanked, were the Bavarians near Kolki and the Polish Legions near Kolodye. Their help, it will be remembered, was gracefully acknowledged in the Vienna *communiqué* of July 7, and honours were conferred on the surviving remnants of what once had been regiments. "The losses are serious," said a semi-official Polish report, "though one cannot speak of a general catastrophe." As a matter of fact, some of the Polish regiments were practically wiped out; thus—*e.g.*, the 5th lost almost all its officers, no less than 12 remaining dead on the battlefield of Kolodye.

In the night of July 6-7, the last enemy rear guards were withdrawing to the west, firing in their retreat villages, causeways and forests. A curtain of flames was to cover the defeated army from its pursuers. Under the pale stars of the short summer night, across the plain covered with delicate purple poppies, past the treacherous marshes, they were trekking towards the distant blue range of hills, where the remnants of the Austrian forces had already found a temporary shelter and comparative safety. In spite of the curtain of flames and the destruction of causeways, the



ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT.

Austrian prisoners at work relaying a narrow gauge railway.



FIGHTING BEYOND THE STOKHOD.

A party of Infantry advancing in the open.

intrepid Cossacks elung to the defeated enemy, harassing his worn-out columns.

Towards the end of June, in the days of the most violent German attacks between the Stokhod and the Styr on both sides of the Rovno-Kovel railway, our Allies had had to withdraw their line in several sectors by some four to six miles. That the withdrawal was quite insignificant was admitted even by the German official summary of the Russian offensive published on September 8, 1916: it tried to explain away "the comparatively small progress made by the counter-offensive." But even that they were unable to maintain. Simultaneously with the advance of General Lesh's army the troops of General Kaledin resumed the initiative, and between July 4-8 regained most of their previous positions on the Rozhyshche-Gruziatyn front, and enlarged their holdings between Gruziatyn and Kolki, capturing 341 officers, 9,135 unwounded soldiers, and rich booty.

On July 8 the two Russian Armies under Generals Lesh and Kaledin had reached the River Stokhod practically on the entire front between the Kovel-Sarny and Kovel-Rovno railways. At two points, near Arsenovitehe and near Ugly (in the bend of the river between Kashovka and Yanovka) they even forced the passage. At Ugly, Colonel Kantseroff, commanding the 283rd Pavlograd Regiment, a Knight of the Order of St. George, at the head of his troops, crossed the river over a burning bridge. When the fire had been extinguished three German mines were found under the bridge; by some miraele they had failed to explode. In the course of the next day our Allies extended their positions on the western

bank of the Stokhod, capturing practically the entire district within the Kashovka-Yanovka curve, and also carried the bridges near Bogushovka on the road and railway leading from Rovno to Kovel. The latter gains seem, however, to have been abandoned in the fighting of the next few days.

The forcing of the Stokhod line was certainly to prove neither an easy nor a short affair. The fighting on that front extending round Kovel at an average radius of slightly more than 20 miles was the first stage of the battle for that important strategic centre and railway junction. "On the issue of these battles," said an explanatory statement issued by the Russian Staff about the middle of July, "undoubtedly depends not only the fate of Kovel and its strongly fortified zone, but also to a very considerable degree all the present operations on our front. In the event of the fall of Kovel and its zone, fresh important perspectives will open out to us, for the road to Brest-Litovsk, and to some extent also the roads to Warsaw, will be laid bare." No wonder, then, that the Germans were determined to hold the line of the Stokhod to the last gasp. Kovel was to them what Verdun had been to the French.

The defence was decidedly favoured by the topographical conditions of the country. The Stokhod itself, it is true, is but a shallow stream fordable at many points. Yet its passage is impeded by the wide, marshy areas on both its banks. The country round, except near Kashovka, is completely flat, with a slight tendency to elevation on the western side. Through that low-lying plain winds the sluggish Stokhod, in the midst of banks of reeds and beds of water-lilies. Artillery, especially

that of the heavier kind, can approach its belt only in certain sectors, and the conditions in that respect were especially bad on the eastern side.


The defensive positions of the enemy on the left bank had been partly prepared by the Austrians in the autumn of 1915. Ever since the Russians had broken through in front of Lutsk, the Germans had been busy converting them into first-class defences; tens of thousands of prisoners of war and of local inhabitants, pressed for the purpose, were compelled to work under the direction of German engineers. Consecutive lines of trenches were built, land mines were laid, mazes of barbed wire were sunk among the thick water growth, under the surface of the slow-flowing river. A very considerable force of artillery was brought up for the defence of the Stokhod line; according to the best Russian authorities no less than 100 heavy guns and 180 of a lighter calibre were gathered in front of Kovel. Nor was there any lack of men—by now far less abundant with the enemy than material. Picked troops—Bavarians, Magyars, Austrian Germans and Polish Volunteers—were facing the Great Russian,

Finnish, Siberian and Turkestan divisions of our Allies. The numbers of the enemy were even sufficient to enable him to answer with vigorous and costly counter-offensives the attacks of the Russians.

The gathering of troops and material for the defence of Kovel seems to have begun directly after our Allies had resumed their offensive in Volhynia—*i.e.*, in the first days of July. "Fighting continues in the Stokhod district," said the Petrograd *communiqué* of July 11. "The enemy having brought up reinforcements and advanced powerful artillery, is offering a stubborn resistance." A battle more fierce than any that had as yet been seen in the Volhynian offensive developed now on both sides of the Kovel-Sarny and the Kovel-Rovno railways, both armies suffering heavy casualties. "Though we are already across the river at several places," wrote *The Times* special correspondent, Mr. Washburn, under date of July 13, "it must not be expected that the Russians will be able to rush in a few days positions which are unquestionably stronger than any since the enemy departed from his first line before Rovno. Up to this time the



A TYPE OF STRETCHER FOR CARRYING WOUNDED.



MAP TO ILLUSTRATE GENERAL SAKHAROFF'S ADVANCE.



BEHIND A FORTIFIED LINE.

Russian officers outside a house in an Austrian rustic village. Circle picture: An altar in the village.

enemy has certainly been out-manceuvred, out-marched, and fairly out-classed in all particulars." Now, however, the fighting resumed the character of trench warfare, resembling the battles of Baranovitche and on the Somme rather than those fought in Volhynia and the Polésie during the preceding five weeks.

A few days after the line of the Stokhod had been reached, about the middle of July, the Russian offensive began to slow down, our Allies contenting themselves with repelling German attacks. At several places even some withdrawals were made from the exposed positions on the western bank of the river. It seems more than likely that the statement of the Russian Staff concerning the vital importance of Kovel, issued at the time of the hottest battles for the river-crossings, was really meant as a blind, to cover the impending offensive of General Sakharoff. It was well known to Russian Headquarters that the enemy was gathering considerable forces on the southern flank of the Lutsk salient. It would therefore have been, to say the least, risky to engage very considerable forces (and such would have been needed for a serious



offensive against Kovel) in an advance even beyond the farthest existing salients to the west, whilst Bothmer's army still maintained its original positions in the centre, and fresh troops were being concentrated on its northern flank, on the Stoyanoff-Brody front, for a counter-offensive against Lutsk and Dubno.

It was not until the operations on the north-western border of Galicia were reaching their victorious conclusion that our Allies resumed their offensive in northern Volhynia and on the Stokhod. "To the west of Lutsk," said the Petrograd report of July 28, "our troops took the offensive and broke through the whole first line of the enemy, inflicting severe losses upon him. Our troops are now advancing, and

our cavalry is pursuing the fleeing enemy. In this district we have captured 46 guns (including 6 howitzers), 6 machine-guns, about 50 officers (including 2 generals and 2 commanders of regiments), and over 9,000 men.'

On the Stokhod itself the two armies of Generals Lësh and Kaledin opened their offensive on July 28, at 1 o'clock in the afternoon. The first day's fighting proved extremely successful, resulting in important strategic gains, and in the capture, within the first hour of the attack, of 38 guns, two being heavy and all German, and 4,000 (mostly German) prisoners. In the region of Gulevitche, not far from the spot where the Kovel-Sarny railway crosses the Stokhod, Russian troops, having



GENERAL SAKHAROFF,
Commanded the Eleventh Russian Army.

built bridges, passed to the left bank of the river, where they took up strong positions. Similarly a crossing was again forced in the district of Kashovka. The most important move, however, was made, and the greatest success was scored, in the direction of the village of Ozeriany, along the head-waters of the Stokhod, where the river is less wide. The simultaneous pressure on the entire front round Kovel made it difficult for the enemy to shift the local reserves which he had at his disposal in that district. But "on account of the extraordinary nature of the German defences," wrote, under date of July 29, the special correspondent of *The Times*, Mr. Washburn, then with Headquarters on the Stokhod front, "we must not expect the Russians to run over them in a few days. The results already attained are extraordinary, when the strength of the


German positions and the quantities of guns and ammunition are considered. Our losses are incredibly small, viewed in the light of what has been accomplished."

Even the Germans had to acknowledge the signal success of their opponents, though they did so with hardly veiled annoyance. "North-west of Lutsk," said the Berlin report of July 29, "after several unsuccessful attacks, the enemy succeeded in penetrating our lines at Trysten, and obliged us to evacuate the positions we still held in front of the Stokhod."

During the following days the successes of July 29 were systematically developed. By noon of July 30—i.e., within 48 hours from the commencement of the offensive, the number of captured guns had risen to 49, that of prisoners to 9,000. A desperate battle was proceeding at Gulevitche. Meantime, the Russian troops which had crossed the Stokhod at Kashovka extended their gains for $5\frac{1}{2}$ miles beyond the river, whilst on the left bank the movement was slowly swinging forward with the village of Perekhody for its approximate axis. On July 31 further captures of ground and men were made in the bends of the Stokhod. At one point the whole 31st Honved Regiment was taken prisoners by our Allies, together with their regimental commander and his entire staff. As a further illustration of the enemy's losses may serve the fact that in the battles fought during the last days of July the 41st Honved Division was cut to 4,000, and the 4th Austrian Division to 3,000 men. No less heavy were the losses of the Germans and of the Polish Legions. And again the Berlin report of July 30 growled out its unwilling, distorted admissions:

"*Army Group of Von Linsingen.*—Enemy attacks in increased strength are reported. With the exception of some sectors, these attacks are now being made on the whole front from Stobychva to the west of Berestechko. They all collapsed with gigantic losses. . . . During the night the withdrawal, which had been planned for a long time from the Stokhod curve, which projects towards the east and north of the Kovel-Rovno railway, to a shorter line was carried through without interference by the enemy."

In the first days of August further fighting took place on the entire front—round Stobychva, Smoliary, Gulevitche, Sitovitche and Syeltse, down to Kisielin, culminating on August 3-4 in the battle for Rudka Mirynska,



Advance of Russian Infantry
and convoy.



Russian engineers repairing bridges destroyed by the Austrians. Centre picture: Russian Cavalry crossing a hastily built bridge.

ADVANCE OF GENERAL SAKHAROFF'S TROOPS.

a village on the east bank of the Stokhod (a left-hand tributary of the Stokhod). Having reached, on August 2, the front Sitovitché-Yanovka within the big bend of the Stokhod, our Allies proceeded to attack the next defensive line of the enemy. On August 3, before dawn, the Russian artillery opened a heavy bombardment of these positions. About 1 p.m. Turkestan regiments broke through the Austrian defences north of Rudka Mirynska, occupied the hamlets of Popovka and Yastremiets, and reached the Miryn-Poviersk road. Then Rudka Mirynska itself was attacked. The battle developed into bayonet fighting in the streets of the village, which changed hands several times. About 4.30 p.m., the enemy opened a counter-attack along the entire line. Bavarians, the Third Brigade of the Polish Legions under Count Sheptyski, and Germans from Lower Austria and Southern Moravia belonging to the army corps of General von Fath, opened an encircling movement against the Turkestan troops holding the village and district of Rudka Mirynska. A series of enemy attacks were repulsed. Finally, however, about 3 a.m., our Allies evacuated the salient, which the village was now forming, and fell back 400-600 yards to the east.

The battle of Rudka Mirynska closes the second stage of the fighting on the Stokhod. The result of the week's operations consisted in the river line having been forced on almost the

entire front. The enemy troops holding the district had thus lost one of their main natural defensive lines, and a good start had been gained by our Allies for an attack against Kovel, should the developments in other parts of the line make such a movement desirable.

On a level with the greatest feats of the armies of Generals Kaledin, Lechitsky and Lesh stands the offensive undertaken in the second half of July from the southern flank of the Lutsk salient by General Sakharoff, commanding the Eleventh Russian Army, and well known from the time of the Russo-Japanese War as Chief of General Kuropatkin's Staff. The enemy, in view of the utter failure of his offensive against Lutsk, on the Kovel-Rozhyshe line, had decided in July to make another desperate attempt at driving in the Russian salient in Volhynia by means of an attack from the south. A highly developed net of roads and railways radiating from Lvoff in the direction of the Volhynian frontier supported the movements of his forces; besides the double-track Lvoff-Krasne-Brody line, he had at his disposal the Lvoff-Stoyanoff and the Lvoff-Sokal-Vladimir Volynsk railways. In view of their superiority in communications the Austro-German commanders hoped to be able to effect a sudden concentration of men and material, and then, by a sharp flank attack against Lutsk and Dubno, to undo the results of the preceding



RUSSIAN ARTILLERY ON THE WAY TO THE FRONT.



GENERAL SAKHAROFF'S ARMY.

A Russian General conducts an attack by field telephone. Smaller picture: The Russian Commander consults General Turbin.

six weeks of Russian operations in Volhynia. The phalanx of Linsingen and Boehm-Ermolli was to include on this front 20 divisions, and July 18 was the date chosen for the opening of this Austro-German counter-offensive.

Our Allies could hardly have assembled an equal force in such short time. The movement had therefore to be forestalled and frustrated by an attack whilst the enemy concentration was still incomplete. On July 15, south-west of Lutsk and Dubno, the Austro-German commanders had gathered as yet only some seven infantry and four cavalry divisions. Among the infantry divisions were the 7th, 48th and 61st Austro-Hungarian and the 22nd, 43rd and 108th German divisions—the 48th and 61st Austro-Hungarian divisions having been brought up from the Trentino, the 22nd German division from the Dvinsk front, and the 43rd from Verdun. Their front extended from about Shklin, past Ugrinoff, Zlotchevka and Mikhailovka (sometimes called Boremel) to Novoselki on the western bank of the Styr; on the right bank of the river it stretched across the region of Verben to the Pliaskevka and then in a southerly direction, across fairly high wooded



hills, to Radziviloff on the Lvoff-Brody-Rovno railway.

Four stages can be distinguished in the offensive of General Sakharoff which opened during the night of July 15-16 and lasted for about a month. The object of the first attack (July 15-17) was to frustrate the offensive plan of the enemy by deranging and destroying his preparations. The aim was brilliantly achieved, and the Austro-German forces had to fall back



ENEMY TRENCHES IN VOLHYNIA.

on the line of the Lipa (a left-hand tributary of the Styr). Then, between July 20-22, followed the second battle which resulted in the forcing of the Lipa and the capture of Berestechko. The Lutsk salient, of which the enemy had planned to drive in the left flank by means of a thrust from the south, was rapidly extending up the western bank of the Styr. The battle for Brody which opened on July 25 and closed with the fall of that town on July 28 formed the third stage of the offensive. The fourth and last step in General Sakharoff's advance came as the result of an attack against the Brody-Zalostse-Vorobiyovka front. The victories gained on that line brought his forces into the direct neighbourhood of the Lvoff-Krasne-Tarnopol railway, and this, in conjunction with General Lechitsky's offensive against Stanislavoff, caused the withdrawal of Count Bothmer's Army from its unconquerable positions on the Sereth-Strypa line.

On July 15 a minor engagement was fought on the Sviniukhy and the Ostroff-Gubin front with results favourable to our Allies. On the same day, at 4 p.m., began the Russian bombardment on the entire Bludoff-Shklin-Zlotchevka front. The night which followed was wet and rainy, and as the fire was distributed in equal volume all along the line, the enemy does

not seem at first to have taken any alarm as to what was coming. Soon afterwards the Russian artillery commenced, in its usual style, cutting breaches in the barbed wire entanglements. Thus, for instance, in front of a Siberian army corps which had achieved world fame in the battle on the Bzura in January, 1915, and was now to play a leading part in the attack, the Russian guns had cut by midnight 10 avenues, each approximately 20 paces broad. The attack was timed for 3 a.m. The chief blow was struck from Shklin and Ugrinoff in a due southerly direction. Wading under the machine-gun and rifle fire in water and marsh above their waists, often to their armpits, the Russians crossed the river and forced the Austrian and German positions on its southern bank. At the same time, in the angle between the Styr and the Lower Lipa, an attack was delivered in a westerly direction. In an interview with the Petrograd Correspondent of *The Times*, on July 22, General Alexeieff, Chief of the Russian Staff, made the following comment on the first stage of General Sakharoff's offensive: "General Sakharoff accomplished a brilliant feat of arms on July 16 at the expense of the 48th and 61st Austrian Divisions. Pivoting his army on Bludoff he manœuvred on the enemy's flank,

shepherding the Austrians and driving them in full rout during the night a distance of nearly seven miles ; he badly mauled the 22nd German Division, transferred from the Dvinsk front, and also the above-mentioned 43rd Division, which tried to save the hard-pressed soldiers of the Archduke Joseph-Ferdinand. The latest accounts show that General Sakharoff is developing his success with extraordinary rapidity and is crossing the two rivers in pursuit of the foe."

No less important than from the strategic point of view was the victory on the Mikhailovka front when measured in terms of captures of men and material. As the enemy had been preparing in that region for a big offensive, his accumulation of stores proved enormous. Every peasant's hut was stacked with shells and small-arm ammunition, while huge supplies were accumulated in all the important villages. Of the three biggest ammunition stores captured by the Russians on July 16, one alone contained 35,570 projectiles of different calibres, 5,230 grenades, and an enormous quantity of cartridges, as well as three searchlights, a band, a military tailoring depôt, field kitchens, and a large quantity of barbed wire, telephone wire,

and other war material. On the same day 317 officers (including two commanders of regiments with one entire regimental staff) and 12,637 men were taken prisoners, and 30 guns (of which 17 were of heavy calibre—4-inch and 9-inch), 49 machine guns and 36 bomb and mine-throwers were captured. Some of the heavy guns were in perfect condition and could almost immediately be turned against their late owners. The counter-attacks meantime undertaken by the Germans on the western flank, in the Zviniany-Elizaroff region, proved of no avail. And again Vienna made its acknowledgment of defeat—with its inevitable compliments to the saving Germans and its customary lies concerning Russian numbers and the character of their own retreat. "To the south-west of Lutsk," says the Austrian official *communiqué* of July 17, "the Russians attacked with superior forces. The front sector near Shklin withdrew into the district to the east of Gorokhoff. Covered on the western flank by a counter-attack delivered by German battalions, the allied troops fighting to the south of Lutsk were thereupon withdrawn behind the Lipa without being disturbed by the enemy."



WITH GENERAL SAKHAROFF'S ARMY.
Dawn on the battlefield: Russian and Austrian wounded.

The heavy rains about the middle of July threatened to put serious obstacles in the way of a further Russian advance; the rivers were rising and the marshes were becoming almost impassable. Still General Sakharoff pressed forward his advance, and that across most difficult ground, at points where it was least expected. It was on historic fields that the second battle of his offensive was fought on July 20-22. Previous to the eighteenth century the Crimean Tartars, emerging from the Wild Fields of Southern Russia, used to invade periodically the Ukraina, Podolia and even Volhynia. Crossing the Dnieper at the so-called Tartars' Ford, they followed certain regular paths. One of their main roads—named the Black Route—led past Loshniöff (about half-way between Berestechko and Brody). In 1651 they were advancing along that road as allies of the Cossacks, who since 1648 had risen in arms against the attempts of the Polish magnates and gentry to convert into serfs them, the free peasants of the Ukraina. On the fields of Berestechko their armies were defeated by the Poles under King John Casimir.

This time it was a vanquishing army which was advancing on Berestechko. The Russian attack was carried out on concentric lines, the pincers closing in from the north and from the east, across the Lipa south of Mikhailovka and

across the Styr, south-west of Verben. On the Lipa, having once overcome the difficulties of crossing the marshy valley under concentrated fire, the Russian troops broke fairly easily through the Austrian front. On the Styr, having dislodged the enemy from the village of Verben and from the organized works south of it, General Sakharoff's troops routed the Austrians, intercepting big numbers of the demoralized enemy. Thus—*e.g.*, between Verben and Pliashevo, on the right bank of the Styr, south of its confluence with the Lipa—the entire 13th Austrian Landwehr Regiment was surrounded and captured. With their *moral* fallen to such a low level, the Austrians could no longer offer any serious resistance.

The Styr was crossed by the Russians on the same day, and after a short fight on the surrounding heights our Allies entered the town of Berestechko.* In this battle fell Colonel Tataroff, the conqueror of Kozin †; wounded in the heart by a shrapnel bullet, he exclaimed, "I am killed," and then by a supreme effort got up, and with his last breath gave the word of command: "Regiment—Charge!"

By the end of the next day (July 21) the defeat of General von Boehm-Ermolli's left

* The town of Berestechko was known in the 16th century as an important centre of the Polish Unitarians, the so-called Socinians.

† Cf. Chapter CXXXVII., p. 26.



AN AUSTRIAN BOMB-PROOF TELEPHONE SHELTER.



COLONEL TATAROFF.

The Russian officer, who on the Styr, was wounded in the heart by a shrapnel bullet. Before dying he gave his last word of command: Regiment—Charge!

wing was complete. The Russians, having captured in these two days more than 300 officers and 12,000 men, were on both sides of the Styr closing in against the Galician frontier. General Sakharoff's offensive was changed in character and direction. All danger of an enemy attempt against the Lutsk salient from the south was now gone, its line was improved and its left flank covered. General Sakharoff's operations which had begun as a movement in defence of the convex Russian line in Volhynia, passed, after the first task had been accomplished, into a flank attack against the Austro-German centre on the Strypa-Sereth line. The offensive now developed south-east of the Styr, on Galician ground, and was directed against the Brody-Zalostse-Vorobiyovka front.

By July 22 the fate of Brody was sealed. The military hospitals were cleared. The Austrian authorities began to evacuate the town. The post office left on July 25. On the same day "evacuation trains" were placed at the disposal of the civilian population. Stores were removed. In short, profiting from their vast experience in retreats, the Austrians were carrying out this one in a most systematic manner. Indeed, the evacuation was so thorough that during the next

days whatever population had remained behind was in danger of starvation, as no sufficient stores had been left for them. The following is the description given by an eye-witness of the last days in Brody: "The town is empty. Of its 20,000 inhabitants hardly 6,000 are left. Few civilians are seen in the streets, and all traffic ceases early at night. The shops are closed, the public gardens, crowded a short time ago, are now deserted and forsaken. The battle-front is but a few miles out of Brody, and so the roar of the guns is deafening. The nights are frightful, no one can shut an eye. There is some kind of new Russian guns of a big calibre; when these start booming, mirrors and pictures fall off the walls, the window-panes clatter like mad, and the houses shake as in an earthquake. One can also clearly hear in the town the continuous rattle of machine-guns; the voices of war and the breath of death reach the town and pass even beyond it. . . .

"Austrian captive balloons continually soar above the town. Frequently we hear the rattling of Russian aeroplanes, which reconnoitre the entire district; some of the aviators are French or British. . . ."

The last two "evacuation trains" left Brody late at night on Thursday, July 27. Of these one passed through Lvoff on Friday at 1 p.m., the other remained throughout the day in a little station on the road, waiting for orders where to take the unfortunate "evacuated." Although the Austrian Government is very particular to carry away all population which might be of any use to the Russians, or show




THE BRODY FRONT.

sympathies for the "enemy cause," it is much less careful about their future. The barracks for Galician "refugees" at Chocnia will for all time remain one of the most outstanding examples of the criminal indolence and thoughtlessness of the Austrian bureaucracy. "They are built in a marshy region," writes the Cracow daily *Glos Narodu* of August 6, 1916, "where there is no good drinking water available. The barracks were hastily constructed and do not answer the requirements of hygiene. In fact, it is difficult to speak of hygiene when 500 or more people have to live in a dark hut, which can hardly be properly heated in winter, and where vermin of all kinds has taken up for good its abode." The Austrian censorship has never allowed the statistics of mortality at Chocnia to be published, but it can be learned from a statement made in June, 1916, by Count Lasoeki to the Austrian Minister of the Interior, and printed, though with deletions by the censor, in the *Glos Narodu* of July 3, that 1,300 cases of death had occurred in the camp harbouring an average of 5,000 refugees. In July, 1916, typhus was no longer prevalent, but typhoid and scarlet

fever and small-pox were still claiming scores of victims. Into that camp hundreds of fresh "evacuated" were moved in the course of the month.

The following was the disposition of the enemy defences round Brody on the night of July 24—*i.e.*, on the eve of the Russian offensive against the town: His left flank rested on the Styr, near its junction with the Slonovka (about two miles north-east of Loshnioff). Here it was perfectly safe against any possible attempts at outflanking from the west. The corner between the Styr and the Slonovka is an impassable marsh several miles wide. South of it, on the Upper Styr, between Loshnioff and the Brody-Lvoff railway, stretches a forest, about 15 miles long and about 12 miles wide. This forest could not have been crossed without long and elaborate preparations, and even then, in view of the complete absence of good roads, this could have only been done at a very slow rate. East of the Styr the enemy positions followed up to about Batkoff the line of the river Slonovka (in its upper course, above its junction with the Sitenka, called Sestratyn). The wooded



FROM THE AUSTRIAN ENTRENCHMENTS.

Bursting of a shell: Russian infantrymen taking cover in the long grass.



THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE: EXAMINING GERMAN PRISONERS.

heights round the village of Butchina,* at the headwaters of the Ikva, formed on the right flank the corner bastion of the enemy positions, which thus stretched from north-west to south-east for about 10 miles on each side of Brody.

The positions in front of Brody themselves were very strong by nature. Everywhere the broad belt of dangerous marshes on both sides of the Slonovka-Sestratyn river formed the first line of defence. South of Loshnioff, the entire space between the Slonovka and the parallel stream of the Boldurka is filled by the forest called Gaydzisko; on its south-western flank extend the marshes of the Boldurka, more than a mile wide. And again, between Height 238 (north-west of the Brody-Radziwiloff high road) and the village of Gaye Dytkovietskie † extends another forest as long as, though narrower than, the Forest Gaydzisko. Thus there are only two gaps in this belt of forests, one north-west, the other south-west of Brody. In the north-western gap, about three and a half miles wide, lie the

three villages of Shniroff, Klekotoff and Opariptse, which were to be the scene of the severest fighting in the battle for Brody. Between Shniroff and Klekotoff lies a wood called Volanik. The southern gap, at the foot of the Makutra Height, is hardly a mile wide, and may best be denoted by the name of the adjoining hamlet of Vieselova.

July 25, 1.30 a.m. Petrograd time—*i.e.*, 3 a.m. Central European summer time—marked the beginning of the battle for Brody. The Russian attack proceeded in three directions: against Loshnioff, against the Klekotoff-Opariptse front, and against the Vieselova line. The most serious of the three was the attempt in the centre, striking directly at Brody; the other two movements aimed merely at outflanking the key of the enemy's positions, the fortified heights of Klekotoff. Whilst in the centre several hours of bombardment preceded the infantry attacks, in the sector of Loshnioff the Russian batteries did not open fire until the infantry had reached the southern bank of the Slonovka. Unseen by the Austrians, soon after dark, the Russians had laid a causeway across the swamps among the reeds of the valley, and the first line of Austrian trenches south of Loshnioff, on the left bank of the Slonovka, was carried by

* The Makutra, Mogila, etc. Their average height is about 1,200 feet, and they rise about 400 feet above the ground north-east of them and about 700 feet above the level of the Sestratyn valley.

† The name itself of this settlement—Gaye Dytkovietskie—means "the Woods of Dytkovtse."

surprise. By the morning our Allies had captured the fortified village of Lasovo,* in the north-eastern corner of the forest Gaydzisko. But inside the forest the Austrians held strong fortified lines, which enabled their beaten forces to withdraw beyond the river Boldurka, though not without heavy losses in guns and prisoners. Only the south-eastern part of the forest, on the line of the Heights 246 and 219, remained in the hands of the enemy.

On the other flank, near Batkoff, where the valley of the Sestratyn is very narrow, the first step—the crossing—did not present any serious difficulties, but the further advance was exceedingly slow work; the country round was dominated by the heavy Austrian batteries on the Makutra.

In the centre the Russian infantry opened in the early morning an attack against the Opariptse front. The town of Radziviloff and the surrounding forests on the Russian side offered the attacking troops favourable con-

* "Lasovo" means the "village in the forest."

ditions for approaching the river. Here, however, they had to face most serious difficulties. On the northern side, in front of Shniroff and Klekotoff, the marshes are too wide to be crossed; and in the more favourable sector in the south almost the entire front is taken up by the village of Opariptse, which had been strongly fortified by the enemy (Opariptse, and the village of Berlin on the Boldurka north of Brody, were originally German settlements, and are not clustered villages of the Slav type, but are laid out as a single long street of substantial, well-built homesteads. Opariptse is about a mile and a half long.)

One Russian attack against Opariptse followed the other; many of them broke down under the intense fire of the enemy's artillery and machine-guns. Whenever our Allies succeeded in gaining a foothold on the Austrian side, the enemy, with a total disregard of losses, delivered desperate counter-attacks. Many of the best troops of General von Boehm-Ermolli's army were engaged—Magyar, Vien-



THE DESERTED BATTLEFIELD.

Austrian trenches and dug-outs captured by the Russians during the great advance.



FOR CONSPICUOUS BRAVERY.

Cossack troops quartered in the late Austrian Custom House, Itskani, Bukovina. The Cossack on the left was thrice decorated for bravery. Smaller picture: Russian soldiers receiving the Cross of St. George on the battlefield.

nese, Bosnian and Galician regiments fought in the battle for Brody. Opariptse was not taken until the sixth Russian attack. Yet even this success was no more than a first step: our Allies had merely obtained a safe crossing of the Sestratyn. Even now they stood only at the foot of the hills which extend from Klekotoff to Height 238, and which formed the main Austrian line of defence.

But at this stage help came from the division which had crossed the Slonovka, at Loshnioff, and had been working its way through the Forest Gaydzisko. Advancing step by step, they emerged from the forest and captured the village of Shniroff. On the morning of July 27 the Austrian line of defence followed the Boldurka as far as the village of Bielavtse: from here it extended through the forest of Volanik to Klekotoff; from Klekotoff, along the range of hills facing Opariptse to Height 238, and the forest on both sides of the Brody-Radziviloff road and railway. The Russian infantry continued on July 27 its attacks against the positions above Opariptse, the enemy counter-attacking immediately whenever any gain was effected. At 5 p.m. our Allies had captured the main positions south



of Klekotoff. Still the Austrians did not give up the game for lost. One of the best Magyar regiments was ordered to counter-attack. But whilst this movement was developing, all of a sudden Russian troops appeared on the left flank and in the rear of the attacking Magyars. Our Allies had forced their way through the Forest Volanik. The Klekotoff



AFTER CZERNOVITZ.

Fire engines from the Railway Station, Czernovitz, being conveyed across the Rumanian frontier.

positions were lost to the enemy. About the same time the Russian forces began to emerge from the forest near the village of Gaye Dytkovietskie. These two movements decided the battle for Brody. Throughout the night rearguard actions were still continued by the enemy on the heights and in the forests and villages north of the town. On July 28, at 6.30 a.m., our Allies entered Brody for the third time during the War, after almost a year of Austrian occupation.* "The plan for General Sakharoff's offensive against Brody," wrote the special correspondent of *The Times*, Mr. Washburn, under date of July 28, "was laid out on a schedule. I have watched every phase of it, and it has moved without a single hitch, and Brody has been taken within 24 hours of the exact time planned by the General when he began the movement two weeks ago. I think that this represents one of the most remarkable achievements of the war, for even

* Russian cavalry entered Brody for the first time on August 14, 1914, but had to withdraw on August 18. Two days later our Allies re-entered the town, and remained there until September 2, 1915. From September, 1915, till June, 1916, the headquarters of the Second Austro-Hungarian Army under General von Boehm-Ermolli were at Brody.

the clever Germans have never been able to keep their movements up to schedule time."

During the three days of fighting for Brody (July 25-28), General Sakharoff's troops took prisoners 210 officers and 13,569 soldiers, besides capturing a great amount of arms and ammunition. The total of their captures since July 16 amounted now to 940 officers, 39,152 men, 49 guns (17 of heavy calibre), and an enormous amount of other booty.

With the fall of Brody opens the last stage of General Sakharoff's offensive. On a front of about 50 miles his army was facing the Krasne-Zlochhoff-Tarnopol line, the best-built railway in Eastern Galicia, and the most important line of communication in the rear of Count Bothmer's Army. A distance varying from about 10 miles in the region of Zalostse to about 20 miles round Brody intervened between that railway and the Russian troops. To break through along the Brody-Krasne railway would have proved a practically impossible task. Hardly any roads lead across the wide marshes and through the forests which extend round the head-waters of the Bug and Styr. Moving along the railway from Brody to

Krasne, one passes in the first 12 miles hamlets, woods, and fields bearing these names: "Near the ponds," "on the islands," "in the mud," "in the hollows," "behind the swamp," "behind the mud," "the great island," "the old pond," "next to the swamp." No wonder, then, that the road avoids that district, and runs further east past Sukhodoly ("dry valley") and Podhortse ("next to the mountain"). This, the only first-class high-road running from the frontier of Volhynia and Galicia to the Krasne-Tarnopol railway—namely, from Brody to Zlochhoff—keeps to the north-western side of the ridge which forms the watershed between the Bug, the Styr, and the Sereth—*i.e.*, between the basins of the Vistula, the Dnieper, and the Dniester. The road from Brody, which encircles that ridge from the east, has its terminus at Pieniaki. These two roads were the only lines of communication at the disposal of General Sakharoff's forces in their advance against the left flank of Count Bothmer's Army.

Still, even these roads could be used only to a very limited extent. In the triangle Brody - Krasne - Tarnopol all the numerous marshy rivers flow north-west and south-east—*i.e.*, parallel to the Brody-Tarnopol side of the triangle, and all the ridges (except the irregular heights of the watershed) follow the same direction. An attack, cutting this series of strong defensive lines at right angles, was perfectly unthinkable. Hence General Sakharoff had to adopt a different plan. From Brody he moved his army across the heights round the watershed on to the Podkamien-Pieniaki line (and also for about two or three miles south-west of Pieniaki), whilst in the direction of the Krasne-Tarnopol railway he advanced only as much as was necessary to cover the flank of the forces on the Pieniaki-Podkamien front. The forces on that front stood *with their flank to the Krasne-Tarnopol railway*, but as this railway *cuts* the upper valleys of the Strypa and Sereth and their confluents, a movement down these valleys was bound, if successful, to strike at the railway in *the rear* of Count Bothmer's positions, which faced Tarnopol on the Vorobiyovka-Gladki line.

General Sakharoff's strategy seems to have taken the Austro-German commanders by surprise. They had withstood for many months attacks from the north-east, on the Zalostse-Novo Alexiniets line. They did not

expect an offensive moving *parallel* to their basic lines. Especially unlikely did such a movement appear in view of the obstacles which it had to encounter on the Nushche-Zagozhe front. A transversal depression cutting the lines of the ridges and streams marks there the border line between the wooded district of Brody and the more open country round Tarnopol. The hollows in that depression form a string of small lakes; these are as the base of a trident, of which the three arms are the Sereth on the left, the Graberka in the centre, and the Seretets on the right. Three streams unite in the lake of Ratysheche, and from here flow as the River Sereth in a south-easterly direction, through the lakes of Zalostse, past Gladki towards Tarnopol.

On August 4 General Sakharoff opened his offensive against the Nushche-Zagozhe front. Following the Graberka from Pieniaki the Russians advanced against the village Zvizhyn. The Austrians offered absolutely desperate resistance on ground on which, had it been properly fortified and held, probably any attacks might have been resisted. Our Allies, however, did not leave them the time to repair their mistakes. Their advance was most impetuous; by the night of August 5 they had carried in bayonet charges the villages of Zvizhyn, Mezhdygory, Ratysheche, Gnidava and Chystopady, whilst another Russian force broke through from the eastern flank across the Zalostse line. The victory was decisive. Although the Germans were now throwing in reinforcements in great numbers, they could merely delay, but never more reverse, the movement. On August 6 our Allies occupied the villages of Renioff and Trostianiets Vielki. The number of prisoners captured by the Russians in the three days of fighting, August 4-6, by itself gives an idea of the size and success of those operations: they captured 166 officers and 8,415 men.

Their advance continued past Neterpintse, Nesovtse and Vertelka. On August 10 they reached the outskirts of the village of Nesterevtse, only about four miles north-west of the Gladki-Vorobiyovka line. The northern end of Count Bothmer's positions on the Sereth-Strypa front was outflanked and even turned. The eleventh hour had struck for the retreat of his army—especially as south of the Dniester General Lechitsky was threatening to cut off his line of communication along the Transversal Railway.



THE AUSTRIAN RETREAT: RELICS ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

By June 23 the Ninth Russian Army under General Lechitsky had practically completed the conquest of the Bukovina. In the west it had already crossed the Galician frontier, on the border of Transylvania it had advanced within short distance of the main passes. It was not, however, the occupation of the Bukovina itself, but its further consequences, which were of the greatest account from the strategic point of view. The Bukovinian border is the most open and most vulnerable frontier of Rumania. Most of the Bukovina forms not merely linguistically, but also geographically, an integral part of Rumania. In the Bukovinian mountains lie the sources of the three most important rivers of Moldavia, the Sereth, the Moldava, and the Bystrytsa. Their valleys are so many gates opening to the south; important roads and railways lead along these rivers into Rumania. Of all the belligerent States, Rumania, if she intervened, would have in proportion to her size and population by far the longest frontier. Hence it was of considerable importance to her that the gates into Moldavia should be secured before she entered the war. Moreover, the Russian advance into the Carpathian passes on the north-eastern frontier of Hungary

was certain to assist her considerably in her main task in the War—the liberation of Transylvania.

Exactly those factors which made the strategic importance of the Bukovina for Rumania deprived it of strategic value with regard to the Galician theatre of war. The face of the Bukovina is turned to the south-west. Its net of roads and railways in no way intervenes between those of Galicia and Hungary: it can be cut off without any appreciable loss to the systems of communications of the two neighbouring countries. In the spring of 1915 the Russians had occupied most of Galicia and had been crossing the Carpathians without holding the Bukovina or even Kolomea.* Could the Austro-Hungarian armies have stopped the Russian advance on the line Chortoviets - Gvozdziets - Zablotoff - Pistyn, the mere loss of the Bukovina would have had no serious direct influence on the position on the Galician front. All the points and lines of

* For the Russians, however, the loss of the Novosietitsa-Czernovitz-Kolomea line in January-February, 1915, meant more than, under normal circumstances, it would have implied to the Austrians. It cut their direct connexion with Bessarabia and Southern Russia. That is why they tried hard to recover it in May and June of the same year.

considerable strategic value in south-eastern Galicia lie to the west of Kolomea. They may be grouped under four headings:

1. *The Dniester Crossings.*—The river can be crossed most easily between Halitch and Nizhnioff. Its banks are free from marshes such as surround its upper course above Halitch, and do not form as yet a deep, winding cañon as below Nizhnioff. Two railways and three roads cross the Dniester within the 20 miles between these two towns. The side which holds these crossings can establish a much more effective cooperation between its armies on the two banks of the Dniester than is possible for its opponents.

2. *The Transversal Railway.*—There are two big trunk railways crossing Galicia east and west: the Cracow-Przemysl-Lvoff-Tarnopol-Volotchysk line in the north, and the Khabovka-Yaslo-Sanok-Sambor-Stanislovoff-Butchatch-Husiatyn line at the foot of the Carpathians. This latter, called the Transversal Railway, formed for the Austro-German forces in Eastern Galicia one of their main lines of communication with the west. In the summer of 1916 the part of it most directly exposed to a flank attack by General Lechitsky's forces was the Stanislovoff-Tysmienitsa-Nizhnioff sector.

3. *The Stanislovoff-Delatyn-Marmaros Sziget Railway* is the only line which connected the East Galician theatre of war with Transylvania. The next railway across the Carpathians, the Lvoff-Stryj-Munkacs line, runs 60 miles farther west. It is obvious how great was the importance of the Stanislovoff-Marmaros Sziget line for the Austro-German armies in East Galicia with a view to supplies, and also for the general coordination of military operations in Galicia and Transylvania.

4. *The Yablonitsa and the Pantyr Passes,* opening into Transylvania.

At almost equal distances (about 30 miles) from the Yablonitsa Pass, from Stanislovoff and from Nizhnioff lies the town of Kolomea. The "strategic zone" of south-eastern Galicia extends west of Kolomea, the nearest point of it being Delatyn, a station on the Stanislovoff-Marmaros Sziget railway. Both these towns—Kolomea and Delatyn—lie in the Pruth valley, and the distance between them is about 20 miles. Kolomea, the junction of six railways (two of them are local lines leading to the oil district of Pechenizhyn) and of six high roads, is the natural base for operations against the "zone" to the west of it. After General Lechitsky's Army had captured Czernovitz



WITH GENERAL SAKHAROFF'S ARMY.

German prisoners collecting their wounded and placing them in a Russian ambulance cart.



RUSSIAN CAVALRY.

Scouts in South-Eastern Galicia. Smaller picture :
A typical cavalryman.

and secured its left flank in the Carpathians against a counter-offensive from Transylvania, Kolomea became its immediate objective.

A fortnight had passed since the defeat on the Berdo Horodyshe and the capture of Sniatyn (June 13). The attention of the Russian forces having been taken up by the forcing of the Pruth near Czernowitz and by the conquest of the Bukovina, the enemy troops which had withdrawn to the west had had time to take up new positions. Their lines east of Kolomea now stretched from near Niezviska on the Dniester, up the River Chortoviets to the district of Gvozdziets, then down the Cherniava to Zablotoff on the Pruth, and from there towards Pistyn in the Carpathians. On June 28 General Lechitsky's army opened a general offensive practically against the entire front, whilst a regiment of Cossacks, having swum

across the Dniester near Snovidoff, emerged in the rear of the Austrian positions on the Chortoviets. The attack of June 28 was a most striking case of a carefully coordinated plan, carried out with extraordinary vigour. Before the impact of the blow the Austrian lines simply collapsed; they broke in and crumbled like an empty shell. By 7 p.m. the captures made by our Allies amounted to 221 officers and 10,285 men; near Gvozdziets a Trans-Amur regiment succeeded in taking a battery of four 6-inch guns, with their officers, gunners, horses and ammunition. On the next day the Russians entered Kolomea, the panic-stricken Austrians fled, unable to offer any further serious resistance. They did not even find time to blow up the railway station and its sidings. By July 2 the Russians were able to reopen it for traffic. The town of Kolomea suffered hardly any damage, as no serious fighting occurred within its area. Only on its eastern outskirts some five or six houses suffered from fire. But of the normal population of Kolomea, which in peace time exceeded 40,000, hardly 10,000 had been left after the Austrian evacuation.

The further Russian advance to the west proceeded both north and south of Kolomea. An advance due west by the direct road leading through the Pruth valley to Delatyn was impracticable. Several strong defensive lines across it had been prepared by the enemy, and it would not have been possible to force them as long as the hills and mountains south of the road remained in his hands, as from those heights his artillery was able to direct a flanking fire against troops advancing from Kolomea against the west. The attempt to reach the Stanislavoff-Marmaros Sziget rail-

way had, therefore, to be made in a south-westerly direction, across the wooded mountains.

Meantime, the right wing of General Lechitsky's army and the adjoining troops of General Shcherbacheff were pressing forward along both banks of the Dniester. Having broken through the Niezviska lines, they entered the town of Obertyn on June 29. On the next day one of the most extraordinary battles of the war developed next to the Niezviska-Tlumatch road, east of Yeziezhany. The Austrians were holding there a strong line of trenches covered by the usual barrier of barbed wire entanglements. Without waiting for any artillery preparation, a brigade of Circassian cavalry opened a charge against the enemy lines. "The sight was grand, though terrifying," is the account given by a non-combatant eye-witness. "With truly Circassian daring, the cavalymen attacked the trenches, carrying sabre and lance in their hands, and the short *kindzhal* (Circassian dagger) in their teeth. As soon as the riders appeared in the valley the machine-guns started their horrible work. Confusion occurred in the front rank. The wild cries of men and the neighing of wounded horses mixed with the rattling of machine-guns and the cracking of rifles. Even more awful was the sight of the riders who perished in the wire entanglements. Still, with a wild contempt of death, the Circassians started cutting the wire. Many perished, but the road was open for the surviving squadrons. A fresh charge followed, and a real massacre started in the trenches. The Circassians worked with sabres and *kindzhals* . . ." Whoever from among the Austrians was able to escape, fled in terror. On June 30, at noon, the Circassian troops entered Yeziezhany. In conformance with the Austrian retreat south of the Dniester, the army of Count Bothmer, on the left bank of the river, had also to withdraw several miles to the west, on to the Koropiets line, thus bending back still farther its right wing. In this retreat, in the first days of July, they suffered severe losses at the hands of the pursuing Russian troops, especially in the district round Monastezhysa.

Had the Russians been able to push forward another 10 miles to the west, and had they succeeded in capturing the Dniester crossings, Bothmer's position in the centre would have become untenable. Their advance had, therefore, to be stopped by the Austro-German armies on the Tlumatch line, or a general

retreat in East Galicia would have become for them unavoidable. After General von Pflanzer-Baltin's army had been broken up in the Bukovina, its main body withdrew into the Carpathians. That part, however, which had effected its retreat on to Stanislavoff was linked up with the "German Army of the South." Count Bothmer's line was thus extended to the south, and he was put in charge of the defences of the Dniester crossings. Towards the end of June he received considerable reinforcements, consisting mainly of fresh Prussian divisions. On July 2 he opened his counter-offensive along the southern bank of the Dniester. After a violent bayonet fight in the village of Yeziezhany, our Allies had to withdraw before the superior forces of the enemy. Still, in spite of the most desperate attacks, the Germans did not succeed in reaching the Niezviska-Obertyn line, and had finally to settle down on the Yeziezhany-Khotsimiezh-Zhukoff front. "During these battles," wrote the Roman Catholic curate of Yeziezhany, about the middle of July, 1916, "12 civilian inhabitants of my village were killed and 20 wounded. In the neighbouring village of Issakoff more than 100 people are said to have perished. On July 6 the Germans ordered the complete evacuation of my parish on account of the artillery duel which was proceeding, and which destroyed part



GENERAL SCHERBACHEFF.



WOUNDED RUSSIANS AND AUSTRIANS.
A novel form of Russian stretcher. Smaller picture:
War-worn Austrian prisoners.

heroic counter-attacks south of the Dniester," wrote the military correspondent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* under date of July 9, "are preventing further envelopment." But the Austrians west of Kolomea have again "proved unable to make a stand." And then he winds up his remarks in this pathetic, desperate plea: "But in the interests of the whole front it is necessary that the Austrians should stand fast in that district. For even the most heroic valour of our troops cannot realize its aim if the adjoining positions are not maintained"

Yet, however keen the Austrians must have been to satisfy their irate allies, they were unable to withstand the Russian offensive. On June 30 the Russians entered Pistyn, about 12 miles due south of Kolomea, and, on the same day, pushed forward against Berezoff, some six miles farther in a west-north-western direction. Continuing their advance through the mountains they reached on July 3 Potok Charny, only six miles east of the Delatyn-Marmaros Sziget railway. On the following day they cut the railway in the district of Mikulitchin, due west of

of our village. About 1,500 people had to leave their homesteads.

"On the way to Tlumatch, where we were ordered to go, I saw many dead men and horses lying unburied in the fields, poisoning the air. Between Yeziezhany and Zhyvachoff—*i.e.*, between the opposing lines of trenches—they are lying to the present day.

"I found Tlumatch deserted by most of the town inhabitants, but filled with peasants who had been evacuated from the neighbouring villages. These people do not want to go any farther, but wish to weather here the storm and return to their farms."

For the time being Count Bothmer had saved his right flank from complete outflanking. "The German troops which delivered repeated

Berezoff, and 10 miles south of Delatyn. Parallel with this movement, another advance across the hills was carried out from Kolomea against Pechenizhyn. Supported by some excellent artillery work, the Russian infantry forced its way into that town, about seven miles west of Kolomea, on the very same day on which the movement had been started. The Austrians in their retreat were not even able to destroy the bridges at Pechenizhyn. The clearing of the mountains south of the Kolomea-Delatyn road of enemy forces enabled our Allies to effect their advance also along that main highway. On July 4 they carried at the point of the bayonet the Austrian positions in the village of Sadzavka (more than half the distance to Delatyn). Finally, on July 9, the Petrograd official report was able to announce the capture of Delatyn itself, which had been effected on the previous day by the army of General Lechitsky. One of the main objectives of his offensive, the cutting of the railway which connects East Galicia with Transylvania had thus been attained, and the second stage of the advance of the Ninth Russian Army had reached its victorious conclusion. In view of the slower development

in the north no further advance was now intended by Russian Headquarters south of the Dniester. In their evening *communiqué* of July 9 they published a summary of the captures made during the second stage of General Lechitsky's offensive—*i.e.*, since the conquest of the Bukovina had been completed. "According to the reckoning made by the army of General Lechitsky, in the period from June 23 to July 7 it took prisoners 674 officers and 30,875 men, and captured 18 guns, 100 machine-guns, and 14 caissons of ammunition."

The heavy rains and floods which occurred in the Dniester region about the middle of July rendered the lull in military operations in that district longer than had been intended. The Dniester had risen nearly 10 ft. and the Pruth more than 16 ft. The plain south of Stanislavoff, which, on a width of about 18 miles is traversed by some 14 rivers and streams, was becoming impassable. "The overflow of the Dniester continues," was the Petrograd report of July 20, "the valleys situated in the neighbourhood are flooded through the rivulets overflowing their banks. The slopes of the heights are so slippery as to



RUSSIAN SCOUTS AFTER FORDING A STREAM: CREEPING TOWARDS AN ENEMY POSITION.



GENERAL KELLER,

Holding an important command in General Lechitsky's Army.

be almost unclimbable. At many points the bridges have been washed away." Only in the high mountains, round Tartaroff and Vorokhta and in the regions of the heights of the Magura and Capul, were our Allies able to continue extending their positions towards the Transylvanian border.

In the first days of August fresh fighting was reported north-west of Kolomea, and also north of the Dniester, where our Allies succeeded in gaining a foothold on the western bank of the Koropiets. On August 7, after a month's interval, General Lechitsky resumed his offensive, which now entered on its third stage. The first attack was carried out round Tlumatch, on a front of about 16 miles. The "heroic valour" of the German troops did not prove in this case much different from the "inability to resist," ascribed by them to their allies. On the same day on which the offensive was begun the Russians broke through the German front and captured Tlumatch. On the next day the movement extended into a concentric advance from the east and south against Stanislavoff; at 6 p.m. our Allies entered the town of Tysmienitsa, whilst farther north, round Nizhniwoff, they captured the right bank of the Dniester. On the next day also the northern bank was reached in that dis-

trict by the Russian troops (of General Shcherbacheff's Army), which by a vigorous attack against the Velesniwoff-Koropiets line had forced their way across the River Koropiets. Thus the first Dniester crossing had fallen into the hands of our Allies. On August 9 they captured the railway station of Khryplin, the junction of the three railways which approach Stanislavoff from the south and east (the Transylvanian line, the Czernovitz-Kolomea railway, and the eastern sector of the Transversal railway). On the same night the Austrian Army Command evacuated Stanislavoff. On the next day our Allies entered the town for the third time during the war.

Count Bothner could now no longer delay his retreat. In the north General Sakharoff was rapidly approaching the Lvoff-Tarnopol railway, and turning his positions on the Gladki-Vorobiyovka front; in the south his retreat by the Transversal line and his connexion with Transylvania were cut by General Lechitsky, whilst the troops of General Shcherbacheff were turning his flank on the left bank of the Dniester. By August 10 they had captured Monastezhyska and even crossed the River Zlota Lipa in the neighbourhood of Nizhniwoff. By August 12 the last remaining part of the enemy's winter line of fortifications was captured by our Allies. The entire enemy centre had to be withdrawn from the Strypa. Suffering severe losses at the hands of the



GENERAL VON TERSZTYANSKY,

Commanded the Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army.



WITH GENERAL SAKHAROFF'S TROOPS.

Periscopic work on the field.

pursuing Russians, the Austro-German armies fell back on the Zlota Lipa line, though that front had already been passed by our Allies in the direct neighbourhood of the Dniester, where they had reached the River Horozhanka. On the Krasne-Tarnopol line they abandoned even the important district and town of Zboroff which but a week earlier had been visited by Field-Marshal von Hindenburg. And, again, tens of thousands of peasants from these districts were compelled by the Austrian Government to evacuate their homesteads and trek into exile amongst strangers. For many weary days they travelled in carts and on foot towards the west—a picture of hopeless, unrelieved misery. In the centre the Austrians withdrew to Bzhezhan, the town itself being included in the battle-front. “On August 11,” wrote an eye-witness, “all the Austrian civilian authorities suddenly left the town. The last train left it on August 13, at 2 p.m. With the flight of the authorities, greater liberty came for the people; passports and permits were no longer required, and we were free to leave our houses at night; bread, sugar and flour cards lost their use. Still there is hardly anyone left to avail himself

of the new freedom. . . .” Again, the Austrians had carried out their thorough “evacuation.”

By the middle of August, when a new lull intervened on the Eastern front, the problem implied in the second phase of the great Russian offensive of 1916 had been solved completely in favour of our Allies. The enemy had abandoned his entire front south of the Marshes, having lost in ten weeks' fighting in prisoners alone well over 300,000 men. The total casualties suffered by him in that campaign almost equalled the original strength of his armies between the Pripet Marshes and the Carpathian Mountains.

Our Allies could watch with amusement the changes which, as a consequence of the defeats suffered at their hands, were made in the higher army commands of the Central Powers—it was now clearly beyond the power of any human being to reverse the verdict of the preceding weeks. It will be remembered that directly after the first defeat near Lutsk and Dubno the Austro-Hungarian armies in Volhynia had been put under the command of the Prussian general von Linsingen. Moreover,



GERMAN PRISONERS IN A CORNFIELD.

Archduke Joseph-Ferdinand, who since the winter of 1914-15 had been in command of the Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army, was replaced by General von Tersztyansky; and General Puhallo von Brlog, who in May, 1915, had taken over the command of the Third Austro-Hungarian Army,* was succeeded by General von Fath, previously in charge of an army corps in Puhallo's army. In the south Count Bothmer's line and powers were extended, and a new army under General Kövess was formed in Transylvania to hold the lengthened front in the Carpathians.

It was generally known that as a result of the defeats suffered by the Austro-Hungarian Armies in the first weeks of June their Commander-in-Chief, Archduke Frederick, and the Chief of the General Staff, Baron Conrad von Hötzendorf, had had to relinquish their posts. With the possible exception of the extreme "Great-Austrians" no one regretted their fall. The Magyars even rejoiced over it, as these two generals were known as enemies of the Dualist Constitution and of Magyar separatism, and were considered enthusiastic votaries of a unified, centralized Hapsburg Monarchy (*die Gesamtmonarchie* was their ideal). Still,

* His predecessor, General Borojevic von Bojna was transferred to the Isonzo on the outbreak of the war with Italy.

it was a real humiliation to Old-Austrian pride when, on August 2, the Prussian Junker, von Hindenburg, was proclaimed sole commander on the Eastern Front. A few days later a Hapsburg amendment was added to the announcement. Hindenburg's command was to extend only from the Baltic Sea to a point south of the Lvoff-Tarnopol railway, thus including, south of the Marshes, the armies of Linsingen's group, and, moreover, on its right flank, the Second Austro-Hungarian Army under General von Boehm-Ermolli. The remaining three armies (those of Bothmer, Kövess and Pflanzer-Baltin) were put under the command of a new genius from the House of Austria, the Heir-Apparent Archduke Karl Franz Josef. Born in 1887, he had received his commission of second lieutenant in 1903, became a major in 1909, and a colonel on July 25, 1914—at the age of 27. A year later he advanced to the rank of major-general, and in March, 1916, to that of a Field-Marshal-Lieutenant. In May he was put at the head of the ill-fated Austrian offensive against Italy, and now he was placed in command of the forces on the Transylvanian border—to retrieve in a struggle against Russia, and soon also against our new Ally, Rumania, Austria's fortunes and the military reputation of the Hapsburgs.



CHAPTER CXLIV.

THE MEDICAL SERVICE OF THE ROYAL NAVY.

THE NAVAL DOCTOR AND HIS WORK—PROBLEMS OF MODERN WARFARE—PREVENTION OF DISEASE—NERVE STRAIN AND THE SEAMAN'S PSYCHOLOGY—THE NAVAL MEDICAL DEPARTMENT—DANGEROUS DISEASES—THE TYPHOID PERIL—VENTILATION OF SHIPS—NEW DEVICES—THE NAVAL ACTION OFF HELIGOLAND—TREATMENT OF WOUNDED—THE VALUE OF EXPERIENCE—HOSPITAL ACCOMMODATION—HOSPITAL SHIPS AND TRAINS—MEDICAL WORK IN MINOR ACTIONS—THE PEGASUS—THE EMDEN—THE TIGER IN ACTION, JANUARY 24, 1915—THE DARDANELLES—NAVAL MISSION TO SERBIA—ROYAL NAVAL AIR SERVICE—THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK—ON BOARD THE WARRIOR—IN THE LION—HONOURS FOR NAVAL DOCTORS.

IN earlier chapters the story of the work of the Army doctor has been told. It has been shown how that work fell naturally into two divisions, the work of attending to the wounded and the work of guarding the health of the forces in the field. The latter duty was, perhaps, of paramount importance, since upon the mental, moral, and physical well-being of its fighting men depends at all times the efficiency of an army.

The army doctor, however, was not the only member of the medical profession into whose hands a great trust was committed when war broke out; equally with him the naval doctor shared the heavy responsibility. Disease was perhaps a less instant menace to the fleets at sea than to the troops ashore, but the task of the naval doctor was no whit less difficult, no whit less important than that of his Army colleague. It was, moreover, a task of a special kind, differing in essential particulars from that of the army doctor, demanding knowledge of an unusual sort, and presenting many complex problems of a kind not met with in other spheres.

It is a tradition of the Navy to keep silence; silence, also, is the tradition of the medical

profession. In the Naval Medical Service the traditions were joined, and so little was heard by the world of the great work which these sea doctors accomplished, of the heroism revealed by them, of the sacrifices which they offered. Yet it is certain that the men of the Naval Medical Service performed a task, the value of which cannot be reckoned too high. They themselves were the shield of the "Sure Shield" of our coasts, in that they stood between our seamen and the influences threatening their efficiency; they were guardians of the well-being of our fleets, just as our fleets were the guardians of our national well-being; behind the gun was the man, but behind the man, again, responsible for his steadiness in emergency, his fighting capacity, his untrammelled use of all his faculties, was the doctor.

The naval doctor was ready when the call upon him came, so ready, indeed, that within four days from the declaration of war hospital ships were fully equipped and on their way to join the Grand Fleet. The equipment had been thought out and prepared long before; had been packed and stored in readiness; it included everything which the wit of experienced man could suppose might be wanted during and after an action at sea. There was only



ON BOARD A WARSHIP.
Passing wounded down to the Sick Bay.

to speak the word and to proceed forthwith to the war stations.

As it happened, this early equipment was not required at once; the great battle which many expected during the first days of war did not take place, and the calls upon the hospital ships were few. This, however, is no reason for minimising the importance of the preparations made, nor yet for forgetting that, in the hour of need, the Naval Medical Service was ready just as the Navy was ready, fully equipped, fully trained, in a position to handle the work occasioned by a great battle. Jutland Bank, with its fierce incidents, its terrible calamities, might have occurred in August 1914 instead of in May 1916, so far as the ability of the doctors to cope with it was concerned. The administration at Whitehall had done its work thoroughly in the light of knowledge; readiness had been its watchword for years.

Nor was this readiness destined to become the prelude to a policy of *laissez faire* while the long days of waiting and watching which followed the declaration of war ran their course. In the Navy, as in the Army, a new

conception of medicine had during the years before 1914 become firmly established. Men remembered with glowing pride the gracious figure of the surgeon pictured in attendance upon the dying Nelson. They recalled, perhaps, with wistful thought the fierce setting of smoke and flame in which that picture ever presents itself; they thrilled as the eyes of the hero rose in their minds. But they knew that those old days had passed for ever. The greatest office of their service was still, in a sense, the office of mercy and of healing, but in a sense only. Naval battles were no longer as the battles Nelson fought; vast ships carried to sea vast numbers of men; the Grand Fleet was a town, a city, subject to all the dangers and troubles which beset the health of cities, needing protection from these dangers, dependent for its efficiency upon the vigilance, the knowledge, and the devotion of its health officers.

This was the new doctrine of preventive medicine; the doctrine that while few diseases are really curable, almost all diseases, certainly all infectious diseases, are preventible. The Naval surgeon found himself faced with a


harder task than healing the wounds of battle. He realized that to his care had been committed the health, the fighting capacity of those highly trained, irreplaceable men, the gunners, the engineers, the signallers, and all the ratings who go to make up the strength and efficiency of the Royal Navy. He was the health officer of a community in which every man counted, and in which the value of any particular man was beyond assessment.

The conditions of work, too, were not easy. Much was written at the time about the long strain of waiting and watching undergone by our seamen during those early months, but probably the full extent of the penalty exacted was not then grasped by anyone outside of the Service. On the one hand there was the prospect of battle at any hour, on the other the weariness of hope indefinitely deferred. And later came the anxiety of mine and torpedo, demanding a ceaseless vigilance.


These were menaces to health without question, for it is an established fact that a man who has been subjected to prolonged mental strain falls an easier victim to disease.

"The nervous strain of being under shell-fire day after day, week after week, and month after month might," wrote a surgeon of the Royal Marines in Gallipoli, "be expected to cause a large amount of mental depression and even insanity amongst the troops. The expectation was not realized in this battalion. During the first six months of war on board a battleship in the North Sea I saw many more cases of conditions allied to melancholia than I did during my stay on the Peninsula. Surgeon Beaton, R.N., whom I had the privilege of serving with in that ship, found, after an exhaustive inquiry, that the number of mental cases (both severe and slight) was less than 5 per cent. of the ship's company. Though I had neither the time nor the skill he possesses in the investigation of the minor forms of mental disturbance, my impression is that in this battalion there were much fewer cases. The mental strain of being under shell-fire appeared to be much less than that of being exposed to the hidden dangers of mines and submarines."

These observations of Surgeon Beaton, R.N.,



THE SICK BAY ON BOARD A WARSHIP.
Showing how the cots are swung



Norman Wilkinson

THE "KÖNIGSBERG" (IN THE DISTANCE) "BOTTLED UP" BY THE "CHATHAM," OCTOBER 30, 1914.
The German cruiser, with masts disguised as palm trees, was discovered by H.M.S. "Chatham" hiding in shoal water about six miles up the Rufigi River, opposite Mafia Island (German East Africa).

which were published in the "Journal of the Royal Naval Medical Service," were indeed of a remarkable character as showing one side of the great problem which had to be faced. The ship's company which formed the material of the investigation was perhaps exceptional, for most of the men were married and had held, during their shore life, positions demanding considerable intelligence and necessitating much self-reliance. Some had had a certain amount of responsibility in civic life.

The ship under consideration lay for a long period at the beginning of the war (over four months) in an exposed position on the East Coast; next she went to sea for two days; lastly, she lay six weeks in a protected harbour on the South Coast. Surgeon Beaton commented: "Roughly speaking, the influence of the first period was in the nature of a prolonged and monotonous stress. Owing to the nature of the position the routine demanded was of an extremely irksome type, consisting of continual watches, night and day, daily repetition of the measures for defence and offence possessed by the ship and, save for a very occasional route march, giving the men two or three hours away from the ship, nothing to break the monotony or to give some little change to the environment. Recreation, while off actual duty, too, presented many difficulties, owing to the need for darkening the ship and the shortness of the daylight at the time of the year. There was the always-present possibility of attack by submarine or by ships of superior force, at some times more apparently imminent than at others."

A very careful and important analysis was then given of the steps by which a man passes from one mental state to another under this strain. This record presents the situation with deadly clearness and deserves to be studied by all who would learn how much our sailors did and suffered on our behalf:

"The man takes up his duties," wrote Surgeon Beaton, "it may be assumed with more or less eagerness and pleasure, the unpleasant facts of leaving his home and his ordinary life and the possibility of danger in the new sphere being more than counterbalanced by the emotional satisfaction arising out of the gratification of his patriotic instincts. Largely influenced by this self-satisfaction, he smooths over his absence from his home; the life on board ship obtains a certain glamour; and the

little difficulties to be encountered do not appear on the horizon. There is also the feeling of returning again to a life belonging to his younger days, of which he undoubtedly recalls much that is inviting. He meets a large number of entirely fresh faces, and in the interest to be found in such circumstances his mind is fully employed.

"It was remarkable to notice how quickly the men settled down and merged their individuality into the component of the ship's company. Given a short space of time the man has sorted out the new acquaintances into friends and otherwise; the novelty of the situation has passed off; the routine no longer demands that close attention which was necessary at first, and there is nothing further to be discussed in the ship. His mind then turns to other more remote matters; the possibilities of the duration of the war, the probabilities of the employment of the ship and the part he himself will actually play in the war. Such topics are naturally of great importance to him, and consequently they are discussed everywhere in the ship. Pass along another week or so and these matters have been threshed out to the bone; everyone's opinion has been given many times over. The newspapers do not help by bringing any fresh material as food for discussion, and he is completely in the dark as to any movement on the part of the ship herself.

"It is only to be expected that under such circumstances discussion of these topics becomes unprofitable and highly unsatisfying. To a man accustomed to foresee his own course of action, it is very difficult to maintain a state of intelligent anticipation with so little material to work upon. More than that, the effort to maintain it in the face of such difficulties, coupled with the feeling of helplessness in his own destinies, becomes an irritating factor the longer it continues.

"As a result it was found that, as a subject of general interest, the war and its personal application to the individual ceased to be heard. Instead, as a defensive measure, the man adopts a condition of more or less unstable apathy to his future, unstable on account of the setting on one side of his instincts of self-preservation and self-control.

"In the meantime, he has been going on, day after day, repeating the same evolutions of the routine; and though, as regards the efficiency of the ship, the automaticity with which these



[Vandyk.]

SIR JAMES PORTER.

Director-General, Naval Medical Service,
1908-1913.

come to be performed is very desirable, from the individual's standpoint the results are not so happy. Apart from the actual time while on duty, the man has nothing of importance in the ship left to think about. The effort, too, at maintaining a sufficient interest in so monotonous and trying a routine, becomes a steadily increasing stress as time goes on."

The writer then goes on to show that in these circumstances small events tend to assume great proportions, and continues: "It will be seen from the fact of the underlying stress and the failure of satisfaction of the primary instincts and habits of the man that the emotional background is more likely to be dark than bright. The disproportion will therefore probably exist in a direction tending to produce a state of anxiety and distress of the mind. It must be remembered that this anxiety, though outwardly attributable to the insignificant event, is in reality the outward expression of the general unsatisfaction of the mind."

The extent of such mental disturbance depends on the cast of the man's own mind, and necessarily varies in each individual. Generally speaking, however, the doctors

had to weigh the factors just outlined when visiting the men.

"The attendance at the sick bay towards the end of the period under discussion, showed quite plainly the necessity for taking these considerations into view in dealing with the various minor ailments and injuries which came under notice. Mild conditions of neurasthenia with hypochondriacal ideas were prevalent. Minor accidents all had a mental sequence of some kind."

From this period of writing, the story passed to the second period of active service at sea. It was productive of very striking effects. The relief from the monotony was very welcome, and the patriotic emotions were stirred anew. Against this was the new risk to the individual. What occurred was this:

"By far the majority of the men showed appreciable relief—a general rising of spirits was to be noticed. Work was carried out with an eagerness belonging to the early days of the war—altogether a sense of satisfaction could be felt throughout the ship. In one case, however, a fatal result ensued, the man severing his carotid artery on the second morning at sea. In another, severe emotional crises arose, attributed by the man to an alteration in his home affairs of which he had just heard. In others, the intensity of hypochondriacal ideas in cases under observation became much greater."

In the final period the conditions were entirely different; the men were not continually subjected to the stress of imminent danger, and they could have a little time ashore away from the ship and its discipline. Also they saw new people. The writer concludes:

"It may be said that so far the men have come through exceedingly well. Mental troubles of a really serious nature have occurred in less than 1 per cent. of the ship's company, while the mild neurasthenic conditions amounted to under 3 per cent. or 4 per cent. The conclusions to be drawn can only be that such lengthy periods as the first four months under the conditions which prevailed in the first part of the war are highly undesirable, and should be prevented if military exigencies will permit. All the attention possible should be paid to the need of change in the mental environment while the men are under the influence of such continued stress, especially as adequate recreation could not be obtained owing to the military

precautions necessary in such a situation. That the results were not more regrettable can only be due to the standard of the men and their *moral*, and of that nothing too good can be said."

Here, then, was a lesson learned early in the war by the naval doctor. But let there be no illusion; the lesson was not learned by doing nothing and waiting for events to force themselves upon attention; these doctors went out to look for their lessons. In their own sphere they were as watchful as the fighting men were in theirs. The minute description of the mental state of the men afforded by Surgeon Beaton shows how carefully he carried on his investigation, how diligent were his observations, and how shrewd his deductions.

The value of the work scarcely needs emphasizing. After all, the good spirits of a great fighting unit are one of its chief assets: loss of enthusiasm, of freshness of mind, means deterioration of all other qualities; every man is then less a man than he was. The discovery of the factors which, if given free play, must sap energy and damp interest was no small service; the ability to indicate a better way was a service of infinite worth. Not in vain did the naval doctor constitute himself thus early in the war the guardian of that "jolly spirit" of the Navy which throughout the world has always been its title to love and admiration.

But this after all was only a fraction of the great work which the doctor accomplished aboard ship. While *ennui* and depression and the strain of prolonged expectancy were attacking the minds of the seamen a host of dangers no less threatening were attacking their bodies. For a great city, be it ashore or afloat, is not, as we have seen, kept in health by good luck. Hard work, clear thinking, and strenuous preparation are the only means by which this end can be accomplished.

No one knew this better than the heads of the Naval Medical Department, Sir James Porter and, later, Sir Arthur May. Sir James Porter, who was Director-General from 1908 to 1913, laid the foundations of a great new system of naval health; to Sir Arthur May, who succeeded him, it was given to carry the system into execution and to amplify it in accordance with the needs of the hour. The broad principle adopted may be summed up in the word "supervision." Nothing was to be left to chance; no detail, however



SIR ARTHUR MAY.
Director-General, Naval Medical Service,
in the War.

insignificant, was to be overlooked; no pains were to be spared.

It is easy to make light of a policy of this kind; but it is not easy to discount the fact that by the exercise of it a number of men equivalent to the complete crews of two super-Dreadnoughts were presented during the first year of war as a gift to Britain. Before these measures of protection and prevention and of inspection were instituted these men were in hospital as a permanent incubus. Had the measures not been instituted they would have stayed in hospital at a time when the need of them was overwhelming!

The object of these health measures was expressed in the phrase "to secure for the officers and men in their unavoidably crowded conditions on board freedom from infectious disease, an adequate supply of pure air, pure water and good wholesome food." This object was, of course, as old as the Navy itself, and the history of the efforts made to attain it is a fascinating one. All the great naval commanders, including Anson, Rodney, Howe, St. Vincent, Nelson and Collingwood, took an interest in work of the kind, and not without good reason. For the Navy had been fear-



ON BOARD A HOSPITAL SHIP.
Method of lowering a man into the wards.

fully scourged by disease on more than one occasion. Commodore Anson, for example, in his famous voyage round the world lost four out of five of his original crew, and in the first nine months 666 men out of 961 who made up the crews of the three ships of war—the Centurion, the Gloucester and the Tryal—that succeeded in rounding Cape Horn during the worst and most tempestuous period of the year and reaching the coast of Peru. Pizarro, who followed him in pursuit with a Spanish squadron, fared worse; he failed to weather the Cape and returned with only one ship, the Asia, and 100 men out of an original squadron of six battleships and 3,000 men. Most of Anson's men had died of fever and scurvy, while Pizarro's men had died of scurvy and hunger. Some of our expeditions actually failed because of sickness, and among these was Sir Francis Wheeler's attack on Martinique in 1693. But much later than this, disease was the great enemy of the sailor.

Scurvy was at one time one of the worst of the foes, but a naval surgeon, Lind, killed scurvy by his discovery of its origin in a faulty diet. There remained as dangers up till the beginning of the Great War the ordinary fevers, especially typhoid and cerebro-spinal

fever ("spotted fever") and venereal disease. From the following table, which is taken from an article by Prof. W. J. Simpson in the "Journal of the Royal Naval Medical Service," may be gathered how steady was the progress of health work in the Navy before the war.

ANNUAL DEATH-RATE IN THE BRITISH NAVY
FROM DISEASE.

Average Rate of Mortality.

Years.	
1776-1780 1 death in 8 men.
1810-1812 1 .. 30 ..
1830-1836 1 .. 72 ..
1885 1 .. 112 ..
1895 1 .. 143 ..
1905 1 .. 256 ..
1907 1 .. 293 ..
1910 1 .. 311 ..
1913 1 .. 309 ..

It was evident that, mobilization having taken place, steps must at once be taken to arrange for the nipping in the bud of any epidemic which might threaten. An epidemic in the Navy, it must be remembered, no matter how light its character, would have been a calamity which might even conceivably have assumed tragic proportions. Therefore it was

greatly feared, and every kind of precaution was taken to prevent it.

The Navy for one thing was a vaccinated force. Every man had been vaccinated against smallpox, and inoculation against typhoid fever was general. It being quite certain, in spite of the declarations of well-meaning faddists, that vaccination does protect against smallpox, the Navy medical authorities rightly refused to take the risk of shipping persons who might originate an epidemic. And so successful was their policy that naval men on leave were free to enter areas closed to soldiers because of outbreaks of the disease. No ill effects were noted.

Typhoid fever was always an enemy and the utmost vigilance had to be exercised. The danger, of course, was greater in the Mediterranean than in the North Sea; but nowhere was the danger a negligible quantity. A case was recorded, for example, in which a particular ship showed a constantly recurring series of cases of typhoid fever. No cause could be found in the water or food, and so it became clear that a "carrier" must be responsible. A "carrier" is a person who has had the fever and made a good recovery, but who does not cease to harbour the bacillus. A search

was made, the blood of the crew being carefully examined by the test known as the Widal reaction and by other methods, and finally, the evidence pointed to a particular man. Investigation proved that this man, who had suffered from typhoid fever 10 years previously, had infected men in every ship in which he had been stationed. In all some 53 persons were infected, of whom 11 died. The following note was made upon the disposal of this man:

"From the naval point of view he was not a safe man to have in any ship where any number up to 900 men live under cramped conditions." He was accordingly invalided out of the Service, the medical officer of health ashore being warned about him.

An even more remarkable case, which illustrates how vigilant the naval doctor had to be, occurred in Portsmouth Harbour, in October, 1914, on board H.M.S. Euryalus. In this case some oysters had been bought from a local fishmonger, and were eaten at dinner, at 7.30 p.m., when most of the officers and ward-room servants partook of them. Next day the ship went to sea. Within 48 hours of eating the oysters several officers were attacked, and similar cases




ON BOARD A HOSPITAL SHIP.
A ward set apart for officers.

occurred among the ward-room servants, and within the next week other cases appeared. Finally, typhoid fever was diagnosed in the case of a lieutenant, a midshipman, and a marine servant. The oysters were traced to a contaminated bed, and in several specimens obtained the bacillus of typhoid fever was found. Unhappily there was no law to prevent oysters from this bed being sold in Portsmouth, and as ships were constantly coming and going to the harbour, the utmost vigilance became necessary, since a case of typhoid fever on board ship is an ever-present menace.

The efforts made to control typhoid fever met with full success, and except for an occasional case the disease did not show itself. On the other hand the naval doctors had to cope with an outbreak of cerebro-spinal fever (spotted fever) which reached the dimensions of 170 cases. A very small number of these cases occurred afloat, however; ten in the Impregnable, an establishment consisting of three ships, used for training purposes, and 12 in sea-going ships. As the means of propagation of this fever was not known, the outbreaks were difficult to cope with, but a solution of a more or less satisfactory kind was found in a careful search for "carriers" and in hygienic measures, the chief of which was good ventilation, the prevention of overcrowding, and personal cleanliness.

The outbreak, which was a land outbreak,


was prevented from going to sea—a tribute to the doctors who laboured to prevent it, and a tribute to the organizers who had made ready against such a chance. These organizers, Sir Arthur May and the men associated with him, were kept as fully informed of the movements of their enemy—disease—as were the admirals of the movements of the German fleet. Every week there came to Sir Arthur May's desk a report on the health of every unit, every destroyer as well as every super-Dreadnought. In that report exact figures were given, and an average presented. As a general rule, the average of sickness was a point per cent.; but if it rose for any reason, instantly the chiefs of the Medical Service knew that it had risen. It was as though the foe had been sighted upon the



1.



3.



4.

1. Cot-carrier on cushioned tressels, showing the rollers and movable tail-boards in their slots. 2. Tail-tail-board has been removed at one end for the purpose. 4. Tail-board replaced and patient ready to be
FOR TRANSFERRING SICK AND WOUNDED


horizon. The decks were cleared for action: measures of protection and measures of offence were initiated until the dangerous rise in the figures had declined again, and the enemy been driven back. Any case of infectious disease, measles or typhoid fever or any other fever, was notified when diagnosed, and transferred at once to an isolation hospital ashore. And all the men who had been in contact with it were watched to make sure that they had not been infected, or that, if infected, they would not spread infection from one unit to another.

These weekly health reports from the ships, from the North Sea, from the South Sea, from the Mediterranean, from the coasts of India, were, indeed, inspiring documents. Each of them told of honest work performed in the


light of an ever-present sense of duty, a love of the Service and a pride in it, and also in the "doctor-man's" own ship, which made the remarkable sick percentage—0·6—something more than a mere triumph of organization.

Thanks to these devoted ship's doctors the health of the Navy improved during the war in spite of shock and alarm, and the long weariness of inaction. In fact, the health of the Navy had never been so good. Writing in the first war number of *The Practitioner*, Surgeon-General Rolleston, R.N., stated that the health of the Navy had been "much better" in war than in peace time, and that the figures given (1 per cent. to 0·6 per cent.) would have been lower, but for the higher percentage incidence among the men of the Royal Naval Reserve and the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. "In two battleships with a complement of over 1,000 each," he wrote, "which I happened to visit on two successive days, there were only two men in the sick-bays. . . ."


Setting aside for the moment the work of inoculation and of inspection, two things undoubtedly contributed in an especial degree to this splendid result: these were improved systems of ventilation and the instruction in health matters given by the doctors to the crews. The latter was indeed a most important adjunct to success, for it achieved the double purpose of enlisting the sympathy of the men, and of opening their eyes to the dangers surrounding them. Lacking knowledge, a man is



2.



5.



6.

boards partially removed from their slots. 3. Canvas-cot being passed into carrier on the rollers. The hoisted out. 5. Patient hoisted. 6. Cot and carrier being passed outboard.

FROM SHIP TO HOSPITAL: A COT-CARRIER.



WATCHING A GERMAN CRUISER GO DOWN.
The sinking of the "Mainz" during the action off Heligoland, August 28, 1914.

apt to chafe under restraints placed upon him by his doctor; possessing that knowledge, he gladly accepts them, and may even carry them a stage farther on his own behalf. Sir Arthur May, whose policy was ever to encourage the friendliest relations between patient and doctor, both of whom, he was at pains to emphasize, he regarded as brother "sailor men," was an enthusiastic supporter of the lectures on health subjects which were a feature of battleship life. He reaped a speedy reward, for the men entered into the spirit of their medical officers. They showed their pleasure by taking the advice offered to them, and by spreading it; the effects were soon evident.

The lecturers spoke simply of the great fight with disease upon the issue of which so much depended. They told of the terrible effects of dirt and insanitary condition among men living a life aboard ship in quarters necessarily cramped; they indicated the dangers of bad teeth, of abuse of tobacco and alcohol, above all of venereal disease. Further, they gave instruction in first aid, so that during a battle, when the doctor could not be reached, help might be afforded to wounded comrades. The lectures gave the men a new interest, and helped to brighten the monotony of the long winter evenings, and they sowed valuable seed, the fruits of which were gathered during the course of the war.

But if this method was important, the work accomplished upon ventilation was revolutionary. Ventilation ashore is important, but not perhaps very interesting; ventilation upon a battleship proved to be often a matter of life and death. A battleship lived by her ventilation, for unless the air below decks was kept sweet and pure, disease had an opportunity; and in actual combat efficient ventilation was found to mean clear heads and eyes, and so to double the fighting capacity of the men in the gun turrets, the signallers and the telephone operators who were the nerves between brain and hand, between those who planned and those who executed.

The ventilation of many of the older ships was notoriously bad, and the crews suffered in consequence. In the presence of the fumes of exploded charges good shooting became difficult in the extreme. On the other hand, a man could not remain in that condition of physical well-being which was so essential to modern scientific fighting if he was being "blown away" by a strong blast of air pumped


into the room in which he worked. The difficulty had always been to find a method of ventilation which would ensure an evenly distributed supply of fresh air without draughts. The air should, it was seen, be "breathed" throughout the ship, not driven in blasts through it.

In 1912 a Committee, with Fleet Surgeon R. C. Munday as Secretary, was appointed by the Admiralty to investigate and report on the best methods of ventilating modern warships. It is no exaggeration to say that the work of this Committee was as important in its way as the work of those who devised the huge guns they did so much to render efficient. A new era in naval ventilation was inaugurated. By means of most ingenious devices a free and full supply of warmed air was secured for every part of the ship; while the ventilation of destroyers was improved to such an extent that even the fastest of them in the roughest sea could have their living spaces supplied with fresh air which might be warmed.

Many men had reason during the fierce hours of the Jutland battle of May 31–June 1, 1916, to bless these ventilation schemes. In the gun turrets lives were saved by them, while down in the bowels of the great ships activities were made possible which otherwise had been stayed from the outset of the engagement.

The Battle of Jutland Bank, however, was not the first engagement in which the naval surgeon had opportunities for practising his craft in actual warfare. In a hundred small affairs he was called upon to play his part, and played it as naval surgeons from the great Beatty, to whom Nelson addressed his last brave words, onwards have ever played their parts. At the Falkland Islands, at the Cocos Islands, in the harbour at Zanzibar, off Heligoland, and elsewhere the same heroism characterized this Service, and the same quiet, brave work was carried on.

It is impossible in a chapter such as this to do justice to all these deeds, and some must be passed over in silence; but a more or less careful survey is essential to a true understanding of the work which was accomplished, for our naval actions were very few as compared with the actions of the armies in the field, and each possessed special features in respect of time, place and circumstance.



AN AMBULANCE TABLE.

The Mono-wheel Stretcher and Carrier devised by the Rev. Bevill Close, Chaplain, R.N. This stretcher was used in the trenches of the Royal Naval Division at Gallipoli.

The naval action off Heligoland in August, 1914, stands first in chronological order and offers a good illustration of the state of affairs in the early days of the war. Happily an excellent record of its medical aspect was preserved by a surgeon who played his part in it.*

"On 28th August (says this writer) 'action' was sounded off. Two cruisers (supposed enemy's ships) having been suddenly observed had caused us to take up 'stations' somewhat

* *The Naval Action off Heligoland.* By Fleet Surgeon Walter Hopkins, R.N. Journal of the Royal Naval Medical Service.

earlier than had been anticipated. It was quickly discovered, however, that the cruisers were our own. Shortly after, therefore, breakfast was piped to each watch in turn, and at about 7 a.m. the enemy's ships were actually sighted. From this time on to close upon 2 p.m. successive actions were fought between various opposing forces in the two fleets.

"The day was fine and calm, while the sun gleamed through a very hazy atmosphere in which patches of fog shortened up the visual distance from time to time. I remained on the upper deck during the earlier part of the affair and found it a most interesting and inspiring sight to watch our destroyers and the *Arethusa* and her divisions dashing at full speed after the enemy, while soon the frequent spurts of flame from their sides, the following reports and the columns of water and spray thrown up by the enemy's shells pitching short or over began to create in most of us a suppressed excitement which we had not hitherto experienced, telling us that the 'real thing' had begun, that an action was actually in progress.

"Shortly our interest was to multiply four-fold when the order to fire our own guns was given. After a time, shells beginning to drop ominously near, I retired to my station, a selected spot just below the waterline in the after bread-room, one of the few available places in a ship of this class where some of my party of first-aid men could be accommodated; the other half of the party, in charge of the sick-berth steward, being situated at a similar station forward. This period one found trying. For knowledge as to how matters were progressing we had to rely upon fragments of information shouted down the nearest hatchway from someone in communication with those on the upper deck.

"The rat-tat-tat! rat, tat, tat, tat, on our sides from time to time as we got into the thick of it told us plainly of shells pitching short and bursting, whose fragments struck but did not penetrate the ship's skin; it was a weird sound, occasionally varied by a tremendous 'woomp,' which once at least made the paymaster, who was reclining near me on a flour-sack, and myself look hard at the side close by us, where we fully expected, for the moment, to see water coming in. As a matter of fact, this shell entered some 40 feet away, bursting an entry into the Lieutenant-Commander's cabin, while its solid nose finally

fetched up in the wardroom where later on it was christened 'our honorary member.' For this trophy I believe we have the Mainz or the Köln to thank. The wardroom steward found a similar piece of shell in his hammock that night. It had penetrated the ship's side and a bulkhead before finally choosing its highly suitable place of rest.

"The Fearless appears to have borne a somewhat charmed life—a large number of shells pitched just short and just over her—she was hit fair and square by seven, one of which played a lot of havoc with middle deck forward and the mess gear there. Her sides showed some 23 holes of varying sizes, and yet her list of casualties was only eight wounded, none dangerously . . . for suppressed excitement and vivid interest I should say that the seeker after excitement could scarcely ask for more than a modern naval action."

The eight wounded did not give the doctor very much work to do. But the engagement revealed the fact that work in the distributing station of a warship during an action was of a kind to test the strongest nerves, and that many precautions would require to be taken. The doctor was ordered presently to go aboard the *Laertes*, which had been taken in tow, and there he found some severe cases awaiting him, and he says:


"Arriving on board I found the worst case was that of a young stoker in a serious condition from shock and loss of blood. He had sustained several shell wounds, one of which involved the left tibia and fibula. . . . Around this patient the deck was covered in blood and so slippery that I had to send for cloths to be put down to enable me to keep a footing. Near by were two others, somewhat less severely wounded, lying on the deck, while just beneath me lay two figures covered with the Union Jack."

Thanks to the skill of their comrades the wounded had all received first aid, but still considerable hæmorrhage was going on.


From this engagement dated the knowledge that in modern naval action wounds were either very slight or else terribly severe. Further, the part which burns were to play in swelling the casualty lists became evident. Huge areas of burning were seen, "the whole length of the upper limb from finger-tips to shoulder as well as the face, ears, neck, and upper part of the chest." Many of these burns were inflicted by the flash of bursting shells, yet it was

interesting to note that the eyes themselves almost invariably escaped injury by the flame. This happened even in cases in which the eyebrows and eyelashes had been singed and the skin of the eyelids badly damaged. It proved that "instantaneous" as was the flash of the bursting shells, the power of the eye to detect it and protect itself against it was quicker in its action. The eye saw and the brain understood in time to cause the eyelid to shut before the scorching sheet of flame could do its work.

These burns were not the same as those caused by explosions in gun turrets which had been hit, and which will be described below



AN AMBULANCE SLING
Devised by Fleet-Surgeon P. H. Boyden.



"SHE'S GONE, SIR: SHE'S GONE!": THE LAST OF THE "EMDEN," NOVEMBER 9, 1914.
Men of H.M.A.S. "Sydney" cheering after defeating the German commerce raider.

They were usually superficial, and it was to the credit of the naval doctors on board ship and in the shore hospitals that in very many instances injuries that seemed at first sight to be irreparable were so treated that complete recovery took place and deformity was avoided. Dressings of picric acid were found to be most beneficial, though other forms of treatment had their adherents—notably the method of irrigating by salt solution, introduced by Sir Almroth Wright during the war and described fully in an earlier chapter.*

Of the total of 27 cases seen by this doctor there were 5 burns or scalds and 22 shell and splinter wounds, 10 of the latter cases being Germans. The wounds were mostly lacerated and punctured, deep and shallow, of all shapes and sizes; several of them involved bones.

The men bore their wounds with cheerful unconcern. A young sub-lieutenant was found sitting in the wardroom with his leg, which had a shell wound in it, stuck up on a chair. His only anxiety was to get back to his work. Other men showed the same spirit, and the Germans were not behind their captors—and rescuers—in this.

The wounds healed well, but it became clear that the fact of being at sea did not save a wounded sailor from the danger of blood-poisoning—it had been believed that on the sea this danger was small. The problem of the cleansing of wounds which loomed so large in the military hospitals of France and Belgium at this time therefore engaged the attention of the naval service also, and solutions of it were quickly devised.

This battle of Heligoland was a small affair, then, from the doctor's point of view. The list of casualties, when comparison is made with the Army, seems almost ridiculous. Any street accident might yield as many. But it would be a grave mistake to suppose that on this account the lessons learned were unimportant. On the contrary, they were of the highest importance. They showed the doctors what to expect, and they revealed the fact that in any great engagement, where smaller craft might be expected to suffer heavily, the casualties would be severe. New ideas were generated; new possibilities opened up; new methods called for.

The naval medical authorities at Whitehall profited by the lesson in various ways. A Committee presided over by Sir Watson

Cheyne was set to work to consider the question of the treatment of wounds; the treatment of burns received attention; the danger from the fumes of bursting shells, which tended to sink down on the decks and penetrate to the cabins below and so to cause suffocation, was considered and the testing of respirators begun forthwith. These steps were doubtless in advance of actual requirements, but on the day of the Battle of Jutland Bank they had their justification.

Experience dictated the modification of other arrangements and more especially of the arrangements for the safety of the wounded during action. The sick bay was the ship's hospital during periods of inaction, and, thanks to the work of Fleet Surgeon D. W. Hewitt and Fleet Surgeon M. C. Langford, these ships' hospitals were splendidly equipped and had been brought to a state of the highest efficiency. No pains had been spared to make them as complete as possible, and it was easy to carry out any surgical measures required in them. But their position on deck, above the armour, rendered them quite unsuitable for use during a battle, and against this contingency other rooms had been prepared and set apart—a precaution the wisdom of which was shown when a sick bay and all it contained was smashed to pieces by a bursting shell.

These other rooms were known as distributing stations, and were situated one forward and one aft, under the armour. It was essential that the transference of material from the sick bay to the distributing stations should take place at the earliest possible moment after the call "prepare for action," and as action might be imminent at any moment, day or night, it was necessary that all preparations should be so far advanced that little or nothing remained to be done when the order was given.

As little gear as possible was, therefore, left in the sick bay. Further, those responsible were advised as to their duties and trained in them. When action was sounded, the water-tight compartments were, of course, closed and inter-communication became impossible; therefore mistakes made or omissions committed could not be rectified. A man had then to do the best he could with the material to his hand and he might be situated in very terrible circumstances for the doing of it. Equipment of the distributing stations was, therefore, of paramount importance and received careful thought and consideration.

* See Vol. VI, p. 57.

The difficulty was space. But ingenuity solved this and made it possible to have an operating table fully rigged, dressings, antiseptics, and other appliances always ready, and also to prepare accommodation for the wounded. As we shall presently see, these rooms were destined to witness some strange and terrible spectacles during the course of the fighting. For accommodation of the wounded after action, the best available compartments in proximity were used; by special fittings previously prepared the wounded could be slung in stretchers from the roof, one tier of stretchers above the other, and in this way a large number could be taken in at one time.

Ashore, preparations as complete as those made afloat had been instituted, and the wounded from the Heligoland battle were thus soon brought to great comfort in well-equipped hospitals. Some of them came to the Royal Naval Hospital at Chatham, which they reached within 24 hours of being struck down. In each case a dose of anti-tetanic serum was given to secure against possible attack by lockjaw and careful operative measures carried out. An arm, a leg, and an eye were part of the price paid by the sailors for this engagement, and some of the other conditions were of a terrible character, yet the eases did exceedingly well; the great cheerfulness of the men and their



FROM THE GERMAN COMMERCE RAIDER.

Prisoners from the "Emden" going through physical drill exercise on board a British warship. Captain Müller (x), who commanded the "Emden."



LANDING WOUNDED AT PLYMOUTH.

heroic attitude even when suffering the most acute pain won the admiration of doctors and nurses alike.

The hospital accommodation at the disposal of the Navy was not extensive when judged by Army standards, but of its efficiency no doubt could exist. There were, in the first place, the three great naval hospitals—Haslar (Plymouth), accommodating 1,434 patients; Plymouth, accommodating 1,173 patients; and Chatham, accommodating 1,107 patients. In addition to these, the Navy had numerous hospitals in the British Isles accommodating some 11,129 patients, and further possessed a hospital for mental diseases at Great Yarmouth. Abroad, there were naval hospitals at Gibraltar and Malta and other points.

Nor was private help wanting to add to these establishments. Lady Bute converted her house, Mount Stuart, Isle of Bute, into a Naval hospital, and it was fully occupied from the beginning of the war. It had beds for 125 patients and proved a boon, both on account




of its beautiful position and healthy surroundings. Lady Nunburnholme also made generous offers of hospital accommodation, and provided for Naval patients a fully equipped hospital for 220 patients in a locality where Naval hospital accommodation was much needed. The British Red Cross Society equipped a hospital for 160 patients at Truro, Cornwall, and the Church Army one for 100



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK, MAY 31, 1916: ADMIRAL BEATTY'S
(From photographs taken)



BATTLE-CRUISERS ENGAGING THE GERMAN BATTLE-CRUISERS.
(During the battle.)



patients at Dunvael, Lanark. Princess Christian provided funds with which the former bed accommodation at Queensferry Hospital was doubled, and Canadian women generously subscribed a sum of £40,000 with which a new block was built at Haslar Hospital. In addition, many kind offers of help flowed in to the Admiralty from all parts of the country, and were accepted.

The wounded men reached these hospitals by hospital ship and hospital train, though in many cases they were landed directly by the warship in which they had been serving. Weather and

FOR REST AND TREATMENT.

From hospital ship to train. A train at Toulon with wounded passengers about to start for the Riviera.

circumstance were the determining factors, for manifestly in a gale transferences could not be made at sea, and, again, a ship which had been badly hit might not stay in her rush for port to unload wounded. As a rule the Grand Fleet returned to its anchorages with the wounded aboard; these were then transhipped to the hospital ships, which brought them to some landing port whence they were removed to a local hospital, or if able to travel comfortably, put on the ambulance trains for transport to one or other of the naval hospitals.

The Navy owned 12 of these hospital ships, splendid vessels fitted with every kind of surgical appliance and fully staffed by doctors. Of these 12, nine were constantly employed in home waters and three in the Mediterranean. The trains were as well equipped as the ships, and the hammock-like cots gave them a distinctly naval appearance. The system was an admirable one, for it allowed of thorough cleansing and ensured that no bumping should disturb the severely wounded. These trains, like those in use for the transport of soldiers, were hospitals on wheels in a true sense, so that it may be said that from the moment he reached the distributing station on his own ship a man was never out of the doctor's hands or cut off

from expert attention. As the distributing station was waiting to receive him, in most cases, the moment he fell, his chances of salvation were excellent. It is not possible to avoid comparing this happy lot with that of the wounded soldier eking out terrible hours upon the No-man's Land, beyond the reach of succour until darkness should have covered him. Yet it must not be forgotten that against that the sailor had to face the perpetual peril of mine and submarine and the chance that at any moment his ship might be sunk and all chance of salvation lost—for how should a sorely wounded man fare in the great hazard of the sea?

The naval medical service played its part in handling the great exodus from Belgium in August, 1914, and also in treating the wounded from the ill-starred Antwerp expedition. Men from the latter were taken to the Chatham and Plymouth hospitals; wounded Belgian soldiers were transported across the Channel in the hospital ships *Plassy* and *Magie*, and about 2,000 wounded French soldiers from Dunkirk to Cherbourg in the hospital ship *China*. The medical officers of these ships had their hands very full during the voyages. The wounds seen were of incredible severity in many cases, for at that period field treat-


ment was not in the advanced stage to which it came later.

Before leaving this part of the subject the directions issued to the medical staff of the *Neptune* in 1913 for dealing with wounded may be alluded to. They serve to show how well the difficulties likely to be encountered had been forestalled; they show also how true an estimate of the actual needs had been formed. The directions were divided into three parts, those "On Leaving Port," those "During Action," and those "After the Action." With the first two we have already been concerned; the last provided that as soon as the action was over or there was a lull the stretcher parties would march to the places appointed, as shown by luggage labels attached to the stretchers. They would take first-aid bags of dressings with them and hot coffee or beef-tea and drinking vessels. On arrival they would move the wounded from the turret or other place to the deck and out of the way of the guns. They would render first aid but not otherwise move the wounded.

The senior medical officer would then make a rapid tour of the upper deck to estimate the number and condition of the wounded, and give any necessary hypodermic injections, attaching labels to prevent the possibility of duplication. At the same time the staff surgeon would inspect



THE SURVIVORS OF H.M.S. "NATAL."
About to proceed on leave after receiving new kit.



THE BATTLE OFF THE FALKLANDS, DECEMBER 8, 1914.
First stage of the action between the British Battle-Cruisers and the German Armoured Cruisers.

the main deck. During a lull the surgeons would supervise the removal of the wounded to a place below the armour, where they would remain under care till the end of the action.

Of great naval actions in the early days of the war there were few, if indeed we except the battle in the Pacific and the battle of the Falkland Isles. About the former there is nothing to be said so far as the surgeons are concerned, for unhappily the disaster which overwhelmed our ships was fatal to doctor and patient alike. Of the latter there is only this to be said—the total British casualties in this great battle were 10 men killed and 16 wounded. This battle, indeed, illustrated the tremendous hazard of naval warfare and showed to what an extent the fate of ships and of men is determined by gun power and gun reach.

But if great actions were very few, there occurred a number of small actions of a deeply interesting kind. Of these the two which command attention most evidently were that between the Pegasus and the Königsberg and that between the Sydney and the Emden, for these were fights of a special character, each showing relatively heavy casualties and each revealing the naval surgeon in a heroic light.

The action between the Pegasus and the Königsberg took place off Zanzibar on the morning of September 20, 1914. The Pegasus was refitting and was therefore taken unawares, and though a brave resistance was offered, she suffered heavily, being literally battered to pieces. In consequence the surgeon, Fleet Surgeon A. J. Hewitt, R.N., found himself faced with the following casualty list—24 men of the Pegasus and 1 native servant killed, 8 officers and 69 men wounded. Of the 3 officers and 25 men admitted to the European hospital 2 officers and 4 men died the same day, and subsequently 8 more men died of their wounds.

When the action began, two collecting stations for the wounded were selected, the stokers' mess deck forward on the lower deck below the sick bay and the torpedo flat aft, on the lower deck below and forward of the ward-room. The deck of these spaces was about four to six inches below the water-line. The sick berth steward had charge of one station and he was assisted by a cook from the galley, the foremost stretcher party and fore-castle party, the other station was in charge of the ship's surgeon, who was assisted by one cook and the after stretcher parties and the poop bearer party. On action being sounded the cooks brought with them to their respec-

tive stations a "fanny" of hot water and some cold water.

Each gun had been supplied with a canvas bag containing a tourniquet, in case of bleeding, bandages, and other appliances. These bags were secured under the shields of the guns. A similar bag had been supplied to the fore-bridge, and various other precautions, which were now fully justified, had been taken.

In his report on the action published in the "Journal of the Royal Naval Medical Service" Fleet Surgeon Hewitt stated that the most remarkable feature of the wounds was the large number of minute superficial wounds and burns looking like the pitting of black powder, also the small penetrating power of the fragments in open spaces like the upper deck. The danger zone, so far as life was concerned, seemed to be confined to a small area round the bursting space, and although the initial velocity of the fragments appeared to be very great, this seemed to diminish rapidly, perhaps owing to the irregularity of their shape. For example, a large number of fragments were removed at a depth of from two to four inches, some embedded in bone and some in the soft tissues. In two penetrating wounds of the skull the entrance wounds were of identical shape and size with the shell fragments found, but in neither case did the missile penetrate more than four inches. A leading seaman had his right arm so shattered that a primary amputation was necessary, but a fragment of the same shell hit the brass buckle of his belt, breaking it but not even bruising the abdomen. "Small fragments" (continued Fleet Surgeon Hewitt) "were also the cause of the loss of four eyes, and I am of opinion that a pair of motor goggles would have saved all these. A case of aneurysmal varix occurred in the right common carotid and jugular vessels caused by a minute particle of shell which probably could have been stopped by a linen collar. In my opinion a coat of light chain armour, or even leather, with a pair of goggles made from toughened motor screen glass would be invaluable to captains of destroyers, navigators and others in exposed positions who are likely to encounter ships armed with similar guns."

These suggestions were made at a period long before our soldiers and those of our Allies wore helmets in the trenches; they were reproduced in an article on the need of protective shields and helmets which appeared in *The Times* in the summer of 1915, and the effects of which were soon evident in France. Thus the



SURVIVORS OF H.M.S. "MAJESTIC," MAY 27, 1915.
Eight minutes after the warship was torpedoed by a submarine.

experience gained in Zanzibar was destined to help in the agitation which secured for our soldiers the great additional safeguard which helmets proved to be.

Many of the wounds met with in the *Pegasus* were of a terrible description and showed the devastating effect of naval gunfire. A leading stoker had his shoulder smashed to pulp, another poor fellow had both eyes and the whole upper part of his face shot away, broken limbs and lacerated flesh were seen on every hand.

"Most of the casualties," the doctor wrote, "occurred on the upper deck, and the scene that this presented can scarcely be imagined. Yet there was very little noise on board from the wounded, and one was impressed by the death-like silence between the periods of appalling din caused by the salvos. Although the ship was in harbour and only a short distance from the shore no one attempted to jump overboard and there was no panic. The *moral* of the men was magnificent."

In this inferno the doctor, Fleet Surgeon Hewitt, went about his work according to the grand tradition of the service he represented. The fumes of the high explosive powder had a stupefying effect, causing a feeling of dizziness; the bursting of the shells smote the decks with blasts of air which had an unnerving effect; but the good work was not suffered to fail on that account. Indeed, the awful scene, so far as it affected himself, was dismissed by the doctor in a line: "I personally had been

breathing more deeply than normal in assisting a wounded man up a ladder from the after torpedo-flat where these fumes were particularly dense, and experienced a feeling of nausea and dizziness. For several days afterwards on deep breathing one seemed to exhale the fumes."

The wounded were taken from the *Pegasus* by boats from the cable-layer *Banffshire* as soon as the firing ceased. All had first aid dressings applied and nearly all the serious cases had had a hypodermic injection of morphia. All were landed within an hour. The landing was difficult owing to a rapidly ebbing tide and boats being required to return and stand by the ship as soon as the wounded were landed, for it looked as if it would be necessary to abandon the ship.

Probably this action was, individually, the most terrible of the first year of war, so far as the doctor was concerned. Fleet Surgeon Hewitt faced his ordeal single-handed, and splendidly did he vindicate the good name of the medical service. His quiet courage and his ability undoubtedly went far to mitigate a most fearful situation, to save gallant lives, and to relieve the pains of those sorely injured.

The action between the *Sydney* and the *Emden* attracted the attention of the whole world. The exploits of the German raider had added to her name a romantic association; her destruction, when it came, was hailed with feelings in which admiration had a large place.

The *Emden* was sighted about 9 a.m. and the

battle began shortly afterwards. The doctors soon found themselves busy. The senior medical officer had begun a tour of the guns as soon as the raider was sighted, to see if the first-aid bags were ready, but before he could return to his station the guns of the Sydney had opened fire. The Emden soon returned the fire and within five to ten minutes from the beginning of the action the first wounded man was brought below. He had a fracture of the right leg and thirteen shell wounds and was in great pain. Following him came a stream of wounded demanding immediate attention. The second case had been shot in the chest and the apex of the heart was seen beating through a hole in the chest wall. Many of the other wounds were of a dreadful character.

At 11.15 a.m. the order "Cease fire" was sounded. The medical staff had now been working two hours in a confined atmosphere at a temperature of 105° F.

"During the action," wrote Surgeon Leonard Darby, R.A.N., in the "Journal of the Royal Naval Medical Service," "the space below was very congested, the tunnel being full of men belonging to the ammunition and fire parties. At the best of times there is little room here, so the regular transport of wounded was considerably impeded. All the time we knew not how the fight was going—we could only hear orders for ammunition and the continual rapid fire of our guns. At one time, when we heeled over and the operating table took charge, it

seemed as though the ship had been badly hit, but we soon found out that this was only due to a sudden alteration of course."


The wounded meantime were in considerable pain and every effort was being made to help them. As soon as possible after the action the sick bay was prepared as an operating theatre. This meant hard work, because during the battle this room had been flooded with water from the fire mains. Moreover, the task of getting the wounded up to the operating room and dealing with them was not made easier by the continual arrival of new patients in the shape of German sailors fished up out of the water, most of whom were in a very collapsed state indeed. One man had been in the shark-infested sea for nine hours, but was brought round after some trouble and next day was none the worse for his immersion.

Operative surgery was therefore not begun in earnest until the day after the battle. This was inevitable, for the wounded demanded constant attention at first. Early in the morning of that day (November 10, 1914) the Sydney had reached Cocos Island and shipped the Eastern Extension Telegraph Company's Surgeon, Dr. H. S. Ollerhead, to help with the German wounded. This addition to the staff was welcome—the Sydney carried two medical officers of her own—and operations began at once.

"Our chief difficulties" (wrote Surgeon Darby) "were lack of space and trained



SURVIVORS IN BLANKETS AFTER BEING RESCUED FROM THE DISASTER.



AFTER THE NAVAL ACTION OFF DOGGER BANK, JANUARY 24, 1915.
Vice-Admiral Beatty's flagship "Lion" towed into port after the British victory in the North Sea.

assistance, and we had used up all the sterile towels on the day of the action; also there was much delay in getting instruments re-sterilized. . . . Late in the day we organized a theatre staff from volunteers. They helped to clear up, held basins, handed stores and dressings, and did much remarkably useful work with a composure that was astonishing, as they were present at many bloody operations to which none of them previously had been in any way accustomed. Surgeon Wild acted as anæsthetist and Dr. Ollerhead assisted me with the operations."

The operations went on all day, the doctors as usual refusing to spare themselves until their patients had been given every possible attention. Next day the Sydney returned to the Emden, which was flying signals of distress, and arrangements began for transferring about 80 German wounded. All available stretchers, hammocks and cots were sent to the Emden with a party under Dr. Ollerhead, who did not return till the last patient left the ship some four hours later. Even then some men who had got ashore could not be brought off till next day, November 12.

This transhipping was an exceedingly difficult business, as there was a huge surf running on the beach where the Emden was ashore; the collecting and lowering of the wounded into the boat was attended, unavoidably, by a good deal of pain. The wounded were taken aboard the Sydney in the cots and stretchers by means of davits, but there was no davit available in the Emden. One German surgeon was uninjured, but he had been unable to do much, having had 24 hours with so many wounded on a battered ship, with none of his staff left and with very few dressings, lotions, or instruments.

"The Emden," says Surgeon Darby, "was riddled with gaping holes; it was with difficulty one could walk about her decks, and she was gutted with fire. The wounds of the Germans who were brought off to the Sydney by this time, only 24 to 30 hours after injury, were practically all very septic, with maggots $\frac{1}{4}$ in. in length crawling over them. Little had been done for them, but now they were attended to by our party and transhipped to us as quickly as possible."

This fresh rush of cases soon crowded out the wardroom and the sick bay had to be used as a dressing station. Soon there was scarcely any room to move, for besides the 70 wounded received that day there were over 100 prisoners

and 20 Chinamen from the sunken collier which had been attending on the Emden. Operations had thus to be discontinued at noon on November 11, but they began again at 6 p.m. and did not stop till 4.30 a.m. on November 12—a period of 10½ hours of continuous operating. The German surgeon stood at the table beside his English professional brethren and took his share of the work.

"All this time," Surgeon Darby concluded, "we had to organize and arrange a hospital with its equipment and the feeding and nursing of patients; up to now this was turned over to the first-aid and volunteer nursing party, and they received the cases straight from the theatre. In the case of the Germans we had a party told off from the prisoners to help our staff. We had two large wards, the wardroom and the waist deck, and various special wards, a few cabins being given up by officers. . . . By nightfall (November 12) one could look round with a feeling that some impression had been made on the work, and later that evening the German surgeon and myself went round sorting out the cases we could send off next day to the Empress of Russia, an armed liner which had been dispatched to help us with the wounded and relieve us of our 230 extra men. It would be difficult," added this gallant medical officer, "to imagine a more severe test for the medical staff of a cruiser." All credit then to those who faced the test and emerged from it triumphantly.

These two isolated actions show clearly of what splendid material our Naval Medical Service was constituted. Aboard ship the doctors combined with their professional knowledge a seaman's power of adapting himself to circumstances and of adapting circumstances to the need of the moment.

This spirit was shown again and again, but never more conspicuously than on board the Tiger during the North Sea action of January 24, 1915. The Tiger went into action on that day at 7.15 a.m., and at 9.3 the first shot was fired. Fleet Surgeon John R. Muir had originally intended to deal with the cases seriatim as they came to him, operating on each one at once; he soon found that this was an utopian idea. The violent concussion from a gun turret near by made operation an utter impossibility and necessitated the use of first-aid methods only. At 10.50 an urgent telephone message came down to the doctor from "Q" turret asking for a medical officer and an ambulance



AT THE DARDANELLES.

Admiral de Robeck inspecting sailors on board H.M.S. "Canopus."

party. The doctor, however, knew that it was impossible to handle men in stretchers through the working chambers and going on deck was not to be thought of. He refused the request and soon found he had done wisely. The wounded readily found their way to the dressing stations themselves.

About 11.30 a 12 in. shell entered the distributing office on the upper deck. This shell was very destructive because it exploded upwards.

"It blew up the trap hatch in the roof of the distributing office," wrote Fleet Surgeon Muir ("Journal of the Royal Naval Medical Service"), "which communicated with the gun control tower, killed one officer who was standing on the hatch, seriously wounded another, and severely scorched the face of a third, all of whom were in the gun control tower. In its explosion in the distributing office it killed six men and wounded five men. In the port 6 in. gun control the same shell killed a boy and injured a midshipman and two boys.

"An urgent telephone message was received from the gun control tower and an ambulance party was sent off in charge of a surgeon to see what could be done. This party had consider-

able difficulties, as the lights had all gone out, the alley way was wrecked and the escape up past the distributing office, which was the only possible route, was blown to bits and threatened by fire from the intelligence office, which was immediately below the distributing office. Thanks to the heroism and bravery displayed by a sick berth attendant and two boys all the cases mentioned except one, who was discovered after the action was over, were brought down to the forward distributing station.


"When they arrived seven were dead or expired as they were laid on the floor. The dead were laid on one side as decently and quickly as possible, covered with a flag, and the wounded attended to. . . . There was complete absence of moaning or complaints. The explosion of the shells caused a black, oily, sooty deposit in the skin of nearly all these patients. This was readily removed with turpentine, but nothing else seemed to have any effect. Soap and water and spirit were useless."

During the summer and autumn of 1915 the naval doctor had opened up to him a new field of operation in the Dardanelles. Throughout the Gallipoli campaign the naval medical service cooperated with that of the Army,



FROM THE DARDANELLES.

Wounded being landed from a hospital ship at Plymouth.



AT THE DARDANELLES.

Transferring wounded from a British warship.

rendering most valuable assistance and, indeed, so far solving the difficulty of the transport of wounded from the shore as to convert a situation of grave anxiety into one of comparative security. Naval hospital ships were in attendance, and one of the largest of these was the *Soudan*, of which Fleet Surgeon Trevor


Collingwood, R.N., was the Senior Medical Officer. On February 25 this ship arrived at Tenedos, and in the evening of the same day seven wounded were transferred to her from the *Agamemnon*, which showed signs of having been hit by a shell. The following day a party of men landed from the *Vengeance*

and the Irresistible and more wounded arrived. Other wounded came in, and then, on March 6, two flight officers fell from a considerable height into the sea and had to be succoured. Wounded were taken in from time to time until March 22, when the Soudan left for Malta and landed 113 cases. It is interesting to note that there were no cases of gangrene and only one case of tetanus, which resulted from shell wounds; this must be considered somewhat exceptional.

This first voyage of the hospital ship took place before the great landing on the beach, and it compares strangely with the second voyage, which ended on April 25, when the Soudan

appeared again off the entrance to the Dardanelles. By the evening of that day no fewer than 10 military officers and 342 soldiers had been received; by 8 p.m. a total of 430 cases were aboard, and the ship drew off in order to allow the staff to work in quietness. They performed numerous operations, and then on April 27 all the wounded were transferred to a so-called "hospital carrier ship" and taken to Alexandria. Subsequently, in May, 411 Anzac soldiers were treated in five days. During this period only four naval wounded were received from the Amethyst, which had been under fire at Smyrna—a fact which emphasized once more the difference between sea and land fighting.

The hospital ship Rewa also rendered splendid service at the Gallipoli beaches between June and August 1915, during which time she carried some 7,000 cases. It was noted by her medical officers that while it seemed to matter little what types of antiseptics they used to clean the wounds, efficient cleansing was all-important; and they observed further that the length of time which elapsed between the infliction of a wound and its attention on board the ship was an important determining factor upon the



HEROES OF THE JUTLAND BANK BATTLE.

Wounded seamen enjoying a trip in Surrey.

result of treatment. The doctors had an interesting proof of their view, for they had cases sent to them from three different beaches, each one situated at a different distance from the ship than the others.

Hellas Beach provided by far the most septic type of case. The average time which elapsed between wounding and arrival on board was from 22 to 24 hours, some cases spending as long as three days on the journey. The reason lay in the distance of the front-line trenches from the beach and also the exposed character of the intervening territory. These patients too suffered much from insects and were hoisted aboard, in the words of the medical staff, "black with flies," and very soon after the first load or two had been received "the decks and wards are also black with flies." Many wounds were found on arrival to be already swarming with maggots. Gas gangrene came from this beach and from this beach only.

The best beach was the Anzac Beach, where the front line of trenches was near the shore, and the average time taken to put men on board after they had been wounded was five to six hours. Also the Anzac soldiers were very fine men physically; and the flies were fewer. Suvla came between Hellas and Anzac, the time here being between nine and ten hours.

This experience corresponded with the general experience of the war and made rapid evacuation of wounded a matter of paramount importance everywhere. It bore out the view stated by Sir Almroth Wright that it was not the wound which killed, but the dirt—bacteria and flies' eggs—introduced into the wound.

The experience, however, meant that when a batch of wounded arrived in this and other hospital ships the staffs had to work, literally, till they dropped. Every moment of delay meant so much more danger for the wounded—not merely so much more discomfort. Great as the tasks were which often faced these doctors, they did not spare themselves; in four trips they actually performed 383 operations of various kinds, and that number does not include a host of smaller measures: for example, easy removal of bullets. A number of interesting facts emerged from this huge body of work, not the least of which was that the men as a whole took anaesthetics exceedingly well. The reason was, perhaps, that alcohol had not been consumed in any quantity for a long time.



IN A SUBMARINE.

Men from the engine room enjoying the sunshine.

"Most text-books," wrote one of the doctors, "give tobacco as a reason for anæsthetic difficulties, but this did not seem to be the case, as smoking amongst all of them is quite heavy, especially cigarettes, and indeed a good proportion of them arrived on the table with a cigarette in their mouth."

Nursing sisters of the Queen Alexandra's R.N. Nursing Service rendered splendid help in these hospital ships which lay off the terrible Gallipoli beaches, and their task was no less onerous and exacting than that of the doctors. They did not spare themselves in any way, and an idea of what they had to do may be gathered from the following account written by one of them, Nursing Sister Hilda F. Chibnall ("Journal of the Royal Naval Medical Service"):—

"Our chief difficulties are the endless struggles to get them (the patients) properly clean and decently clothed, to endeavour to combat the acute collapse, exhaustion, and mental shock from which many of them are suffering when they reach us—especially those from Hellas Beach, who have often been lying out for 24 or 36 hours without food, exposed to the sun and tormented with flies—and the hopelessness of trying to make comfortable the men who are wounded in so many different places that they can find no easy position in

which to rest. They all arrive on board in the clothes they have worn for many weeks or months; these are usually quite stiff with blood and sand, alive with vermin, and almost black with flies. . . . The dressings are done under some difficulty, especially in rough weather, and the most fortunate people are those who are slightly built and can easily squeeze between the cots; light wooden dressing tables have been made by the carpenter's crew, easily carried along the gangway but large enough to hold all that is necessary.

"Work in the operating theatres is very different from anything we have ever seen before. . . . The patients have had no previous preparation. They are carried straight on to the table and their dirty blood-stained clothes have to be cut right off and the skin scrubbed clean before any actual surgery can begin.

"Owing to the tremendous number of dressings done in the ship each day we find that keeping up the stock is a very big item in our work. There is no time to cut up dressings when the ship is full of patients, but after landing them at a port on our return voyage to the Peninsula we all work hard to make up and sterilize sufficient dressings for the next trip. As our numbers are limited only one night sister can be on duty at a time, and with so many cases in the ship her task is not particularly easy. However, on one point we are all agreed—that we have never before nursed men who suffered so much and complained so little nor seen patients show so much unselfishness towards each other and gratitude to those who are nursing them."

These nursing sisters thus rendered noble service and took great risks, for it is the way of the Navy to discount danger in the discharge of duty and the hospital ships came very close to the Beaches. They were not attacked from the shore, for the Turk fought cleanly; but the presence of German submarines was an ever present danger, the German being a very different kind of opponent from the Turk. Moreover there was danger from the air. On one occasion the hospital ship *Soudan*, to the work of which reference has already been made, had a most unpleasant experience. Two trawlers were alongside taking away minor cases when a hostile aeroplane appeared overhead and dropped four bombs quite near the ship; two of the bombs indeed "straddled" her, throwing up fountains of water on explosion. There were no other

ships near at the time and the *Soudan* was lying outside the temporary boom well away from the transports. On another occasion bombs from an aeroplane fell near this vessel and it was considered advisable to have two large red canvas crosses sewn on to the upper surface of the fore and aft awnings in the hope that they might be seen and respected.

It is impossible in this chapter to deal with the activities of the naval doctor in other spheres than those which have been indicated, but mention must be made in passing of the British Naval Mission to Serbia and of the heroic work accomplished during the epidemic of typhus which raged in that unhappy country. A very full report on this epidemic was presented by Temporary Surgeon Merewether, R.N., who saw it for himself and took part in the brave efforts to cope with it, thus incurring the gravest personal risk.

Mention must also be made of the work done by naval doctors in connexion with the Royal Naval Air Service. This work was exceedingly interesting because experience soon showed that a high measure of physical fitness was essential to a successful pilot and hence upon the doctor devolved the heavy responsibility of selecting or rejecting candidates for the service. Some curious conditions were also met with, not the least of these being "Aerosthenia," to use the word coined for it by Staff Surgeon Hardy Wells. It was found occasionally among aerial pupils; the pupil pilot was not comfortable in his flying; he had not got that self-confidence which was so necessary. He was perhaps too keenly apprehensive lest he might make a bad landing or might get an engine failure over bad landing ground and smash the machine. He went on flying, nevertheless, hoping that he might overcome this feeling. But he did not overcome it; instead he slept badly, worried, and eventually got into a really nervous state. It was found that there was only one thing to be done in those cases. The pupil had to give up flying; he was not suited for it. Men of proved courage sometimes suffered from this trouble, and the conclusion was that "it is not given to every man to fly; and to be left alone in the wide air-world with no one to consult is a strange feeling."

Height effects were another type of condition upon which the naval air service doctor had to keep a watchful eye. The trouble arose usually through too rapid a descent being



AFTER THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK.

Wounded Heroes in a Hospital Ship.

made. In regard to the question of age, it was found that 30 was the highest limit advisable in selecting pilots. At first 23 was fixed as the lowest because it was feared that boys under that age would be reckless in their handling of the machines, but this rule was later relaxed, and indeed experience showed that lads of 18 and 19 are most excellent material and that very few of them were rejected subsequently owing to failure to show aptitude for flying.


These many activities gave to the naval medical service a broad and catholic character, but the actual work upon the fighting ships remained the chief claim to honour. How supremely heroic that work was was not revealed until the terrible day of May 31, 1916, when the Battle of Jutland Bank, the greatest naval engagement in history, was joined.

It is clearly impossible to do full justice to the work of the naval doctors in this engagement, but quite enough material is available to justify unstinted admiration and to evoke heartfelt gratitude in every mind. In all the great traditions of the service no nobler record can be found than the record of the men who, in darkness and danger, laboured without thought of self or safety for the benefit of their friends and the honour of their uniform.

Of all the wonderful deeds of that great day perhaps those enacted upon the *Warrior* were the most wonderful. The *Warrior* belonged to Sir Robert Arbuthnot's squadron, and at 6.16 in the evening with the *Defence* was observed passing down between the engaged lines under a very heavy fire. The *Defence*, flying Rear-Admiral Arbuthnot's flag, disappeared and the *Warrior* passed to the rear disabled. They had only a short time before been observed in action with an enemy light cruiser which was subsequently seen to sink. The ships' companies of both the *Defence* and *Black Prince* were lost, but that of the *Warrior* was saved by the *Engadine*.

On the afternoon of May 31 the doctors of the *Warrior* were in their dressing stations making ready for the gun work ahead. After the first few minutes of the action, however, a terrible catastrophe occurred which in an instant cut down their effectives and threw upon those who survived a terrible new burden of responsibility. A shell crashed into the ship and destroyed utterly the after dressing station; other shells followed, and finally a fire broke out resulting in many casualties.

As soon as possible, and while firing was still in progress, one of the surgeons went along the



AT WORK IN A STROKEHOLD IN A BATTLESHIP.

upper deck and the after part of the ship and rendered first aid, and in this he was assisted by the doctor in charge of the wrecked station, who had escaped miraculously. The wounded were carried along the decks from the scene of the disaster to the forward station, and this dangerous work was carried out in most efficient and speedy fashion.

Then, to add to the terrible character of the situation, the electric lights went out and gas and smoke began to fill the mess decks and especially the forward dressing station; and although candles and an electric torch had been provided it was very difficult to see owing to the dense smoke and consequent irritation of the eyes.

These various circumstances rendered the dressing station a kind of inferno. But courage and devotion discounted even so great troubles. As soon as the watertight doors, which shut off one part of the ship from the other parts, were opened, the doctors went forth again with their stretcher parties to collect wounded from the various parts of the ship and to carry them to the sick bay and fore-castle mess deck, which were still intact. Mess tables were rapidly cleared away and the wounded brought to a place of comfort with all speed.

But down in the forward dressing station the conditions had meanwhile become so bad that the atmosphere was dangerous by reason of the gas and smoke in it. One of the doctors was actually "gassed," but soon recovered; on recovery he began his work again without a moment's delay or hesitation, for there was much work waiting to be accomplished.

When the wounded were collected all serious cases were placed in beds on deck and in cots in the sick bay. Some of the wounded died here, but none from bleeding, for efficient dressings had been applied. About 9.30 the Senior Medical Officer was ready to begin his operating work.

A bathroom forward of the sick bay was selected as an operating theatre. As soon as it was ready the surgeons set to work, for several men required their attention very badly. All through the long hours they toiled, knowing little or nothing of what passed upon the sea about them, of the position of their own ship, of the chances of personal safety; perhaps caring little; toiling with dogged perseverance towards the aim of bringing help and comfort to their fellow sailors.

The work went on without a break, and by

the light of candles, till 4 a.m. of June 1, when all the wounded had been attended to and made comfortable. Indeed, at this time many of them were asleep. But the work was as yet only half done, for just as the surgeons completed their task orders came to abandon the ship; the *Warrior*, which was then being towed by the *Engadine*, was sinking.

It was well that this order came after a measure of comfort had been restored, and after the patients had recovered from the effects of the anaesthetics administered to them, for there was a heavy sea running and the ship was moving restlessly as she went to her doom. Fierce was the ordeal awaiting the doctors, who must transfer their thirty-one patients in that maelstrom.

Yet the task was carried out, in spite of the sea and the rolling and plunging ships. Life-belts were put on the patients and in cots, stretchers, and sick-bay iron cots they were moved from one vessel to the other. All watertight rooms were then rapidly closed. The *Warrior* by this time was very low in the water, and might sink at any moment; numerous seas swept the upper deck as she lay secured to the *Engadine*. It was difficult work to prevent the wounded from being soaked through. The stretchers and cots were held up by men, walking on either side of them; but the movements of the ships rendered this task exceedingly dangerous and difficult, and unfortunately one man fell overboard owing to the breaking of a stretcher. He was, however, rescued by an officer of the *Engadine*, but subsequently died. The heroic character of that rescue between the bumping, plunging ships may be left to the imagination.

The injuries received by members of the *Warrior's* crew were of the most terrible kind. Several bodies were rent in pieces; many limbs were torn from bodies; some men were stripped naked. Among the operations performed by the light of the guttering candles, upon a sinking ship in a gale of wind, were amputations, ligaturing of bleeding vessels, and removal of shell splinters.

Magnificent as was this conduct, it was typical of that prevailing throughout the whole fleet; indeed on such a night of heroes discrimination between gallant deeds was almost impossible. Nevertheless a few other cases may be mentioned in order to show how universal was the response to duty by the medical service. In the *Lion*, for example,


the trouble from gas fumes was experienced just as it had been on the *Warrior*. Respirators and anti-gas goggles were issued to each turret, compartment and mess deck. As a result of this precaution no case of "gassing" occurred. Nearly all the casualties occurred within the first half-hour of action. During the first lull the medical officers emerged from their stations to make a tour of inspection. The scenes that greeted them beggar description. Most of the wounded, however, had already been dressed temporarily. Tourniquets had been applied in one or two cases, and hæmorrhage thus arrested. But many of the wounded were terribly mutilated and broken.

Happily in this ship the light did not go out—though precaution against this eventuality had been taken—and so it was possible to get to work in comparatively good conditions. As usual, morphia was administered at once, and acted like a charm, relieving the terrible sufferings of the stricken men.

Thrice during the evening the battle was renewed so far as this ship was concerned, but as each lull came it was found possible to remove the wounded to a place of safety by means of the admirable Neil Robertson stretcher (devised in 1910 by the late Fleet Surgeon Neil Robertson, R.N.) which proved so great an addition to the equipment of the naval doctor.

After the action was over the injured were nursed carefully throughout the night, and were supplied with warm blankets, hot-water bottles and hot beef-tea and medical comforts. Some of the men were terribly burned and others mutilated, so that all hope of saving life was vain.

The burns, as has already been indicated, were of two kinds, both of which were seen in large numbers in the Jutland battle—burns from exploded gun-charges and burns from bursting shells. The former type were occasioned when an enemy shell managed to ignite some of our explosives in gun turrets. In these cases the bodies of the unhappy victims were often charred instantly so that they resembled mummies; it was an instantaneous process of death, and but rarely cases of this kind concerned the surgeon. The other type of burn was due to a shell bursting near the victim, and often involved large areas of his skin. It was, however, a superficial burn and very amenable to treatment. Various forms of treatment were employed, but probably that by picric



THE NEIL ROBERTSON HAMMOCK STRETCHER.

acid was the most successful. The objection to picric acid, however, was that it adhered, rendering dressing difficult and painful. So a trial was given to the method of using liquid paraffin, recommended by Dr. Sandfort, Médecin-Major in the French Army. The preparation was used at a high temperature; it solidified and formed a coating which excluded the air, stopped pain in ten to fifteen minutes, and afforded painless redressings.


Not until 7.30 a.m. on June 1 was it thought safe to bring the *Lion's* wounded up from below. The Vice-Admiral's and Captain's cabins were accordingly cleaned, dried, and thoroughly ventilated, a process which occupied a considerable time as they were both full of water and smoke, and the Captain's bathroom was rigged up as an operating theatre. By 8.45 a.m. operations began, and 51 cases were dealt with. Almost 50 per cent. of these cases had burns of the face and hands alone, the reason being that the clothing completely protected the rest of the body against the momentary flash of the bursting shells. The staff worked continuously in the operating theatre till 12.15 a.m. on June 2—some 16 hours—when all the wounded had been attended to.

"The cheerfulness and pluck of the wounded," an observer stated, "were simply magnificent. Content to be alive, they waited to be dressed with a silent patience admired by all. In every case we found that the wounds were

far more severe than we had been led to anticipate by the attitude of the patient."

This heroic attitude was commented upon by all the doctors; one of them also told how on glancing over the side of the ship when going into action he saw a raft crowded with "sailor-men" from one of the sunken vessels. As the raft floated by the men gave three lusty cheers, and then began to sing "Keep the Home Fires Burning" until the battleship was out of earshot.

These terrible series of operations, coming upon the top of the fierce strain of action, were



THE NEIL ROBERTSON STRETCHER IN TOPS.

the doctor's most severe test. On some of the light cruisers 10 and 11 hours were spent by the surgeon in disposing of the mass of work awaiting him; during this period there was no pause, a new case being hurried on to the table as soon as the case just finished with had been removed. Nor was this a mere mechanical exercise. The doctor had to exercise judgment upon matters affecting the whole future life of young men in their prime. Upon the answer to the question, Must this limb be

amputated at once or can it be saved? depended often the issues of life and death.

It is, indeed, remarkable that these men were able to carry out their work with so great success, and the value of a piece of advice given to his colleagues by one of the surgeons who bore the brunt of the action is obvious:

"It is necessary," he declared, "that every Naval Medical Officer should keep himself physically fit, as the strain of a prolonged night action is severe."

It was found that hospital ships could hope to play but a small part in a great naval battle, for those ships which had most wounded aboard were necessarily those which had been most severely handled. Those ships were forced in some cases to return quickly to their bases and there was no time to unload wounded, nor, indeed, any necessity since they could be unloaded in much greater comfort in port. Nevertheless, many incidents of the Jutland fight pointed to the conclusion that "rescue ships" might fulfil a useful purpose by picking up men out of the water and restoring them. In the heat of action fighting vessels could not, of course, undertake this work.

The true sphere of the hospital ship, as has already been indicated, was found to lie between the anchorages of the Grand Fleet and the home ports. Many ingenious devices were in use for conveying the wounded from the battleship to the hospital ship (several of which are illustrated in the present chapter). The hospital ships performed splendid service, and to their good equipment and excellent organization it was due that the horrors of the great fight were not prolonged an hour more than was necessary.

Of the men themselves, the doctors, little



THE NEIL ROBERTSON STRETCHER IN STROKEHOLDS.

requires to be said. Their work, indeed, revealed them and was their true mirror. No less was it the mirror of the staffs who co-operated with them, the sick berth stewards, the cooks, the firemen. Nor must the surgeon probationers be passed without mention. Medical students, they showed again and again superb qualities of courage and endurance and much more than justified those who had tried the experiment of appointing them. Finally, the Admiralty surgeons and agents, civil practitioners appointed at most large and small ports round the British Isles, rendered valuable service, one of them treating no fewer than 43 wounded from the Battle of Jutland Bank. There were some 1,122 medical officers serving in the British Navy, including 528 entered for temporary service; and in addition there were 370 surgeon probationers who held the relative rank of Sub-Lieutenant R.N.V.R.

In the list of naval honours appended to Sir John Jellicoe's dispatch on the Battle of Jutland Bank the doctors were well represented. Fleet Surgeon Alexander Maclean was recommended for promotion because of his gallant conduct when "the medical staff was seriously depleted by casualties, and the wounded and dying had to be dressed under very difficult conditions on the mess deck, which was flooded with a foot of water from damaged fire mains." Fleet Surgeon Penfold, though knocked down by a bursting shell and severely bruised and shaken, went on with his work "for forty

hours without rest." He also was recommended. Surgeon Quine, R.N.V.R., received mention because of his "assiduous care of and attention to the wounded, of whom he was in sole charge for over forty hours," the Staff Surgeon having been severely wounded. Staff Surgeon Bickford had actually to be ordered to place himself on the sick list, and his superior officer declared of him that "though severely wounded by a shell splinter, he persisted in attending to the wounded, only yielding to a direct order from myself." A surgeon probationer who amputated a leg in the dark also received honourable mention.

These cases, as will be evident from what has been said, represent the hundreds of others of which no record has been preserved; they show that from top to bottom the Royal Naval Medical Service, like the Royal Navy itself, was sound, a splendid organization with splendid traditions of service, and with a sense of duty and of honour which was stronger than death. This grand body of men placed England in its debt a hundred times; to its Chief, Sir Arthur May, and his staff, the Empire likewise owed her thanks. Upon these men devolved indeed a heavy responsibility. They were the guardians of the guardians of the Empire; day and night their vigil continued, for to their hands had been entrusted the health, the well-being and the happiness, and so the efficiency, of the Royal Navy during the years of its supreme trial.



ON BOARD A PATROL SHIP.

CHAPTER CXLV.

THE SENUSSI AND WESTERN EGYPT.

THE WESTERN FRONTIER OF EGYPT AND THE SENUSSI DANGER—TRIPOLI AND CYRENAICA—BRITISH, ITALIAN AND FRENCH OBJECTS—THE SENUSSI SECT—ITS PART IN RECENT WARS—TURCO-GERMAN CONSPIRACY AGAINST ITALY—ITALIAN OPERATIONS 1914-15—TURCO-GERMAN PLANS FOR SENUSSI INVASION OF EGYPT—THE KAISER AS "PROTECTOR OF ISLAM"—BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN—GENERAL MAXWELL'S OFFENSIVE—ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATIONS—THE ACTION ON CHRISTMAS DAY, 1915—GENERAL PEYTON'S OPERATIONS—DEFEAT AND CAPTURE OF GAAFER PASHA—ARMOURED CARS IN THE DESERT—THE CREW OF THE TARA AND THEIR RELEASE—OCCUPATION OF THE OASES—SIR ARCHIBALD MURRAY'S COMMAND IN EGYPT—THE PACIFICATION OF DARFUR.

THE general position of Egypt in relation to the world war and the first attack, in February, 1915, by the Turks on the Suez Canal have been described in previous chapters. That the Turks would endeavour to invade Egypt from Syria was clearly foreseen from the moment when, through German influences and the ambition of Enver Pasha, the Ottoman Empire was drawn into the war on the side of the Central Powers. An attack upon Egypt from the west—from the direction of Tripoli—was not, however, anticipated. Therefore when in November, 1915, it was announced that it had been necessary to withdraw the Egyptian garrisons from the western frontier posts surprise was felt at this extension of the theatre of war. Shortly afterwards a considerable force of Arabs, Turks and Berbers, under the leadership of Sidi Ahmed, the head of the Senussi fraternity of Moslems, invaded Western Egypt from Cyrenaica, and were joined by some thousands of Egyptian Bedouin. After a campaign which lasted about five months the invaders were decisively beaten, and the danger to Egypt from that quarter, if not wholly removed, was rendered nearly negligible.

Although it was hardly realized, the danger to Egypt from the Senussi movement had been

very serious—much more serious than the Turkish attempts made from the Sinai Peninsula to cross the Suez Canal. General Sir John Maxwell, then commanding the forces in Egypt, put it on record that throughout the summer and autumn of 1915 his principal cause of anxiety was the possibility of trouble on the Western Frontier, for such trouble "might lead to serious religious and internal disorders." No danger of that kind arose in connexion with the Suez Canal operations. A *jihad* proclaimed by the Senussi sheikh might, however, have met with a wide response in Egypt, for the order of which he was the chief was the most powerful Mahomedan sect in North-East Africa, and the only brotherhood exercising sovereign rights and possessing a disciplined armed force on a permanent war footing. Up to 1915 the Senussi had maintained friendly relations with Egypt, but the position was anomalous, for Sidi Ahmed had for many years fought hard to oppose the extension of French authority in the Central Sudan, and he was, when the war in Europe broke out, conducting a campaign against the Italians in Cyrenaica.

Tripoli and Cyrenaica (Bengazi) had, it will be remembered, become Italian possessions as the result of Italy's war with Turkey in 1911-12. The Turks, however, had never withdrawn the

whole of their troops from Cyrenaica, and these, aided by the Senussi, continued the conflict with the Italians. At the end of 1914 the whole of the interior of Cyrenaica was held by the Senussi, and, as the western border of Egypt is conterminous with Cyrenaica, the Senussi had every facility they needed to cross the frontier, where, except along the Mediterranean and at the oasis of Siwa, there were no forces to oppose them. Nevertheless, but for Turco-German intrigues Sidi Ahmed would not have turned his troops against Egypt. The Turks, as has been indicated, had never loyally attempted to carry out the provisions



BRIGADIER-GENERAL H. T. LUKIN,
Commanded the South African Troops, Yeomanry,
and Territorial Infantry and Artillery.



Elliott & Fry

MAJOR-GENERAL A. WALLACE,
Commanded Western Frontier Force.

of the Treaty of Lausanne, which closed the Tripoli war, and their endeavours to stir up trouble for the Italians were greatly aided by German agents. Long before Italy had entered into the European conflict the familiar German methods were employed to undermine her authority in North Africa. The efforts of the Turks and Germans succeeded in provoking revolts throughout Tripoli of so serious a character that in view of the European situation the Italians withdrew their garrisons from the whole of the hinterland, and in Cyrenaica they were unable to occupy that part of the coastline which adjoined the Egyptian frontier. This was an opportunity of which the Germans quickly took advantage when the European War began. Large quantities of ammunition, field and other guns, German and Turkish officers, well supplied with treasure, were smuggled into Cyrenaica in innocent-looking neutral vessels. The presence of these officers, and the arms and money they brought with them, strengthened German influence with the Senussi, and together with the activity, later on, of German submarines off the Cyrenaican coast, finally induced Sidi Ahmed to break off his friendly relations with Egypt.

The invasion of Western Egypt was thus the sequel to the campaigns in Tripoli and Cyrenaica, and was directly traceable to Turco-German

influence. Italy's part in the war in Africa has not hitherto been told, nor its relation to the invasion of Western Egypt made clear. Neither has the significance of the Senussi movement in relation to the European Powers whom it has affected been adequately described. In this chapter, therefore, these matters are dealt with in sufficient fullness to make the whole question intelligible. It will be seen that in the campaign against the Senussi the British, Italians and French were not animated by any anti-Moslem feeling; their objects were purely political. The following pages consider first the position of the Senussi fraternity and their first clash with the European nations who had partitioned Africa among themselves, then the campaign in Tripoli and Cyrenaica, and finally the story of the failure of the invasion of Western Egypt—a failure due to the able dispositions of General Sir John Maxwell, to the leadership of Major-General A. Wallace, C.B., and Major-General W. E. Peyton, C.B., and to the gallantry of the force they commanded. That force was notable in its composition as representing almost every part of the British Empire. It included battalions from the British Army, Indians, Australians, New Zealanders, and South Africans, the last-named making their first appearance on any battlefield outside the bounds of the southern half of the African Continent.

The Senussi sect is of modern origin. Its founder, Sidi or Seyid—*i.e.* Lord—Mahommed ben Ali, was a native of Algeria, and was called es Senussi, after a famous saint whose *marabout* is near Tlemcen. He was recognized as belonging to the *Ashraf* or descendants of Mahomet, and in early life was a student of theology at Fez. Attached originally to the Khadirites, he founded his first monastery in Arabia in 1835. His connexion with the puritan sect of the Wahhabis led to his being suspect by the *ulema* of Mecca, and shortly afterwards he removed to Cyrenaica (or Bengazi, as it was called by its Turkish masters), where in the hill country behind the ancient seaport of Derna he built the Zawia Baida, or White Monastery, which for years was his headquarters. Es Senussi speedily gained a large following, notwithstanding the alleged heterodoxy of his theology. He himself claimed to belong to the orthodox Malikite rite, and sought to revive the faith and usages of the early days of Islam. The distinctive tenets of the Senussi it is not necessary to discuss here; it may, however, be mentioned that to the Prophet's prohibition of alcohol was added a prohibition of the use of tobacco. Religious tenets apart, the Senussi fraternity differed from other Moslem brotherhoods in the exercise of a steady and continuous political influence. Mahommed es Senussi became the



BRIGADIER-GENERAL J. D. T. TYNDALE BISCOE (x)
With members of his staff.



NATIVE DRIVERS' LEADING A STRING OF CAMELS ALONG THE DABAA RAILWAY LINE.


virtual ruler of Cyrenaica, so much so that he aroused the jealousy of the Turks, who reinforced their garrisons and made efforts to strengthen their position. The White Monastery was inconveniently near the coast and the Turkish garrison at Derna, and es Senussi, fearing a surprise raid, moved south—in 1855—to the edge of the Libyan Desert. There in the oasis of Jarabub (now the most westerly point of Egyptian territory) he built another monastery, and there he died, some four or five years later. A splendid tomb-mosque marks his last resting-place. He was succeeded by his younger son, known as Senussi el Mahdi, who enjoyed his father's reputation for sanctity and greatly extended the political influence of the fraternity. Not only were the Arabs* of Cyrenaica ever ready to obey him, but the Bedouin of Western Egypt embraced the doctrines of the sect, and a *Zawia* was established in the oasis of Siwa—the oasis in which is the once famous oracle of Jupiter Ammon, consulted by Alexander the Great. West of Siwa throughout the Libyan Desert Senussi el Mahdi was the acknowledged sovereign of all the wandering tribes, and from them and from the Arabs of Cyrenaica he drew his standing army. Of greater advantage, however, to Senussi el Mahdi's revenues and prestige than his lordship of half a million square miles of the Eastern Sahara and the allegiance of the turbulent Arabs of Cyrenaica was the dominating influence he possessed over Wadai, Kanem, and the other States of the Central Sudan, from Nigeria in the west to Darfur in the east. The power of the Senussi and his reputed hostility to Christians led him to be regarded as a source of danger to the European Powers with possessions in North and North Central Africa, while Abdul Hamid, then Sultan of Turkey, discerned in him a possible rival for the Caliphate. The unwelcome attentions of the Pasha of Bengazi, who, on Abdul Hamid's instructions, visited Jarabub, eventually led Senussi el Mahdi to retire into the heart of the Libyan Desert. The new headquarters of the fraternity were established at Jof, in the Kufra oases, as inaccessible a spot

for an invader to reach as any that exists in regions at all traversable. At Kufra, too, the Senussi sheikh was midway between Wadai and Cyrenaica and was in touch with the Egyptian Sudan through Darfur and with Egypt through Siwa and the string of oases lying west of the Nile from Aswan to Cairo. Many of the inhabitants of these oases—Dakhla, Baharia, Farafra and Kharga—were Senussites.

Senussi el Mahdi refused to have anything to do with Mahommed Ahmed, the Dongolose boat-builder who proclaimed himself *the Mahdi*—*i.e.*, “the expected guide” of Islam—and wrested the whole of the Eastern Sudan from Egypt. The Senussi sheikh had already established friendly relations with Egypt, and his cousin and agent, who lived at Alexandria, was a much-courted and wealthy nobleman, lavish in his hospitality to Europeans and Egyptians alike. Senussi's disapproval of the Mahdist movement in the Eastern Sudan won for him the esteem of Sir Reginald Wingate, and until 1915 the relations between the Egyptian and Sudanese authorities and the Senussi continued friendly—no doubt in part because the political ambitions of the Senussi were not directed to the Nile valley. The reconquest of the Eastern Sudan by Anglo-Egyptian forces under Lord Kitchener in 1896–98 did not affect adversely the relations between the Senussi and Egypt; indeed, as illustrating the anti-Mahdist tendencies of the Senussi, it may be noted that the revolt in Darfur in 1888-89 against the Khalifa had been successful because the tribesmen used Senussi's name, though they received no material help from him.

To the French Senussi el Mahdi offered bitter opposition, but his action proved that he was fighting mainly as a temporal sovereign to preserve his authority over the Central Sudan States. All the merchandise from these semi-Arabized negro sultanates which fringe the southern edge of the desert passed northward through the Sahara, along caravan routes controlled by the Senussites. (The merchandise included valuable consignments of eunuchs for the harems of the East, and slaves smuggled into Egypt and Turkey as domestic servants.) The Central Sudan had come nominally within the French sphere of influence as the result of agreements concluded in 1898 and 1899 with Great Britain, and in 1901 the French began to occupy the country. At once they encountered the opposition of the Senussi, the first

* It is customary and convenient, though strictly incorrect, to speak of the inhabitants of Cyrenaica as “Arabs.” There are genuine Arab tribes among them but the majority of the Cyrenaicans are of Libyan (Berber) stock. They are of the same race as the Tunisians, Algerians and Moors, a distinctly white race which has adopted Islam and the Arab language. In Cyrenaica the Berbers are perhaps more Arabized than in the other Barbary States.



THE WHOLE AREA OF SENUSSI ACTIVITY.

campaign being for the possession of Kanem, a State on the north east shores of Lake Chad. It ended in the defeat of the Senussi in January, 1902, and the loss of Kanem so greatly affected Sheikh Senussi el Mahdi that his death in May following was attributed to grief. He was succeeded as Grand Sheikh of the order by his nephew, who was still head of the fraternity in 1915, Sidi Ahmed-el-Sherif, generally styled in Egypt Seyid Ahmed, or the Grand Senussi.

Sidi Ahmed continued the struggle against the French until 1913-14. The conquest of Wadai, during 1909-10, by the French was a great blow to the power of the Senussi, and the capture in 1913 of Ain Galakka in Borku by Col. Largeau* wrested from the Senussi the last stronghold they held in the Sudan. This was followed by the occupation by the French in July, 1914, of Bardai, the chief town in the

* Col. Largeau later on organized the French expedition which invaded Cameroon from Lake Chad. Returning to France, he was killed at Verdun. (See Chap. CXXXI.)

Tibesti Highlands—a great mountain range stretching north to the confines of Tripoli. Sidi Ahmed was definitely ejected from the French sphere; into the Libyan Desert they made no attempt to follow him. It would have brought them into the sphere reserved by international agreement to Great Britain. Two facts are noteworthy regarding the long struggle between the French and the Senussi—first, that the majority of the forces which opposed the French were not the immediate followers of the Senussi, but the troops of the States, such as Wadai, whose rulers were virtual vassals of the Senussi; secondly, that the struggle against the spiritual head of a widely spread Moslem fraternity did not arouse any special anti-Christian feeling among the Moslems of North Africa. There was no *jih'd*, no holy war, partly because, perhaps, the true Arabs do not form even a fourth of the population of North Africa, and on the Berbers—the great mass of the people—Moslem doctrines sit somewhat lightly.

It will have been noticed that the final defeat of the Senussi in the Central Sudan occurred in the middle of 1914, just before the great war in Europe broke out. During the latter stages of that conflict Sidi Ahmed had also been busily engaged in the north. As has been shown, relations between the Senussi and the Turks had been far from cordial, but in 1910 Sidi Ahmed received at Kufra an embassy from the Young Turks, who sought to enlist the sheikh's aid in the Pan-Islamic ambitions which they took over from Abdul Hamid. There is evidence to show that the Senussi sheikh did not share those ambitions. Whatever may have been the views of his grandfather and uncle, his predecessors in the headship of the Order, Sidi Ahmed, who was well versed in European politics, and, through his many agents abroad, in close touch with the outer world, set at least as much store on his position as a temporal sovereign as on his spiritual lordship. But when in September, 1911, Italy declared war upon Turkey and invaded Tripoli and Cyrenaica he was moved to action.

It is necessary to remember the distinction between these two provinces, the custom in England to include Cyrenaica in Tripoli being

misleading. They formed separate governments under the Turks, and remain separate provinces under the Italians.* Though they have many characteristics in common they are distinct entities separated by the Gulf of Sidra. Tripoli adjoins Tunisia; Cyrenaica Egypt, and had the fate of Tripoli alone been in question the Senussi sheikh might have remained indifferent to Italian action, Tripoli not being directly in the Senussi sphere of influence. In Cyrenaica it was otherwise. Here, as has been seen, the Senussi were in strength, and it was through its seaports—Bengazi, Derna, etc.—that, with or without the permission of the Turks, they drew their supplies of arms and munitions and passed the merchandise coming from the Central Sudan. Through Cyrenaica also the Senussi largely maintained their contact with Egypt, along the great limestone tableland, the Libyan Plateau, which forms the land bridge between Egypt and North Africa. Farther south the arid expanse of the Libyan desert renders extremely difficult any communication with Egypt from the west. The control of Cyrenaica, itself mainly a sterile rocky tableland,

*The common name for Tripoli and Cyrenaica under Italian rule is Libya.



A COUNCIL OF WAR IN THE DESERT.

was therefore a vital point in Senussi policy. Turkish control of the seaports was one thing, but Sidi Ahmed knew that Italian control of the coast would be another, and for him a far more disagreeable thing. He had lost, or was losing, the Central Sudan to the French; therefore it was the more needful to keep open his road to the sea. Little as he loved the Ottomans, in his own interests he instructed his adherents in Cyrenaica to help Enver Pasha (then Enver Bey), who commanded the Turkish troops in Cyrenaica, and the Arabs formed a valuable part of Enver's army.

In October, 1912, the threatening situation in the Balkans induced Turkey to choose the lesser of two evils, and on the 18th of that month the Treaty of Ouchy (Lausanne) was signed, Turkey renouncing her sovereignty in Tripoli and Cyrenaica,* and agreeing to withdraw her troops. By a clause which later on gave opportunity for much intrigue on the part of the Turks, the Italians, in accord with their wish to deal fairly with Moslem susceptibilities, agreed to recognize the religious authority of the Sultan as Caliph. When the Treaty of Ouchy was signed the Italians held in Cyrenaica only the chief seaports, Bengazi, Derna, Bombah and Tobruk. Their authority extended inland nowhere more than three or four miles. The position in Tripoli was similar and the energies of the Italians were directed first to the pacification of that province, whose inhabitants showed less determined opposition to the extension of Italian authority than did

* By the Turks, as already stated, Cyrenaica was known as Bengazi, after its chief town. Another usual name for the province is Barca.

the Arabs of Cyrenaica. This task, the occupation and pacification of the hinterland of Tripoli, was completed in August, 1914, the month in which the Great War began. Besides Tripoli proper the Italians had occupied Ghadames and Ghat, as well as the sub-province of Fezzan, with its capital of Murzuk. This had not been accomplished without considerable fighting, but the opposition was less serious than might have been expected. By the French authorities in Tunisia and Algeria the advent of the Italians was officially and cordially welcomed as putting an end to a state of anarchy on the frontier which had caused unrest in the French Sahara.

When the pacification of Tripoli was nearly complete the Italians turned their attention seriously to Cyrenaica, where, towards the end of 1913, the situation was much the same as it had been twelve months previously—that is, the Italians held only the seaports. General Ameglio was then appointed Governor of Cyrenaica, and a considerable force was placed under his command for the reduction of that province. He had made a promising beginning, when, in view of the situation in Europe, he received orders to suspend operations. Italy was still a member of the Triple Alliance, but she had doubts as to the loyalty of her Allies, doubts that diplomatic revelations proved to be well founded. She therefore determined not to lock up large bodies of troops in Africa when their services might be needed in a nearer theatre of war. Her original rupture with Turkey had been precipitated by the knowledge of German designs to obtain a footing on the Mediterranean in agreement with the Porte,



INDIAN TROOPS IN THE DESERT.



TAKING CAMELS TO RAILHEAD, DABAA.

while her conduct of the war of 1911-12 had been hampered by objections raised by Austria-Hungary to action in Albania and the Aegean, and she now had to encounter covert intrigues directed to undermining her position in her newly acquired territory.

Bad faith on the part of the Turks Italy had experienced ever since the signing of the treaty which was supposed to have ended the war in Tripoli. From Tripoli itself the Ottoman troops had been withdrawn, but a considerable body of Turks remained in Cyrenaica. There, with the aid of the Senussi forces, they carried on the war. The Italian troops captured during the year of fighting were not released. For several weeks after the peace treaty was signed Enver Pasha himself continued to direct the operations against the Italians; on his return to Constantinople, Aziz Bey took up the command, and held it till the end of June, 1913. After the departure of Aziz Turkish officers continued to arrive in Cyrenaica—the Italian Government was in possession of the names of over 100 of these gentry—and arms and ammunition reached the Turco-Arab force by various means, chiefly through the small ports between Tobruk and the Egyptian frontier. That the Italian Government acted wisely in ordering the suspension of operations was soon demonstrated.

In September, 1914, the Fezzani broke out in revolt, and the whole of the hinterland of Tripoli was shortly involved in the movement. This conspiracy against Italian rule was attributed to the intrigues of German-inspired Turkish agents, though at the time the Italians made no charges in public against either Turkey or Germany. The German method of stirring up discontent in the over-sea possessions

of States with which she was at peace had been exposed in the French Yellow Book issued just after the war began. It contained a secret memorandum, dated Berlin, March 19, 1913, in which the writer stated that it was —

absolutely necessary that we [Germany] should open up relations by means of well-chosen organizations with influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algeria and Morocco, in order to prepare the measures which would be necessary in the case of a European war. Of course, in case of war we should openly recognize these secret allies; and on the conclusion of peace we should secure to them the advantages which they had gained. These aims are capable of realization. The first attempt which was made some years ago opened up for us the desired relations. Unfortunately these relations were not sufficiently consolidated. Whether we like it or not, it will be necessary to make preparations of this kind, in order to bring a campaign rapidly to a conclusion.

Tripoli and Cyrenaica were not mentioned in this secret Memorandum, but the Italians knew that it was idle to expect that German agents would refrain from practising in Libya the methods adopted elsewhere in North Africa. They had had already proof of the manner in which Germany regarded her obligations to her Ally, for in the war of 1911-12 German naval and military men in the Turkish service had been ordered to take part in the operations against Italy—action which contrasted with that of Great Britain, who during the continuance of the war recalled her officers serving in the Turkish navy.* Sincerely desirous, if it could be done with honour, of keeping out of the great war which was devastating Europe, the Italian Government ignored as far as

* Long afterwards—on July 6, 1916—the German Government officially announced that “in the case of men who by supreme orders took part in the Italo-Turkish war of 1911-12, one year of war is calculated for pension purposes.” The text of the order was republished in the Italian newspaper, *Idea Nazionale*, in September, 1916.



A COLUMN OF BRITISH ARMoured CARS PASSING A CAMEL CORPS COLUMN.



CAMEL TRANSPORT LEAVING FOR THE FRONT.

possible the repeated provocations from Turco-German sources; they even passed over at the time the proclamation of the Holy War against the Italians. It was not until August 20, 1915, that Italy again declared war on Turkey. Towards Germany, for reasons not directly connected with the situation in Africa, she was still more patient. At the outset of the war Germany had sought to take advantage of Italy's position to make Tripoli the base of intrigues with the natives of Tunisia and Algeria against the French. The arrest and deportation by the Italians of a party of Arabic-speaking German officers who reached Tripoli and were making for the Tunisian frontier, showed that Italy was loyal to her international obligations. Thereafter the intrigues were directed into what proved a more fruitful channel, the stirring up of disaffection in Tripoli and bringing pressure to bear on the Senussi sheikh to induce him to abandon his friendly attitude towards Egypt. In July, 1915, the Italians, through the seizure of documents in the houses of Arab notables living in Tripoli city and in Derna, became possessed of many details of the movement conducted by German-inspired Turkish agents, which had already led to the revolt in Fezzan and other parts of the province of Tripoli. Events in Cyrenaica developed somewhat later; it is necessary to deal first with the rebellion in Tripoli.

In the operations for the occupation of the hinterland of Tripoli the Italians employed, in addition to troops from Italy, a considerable number of men from their Red Sea colony of Eritrea, as well as native—*i.e.*, Libyan—partisans. The Eritrean troops are nearly all Abyssinians—excellent soldiers and Christians. Priests of the Abyssinian Church accompanied them as chaplains. Their faith and race distinguished them sharply from the Arabs and Berbers, and their loyalty and bravery were unquestioned. It was otherwise with some of the tribes who had joined the Italian standard. On March 3, 1914, Col. Miani, with a force which was mainly composed of 2,000 Eritreans and 1,200 auxiliaries (Libyans), occupied Murzuk, the chief town in Fezzan, and a column under Col. Giannini occupied Ghat—600 miles from the coast—on August 12 following. Thus every important point in the hinterland was in Italian occupation, and an era of peace appeared to have dawned. Appearances were deceptive for towards the

end of September the Fezzani suddenly attacked small Italian garrisons between Murzuk and the coast and inflicted serious losses on the Italians. At first the authorities believed that they had only to deal with a local affair, but the movement spread, and at the end of November the Italian Government directed that Fezzan should be evacuated. The gallant Col. Miani and his troops fought their way back to the coast *via* Sokna. This withdrawal left the garrison of Ghat isolated, while that of Ghadames was also in a perilous position. Both Ghadames and Ghat are situated in oases of the Sahara on the caravan route from Nigeria to Tripoli; ancient towns, now in decay, famed as entrepôts for European and Sudanese merchandise. The townsmen were fairly friendly to the Italians, but could afford them no protection against the nomads of the desert. For the troops to cut their way north to the coast was impossible, and that reinforcements would reach them in time was most unlikely. In this extremity the French Government came to their aid, although not yet allied to Italy. In Africa, indeed, the solidarity of European interests was recognized by all the Powers except Germany. Both Ghat and Ghadames are close to the French Saharan frontier, and the garrison of Ghadames withdrew into the Tunisian Sahara, while that of Ghat marched over 200 miles across the Algerian Sahara to Fort Flatters, where they were made welcome. This was in December, 1914, and the generous action, spontaneously taken, of the French was deeply appreciated in Italy.

The ramifications of the conspiracy to overthrow Italian authority in Tripoli were not then fully known, and General Tassoni, Governor of Tripoli, organized expeditions to re-occupy both Ghadames and Ghat. After some fierce fighting, Col. Giannini again entered Ghat on February 18, 1915, and shortly afterwards Ghadames was re-garrisoned. The improvement in the situation was only temporary. In April, in an engagement with the rebels in the Sokna region, the Libyan auxiliaries of the Italians went over to the enemy on the field of battle, and the Italian and Eritrean troops only saved themselves from complete disaster by a very skilful retreat. This defection led several tribes whose attitude had been doubtful to turn against the Italians, and in June, 1915, the Italian Government announced a general temporary withdrawal of all garrisons

in the Tripoli hinterland. The withdrawal was not carried out without serious loss; loss which would have been much greater but for the effective help given by the French in Southern Tunisia. The last place in the interior to be evacuated was Ghadames, the garrison crossing the Tunisian frontier on July 19. By a decree of July 15, 1915, General Ameglio was named Governor of Tripoli, while retaining his post of Governor of Cyrenaica. Thus the direction of the affairs of both provinces was concentrated in the hands of one man. Under General Ameglio the coast district of Tripoli was prepared for defence. During the summer of 1915 rebel forces approached within fifteen miles of Tripoli city, but the measures taken by General Ameglio freed the region to which the Italians had withdrawn from enemies. The reconquest of the interior was a measure postponed to a more propitious season.

One object of the Turks and Germans in stirring up sedition in Tripoli was to create trouble for the French in their adjoining possessions. In this they failed. The state of anarchy re-created in Fezzan had some effect in Southern Tunisia, but the great majority of Tunisians remained absolutely loyal to the French. In September and October, 1915, bands of Tripolitans, led by Turkish officers, and joined by Tunisian rebels, attacked some French outposts. They were defeated by Lieut.-Col.

Le Boeuf in three or four stiff engagements and peace on the Tunisian border was reestablished. In Algeria and the Algerian Sahara the work of German agents remained absolutely fruitless.

The Tripoli revolt was, as it were, supplemental to the main plan of the enemy, whose chief energies in North Africa were concentrated on Cyrenaica, Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. In the Sudan the conspicuous loyalty of the Morghani,* the principal Moslem fraternity in that region, counteracted the efforts of the Turks and Germans, and only in Darfur was there any anti-British movement. The Darfur incident itself was a sequel to the Senussi movement, and is dealt with in its proper sequence. The plots of the Neufelds, Prüfers, Hatzfelds and others in Egypt and the Sudan, though backed by the Egyptian "Nationalists," did not have the effect designed. In Cyrenaica the Turco-Germans had a more promising field for their enterprise. The Italians had been willing to come to an arrangement with the Senussi Sheikh, and though negotiations were not officially opened, Arab notables who had thrown in their lot with Italy were allowed to visit Sidi Ahmed with a view to effecting an accommodation. No interference with the Sheikh's religious authority was contemplated, nor did Italy

* Sayed Ali, the head of the sect, was in January, 1916 created K.C.M.G.



AUSTRALIAN TROOPS IN THE DESERT.



BEDOUIN PRISONERS IN THE BRITISH LINES.

propose to occupy Kufra or other oases in the Libyan Desert—whether those places would fall eventually within the Italian or British sphere of influence was still uncertain—but an acknowledgment of Italian sovereignty was required. The *pourparlers* failed, for Sidi Ahmed refused, as he said, to accept the position of “a protected Bey.” He was master of the interior of Cyrenaica, and even had access to the Mediterranean at various points west of the Egyptian frontier. While he could not dislodge the Italians from the ports they held, nor even prevent them from consolidating their ground between Bengazi and Derna, he saw that they had withdrawn from Fezzan and Ghat, and, left to himself, he would probably have been satisfied with the situation as it was. Details of his relations with the Turks in Cyrenaica are naturally lacking, but his actions showed that he hesitated long to take their advice and commit himself to an attack on Egypt. Had the Allied Fleets in the Mediterranean been able to prevent any supplies reaching the Senussi he would in all probability not have broken his traditional good relations with Egypt. Even as it was, throughout the latter half of 1914 and the opening months of 1915, notwithstanding the pressure brought to bear upon him by the Turco-German party, he maintained a correct attitude towards the Egyptian authorities.

Signs that the pressure on the Senussi Sheikh to invade Egypt were beginning to take effect

were first apparent in May, 1915. In the previous month Gaafer Pasha, “a Germanized Turk of considerable ability,” to quote General Maxwell’s description of him, had arrived in Cyrenaica with a large supply of arms and ammunition. He joined Nuri Bey, a half-brother of Enver Pasha, who was the leader of the Turkish party in Cyrenaica. That Turkey and Italy were still at peace with one another did not in the least affect the action of Nuri or Gaafer. At what spot Gaafer landed or for how long Nuri Bey had been in Cyrenaica does not appear; a number of Turks and Germans gained access to the country by passing themselves off as Tunisians, Egyptians or Moors. But not all those who tried to smuggle themselves in succeeded. In June, 1915, the French Ministry of Marine notified the capture in the Eastern Mediterranean of a sailing boat flying the Greek flag, provided with false papers and carrying a party of Turks, whose luggage consisted of valuable presents for the Senussi Sheikh. Other boats were also captured, but it was not until the beginning of 1916 that the Cyrenaican coast was so well patrolled by Allied warships that Nuri Bey and Sidi Ahmed were entirely cut off from over-sea supplies. Among those who reached Cyrenaica before the arrival of Gaafer Pasha was a senator of the Turkish Parliament with special knowledge of the Senussi organization. He came, accompanied by Turkish military officers, and visited the Sheikh, then encamped near the Egyptian frontier, using all his eloquence to induce Sidi

Ahmed to break with Egypt and proclaim a *jihad*. At that time Sidi Ahmed, who was to some extent dependent for his commissariat upon supplies imported through Sollum, was in correspondence with Lieutenant-Colonel Snow, the British officer then commanding on the Western Frontier of Egypt, and it was chiefly owing to Colonel Snow's tactful handling of a very delicate situation that a rupture with the Senussi was so long deferred. The Senussi Sheikh represented to Colonel Snow that he held his Turkish visitors as prisoners, and he sent to Cairo as his special envoy a leading member of the fraternity, Sidi Mahommed el Idris, who, on his part, endeavoured to maintain peace between his people and Egypt. The aim of Sidi Idris appears to have been to get a recognition of Senussi autonomy, a matter which, however, could only be settled by agreement between Italy and Great Britain. It may be added here that, when affairs had reached a critical stage, Sidi Idris was sent by the British to Cyrenaica "to arrange negotiations whereby the Senussi should get rid of his Turkish advisers in return for a sum of money." (Sir J. Maxwell's despatch of March 16, 1916.) This plan had obvious merits and had it been tried at an earlier stage it might have succeeded. But it was adopted too late, for the Senussi coffers were already filled largely with German gold. Heedless of his international engagements, and of the fact that his country was still at peace with Italy, the Kaiser himself did

not disdain to make a direct appeal to Sidi Ahmed. In one of the boats captured while endeavouring to carry gifts to the Senussi was found an embossed casket containing the following letter in Arabic, written by William II. in his favourite *rôle* of the protector of Islam:—

Praises to the most High God. Emperor William, son of Charlemagne, Allah's Envoy, Islam's Protector, to the illustrious Chief of Senussi. We pray God to lead our armies to victory. Our will is that thy valorous warriors shall expel infidels from territory that belongs to true believers and their commander. To this end we send thee arms, money, and tried chiefs. Our common enemies, whom Allah annihilate to the last man, shall fly before thee. So be it.—WILLIAM.

This was not the only appeal of the kind made to the Senussi Sheikh. Among the documents found in January, 1916, by the Allies in the archives of the enemy consulates at Salonika were 1,500 copies of a long proclamation in Arabic addressed to the "Chiefs of the Senussis." This proclamation, urging Moslems, on religious grounds, to wage war on Christians, was discovered in the consulate of Austria, whose sovereign bears the title of Catholic and Apostolic Majesty. The special correspondent of *The Times* at Salonika who sent extracts from this document said that it was not signed, but its pseudo-oriental wording clearly betrayed its Germanic authorship. The following are some passages from this precious document:—

IN THE NAME OF ALLAH THE COMPASSIONATE AND
MERCIFUL!

CHIEFS OF THE SENUSSIS!

You have seen that in consequence of the oppression ceaselessly inflicted on your Musulman brethren by



BEDOUINS CAPTURED DURING THE FIGHTING.



CONVEYING WOUNDED ON CAMEL BACK.

their enemies, France, England, Italy and Russia, that the Musulmans, who once enjoyed freedom, have been reduced to slavery and humiliation. These tyrannical nations have no other aim but to blot out the light of Islam throughout the world.

Of all the instruments Allah has chosen for the protection of our religion the surest is the German nation, with its sympathy for Musulmans. These our allies have placed the precious help of their policy at our service. They have begun to help us in every way in their power to emancipate ourselves from the afflictions which our oppressors deal out to us.

In these circumstances we have realized the imperious necessity of proclaiming a Holy War throughout Africa, the north of which continent has been corrupted by the dissolute morals introduced by France, England and Italy, and dishonoured by the contempt in which Musulmans are held by those Powers.

In all that region the most powerful ruler and the one possessing most authority in the Musulman world is His Excellency The Imaum, the Illustrious Exemplar, the Champion of Islam in the cause of Allah, who is our Lord and Master, Seyyid es Senussi, the Sure Guide of All Elect.


This leader is bred in the truth of the Koranic Law, and his soul, shining with its pure effulgence, has undertaken the task of purifying all corrupt souls and directing them in the path of life revealed by the Holy Book given to all Musulmans.

Your glorious renown, Your grand designs and incomparable bravery, Oh, Chiefs of the Senussis, are known throughout the world. All the Musulmans of the earth count on your bravery and noble conduct in proclaiming and waging a Holy War by which the bright rays of Islam will once more shine on African soil, and the Musulmans of North Africa recover the rights of which they have been bereft by tyrannical nations.

Appeals to him as a leader of Islam had less effect upon the Senussi Sheikh than the demonstration that Germany and Turkey could afford him material aid. A factor that helped in his decision to invade Egypt was the appearance of German submarines off the coast of

Cyrenaica in the late summer of 1915, and the success which attended their operations. It was some four months after the arrival of Gaafer Pasha in Cyrenaica that the first untoward incident of importance between the Senussites and the British occurred. On August 16, 1915, two British submarines were sheltering from the weather under a headland of the coast of Cyrenaica when they were treacherously fired upon by Arabs under the leadership of a white (? German) officer, casualties being suffered on either side. "The incident," wrote Sir John Maxwell, "was, however, closed by the acceptance of the Senussi's profound apologies, and of his assurances that the act had been committed in ignorance that the submarines were British"—the Sheikh may have assumed that the submarines were Italian. Nothing noteworthy occurred for the next few weeks, but in November events happened which placed beyond doubt the hostile intentions of the Senussi towards Egypt. The sequence of events in that month showed, too, close cooperation between the action of German submarines and the Turco-Senussi forces.

On November 5 H.M. auxiliary cruiser Tara was torpedoed off Sollun by the U35: on the 6th enemy submarines shelled the Egyptian post at Sollun, and two coastguard cruisers then stationed in its harbour. One of them, the Abbas, was sunk at her moorings, the other, the Nur el Bahr, being badly damaged. The next



YEOMANRY CROSSING THE LIBYAN PLATEAU.

day, November 7, the British horse transport *Moorina* was also sunk off the Cyrenaican coast; on the 15th the camp at Sollum was sniped; on the 17th the Zawia (monastery) at Barrani—50 miles within the Egyptian frontier—was occupied by some 300 Senussi regulars; on the 18th the coastguard barracks at Barrani were attacked; on the 20th another coastguard station was also attacked.

The long threatened campaign had begun. There is no need to suppose that Germany and Turkey, the Powers which had dragged the Senussi into the adventure, expected from it any great military success. They hoped, however, to create such unrest and disaffection throughout Egypt that British action in the Near East would be much hampered. The Senussites believed that even if they could not hold, they would be able to raid the rich lands of the Nile Delta.

The strength of the force at the disposal of the enemy is conjectural; it was not, however, less than 30,000. It consisted of a nucleus of Turkish troops, with Turkish, German and Arab officers, the *Muhafizia* or Senussi regulars (a well disciplined uniformed body some 5,000 strong) and a varying number of irregulars, every adult male in Cyrenaica being accustomed to arms. The troops were supplied with machine guns, pom-poms and a number of field pieces. There was ample camel transport, and a considerable number of the Senussites were well mounted. The particular in which they were most lacking appears to have been food. Certainly some of the Senussi camps were very badly off for provisions. The conduct of the operations against Egypt was entrusted to Gaafer Pasha (who was destined to become a prisoner of the British). Sidi Ahmed and Nuri Bey were also usually with the main body of their troops. Whatever the strength of the combined Turco-Senussi army, a proportion of it had to guard the rear, that is to watch the Italian garrisons at Bengazi, Derna and Tobruk, while another part was detached to seize Siwa and other oases west of the Nile.

British troops, the 1/1st North Midland Mounted Brigade, with the Berks Battery, R.H.A., were sent to garrison the Fayum, and cavalry of the Egyptian Army with a Bikaner Camel Corps detachment occupied the Wadi Natrun. These were the two oases nearest the Nile. Other measures, such as placing a garri-

son at Damanhur, between Cairo and Alexandria, were taken to ensure the tranquillity of the Delta region west of the Nile. As to the Bedouin of the Libyan Plateau, mostly members of the Walid Ali tribe, all within the sphere of Sidi Ahmed's operations, which rapidly extended over 200 miles of Egyptian territory, joined his standard. Thus in numbers his force was more than doubled, though its military value was not greatly increased. But should the Senussites have gained any striking advantage hostile outbreaks in Egypt itself, where agitation was rife, would have been very probable. Even in Alexandria the Senussi had many adherents, and his prestige was increased by the measures which Gen. Maxwell now ordered, the withdrawal of the Egyptian garrisons from Sollum, Sidi el Barrini, and other outposts. Siwa also fell to the Senussi as well as el Gara (Qara) and Moghara, oases, at the foot of the southern escarpment of the Libyan Plateau, on the way to Cairo by the Wadi Natrun. The more southern oases, Baharia, Farafra, etc., were for the time unoccupied either by enemy or British troops. They too led to the Nile, but the main advance of the enemy was necessarily along the plateau which separates the Libyan Desert from the sea.

This plateau, known as the Libyan Desert Plateau, rises abruptly above the Mediterranean. Its level varies from 300 to 600 feet, it is composed of limestone, and large areas of the surface are bare rock, golden coloured. Other areas are covered with a thin layer of soil and in depressions and dry river beds camel thorn and coarse grass are found. Numerous isolated hills rise above the tableland. The seaward face of the plateau is almost everywhere precipitous. The country receives a fairly heavy winter rainfall, but it has no streams and is therefore only traversable along routes where water can be found in wells or springs. From time immemorial the main road across this desolate land has kept close to the Mediterranean, and the only considerable centres of population are found along the coast. The chief town is Mersa Matruh, about 200 miles west of Alexandria, and 150 east of Sollum. As its name (*mersa*=harbour) implies, it is a port,* and around it is a fairly large cultivated area, barley of excellent quality being raised. At Matruh itself there is a European population, mainly Greek and Italian, of about 200.

* It replaces the *Parætonium* of Ptolemaic and Roman times.

Within 12 hours' journey by water from Alexandria, Matruh was chosen as the British base, and to it the advanced garrisons at Barrini and Sollum were withdrawn—not without the defection of 12 native officers, two cadets and 120 other ranks to the Senussi. These all belonged to the Egyptian Coastguard Camel Corps, and their desertion was significant of what might happen on a larger scale if circumstances favoured the enemy. While the sea route to Matruh was the chief means of transport, a secondary means of communication was afforded by the railway which runs west from Alexandria. This line, when hostilities began, had reached Dabaa, 85 miles short of Matruh. Thence by Matruh as far as Sollum a motor service was ordinarily maintained.*

Starting from Bir Warr and Msead, camps somewhat west of Sollum, the enemy rapidly overran the country as far east as Dabaa, but the prompt measures taken by Gen. Maxwell prevented any danger of Matruh and Dabaa being captured. Gen. Maxwell wisely decided that the best way to deal with the situation was by a vigorous offensive. In view

* Both railway and road were built by the ex-Khedive Abbas Hilmi Pasha, the railway being generally known as the Maruit line, while the road is called the Khedivial Motor Road. A road, however, was in existence and in constant use in Roman times between Alexandria and Matruh, and along it are many broken wells and cisterns dating from the first to the fourth centuries.

of the danger of a rising in Egypt, should the enemy approach the Nile, it was imperative to keep the sphere of hostilities as far as possible west of the Delta. This meant as bold an offensive as was consistent with not running the risk of a serious reverse. For all that the force immediately available for service was neither large nor homogeneous. Orders for the formation of a Western Frontier Force, consisting of a Composite Mounted Brigade and a Composite Infantry Brigade, were issued on November 20, Major-Gen. A. Wallace, C.B., being given the command.

This force, the best available in Egypt at the moment, was by no means well adapted to the task which lay before it. Regiments and staffs had been somewhat hastily collected, and were not well known to one another. The Composite Yeomanry Brigade, to give an instance, contained men from 20 or more different regiments. . . . The composition [of the force] was constantly changing, and it was not until the middle of February that the condition of the Western Frontier Force could be considered really satisfactory. (Sir J. Maxwell's Dispatch, March 1, 1916.)

It is interesting to set forth the original composition of this force and to note how it was gradually changed till it came to represent practically every part of the Empire except Canada. On December 7, when Gen. Wallace took up his headquarters at Matruh, the Mounted Brigade, which was under Brigadier-Gen. Tyndale Biscoe, was made up of :

Three Composite Yeomanry Regiments (from details 2nd Mounted Division).



A STEAM PUMP IN THE DESERT.



WATERING HORSES AT A DESERT WELL.

One Composite Regiment Australian Light Horse (from details Australian L.H. Brigades).
Notts Battery R.H.A. (T.F.) and Ammunition Column.

Part of this Brigade (five squadrons) was at Dabaa; the rest at Matruh. Brigadier-Gen. Lord Lucan commanded the Infantry Brigade, which was made up as follows:—

- 1 6th Batt. Royal Scots (T.F.).
- 2/7th Batt. Middlesex Regt. (T.F.).
- 2/8th Batt. Middlesex Regt. (T.F.).
- 15th Sikhs.

There was also a squadron of the Royal Flying Corps. The Divisional Train was supplied by the 1st Australian Division and, no Royal Engineers being available, Gen. Wallace was given a detachment of the Egyptian Army Military Works Department. Besides this newly raised force, Gen. Wallace also had the normal garrison of the Western Frontier. This consisted of a small British force and detachments from the Egyptian Army. There were, in addition, a squadron of the Royal Naval Armoured Car Division, which had been rushed up at the first sign of serious trouble and stationed along the Alexandria-Dabaa railway; the 2nd Batt. New Zealand Rifle Brigade,* 150 men of the Bikanir Camel Corps (with an Egyptian Army machine-gun section); and one armoured train manned by the 1/10th Gurkha Rifles, with two 12½-pounders of the Egyptian

Army Artillery. Thus Gen. Wallace began his campaign with "a scratch lot" of Yeomanry, Territorials, Australians, New Zealanders, Indians and Egyptians. No "scratch lot" of men rendered better service than did the original units of Gen. Wallace's command. Only the three Territorial regiments and the Notts Battery R.H.A., however, saw the campaign through from start to finish. The commander, it will be realized, had many difficulties to meet beyond those caused by the enemy. One of the most serious of these difficulties remains to be mentioned—the lack of sufficient and suitable transport made it necessary for Gen. Wallace to withdraw his troops to Matruh after every engagement.

The first encounter with the enemy occurred on December 11, and on that day and on the 13th there were sharp fights west and south of Matruh, the Senussi holding in considerable strength the Wadi Senaab, which runs south from the coast. Owing to the "bad going" the infantry employed (the Sikhs) could take no part in the fight on December 11, but the Yeomanry, aided by a squadron of the Australian Light Horse and the armoured cars, cleared the Wadi Senaab, the enemy losing over 100 in killed and wounded. The British*

* A few weeks later the 161st Brigade (54th Division) relieved the New Zealanders on the lines of communication.

* Here as elsewhere in this chapter the term "British casualties" is used to include all ranks under British command—whether Dominion or Indian or the British Army proper.




THE FORT AT SOLLUM.

Occupied by the Force under Major-General Peyton, March 14, 1916.

casualties were 32. Lieut.-Col. Snow, who, until the formation of Gen. Wallace's force had been in command on the Western Frontier, was killed by an Arab whom he was endeavouring to persuade to surrender. He had been 25 years in the Egyptian Coastguard Service and was intimately acquainted with the country and its inhabitants, and his death was a severe loss to the force. The column camped on the field

on the 11th, and on the 12th rounded up some prisoners. On the 13th, reinforced by the Royal Scots, the column started, at 8 a.m., to engage the enemy at a spot 13 miles distant; but, on crossing a wadi (the Wadi Shaifa) they were themselves attacked with considerable vigour by a force estimated at about 1,200, with two guns and machine-guns. Only the opportune arrival of reinforcements from


**BRITISH CAVALRY IN WESTERN EGYPT.**

Searching a Senussi encampment outside Sollum.

Matruh turned the day against the Senussites, who lost 180 in killed alone. The British casualties were nine killed and 56 wounded. The column pursued the enemy till dark and the next day returned to Matruh. The chief result of these actions on December 11 and 13 was to show Gen. Wallace that he was not strong enough to risk a decisive engagement. He asked for reinforcements and, in the third

week of December, was given the 1st Batt. New Zealand R.B., two naval 4.1 in. guns, and "A" Battery Hon. Artillery Co.

Thus strengthened, Gen. Wallace again engaged the enemy, the action being fought on Christmas Day, 1915. The main Senussi force was then near Gebel Medwa, a hill some eight miles south-west of Matruh. Gaafer Pasha was in command, and from air recon-



MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE BRITISH OPERATIONS.

naissance and other sources the British estimated his strength in infantry, cavalry, and artillery, to be about 5,000, of whom more than half were *Mahafizia* (regulars). Gebel Medwa was within a few miles of the sea, and on the 25th Gen. Wallace arranged with the commander of H.M.S. *Clematis*—which vigilantly patrolled the coast—that he should support the attack on the hill with gun-fire from the sea. Gen. Wallace, in personal command, moved out from Matruh before daylight on Christmas morning. He divided his force into two columns. The Right Column, under Lieut.-Col. J. L. R. Gordon, 15th Sikhs, included the bulk of the infantry, with the Bucks Hussars and a section of Horse Artillery, and its task was to advance along the coast road directly on the enemy. The Left Column, under Brigadier-Gen. Tyndale Biscoe, was made up of mounted troops and Horse Artillery, and was directed to make a wide detour round the right flank of the enemy and cut off his retreat westward. As Col. Gordon's column moved

out, it came under sharp artillery and machine-gun fire, but by 7.15 a.m., having marched seven miles, Col. Gordon was in front of the main enemy position—an escarpment about a mile south of Gebel Medwa. The 15th Sikhs, temporarily commanded by Major Evans, were sent forward to attack the enemy's right flank, the Bucks Hussars and the 2/8th Middlesex delivering a containing attack on his front. Meantime the Notts R.H.A. silenced the enemy's artillery (obtaining a direct hit on the largest of the enemy's pieces), aided by the 6-in. guns of the *Clematis*, which opened "an accurate and useful fire" at a range of about six miles. The enemy fought with resolution, and three companies of the 1st New Zealand Rifle Brigade were sent to help the Sikhs. After nearly three hours' struggle the Sikhs and New Zealanders cleared the crest of the escarpment, driving the white-robed Arabs into a long rocky nullah, studded with caves and small gullies into which many of the enemy retreated. The nullah was cleared bend by

bend and the edge of the table-land, beyond which lay the enemy's camp, was reached. Here the mounted column, which had met with determined opposition from the Senussi horsemen, could be seen two miles away. Working their way towards Col. Gordon, the mounted troops joined in the assault on the enemy's main position in the Wadi Majid, which was carried, about 4 p.m., at the point of the bayonet. By that time, however, the bulk of the enemy had made good their retreat along the sea-shore and the approach of darkness prevented pursuit. So hurried had been Gaafer Pasha's flight that he left behind his office and personal effects.

The British casualties were light—14 rank and file killed and 3 officers and 47 other ranks wounded. Over 370 enemy dead were counted and 82 prisoners were taken. Much live stock, 30,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition and three boxes of gun ammunition were also captured. The honours of the day fell to Col. Gordon and the Sikhs and New Zealanders (the latter under command of Major Austin). It was the first time these New Zealanders (among whom was a Maori contingent) had been in action, but they fought with the steadiness of seasoned troops. Col. Gordon's column bivouacked at Gebel Medwa.

The troops (wrote an officer who took part in the fight) slept for a few hours, during which time a volunteer party went back to rescue certain wounded reported to be in the long nullah. They feared for the lives of any men left behind. Their fears proved only too well founded. No wounded were found, but some of the dead had been grievously maltreated. The men probed every cave and crevice in the vicinity, and not a lurker there escaped the terrible revenge they took. The light

of the burning fodder shone on evidence that we do not box with kid gloves when the punching is below the belt.

At daybreak to-day (Boxing Day) the column moved back into camp, tired out, it is true, with its long march and running fight across the sand, and then through boulder-strewn ravines, but high in spirits.*


One result of the Christmas Day fight was the withdrawal of the Senussi main body to Halazin†, 25 miles south-west of Matruh. The enemy had received a severe handling, but was far from beaten, and the last week of 1915 and the first half of January, 1916, had to be employed in clearing out parties of the enemy who were threatening the line of communications between railhead and Matruh. These operations were interrupted by torrential rains—perhaps the last thing most members of the Expeditionary Force expected—which lasted a week and turned the land into alternate stretches of sand and mud. This work of clearing the rear of enemies was performed by

* *Morning Post*, January 19, 1916.

† This place was in the official dispatches at first incorrectly spelt Hazalin.



NAVAL ARMOURD CARS AT MERSA MATRUH.



WOUNDED BEDOUIN SOLDIERS UNDER GUARD OF INDIAN TROOPS AT MERSA MATRUH.

a column under Lord Lucan, helped by the Naval Armoured Car Division. Meantime, the enemy at Halazin received reinforcements. Careful watch was kept over that place by the Flying Corps. The camp comprised at least 100 European tents and 250 Bedouin tents, including that of Sidi Ahmed, it being recognized by Capt. Royle, the observer. The strength of the enemy was estimated at 6,000, and once more Gen. Wallace awaited the arrival of reinforcements before attacking.

At that time the first of the South African troops raised by the Union for service overseas (the campaign in German South-West Africa had been regarded as a domestic affair) had reached England and the 2nd Regiment (under Lieut.-Col. W. E. C. Tanner) of the 1st South African Infantry Brigade was sent to reinforce Gen. Wallace. It disembarked at Matruh on January 20 and 21, and at once was given a share of the fighting. On January 22 Gen. Wallace moved from Matruh and, marching 16 miles, encamped that night at Bir Shola. There he formed his troops into two columns and, at 6 a.m. on January 23, went forward to engage the enemy. As in the action on Christmas Day, Col. Gordon commanded the infantry, which formed the Right Column, and had with it one squadron of Yeomanry (the Duke of Lancaster's Own), and Brigadier-Gen. Biscoe the mounted men. The action that ensued, the hardest fought of the whole campaign, demonstrated, among other things, that the Senussi army had capable and daring leaders. Among them were German officers. Col. Gordon advanced direct on the enemy's camp, Gen. Biscoe's men being echeloned to the left front of the Right Column, moving parallel to and in close touch with it. Col. Gordon had with him his own regiment, the 15th Sikhs, the 2nd South African Regiment, the 1st Batt., New Zealand R.B., and the Notts Battery, R.H.A. In two hours and a half they had covered about seven miles; a very trying experience, especially for the South Africans, most of whom had been originally cavalry. The advance was made in abnormal conditions. The whole country had been turned by the recent rains into a quagmire, which hampered the movements of the mounted troops and deprived the infantry of the support of the Naval Armoured Car Division. "Throughout the day," wrote Sir J. Maxwell, "this factor—of mud—played an important and unfortunate part." Though it hampered, the mud did not prevent the advance of the troops. At

8.30 a.m. the Left Column reported the enemy in sight, and shortly afterwards Biscoe's advanced squadron of Australian Light Horse became engaged. Gen. Biscoe sent the Bucks Hussars and the H.A.C. to support the Australians and, at the same time, Col. Gordon's column pushed on in attack formation, the indomitable Sikhs leading. After an engagement lasting eight hours the enemy were defeated and fled. The course of the fight is succinctly told in Gen. Maxwell's dispatch as follows:

Relieved by the advance of the Infantry, the mounted troops pressed on, endeavouring to work round the




EGYPTIAN TROOPS.
Boarding a steamer at Sollum.

enemy's right, and at the same time covering the left flank of Col. Gordon's attack. The latter, spread over a front of nearly a mile and a half, led across ground absolutely destitute of cover, while mirage in the early stages made it impossible for a considerable time to locate the enemy's positions. During this advance the Infantry suffered somewhat severely from artillery and machine-guns, the enemy's fire being both rapid and accurate. Nevertheless, the enemy was gradually pressed back, but his retirement of nearly three miles on to his main positions was conducted with great skill, denying all our efforts to come to close quarters.

By 2.45 p.m. the Sikhs and South Africans, with part of the New Zealand Battalion, on the left of the Sikhs, had reached the enemy's main line. But in the meantime the flanks had not made equal progress, and bodies



BRITISH CAVALRY ON THE MARCH.



BRITISH CAVALRY HORSES IN THE DESERT.

of the enemy were working round both north and south, the line gradually forming the arc of a semi-circle.

Soon after 1 p.m., so great was the activity of one of these detachments on our right, or northern flank, that the reserve Battalion (1/6th Royal Scots) had to be put in to restore the situation, but by 2.30 p.m. all danger from that quarter was past. On the extreme left, however, by 3.30 p.m. the Cavalry of the Left Column had been forced to give some ground, and with the H.A.C. guns were occupying a position nearly 1,000 yards in rear of the Field Ambulance.

Col. Gordon was called upon to detach two companies of New Zealanders to assist the Cavalry, who were being pressed. With this reinforcement the threat against our left rear was finally repulsed and the enemy driven off.

In the meantime the main attack by Col. Gordon's Column had progressed satisfactorily. By 3 p.m. the enemy had been driven from his positions, and shortly afterwards his camp was occupied and burnt, the work of destruction being completed by 4.30 p.m.

This account may be supplemented by extracts from a letter written immediately after the engagement by an officer who fought at Halazin, and printed in the *Morning Post*:

While advancing on the enemy's position some hundred Springboks [South Africans] were sent back as unfit to march any further, but when the first gun boomed they halted undecided. Then the wind wafted down their battalion's weird war cry on its wings. Catching up the echo, they "about-turned" with a roar, and, boots carried in their hands, they struggled back to the opening fray, and saw it through to a finish—a likely looking lot these.

The enemy contested the day with the utmost determination. For four hours there was a struggle for supremacy in rifle fire which rivalled in rattle the old Gallipoli days. These native troops carried as many machine-guns as we did, and under German (two of them naval men) and Turkish officers, worked them with valour and precision. Their artillery threw poor-quality shrapnel with more accuracy than hitherto.

A profitable stratagem was brought off by the cavalry screen. When we were more than holding our own a portion of the cavalry on the left retired under orders at a hand gallop. Encouraged by this, the Arabs who had opposed this portion of the line pressed forward in masses, to be blown to pieces by three of our guns just then placed in a new position. Concentrated rifle fire blotted out several of the Senussi's machine-gun crews, including a German captain.

Our troops passed through the hostile camp, and found every evidence of European supervision. Opportunity had been taken by the enemy during their determined resistance to remove much booty, but a good deal remained to be destroyed by the victors. Half a mile of Bedouin encampments went up in smoke.

Pursuit of the enemy was impossible; the cavalry horses were spent and the troops bivouacked two miles east of Halazin, at a spot where the Field Ambulance had stuck in the mud. The supply train had not been able to reach that place, and the night, intensely cold and wet, was passed—few slept—with neither supplies nor blankets. The enemy showed no inclination to renew the combat and on January 24, Gen. Wallace marched his troops back to Bir Shola. It was a trying march in deep mud, all vehicles having to be drawn

by hand and the severely wounded carried on stretchers by the tired and thirsty infantry, until three miles from Bir Shola the supply train was met. The next day, in better weather, the troops reached Matruh once more. The British casualties at Halazin were comparatively heavy, 31 killed and 291 wounded. The Sikhs alone had 136 casualties. The Senussites had suffered severely, a conservative estimate putting their loss at not fewer than 200 killed and 500 wounded. For the success attained, as in the action on December 25, special praise was due to the leading of Col. Gordon, who commanded the main attack, while Gen. Maxwell drew particular attention to "the gallantry of the Sikhs, the South Africans and the New Zealanders, who fought with invincible dash and resolution throughout the day."

At Halazin the Senussites and their Tureo-German allies had fought well, but unsuccessfully, and their defeat, following the defeat on Christmas Day, disillusioned the Egyptian Bedouins who had flocked to the standard of Sidi Ahmed. Visions of raiding the rich lands of the Delta faded; they found themselves instead ill-used by the Cyrenaican Arabs and in danger, too, of starvation. From this time many of the Walid Ali surrendered to the British; the peril to Egypt appeared to be past. The immobility of Gen. Wallace's force had prevented him, however, from following up his victories, and thus the enemy was encouraged to continue the contest. The period of immobility was happily coming to an end; the Expeditionary Force was at last—in February—supplied with sufficient camel transport. Its composition was again altered. The 15th Sikhs were ordered to India and the New Zealanders left for Europe. Their places were taken by more battalions of the 1st South African Infantry Brigade, with whom came their commander, Brigadier-Gen. H. T. Lukin, C.M.G., D.S.O., an officer with a brilliant record. The composite Yeomanry Brigade also vanished, being replaced by the 2nd Mounted Brigade. Lord Lucan still had his three Territorial regiments (the 1/6th Royal Scots and the 2/7th and 2/8th Middlesex Regt.), while, to emphasize the Imperial composition of the force, two sections of the Hong Kong and Singapore Mountain Battery had joined. The camel drivers, it may be added, were negroes from the Sudan.

Gen. Wallace considered that the operations now contemplated—the reoccupation of Barrini

and Sollum—would, in view of his age, involve a physical strain beyond his powers, and he, therefore, resigned the command which he had held with unvarying success for three months. In his place Gen. Maxwell appointed Major-Gen. W. E. Peyton, C.B., D.S.O., who took over the command on February 9, 1916, when the Expeditionary Force, reorganized in the manner stated, was completely mobile and would no longer have to return to Matruh after every engagement.

Having completed his preparations, Gen. Peyton dispatched a force on February 20, with orders to establish itself at Barrini. Made up of Bucks Hussars, Dorset Yeomanry, the Notts Battery R.H.A., 1st and 3rd Battalions South African Brigade, Royal Scots, and Light Armoured Car Batteries, this force was placed under the command of Brig.-Gen. Lukin, who located the enemy at Agagia, 14 miles south-east of Barrini. Gaafer Pasha and Nuri Bey were both in camp, but Sidi Ahmed had left for Siwa, a forward movement of Senussi forces in the southern oases having been undertaken as a set-off to his reverses in the coast region. Gen. Lukin planned a night march for February 25, and an attack on the enemy camp at dawn. But Gaafer Pasha, as on previous occasions, did not passively await attack, and on the afternoon of the 25th he opened fire with field and machine-

guns on the British camp. The action on this day was unimportant, but it led Gen. Lukin to abandon his intended night march, and it was not till 9.30 a.m. on the 26th that he moved out with his whole force towards Agagia. Again there was the long march, but weather conditions were now normal, and the South Africans were in good form. About 11 a.m. the 3rd (Transvaal) Battalion, under Lieut.-Col. E. F. Thackeray, attacked the enemy's centre, the bulk of the Yeomanry, with two armoured cars, being on the right flank, and one squadron of Yeomanry and two cars on the left. Gen. Lukin's tactics, based on his South African experience, differed somewhat from those adopted in previous engagements. The infantry were to engage, break the resistance of the enemy, and the moment the foe showed signs of giving way the Yeomanry and armoured cars were to dash forward and complete their rout. Gaafer Pasha kept to his tactics of Halazin; as the Transvaal Battalion advanced (with admirable steadiness), the Senussites and khaki-clad Turks, moving very rapidly, tried to outflank Lukin's left. This enveloping movement was soon checked, and the Transvaal men came on to within 500 yards of the enemy's position. Gen. Lukin decided to press the issue. He threw his reserve, the 1st (Cape Province) Battalion, under Lieut.-Col. F. S. Dawson, into



ON THE WESTERN FRONTIER.

In the foreground are Senussi prisoners; in the background is General Peyton (seated).



AFTER THE BATTLE OF AGAGIA.

Troopers of the Dorset Yeomanry leading their horses back to the base.

the fighting line, and brought back the squadron from his left flank to strengthen his right flank, warning Col. H. M. Souter, D.S.O., of the Dorset Yeomanry, to be ready. Pressed relentlessly by the South Africans, after a two hours' contest the enemy, who had fought with extreme boldness, was compelled to evacuate his position. In exact accordance with the plans, the fight was at once taken up by the cavalry, and the day ended in a memorable charge by the Dorset Yeomanry.

About 1 p.m. [said Col. Souter in his official report] I received a message from the G.O.C. saying that he wished me to pursue and to cut off the enemy if possible. It was my intention to let the enemy get clear of the sandhills, where there might have been wire or trenches, and then to attack him in the open. I therefore pursued on a line parallel to, and about 1,000 yards west of, the line of retreat, attacking with dismounted fire wherever the horses wanted an easy. About 2 p.m. I saw for the first time the whole retreating force extend for about a mile with a depth of 300 to 400 yards. In front were the camels and baggage, escorted by irregulars, with their proper fighting force (Muhafizia) and maxims forming their rear and flank guard. I decided to attack mounted. About 3 p.m. I dismounted for the last time to give my horses a breather and to make a careful examination of the ground over which I was about to move. By this time the Dorset Regiment was complete, and as the squadron of the Bucks Yeomanry had gone on ahead and could not be found, I attacked with Dorsets alone. The attack was made in two lines, the horses galloping steadily, and well in hand. Three maxims were brought into action against us, but the men were splendidly led by their squadron and troop leaders, and their behaviour was admirable. About 50 yards from the position I gave the order to charge, and with one yell the Dorsets hurled themselves upon the enemy, who immediately broke. In the middle of the enemy's lines my horse was killed under me, and, by a curious chance, his dying strides brought me to the ground within a few yards of the Senussi General, Gaafer Pasha.

At this moment Col. Souter was alone, except for Lieut. Blaksley and Yeoman Brown, both of the Dorset Yeomanry, who had also had their horses shot under them. Around them were about fifty fit or lightly wounded enemy, and the situation was distinctly threatening until the arrival of the machine-gun section decided the issue. Gaafer Pasha and his staff were then escorted from the field.

An officer who took part in the charge wrote: "Col. Souter led us splendidly in front of the whole regiment, and the regiment rode behind him in line, like a general's inspection—it was splendid." After describing the charge up to the time when Col. Souter's horse fell at the feet of Gaafer Pasha, this officer added:

We rode on through the valley, and then rallied to the left, but as there were so many wounded, and the horses were done, we could not do much more. The men were grand all through. You never saw such a panic as there was on the faces of the Bedouins. Tamplin (2nd Lieutenant) did awfully well; he rode like a fury, and accounted for a lot of the enemy, and then, when the charge was over, he collected a few men together, and went back twice to pick up wounded.

In fact, these splendid fellows of the Dorset Yeomanry without their officers' control carried on too far—one squadron had been deprived of all its officers, and it was this squadron which suffered most severely. The total of the British casualties was not officially announced—they exceeded 100. The enemy left over 200 killed and wounded on the ground, and besides Gaafer Pasha several other Turkish officers were among the 30

prisoners. It was at first reported that Nuri Bey was killed, but the report was untrue. After a disorderly flight of eight to ten miles, Nuri rallied his forces. He did not attempt to renew the fight, but withdrew to the Senussi base camp of Bir Warr and Msead, in the direction of Sollum, where he was in touch with reinforcements from Cyrenaica. The Turco-Arabs had not yet, in short, quite accepted defeat. Gen. Lukin after reoccupying Barrini (February 28) prepared for an advance on Sullum.

Barrini now became the British advanced base. Capt. Burmester, R.N., and Commander Eyres-Monsell, R.N., M.P., a week ahead of schedule time, brought to Barrini by sea stores sufficient to permit Gen. Peyton to make the next forward movement. The fine work of the Navy was the more gratifying, as the Australian Divisional Train, which had worked splendidly, was needed for duty elsewhere. The attack on Bir Warr and Msead presented, however, special difficulties. The land route was more than usually destitute of wells, and necessitated also the passage of a narrow defile, while to land at Sollum, and thence march inland, involved climbing, in the face of enemy fire, the 600 feet of cliffs which rise steeply above the bay. Nevertheless, all difficulties were overcome, the British being heartened by the clever tapping of telephonic communication between the enemy camps, conversation which showed that Nuri Bey was hesitating whether to fight or to flee. (It is noteworthy as indicating the controlling power in the Senussi force that the enemy used not Arabic, but Turkish, in their telephone conversation.)

Gen. Peyton decided that the advance should be in two lines—one column moving along the tableland, the other, consisting of mounted troops, along the coast road. Gen. Lukin was with the column which took the high ground, having with him two battalions of infantry, the armoured cars, his camel corps company, and mountain guns. Gen. Peyton himself took command of the mounted column. By March 14 both columns were nearing Sollum. At 9 a.m. on that day the air scouts reported that the enemy was breaking up camp. Nuri Bey had in the end decided to fly. The airmen, however, also reported another enemy force some twenty miles to the west, in the open desert. Now came the chance of the armoured cars. A squadron of ten cars, under Major the

Duke of Westminster (Cheshire Yeomanry) was sent in pursuit. They raced across the desert—striking the main road to Tobruk, and getting up a speed of thirty miles an hour, the cavalry and camel corps following. As the camp was reached, the cars were received with a lively fire, but, charging in line over boulders, scrub, and sand, the cars dashed into the camp, which was soon in their possession. Three field guns, nine machine guns, cases of dynamite, travelling workshops, and a great quantity of small arms ammunition were seized. The enemy lost 50 killed and many wounded, while 40 men, including Turkish officers, were taken prisoners. Some machine guns the enemy destroyed with bombs and petrol to prevent them falling into the hands of the British. It was afterwards ascertained that Nuri Bey had also blown up his main ammunition stores.

On the same day as this action was fought, March 14, Gen. Peyton reoccupied Sollum, which had been held by the enemy since on the previous November 23 the Egyptian garrison had been withdrawn by sea. In the coast region the enemy had now been cleared out of Egyptian territory. To follow them into Cyrenaica was not practicable. One thing, however, was attempted and accomplished, and that was the rescue of the British prisoners in the hands of the Senussi.

It will be remembered that the auxiliary cruiser *Tara* had been torpedoed by U 35, near Solhum, on November 5, 1915, the *Tara* being one of several victims of German submarines at that period. They included the *Helensmuir*, whose crew were rescued by an armed Italian yacht and taken to Tobruk, where they were most hospitably treated.* Not all the crews of the torpedoed vessels were so fortunate. When the *Tara* was sunk twelve of the crew were killed. The survivors, 92 in number, mostly Welsh, were towed by U 35 into Port Sulieman (Bardia), then in Senussi possession, or, as the commander of the U boat called it, "a German port." This officer offered to take Capt. Gwatkin-Williams, R.N., the captain of the *Tara*, to Austria, but he preferred to share the trials of his men, and of Lieut. Tanner, R.N.R. Lieut. Tanner

* An account of Tobruk, written by the only passenger on board the *Helensmuir*, is printed in *Chambers's Journal* for September, 1916. It gives an interesting picture of the conditions in which the Italians in Cyrenaica lived.



SURRENDER OF GAAFER PASHA,

The Turkish General who commanded the Senussi, at the Headquarters of the Western Frontier Force.

was the original master of the vessel, which, before the war was well known to travellers to and from Ireland, being a L. & N.W. Railway passenger boat—then called *Hibernia*—plying between Dublin and Holyhead. At Port Sulieman the captors were surrounded by a fierce-looking Senussi guard, and in Capt

Gwatkin-Williams's opinion only the presence of Nuri Bey, "an ardent antiquarian," and Gaafer Pasha saved them from being murdered. The Turkish officers were uniformly kind (several of them had themselves been prisoners of war), as were, later on, several Arab officers; but an Egyptian captain named Achmed.



A TURKISH OFFICER OF THE SENUSSI,
Who surrendered, arriving at the Headquarters of the Western Frontier Force.

who was given charge of the camp, behaved brutally. This man, it was ascertained, was a dismissed employee of the Egyptian coast-guard, and subsequently he fell into the hands of the Italians. On November 15 the Tara survivors were joined by Lieut. T. S. Apear, Indian Lancers, with two ships' officers and a Portuguese cook, of the horse transport Moorina, one of the boats sunk by German submarines. Lieut. Apear had been doubly unfortunate, having been compelled, with his boat's crew, to land in territory held by the enemy, while the other boats of the Moorina made Egyptian territory.

Lack of sufficient food and clothing, long forced marches, actual ill-treatment by the Egyptian Ahmed, bad and verminous quarters, such was the lot of the British captives. The story of their sufferings may be read in the extracts from Capt. Gwatkin-Williams's diary, edited by his wife.* The men, four of whom died from the effect of their privations, were taken to a place called Bir el Hakim Abbyat (the Wells of the White Doctor), a spot over 90 miles due east of Sollum, reached on

November 26. There they were kindly treated by their guards. Capt. Gwatkin-Williams made an attempt to escape in February, and had got half-way to Sollum when he was recaptured. Of the Senussi main forces the captives saw nothing, though Capt. Gwatkin-Williams believes he saw Sidi Ahmed himself. While still at Port Sulieman

we were visited by a man we were told was the uncle of the Grand Senussi. (I have since come to the conclusion that this was the Grand Senussi himself). He is a powerful man with a greyish beard, and reminded one forcibly of the picture of one of the Elders in the story of Susannah. He carries his whip and gun with him everywhere, and amused himself by firing shots at various objects from the tent door. . . . The Turks treated him with great respect to his face and there was much kissing of hands: but as soon as he had retired they spat violently, and said he was a savage.

A Turkish surgeon, Dr. Béchie Fuad, "a kindly and hospitable soul," told many stories of the time when, as physician, he had attended the Senussi sheikh.

Smoking and drinking are sternly forbidden, but much indulged in, by the Senussi sect. When the crime is brought home retribution is swift. The punishment for drinking is 1,000 lashes, and for smoking the loss of a hand. The doctor himself had had to amputate hands for this on four occasions. Had he refused his own hand would have been forfeited.

At the end of January the captives were

* *In the Hands of the Senoussi* (Pearsons, 1916).

informed that a two-months' armistice had been arranged between the Senussi and the British at a conference at Sollum, a pure invention which had disastrous consequences for the guard of the prisoners' camp, as various circumstances led the captives to believe the report to be true. When on March 14 Gen. Peyton entered Sollum, Arab prisoners gave information as to the whereabouts of the captives, and the Light Armoured-Car Battery, under the Duke of Westminster, offered to try to rescue Capt. Gwatkin-Williams and his comrades. To venture thus into absolutely unknown country, against an enemy of unknown strength, was, in the measured words of Gen. Maxwell, "a feat which demanded great resolution." The expedition left Sollum at 3 a.m. on St. Patrick's Day (March 17). It consisted of nine armoured cars, 26 other cars, and 10 motor ambulances. Capt. Royle, of the Egyptian Coastguard Service, acted as leader, and with him were two Arab guides—one of whom had not been to Bir Hakim for 30 years. After a time the party began to doubt if they would succeed. The natives had said Bir Hakim was only 75 miles away, and when they had gone 95 miles and the desert was still bare the Arab guides were arguing as to whether they were on the right track:

The man who had not seen Bir Hakim since his boyhood thought they were wrong; the other would not say much, and though in the circumstances he proved a zealous guide, he thought the pace of the cars greater than it really was. The desert was now very stony, but the going was fairly hard. One hundred miles went by, then 105. That was believed to be the limit of the distance, but still there was not the faintest sign of the prisoners' camp. Between 110 and 115 miles the fear of failure kept every one silent. A mile farther on the Arabs became animated, and through the mirage a small height could be seen.

After a halt, at 2 o'clock, the Duke sent forward the armoured cars to the attack. They raced up to within 200 yards of the mound, the first car that of Lieutenant William Griggs, the jockey, who regards this as the biggest of the "classic" races in which he has taken



THE SURRENDER OF GAAFER PASHA.

The Senussi Commander being assisted on board a picket boat which took him to the warship in the harbour for conveyance to Alexandria. Smaller picture: Gaafer Pasha on his way to the picket boat.



MAJOR THE DUKE OF WESTMINSTER,
Who was in command of the Armed Motor
Cars which rescued the crew of the
"Tara," March 17, 1916.

part. The prisoners were standing silhouetted against the skyline absolutely motionless and as silent as statues, dumb with amazement at the appearance of the rescuers. At last one man threw off a sack covering him and faintly cheered. The crowd staggered forward with the rolling gait of starved men and swarmed round the cars. They could not be persuaded to leave the cars.

Meanwhile the remainder of the column, seeing the prisoners leave the mound, started a tremendous race to the spot. They ran abreast as fast as the engines would propel them, and the air was filled with the cheers of the crews and the noise of the exhausts.*

When the captives saw the first car coming (it was the one driven by Lieutenant Griggs, the jockey) they believed that it carried an envoy to arrange peace on the conclusion of the two months' (fictitious) armistice, and when the Duke of Westminster questioned him as to the position of the guard Captain Gwatkin-Williams had no idea that there was still war, otherwise he would have interceded for their lives. As it was when he heard the Maxims splutter he shouted "Save them, they have

* From an account by Mr. W. T. Massey on information from officers who took part in the rescue.

been kind to us," and, with the Duke, darted up the mound to stop the firing. It was too late.

The garrison (I suppose nine soldiers) had been wiped out in a few seconds, and I could see only prostrate forms lying among the desert scrub. Unhappily with them perished many women and children, who had run out with the soldiers and could not be distinguished from them in the heat of action. Our guards had died like the brave Arabs they were, with arms in their hands and "in death they were not divided."

In half an hour the return journey was begun and in just over 24 hours, the cars having travelled 240 miles, were back at Sollum. Taken straight to the hospital ship Raschid, the rescued men—one of whom was very ill and shortly afterwards died—sailed the next day for Alexandria. Two of the party who had left Bir Hakim some days previously under escort, to obtain supplies, were handed over by Turkish officers to the Italians at Tobruk. Few men have had stranger experiences than the seamen who spent 19 weeks as prisoners of the Senussi.

While the rescue of the captives at Bir Hakim virtually marked the end of the campaign in the north the situation in the oases was still unfavourable. As already stated the Senussi Sheikh had left Gaafer Pasha's army in January and gone to Siwa, and on February 11 and 12 some 1,000 Senussites coming from Siwa occupied Baharia oasis, distant only 100 miles from the rich and thickly populated districts of Fayum and Minia. Further reinforcements followed and by February 27 Senussi troops had seized the more southerly oases of Farafra and Dakhia. Thus while being beaten back in the north Sidi Ahmed sought to retrieve his fortunes by an advance in the south. The likelihood of this movement had been foreseen and Major-Gen. J. Adye, C.B., was directed to organize a force for the protection of the southern provinces of Egypt. This force guarded the Nile from the Fayum in the north to Esna in the south. Meanwhile as a precautionary measure the civil officials were withdrawn from Kharga (or the Great) Oasis.

The strategical importance of these oases is (wrote Gen. Maxwell) very obvious, but in view of the uncertainty as to what troops would be under my command at any moment, I considered that any enterprise distant from the Nile Valley would be out of place and I restricted Gen. Adye to purely defensive measures, with, however, instructions to prepare a small mobile column with which he could strike at the enemy should he approach the cultivation.

Gen. Adye, holding what lawyers call "a watching brief," was largely dependent on the work of the Royal Flying Corps. From the first the more northern oases, Moghara and

el Gara, had been kept under observation by aeroplane, and Capt. (then Lieut.) Van Rynveld, and Mr. Jennings Bramley, of the Sudan Civil Service, to reduce the distance of flights as much as possible, had established advanced depôts in the desert. This system was first tried by Captain Van Rynveld in a great flight over Gara (Qara) oasis, and by February so regular had the routine become that the airmen were able to announce the occupation of Baharia the very day the enemy reached that oasis. Following this up, the airmen made continual flights to Dakhla, inflicting considerable damage with bombs and machine-guns.

It was at this time, March 19, 1916, that Gen. Sir John Maxwell handed over the supreme command in Egypt to Gen. Sir Archibald Murray, whose duty, as far as concerned the Western Frontier, was to guard against enemy raids in the Nile Valley, the stirring up of tribes still inclined to be well disposed towards the Senussi, and the creation of unrest in the Nile Delta among nervous or disaffected elements of the population. Sir Archibald Murray, acceding to a request from Sir Reginald Wingate, undertook, by means of an armed river patrol,

to defend the reach of the Nile from Aswan to Wadi Halfa, so that the western front extended over 800 miles. The *moral* of the enemy had been severely shaken by the campaign in the north, but it was estimated that he had still 3,000 troops in the western desert. The measures taken by the British succeeded in obviating all the dangers feared: the Senussi forces instead of emerging from the oases and invading the Nile valley, were gradually pushed back.* They had entered Kharga oasis on the withdrawal of the Egyptian officials, but on April 15 aerial reconnaissance showed the oasis to be clear of the enemy, and on the 18th a British force of all ranks, 1,600 strong, was concentrated there. This was followed, on April 27, by the occupation by a British force of the more northern oasis of Moghara, and, a month later, of Baharia oasis, a line of blockhouses being built across waterless desert subject to frequent and severe sand storms. At Baharia, and at the other oases, the Senussi had at first set up an orderly form of government, but as


* An enemy party of four, including one Turkish officer, were captured 60 miles from the Nile, at Minia. This was the Senussi's "farthest east."



SOME OF THE SURVIVORS OF THE "TARA."

Left to right—back row: Mr. C. W. Birkby, Wireless Operator; Mr. G. W. Manning, Clerk; Mr. Richardson, Engineer.

Front row: Mr. Colstead, First Mate; Lieutenant E. B. Tanner, R.N.R.; Captain Rupert S. Gwatkin-Williams, R.N.; Dr. Tanner.



THE ACTION AT BIR SHOLA.
A body of Royal Scots in reserve on the left, the Headquarter Staff in centre. Cavalry in the distance are working round to the flank.

their cause grew hopeless they had treated the natives with great barbarity, and the re-establishment of British authority was welcomed by the inhabitants. The military occupation of the more distant oases was not undertaken, but patrols by the Imperial Camel Corps from Kharga kept Dakhla and Farafra oases under control. Motor-car and camel patrols were also carried out in the north from Sollum and Barrini, and in this way communication between the enemy and the Nile Valley and Delta was rendered almost impossible. In short a cordon was established which confined the Senussi in the south to the Libyan Desert, though in the north a small body of the enemy under Nuri Bey was still near Sollum. Raids and reconnaissances from Sollum in April alone resulted in the discovery in concealed depôts of 287,000 rounds of ammunition, two German wireless "sets," and a number of rifles. These were either destroyed or brought in. Only on one occasion did a Senussi guard offer opposition. In May the command on the Western Frontier was taken over by Lieut.-Gen. Sir Bryan Mahon, but shortly after his arrival in Egypt Sir Bryan had to be invalided home owing to severe sunstroke, and Major-Gen. A. G. Dallas, C.B., succeeded to the command.

In May the Italians struck a blow both against the Senussi source of supplies and the enemy submarine bases in the Mediterranean. They occupied Mersa Moraisa and Bardai, the two ports between Tobruk and Sollum which had been in Senussi occupation. On May 4 a naval force from Tobruk landed two battalions at Moraisa, and marching thence overland, the Italian troops a few days later occupied Bardai. Not only were these places, long the nests of U boats, taken without opposition, but with the active cooperation of Said Hillal, a brother of the Senussi chief. Sidi Ahmed was now in a somewhat tractable mood, and negotiations opened between him and Gen. Ameglio led to an exchange of prisoners, whereby some 700 Italian soldiers regained their liberty, though a larger number had died in captivity. Several influential chieftains also rallied to the Italian side, but in view of the European situation no military expedition was undertaken in the interior of Cyrenaica.

A complete settlement of the Senussi question was, indeed, no longer a matter of urgency. As chief of a federation of desert tribes Sidi Ahmed, in his Libyan fastnesses, was still a power but there was no occasion for either



BRITISH YEOMANRY IN THE DESERT.


Italy or Great Britain to undertake a new campaign full of inherent difficulties. By his failure as a temporal leader Sidi Ahmed had lost much of the influence which he had possessed as a spiritual head. Sidi Ahmed, too, must have regretted that he had been led by his Turk and German advisers to break with Egypt, for in future there was to be no tolerance by the British of his warfare with Italy. An anomalous situation was ended by the conclusion in July, 1916, of an Anglo-Italian agreement for common action against the Senussi. This agreement, in the words of the *Giornale d'Italia*, deprived the Senussi sect of all hope of temporal aggrandizement, while restoring to them their purely religious character. The Italian Government had already publicly announced the entire freedom of religious belief among its Moslem subjects.

Within a week of the conclusion of the Anglo-Italian agreement its effects were seen in Cyrenaica. By arrangement between the Italian commandant of Bardai and the British commander at Sollum a joint armoured car patrol was arranged, and in the first days of August a raid was made on a party of the enemy who were harassing the peaceably inclined natives. The raid was entirely successful. Itself a

minor operation, it demonstrated to Sidi Ahmed and Nuri Bey that the time had passed when the British authorities kept to a policy of non-interference so long as the Senussi confined their operations to Cyrenaica. From this date onward, mutual, constant and systematic action by Italy and Great Britain replaced two hitherto independent policies.

The Turkish and German efforts to stir up trouble in the Sudan had been unceasing, and just as the failure of their efforts in Western Egypt became apparent their intrigues succeeded in getting Ali Dinar, the Sultan of Darfur, to defy the Sudan Government. Ali Dinar had been a prisoner of the Khalifa; he was released by Lord Kitchener, had gone back to Darfur, reconquered the throne of his ancestors, and was acknowledged by the Sudanese Government as Sultan, on the payment of an annual tribute of £500. Though far from being a model monarch, he maintained, on the whole, correct relations with the British, who had the control of his foreign affairs. The Sultan had been kept in order mainly through the influence of Slatin Pasha, who had himself, before his imprisonment by the Mahdi, been governor of Darfur. Slatin Pasha, who, as Lord Cromer publicly testified, "during a great many years gave most loyal and efficient service to the British Government," being an Austrian, was obliged to quit the Sudan administration when the great war began, and

in his absence Ali Dinar assumed a more independent attitude. Darfur was, moreover, as has been already stated, subject to Senussi influence, and that in 1915 meant German influence. In that year Ali Dinar became more than usually restive. He refused to pay his tribute, and in February, 1916, began to concentrate a force on the frontier of Kordofan, the Sudan province adjoining Darfur. He had, too, a taste for abusive letter writing, and one lurid communication, to the Governor of Kordofan and the Inspector of the border, was addressed to "The Governor of Hell in Kordofan and the Inspector of Flames in Nahud." The situation created by Ali Dinar's truculence was grave, and unless promptly and successfully handled disturbances throughout the Sudan were to be expected. Wadai, the sultanate wrested by the French from Senussi control in 1909-10, adjoined Darfur on the west, and several of its tribes sympathized with Ali Dinar, who, it was definitely ascertained, was in communication with Senussi chiefs. It was plain, said Lord Crewe, speaking in the House of Lords on behalf of the Government, that Ali Dinar had been misled by German propaganda. "It was likely that if delay had occurred, some German emissaries, whose activities there had been occasion to recognize, might have found their way to Darfur." Fortunately in Sir Reginald Wingate the Sudan possessed a governor whose courage was equal to his knowledge. He did not hesitate to take



SULTAN ALI DINAR'S HOUSE, EL FASHER, DARFUR.



AT EL FASHER, DARFUR.


A gun platform. Smaller picture: Mahmud El Dedingawi, the Sultan's Cavalry Commander.

instant action, although the season was the worst in the year for military operations. As to the consideration of season it had also to be remembered that when movement—owing to the scarcity of water—was difficult for the British it was also difficult for the enemy.

For the expedition against Darfur Sir Reginald Wingate relied on his own resources, except for the help of a detachment of the Royal Flying Corps under Major Groves. All the rank and file engaged belonged to the Egyptian Army. The officers were British. A mixed force of all arms under Lieut.-Col. P. V. Kelly, officer commanding Egyptian Cavalry, was assembled, and in March it entered Darfur after slight opposition. In April, Abaid, a place 90 miles west of El Fasher, Ali Dinar's capital, was occupied and became the base for further operations. On May 15 Col. Kelly set forward for El Fasher. He was well served by the R.F.C., who, from their base at Abaid, made extraordinary flights. On one occasion Capt. Bannatyne was nine and a half hours in the air. The enemy gave battle on May 22, at Beringia, 12 miles north of the capital and fought with all the traditional bravery of the Sudanese "Arabs"—who, in reality, have but a slight admixture of Arab blood. Besides other troops the Darfurians had 2,600 riflemen, the pick of Ali Dinar's forces. They held a strongly entrenched position, which, however, "the Egyptian Camel Corps induced them to leave." The



enemy then attacked the Egyptian troops "with the utmost rapidity and desperation. The attack was met with withering fire, but some few of the enemy penetrated to within 10 yards of our lines. Our troops then counter-attacked, totally defeating the enemy," whose losses exceeded 50 per cent. of his force. The next day Col. Kelly entered El Fasher. Ali Dinar and a large body of horsemen fled. They were chased by aeroplanes, which



GENERAL VIEW OF THE BAY OF SOLLUM.

freely bombed the fugitives. Licut. Slessor threw a bomb which fell almost at the feet of the Sultan, and though himself wounded by a bullet in the thigh, returned safely to Abaid.

"Lieut. Slessor's achievements," said Sir Reginald Wingate, in publicly thanking the Royal Flying Corps, "were as gallant as they were dramatic, and I congratulate him on having administered the final and heavy blow to the Kaiser's latest ally, Sultan Ali Dinar, as he ignobly fled from his capital, where he had boasted he would be prepared to lay down his life in support of our enemies' cause."

Thereafter Ali Dinar disappears from the scene. A military administration was set up at El Fasher, where a considerable quantity of military stores was found, including four field guns and 55,000 rounds of small arms ammunition. (Among other "booty" was a large steam-roller, upon which was fixed a chair of state. This vehicle had served Ali Dinar, in lieu of a motor-car, for touring the town.) Many chiefs surrendered, and in a short time Darfur was at peace. For those who, from Sir Evelyn Wood onward, had laboured for over 30 years in the reorganization of the Egyptian Army it was particularly gratifying that the "Gippy" should have stood up to and beaten his once most dreaded foe. The victory, too, was a triumph of organization. Sir Archibald Murray said truly

that the issue of the campaign was "only rendered possible by strenuous and skilful preparations, which have overcome immense difficulties, and by first-class staff work."

The Germans had counted much on provoking a rising in the Sudan. On May 8 Swiss papers published what purported to be a telegram from Constantinople saying that the Wolff Agency announced that the "Iman" of Darfur had proclaimed the Holy War against the English; that he was marching north with his troops and 8,000 camels; that he was driving back the English—who were in disorderly flight—and intended to join the Senussi. Later in the month, when Ali Dinar had been defeated, the same statement was circulated all over the world by the German Wireless Agency. The Germans were loth to acknowledge the fiasco of Fasher.

As in Western Egypt so in the Sudan, the approved German method of stirring up sedition among the Moslems under the rule of the Allies had been tried and had failed. Equally futile was the second attempt (in August, 1916) made by the Turks, under German inspiration, to invade Egypt by way of the Suez Canal. Britain's highway to India and her position in the Nile valley remained as secure as ever.



CHAPTER CXLVI.

THE INTERVENTION OF PORTUGAL.

THE ANGLO-PORTUGUESE ALLIANCE—LOYALTY TO THE ALLIANCE IN 1914—THE CAUSES OF DELAY—HISTORY OF THE REPUBLIC—GOVERNMENT INSTABILITY—THE FACTORS OF INTERNAL UNREST—GERMAN INTRIGUES—THE MADEIRA CONCESSIONS—CLERICALISM AND ANTI-CLERICALISM—THE MONARCHY—PARTIES UNDER THE REPUBLIC—THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION IN THE WAR—DR. ARRIAGA'S POLICY AS PRESIDENT—POLITICAL STRUGGLES—HESITATIONS OF BRITISH DIPLOMACY—EXPEDITIONS TO ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE—MINISTERIAL DIFFERENCES—GENERAL PIMENTA DE CASTRO'S GOVERNMENT—THE REVOLUTION OF MAY, 1915—DR. MACHADO, PRESIDENT—THE SEIZURE OF GERMAN SHIPS—GERMAN DECLARATION OF WAR.

ON March 9, 1916, Dr. Rosen, the German Minister in Lisbon, called on the Portuguese Foreign Minister, Dr. Augusto Soares, to intimate that the Imperial Government had declared war on Portugal. Next day, quietly, but with all the formalities of international courtesy, he left Lisbon. The Austrian Minister, Baron von Kuhn, on March 15, demanded his passports, and left the country.

At a special session of the Congress, held on the 10th, the Prime Minister, Dr. Affonso Costa, had announced the resignation of his Government, to make way for the formation of a special national War Ministry, formed by the union of the two chief parties in the Parliament, the Democrats and the Evolutionists. The 16th saw the new Government formed, the Evolutionist leader, Dr. Antonio José d'Almeida becoming Prime Minister and Dr. Affonso Costa, the Democratic chief, taking the office of Minister of Finance. Dr. Augusto Soares remained at the Foreign Office. Dr. Brito Camacho, the Unionist leader, elected to remain outside the Government, though promising his support for the national policy.

There was a great demonstration in Lisbon on the 26th in support of the Government

policy. These events passed quietly and occasioned nothing of the general excitement which had characterized the outbreak of European hostilities in 1914. Yet these days will be memorable in Portuguese history. They form the complement of those spontaneous affirmations of loyalty to the Alliance and to the Allies made in full Congress on August 7, and again on November 23, 1914. The declarations then made voiced the undoubted wish of a large section of the Portuguese nation that Portugal should take her place and part with the Entente Powers, as the historic ally of Great Britain and the devoted friend of France. Those declarations were first made in the dark opening days of the war. Belgium was then slowly but doggedly falling back from her frontiers and her fortresses. They were repeated at the very time when Turkey was preparing to throw in her lot with the Central Empires. Portugal, indeed, first of all Europe declared clearly and unitedly for the Allies.

Why? First, without question, because under the old alliance between Portugal and England it was the natural course and policy to follow, although especially since the year 1890 Germany had persistently worked to



PORTUGUESE INFANTRY DRILLING.

supplant British interests in Portugal. Like Belgium, Portugal wished to live free and independent, and recognized in the British Alliance the surest external guarantee for her national independence and the security of her colonies. Secondly, because, as Republicans, the Portuguese saw in this occasion an unequalled opportunity for the establishment of the Republican régime on a firmer basis. To Republicans Germany, with her form of government and policy, was naturally antagonistic. Though the Central Empires only officially declared war on March 9, 1916, the Republic from its first proclamation on October 5, 1910, had been engaged in a ceaseless struggle for its very existence with a confederacy of courts and currents among which Berlin, Vienna, and Munich had a prominent place.

Why, it may be asked, did not Germany declare war before, in view of Portugal's prompt and reiterated declarations of solidarity with Great Britain and the Allies?

First, because Portugal held far too valuable a pledge in pawn in the seventy odd German ships which, curiously enough, the outbreak of hostilities found at anchor in Portuguese ports, or which subsequently sheltered there. Secondly, because the near neighbourhood of the German and Portuguese colonies in Africa

made the neutrality, if not the friendship, of Portugal a consideration, the more that the failure of Germany's schemes for the rapid subjugation of Europe early compelled her to stand purely on the defensive in South-West and East Africa. And thirdly, because, without doubt, Germany yet hoped, by the prolongation of a state of dubious and dangerous indecision, by actively fomenting party strife and internal unrest, and even by revolution, to render active Portuguese help of the Allies impossible, or to produce the adoption of such a policy of neutrality as, with that of Spain, would have converted all the littoral of the Peninsula, together with the ports of Portuguese West and East Africa, Madeira, the Azores, Cape Verde, and the Portuguese colonies of Portuguese India, Timor, and China, into so many landing stages and refuges for the Central Empires and centres for pro-German propaganda.


But this was not to be. "Portugal," in the words of the British Minister in Lisbon, Sir Lancelot Carnegie, "showed herself in this crisis prepared to comply scrupulously with the very letter of her treaties, at whatever risk to herself." "Nor," he added, "will anyone be surprised at the fact." In view of the history of the two nations and the many and recent evidences of the friendship subsisting

between them, it was, in truth, not to be wondered at.

It is needless to retrace the history of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance from 1373 to the twentieth century. The world had changed indeed since Englishmen and Portuguese first fought side by side, in the days of the first Portuguese dynasty, to win Lisbon, and later Silves from the Moors, and since, in 1381, the first defensive expedition of English troops entered the Tagus. Many had been the changes since English archers joined with the Portuguese patriots who defended the stockade at Aljubarrota. But these changes had not altered the real bases which underlay this oldest of international alliances. These subsisted still, as they had subsisted 500 years before, in Portugal's long Atlantic seaboard

and ports and in her wide and vulnerable land frontiers. For Portugal prized her independence above all. Hence it was that she yet looked, as she had ever done, to England, her ally beyond the seas.

The relations between the two countries during the closing years of King Carlos's reign had been close and cordial. In 1899 Admiral Sir Harry Rawson had paid a special visit to Lisbon. In 1903 King Edward VII. had been given a truly royal welcome by the people of Portugal on the occasion of his visit, and a similar reception was given by the British to King Carlos when soon afterwards he visited London. Then had followed the visits of Queen Alexandra, and later that of the Duke of Connaught and his daughters. These visits the Portuguese people had never forgotten. It may be recalled here that Mr. Lloyd George,



WIRELESS TELEGRAPHY: OPERATORS AT WORK.

Mr. Asquith and Mr. McKenna had all visited Lisbon within recent years. Only in 1909 the young King, Manoel, had visited and been welcomed in London. Thither he returned an exile in 1910.

On the establishment of the Republic on October 5, 1910, the attitude of the Republican leaders had been from the first frankly friendly. Dr. Bernardino Machado, the Foreign Minister of the Provisional Government, had declared its wish that the British Alliance might be maintained intact, despite the change in régime, and the desire of the Government to do all in its power for the strengthening of the ties which united the two countries. From the first these advances had been cordially met by Sir Francis Villiers, the then British Minister in Lisbon, who well knew the actual conditions of things in the country during the closing years of the Monarchy. Sir Arthur Hardinge, who succeeded him in October, 1911, after the first Monarchist incursion, had worked actively to foster Anglo-Portuguese relations and in support and promotion of the British Chamber of Commerce in Portugal.

The change of régime, however, as was natural, resulted in the slackening of many of those ties which had hitherto united the two lands. There was much to explain this. The English are a conservative people: they respect tradition, as they respect belief. They were shocked, as was all Europe, by the

assassination of King Carlos. They pitied, and rightly pitied, his son. They are a religious people. They heard of religion persecuted, and its ministers treated with scorn and brutality. They were indignant, and rightly indignant. They are a loyal and a magnanimous people, and they heard of loyalty treated as a crime and punished by stern privation. They sympathized, and naturally sympathized, with the sufferers. Far from the amazing world of intrigue, of plot and counterplot, which made up for so long the under-history of this little land, and knowing little of the causes that determined that vast war of clericals and anti-clericals which involved all Continental Europe and much of Latin America, the British public for years watched Portugal with interest and concern, and sometimes with outspoken indignation. Meanwhile the young Republic, beset without and within, was fighting its uphill battle against odds of which the British public knew little.

To understand Portugal's war policy is not easy. It is impossible without some knowledge of the history of the country during recent years. But before entering on this there are certain facts which require never to be forgotten.

First of these is the condition of chronic governmental instability. A recognition of the enormous difficulties arising from this is essen-



PORTUGAL BECOMES A REPUBLIC.

The last Royalist cavalry in Vinhacs on their way to surrender to the Republican authorities.



PROCLAIMING THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC IN LISBON, OCTOBER 5, 1910.

The crowd listening to Republican leaders who are speaking at the Town Hall.

tial to any judgment of the country, its policy, and its public men. Yet abroad this has often been forgotten. The condition was not new. It characterized the history of the entire country. Latterly, however, it had been accentuated. Thus from 1900 to 1910, during the last 10 years of the Monarchy, 10 governments came and went. The Republic entered with the Revolution of October 5, 1910, and between 1910 and 1916 there had been already 11 governments. Now, this perpetual change spells ruin for any régime or any country. It signifies weakness at home, and irresponsibility and uncertainty in the nation's policy abroad.

This instability had its rise in the destruction of the old political balance maintained for many years by the two old organized political parties—the Progressistas and the Regeneradores—which, while they monopolized all political power, constituted a sort of equipoise.

Its immediate cause was traceable to the persistently obstructive action of dissentient groups which, powerless to govern, were yet able to make the Government of either of the new and but imperfectly organized parties impossible. This policy of systematized obstruction, inside and outside Parliament, was adopted originally by rival monarchic groups within the Monarchy—which it destroyed. It was continued under the Republic by these same groups, with a view either to the destruction of the Republic or to the conquest of power. In this struggle these dissentients united with and worked largely through discontented Republican elements. Further, both before the war and after its outbreak, this policy was systematically employed to weaken the régime, and to frustrate all attempts to define and strengthen the national policy—and this on behalf of Austria and Germany and Spain, as against Great Britain and France. It must



DR. BERNARDINO MACHADO,
President of the Republic.

not be thought that these remarks apply to the Monarchist party as a whole, as there was a considerable section which, especially after the war broke out, either showed a friendly attitude to the Allies, or at any rate remained passive.

Portugal in the beginning of the century was sliding quietly and, as it seemed, contentedly, down to bankruptcy and ruin, and her Monarchy with her. King Carlos, a clever, educated, easy-going monarch, appeared to be either supremely oblivious or supremely careless as to what the future might hold for either his country or his House. The internal political situation was summed up in the see-saw of the two great traditional parties, the Regeneradores (Conservatives), led by Senhor Hintze-Ribeiro, and the Progressistas (Liberals), under Senhor Luciano de Castro. These two parties—the “Rotativos,” as they came to be called—formed the counterpart of the old-world British Tories and Whigs. They had for the most part little connexion with the cities, depending for their strength upon “the country,” local electioneering interests, the official representative of the Minister of the Interior for the time being, the old gentry, the illiterate voter, and the Church. Separated by little except party barriers, they were content alternately to enjoy the sweets of office. And so in a peace broken only by the squabbles of the various would-be successors to the leadership of the parties, the country drifted down towards the abyss.

Republicanism was still little more than the platonic aspiration of professors and medical

men, far removed, it then seemed, from the sphere of actual politics, while among the professional party politicians of all schools the Monarchy and the English Alliance were political dogmas universally accepted. The only section inclined to look askance at England, despite Lord Salisbury’s unforgotten “ultimatum” to Germany, were the Republicans. They saw—and, as it then seemed, not without reason—in the continuance of the British Alliance the prospect of a limitless continuance of the thousand ills and abuses which threatened the national life.

It was the now-forgotten question of the renewal of the Tobacco Monopoly which heralded the downfall of the old order. This question was intimately connected with the financial future of the country, but passed almost unnoticed in England. It ended, after occasioning the fall of three Governments and five Ministers of Finance, in the dramatic defeat of Senhor Luciano de Castro, the split-up of his historic party (the Progressist), and the beginning of that period of faction-fighting and political anarchy which led to the fall first of the parties and then of the Monarchy.

It was in March, 1906, that Senhor Luciano de Castro was defeated, owing to the defection of his right-hand man, Senhor José Maria Alpoim, and left his place of leader of the Cortes for ever. A Regenerador Government, under Senhor Hintze-Ribeiro, naturally followed. This party was even less prepared than its rival to cope with the difficulties of the moment. The Government entered on March 20, 1906. By May 18 it had fallen, its chief,



DR. A. J. D'ALMEIDA,
Prime Minister, 1915.



GENERAL PIMENTA DA
CASTRO,

The Progressist Leader.



DR. BRITO
CAMACHO,

The Unionist Leader.



DR. AUGUSTOS DE
VASCONCELLOS.

Prime Minister, 1911.

one of the finest orators and parliamentarians of his time, having left office—like his rival—never to return. The ruin of the great parties in Portugal had begun. The five years that followed saw the Progressist party reduced to impotence as the result of organized obstruction, in which the Dissidents under Senhor Alpoim were the leading factor, while the Regeneradors fell into faction, and went down with the Monarchy, which their divisions did much to destroy.

Even before this, during the Regenerador Government of 1904–1906, Germany and German official agents had made the attempt to

secure political influence, alike in the Court and in the Regenerador party, led by Senhor Hintze-Ribeiro. Thus it was during his Government, in large measure through Court influence, and trading upon the well-known philanthropic character of the then Queen, Dona Amelia, that the famous Madeira Sanatorium Concession was granted to a German group, of whom Prince Ernst Hohenlohe was the head. Prince Hohenlohe, it should be remembered, was at this time head of the German Colonial Department. By this concession it was proposed to construct in Madeira a palace hotel and sanatoria for the special

TABLE OF GOVERNMENTS IN PORTUGAL

FROM 1900 TO 1915.

1900.	June 25	SENHOR HINTZE-RIBEIRO.
1904.	October 20	SENHOR LUCIANO DE CASTRO.
1906.	March 19	SENHOR HINTZE-RIBEIRO.
	May 18	SENHOR JOÃO FRANCO.
1908.	February 4	SENHOR DO AMARAL.
	December 25	SENHOR CAMPOS HENRIQUES.
1909.	April 11	SENHOR SEBASTIAO TELLES.
	May 13	SENHOR WENCESLAU DE LIMA.
	December 22	SENHOR BEIRAO.
1910.	June 26	SENHOR TEIXEIRA DE SOUSA.
	October 5	THE REVOLUTIONARY PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT proclaimed.
					<i>President</i> : SENHOR THEOPHILO BRAGA.
1911.	September 3	SENHOR JOÃO CHAGAS.
	November 12	SENHOR AUGUSTOS DE VASCONCELLOS.
1912.	June 16	SENHOR DUARTE LEITE.
1913.	January 9	SENHOR AFFONSO COSTA.
1914.	February 8	SENHOR BERNARDINO MACHADO.
	December 12	SENHOR VICTOR HUGO DE AZEVEDO COUTINHO.
1915.	January 28	GENERAL PIMENTA DE CASTRO.
	May 15	SENHOR JOÃO CHAGAS.
	May 24	SENHOR JOSÉ DE CASTRO.
	June 15	SENHOR JOSÉ DE CASTRO.
	November 29	SENHOR AFFONSO COSTA.
1916.	March 15	SENHOR ANTONIO JOSÉ D'ALMEIDA.
					<i>Presidents.</i>
1911.	August 24	DR. ARRIAGA.
1915.	May 29	SENHOR THEOPHILO BRAGA.
	August 6	SENHOR BERNARDINO MACHADO.

treatment of tuberculosis. The scheme was drafted on a large scale. The Queen's interest was secured by clauses making provision for a certain number of beds for the poor and the appointment of the Chief Court physician in connexion with the scheme. Influential Portuguese elements in Madeira and Lisbon were interested in it, and so rapid was the progress made that in less than six months the Portuguese local agent could write to Herr Hoffmann, one of the promoters in Berlin, "Madeira is quite in your hands," thanks to the "magic Sanatoria."

Then came a hitch. A certain property adjoining the concession came into the market.



ON BOARD A DESTROYER.
Hoisting the Republican Standard.

It was bought up by an Englishman, over the head of his German rivals. The German group fell back upon a somewhat ambiguously worded paragraph of the original deed of concession, and on their securing, through Prince Hohenlohe, the support of the German Government, Portugal was surprised by a demand for the expropriation of the English owner, a reply being requested within a stipulated time-limit of so many hours. This "ultimatum" was at once sent on to England by the Portuguese Government of the day. Germany as a result was given to understand, as later in the case of the French Congo, that, should she take her threatened action against the country, force

would be met by force. The result of British intervention was, for the moment, decisive. Germany withdrew her time-limit and agreed to leave the matter to be settled by negotiation, and it was relegated to the lawyers until such time as, on the assassination of King Carlos and the accession of King Manoel, Senhor Wenceslau de Lima, the former Regenerador Foreign Minister, reassumed his post at the Foreign Office.

The incident was, however, very far from being settled. What had originally been put forward as a combined commercial and philanthropic scheme, and subsequently proved a grave political menace, had in 1908 become part of a comprehensive commercial policy. Senhor Wenceslau de Lima was no sooner in office again than there began to be outlined a series of concerted measures, ably planned and far-reaching in their effects, converting the original plan for the domination of Madeira into a systematic scheme for insuring German economic preponderance alike in the country and the colonies.

Four years before, the reliance of responsible statesmen of all parties on the British Alliance as the base of all Portuguese foreign policy was unquestioning and complete. That the reader may be enabled to understand how such a change of attitude in the governing classes could come about in so short a time it will be well rapidly to review the internal situation during these years, which witnessed the ruin of the old parties, the assassination of King Carlos and the Crown Prince, and the short and stormy reign of King Manoel.

In 1906 the Progressist Government under Senhor Luciano de Castro, and the Regenerador under Senho Hintze-Ribeiro, fell in rapid succession. The cause in both cases was the same—the separation from the two parties of dissident or dissentient groups, composed in each case of some of the most capable and influential men in their respective parties. The leader of the one group, which became known as the Dissidents, was Senhor José Maria Alpoim, of the other Senhor João Franco. The apple of discord in each case was the Ministry of the Interior, which carried with it, under the then conditions, the virtual reversion of the leadership of the party. These two chiefs were similarly placed as regards their political influence in their respective parties, and were both able and both ambitious, but here all resemblance between them ends.



Torpedo leaving the ship.



Firing practice.



Firing a torpedo. Circle picture: A torpedo ready for the tube.
ON BOARD A PORTUGUESE DESTROYER.



DR. ROSEN,

German Minister in Lisbon from 1912 to 1916.

The old Progressist Prime Minister, Senhor Luciano de Castro, though defeated in 1906, was very far from having lost his power. He was a really great parliamentary and party leader of the old school—a Portuguese Walpole. Invalided and confined to his room by gout, he continued to hold the real powers of government in his hands, working through his lieutenants, and checkmating both the Opposition and the Dissident group who had left him. His genius prolonged and embittered the party duel, which dragged on through the last years of the life of King Carlos and the short reign of his son.

The fall of Hintze-Ribeiro and the Regenerador party was far more rapid and complete than that of his rival. On his resignation on May 18, 1906, after only 60 days of power, King Carlos took the hazardous step of calling João Franco to succeed him. Senhor João Franco had left Hintze-Ribeiro, his former chief, in 1901, and in 1903 formed the nucleus of a new party—the Regenerador-Liberal. Bitterly opposed, he had none the less drawn around him a group of able and honest men, though he possessed no political organization such as could compare with those

of the two historic parties. Called unexpectedly to power, the new Minister entered upon an apparently impossible task, but faced the position at the outset with courage, honesty and address. His success threatened the very existence of the old parties. The story of how—as a result of the able, but bitter and unscrupulous campaign, carried on against him in the Press, the Parliament and the country, by the old parties, Dissidents and Republicans alike—after some months of useful work and an amazing struggle against his many enemies, he was forced from liberalism into repression, branded as the Dictator, and finally crushed by the simple but terrible expedient of the assassination of the King, who had refused to abandon him, is one of the tragedies of constitutional history in Latin lands. When the time comes to do full justice to João Franco, it will be recognized that his brief government, despite its disastrous close, was the loyal attempt of an honest man to save his country, and the Monarchy with it, not by condoning and temporizing with abuses, but by ending them.



[Vandyk

SENHOR SOARES,
Foreign Minister.



VISIT OF BRITISH CRUISERS TO LISBON.

Sir Lancelot Carnegie, British Minister in Lisbon, chatting with Admiral Yelverton.

João Franco fell, as did King Carlos, only because the official Monarchist parties refused to be saved by the extirpation of those vices which threatened at once the ruin of the nation, the Monarchy and their own political power. Practically none of his legislative work was altered.

The death of King Carlos affected Anglo-Portuguese relations most adversely. He, despite his German blood, had always shown himself a real friend of England and the British Alliance. An intelligent and able man, however greatly his life might appear to belie the

fact, he understood and sympathized in his easy-going way with the free institutions and the liberal trend of opinion which form the distinctive heritage of Great Britain and France. Indeed, it would seem that his calling of João Franco to power and his determined support of him were due in great part to a sincere wish to break with the corruptions of the former pseudo-constitutionalism by the introduction of a more honest administration "*à inglesa*."

Now, side by side with this internal party struggle, a wider, deeper and far more potent international factor was introduced by the



VISIT OF BRITISH CRUISERS TO LISBON.

President Machado (1); Senhor Norton de Mattos (2), Minister of War; and Admiral Yelverton (3), in the Gardens of the Palace of Belem.

growing bitterness of the war of clericals and anti-clericals.

King Carlos was no anti-clerical, but clerical he was not. It is notorious that the one great popular ovation of his public life was that called forth, in the words of the *Seculo*, of August 17, 1914, "not by what King Carlos represented for the country, but by the hope which he constituted at that time of a change in processes with regard to Clericalism. King Carlos failed to follow such a course, and never again in his life was that demonstration repeated."

The Queen, Dona Amelia, on the other hand, was a *beata* in the popular Portuguese acceptance of the word—an earnest, devout Catholic, we should say—but unquestionably wholly in the hands of the Church and the clergy. It was to her influence that the return of the Jesuits to Portugal under Hintze-Ribeiro was attributed, as also the growing numbers and strength of the foreign religious orders in the country. When King Carlos was dead, and in his place sat the young prince Manoel, retiring, unassertive, kindly and, like his mother, deeply religious, the whole tide of Court influence became intensely clerical, in utter opposition to the prevalent anti-clerical feeling of the capital and to many among his Ministers.

Hence it was that, during those disastrous two years, it was the religious question, second only to that of party leadership, which dominated everything. Raised in 1909, by a question as to the right of the bishops to dismiss and to appoint teachers in the State schools without the intervention of the Government, and again in 1910 by a Papal order for the suspension of a periodical (an order given without consultation with the Government, in contravention of the law), the anti-clerical feeling was intensified by the active part taken by the clergy in the elections of August, 1910. In little more than two years, the young King found himself forced to flee the country.

The King and the Court were clerical to a degree. The Press and the cities were no less thoroughly anti-clerical, as was evidenced by the great demonstration in favour of the Bill for the civil registration of births, marriages and deaths which was held shortly before the Revolution. The King's Ministers in the six Governments which came and went during the crowded thirty months of his reign had many of them no vestige of sympathy with the declaredly clerical tone of the King and the Court. They were for the most part far more interested in the personal question of who in

their respective parties was to succeed to the leadership in place of Hintze-Ribeiro or of Luciano de Castro. Personal disputes for party precedence sum up well nigh the record of these six Governments. But from among them, short-lived, sterile and featureless as they were, there is one which stands apart, taking rank, among all the 20 administrations which have come and gone since 1900, as having done more towards changing the course of the national life and policy than any except the Republican Provisional Government. This Government, which lasted only some seven months, was that of Senhor Wenceslau de Lima. Short-lived as it was, it succeeded before it left power in carrying, through a well-nigh silent and complacent Chamber, three measures of capital importance, which served to give a fresh current to Portuguese colonial, commercial and foreign policy. And this policy may be said to have been "made in Germany."

It was just after the Bosnian crisis in 1908, when, in Prince Bülow's striking phrase,

Germany had decided "to fling her sword into the scale," that Count Tattenbach came to Portugal. Previously he had been in Morocco, and was the Minister chosen to represent the Empire, and its new and definite war-preparation policy, at the Conference of Algeiras. When he came to Lisbon the Count found the Madeira Sanatorium question still pending, and at once set to work to secure its settlement in such a manner as to ensure the maximum of advantage to the concessionary group and to his Government. Various proposals were broached, among others that of a privileged line of navigation from Lisbon to Madeira. These all gave place to the wider scheme of a preferential Treaty of Commerce.

Senhor Wenceslau de Lima had been Foreign Minister under Hintze-Ribeiro and was one of the leaders of the Regenerator party. He had large electioneering and commercial interests in Oporto and the North, particularly in the Oporto wine business. On the fall and subsequent death of his chief, the leadership of the



VISIT OF THE BRITISH CRUISERS TO LISBON.

The head of the British Mission to Portugal on board the Portuguese Cruiser "Vasco Gama."

party devolved first upon Senhor Julio de Vilhena, and later upon Senhor Teixeira de Sousa. Neither seems to have been *persona grata* at the Court. Senhor Wenceslau de Lima, as the King's published letters clearly show, was the one of all King Manoel's many Ministers whom he really trusted and for whom he evidenced genuine affection. It was the King's wish, as he himself wrote, to prepare his friend's succession to the leadership of the Conservative party. In the King's first Government, that of Senhor Ferreira d'Amaral, Wenceslau de Lima appeared again as Foreign Minister. Under Hintze-Ribeiro, he had sought to inaugurate a series of treaties of commerce, with a view to the development of the national trade. With this end he approached England, but his advances met with no response. He now turned to Germany. In Count Tattenbach he met with a ready coadjutor. In May 1909 he became Prime Minister. Before his Government fell, in December of the same year, there had been hurried through Parliament his new commercial programme and these three measures—the Law of Sobre-Tax, the Madeira Sanatorium Settlement, and the Treaty of Commerce with Germany—were already law. By the law of Sobre-Tax the Government were empowered to apply a sliding tariff scale for facilitating commercial negotiation. The Madeira Sanatorium claims were settled by the payment to the German concessionaires of 1,200 contos of reis (some £240,000). By the Treaty of Commerce preferential duties were conceded to Germany up to 33 per cent. Subsequently, in application, these differences in some cases attained as much as 2,000 per cent. as against British goods.

These measures, involving fiscal and commercial changes of the utmost political importance, were hurried almost without discussion through a dying Parliament, in the last days of the session. The Government fell, but its work remained. The direction of Portuguese trade had been definitely diverted from Great Britain to Germany, and only time was wanting to ensure the political current's setting the same way.

Meanwhile the Monarchy, dependent as it was upon the warring fragments of the old parties for its existence, was with them tottering to its fall. Two of Senhor Luciano de Castro's former lieutenants, Senhores Campos Henriques and Sebastião Telles, had already attempted


unsuccessfully the task of government. A third, the veteran Senhor Beirão, after some 20 days' conferring, succeeded in collecting a really promising Government, including many of the younger, better, and abler elements of the old Progressist party. If any Government could have saved the Monarchy, this might well have done it. But the Dissidents and the Opposition, who by their organized obstruction in the Chamber had already overthrown four Governments in 22 months, were relentless. Their obstruction led the Premier to ask for a dissolution. The young King refused, and by his refusal destroyed his only chance of weathering the storm. The "Block," of Regeneradors and Dissidents, under Senhor Teixeira de Sousa, entered office, powerless to secure a stable majority either in the Parliament or the country. The Progressist majority, bitterly resentful of the manner in which they had been expelled from power by the King's refusal of the dissolution, which he had perforce granted to their rivals, when they had for the most part only accepted office with reluctance and at considerable sacrifice, now looked on with folded arms while Court and Crown were swept away in Revolution. Yet in those last days, before the crash, while the friends of the Monarchy, dimly conscious of impending ruin, were turning now hither, now thither, for support, there were begun certain noteworthy negotiations which were later to bear fruit.

Before King Carlos's death, negotiations had been on foot for arranging as to the early marriage of his heir, the Crown Prince. The tragic death of the latter and King Manoel's accession naturally resulted in directing attention to the question of the succession. At the time of the young King's visit to England, in May of 1910, rumours had been rife as to a projected English marriage. But just as Senhor Wenceslau de Lima, disappointed in securing the support of Great Britain for his commercial schemes, had turned to Germany, so now did Senhor José de Azevedo Castello Branco, Foreign Minister of the new Regenerator-Dissident "Block," the last effort of the dying Monarchy, in the matter of the young King's marriage. Negotiations were already on foot for ensuring German support for the tottering throne when the Revolution of October 5, 1910, put an abrupt end to the Monarchy.

The Monarchy fell, and the proclamation of the Republic on October 5, 1910, interrupted



Marching through the streets of Lisbon.



The Review at the Palace of Belem.
BRITISH SAILORS IN PORTUGAL.



MOBILIZATION OF THE ARMY.

Students presenting themselves to the authorities at Lisbon.

those German schemes which would have meant the throwing of the political, no less than the commercial, weight into the scale against the Entente Powers.

The Provisional Government of the Republic was noteworthy in many ways. It represented much of what was strongest and soundest in the new régime. Its work has met with much merited and unmerited criticism. But little allowance has in general been made for the difficult conditions with which it was called upon to deal. Called to reform where reform was much needed, it is accused of excess. This was to be expected. Its anti-clerical policy has been characterized as persecution. It was, as were very many of the acts of this Government, primarily a measure of defence. For the truth is that, from the first week of its existence, the Republic never ceased to be attacked, not only by all those warring elements which by their rival ambitions had destroyed the Monarchy, not only from within, but from abroad, by a circle of powerful interests of many kinds—clerical, Monarchical, financial, and international. Thus the Republic's first six years' existence were chequered by two armed incursions from over the Spanish frontier, necessitating the mobilization for months together of large military and naval forces, together with a series of industriously

fomented internal risings, strikes, and threatened military movements, now in the capital and now in the country. The Republic's attitude toward the foreign religious orders, and more particularly the Jesuits, was inevitable. These Orders, with rare exceptions, had entered by Court influence against the law of the land. Their political influence was great. Naturally, that influence was devoted to increasing the power of the Throne and of the Church. The clerical question, as has been seen, existed in acute form under the Monarchy. It was no creation of the Republic.

In Portugal the decay of the national church resulted in the natural preponderance of the foreign orders. They, relying primarily upon the Court, were from the first the enemies of the Republic, and throughout the world have been its bitterest foes. Self-defence dictated the expulsion of the Orders in the first weeks of the Provisional Government. It is to be regretted that politics rather than policy should have stamped the Law for the Separation of the Church, with which Dr. Affonso Costa followed it later on. Such a measure, involving the entire question of the relations of Church and State, together with the



PORTUGUESE OFFICERS
In training.



PORTUGUESE INFANTRY IN CAMP.


subtle claims of the individual conscience, is one to tax the genius of any statesman. Cromwell, Napoleon, and Gladstone alike tried the task, with but partial success. It is certain that no measure of the kind would have given content. To Affonso Costa's law, far more than to any deep love for the Monarchy, the Republic owed the second armed incursion, and very much of the subsequent opposition which it met.

Three groups had already begun to take form in opinion, the Press, and the country, before the work of the Provisional Government came to a close, in 1911, with the election of the Congress and the first President, Senhor Manuel d'Arriaga. These three groups centred around Dr. Affonso Costa, the leader of the Democrats; Dr. Antonio José d'Almeida, chief of the Evolutionists; and Dr. Brito Camacho, the head of the Unionists. These three parties, with a few Independents, under Senhor Machado Santos, one of the naval heroes of the Revolution, and one or two Socialists, made up the Congress. This Congress of 1911 was frankly an "amateur" Parliament. From it, naturally, the old governing classes were, as a whole, excluded. From its successor, as from the régime, they with few exceptions held studiedly aloof.

The first regularly constituted Republican

Governments, those of Senhor João Chagas, Dr. Augustos de Vasconcellos, and Dr. Duarte Leite, represented only the temporary enforced union of these three groups in defence of the régime, before the organization of new political parties capable of governing. This union was imposed on the Republic by the Royalist incursions, which entered the country from Spain in 1911 and again in 1912. Both met with absolute defeat, as also did the third and "most serious and deeply laid" movement, that of October 21, 1913. This result was due, first, to the political instinct which imposed the union of all the groups of the Republic in its defence; and, secondly, to the new organization of the army begun by Major Baretto, Minister of War in the Provisional Government.

Apart from defence, these three Governments are to be remembered as having continued the honest work of Senhor Carlos Relvas, Minister of Finance of the Provisional Government. He and his successors, Dr. Duarte Leite, Dr. Sidonio Paes, and Senhor Antonio Vincente Ferreira, sought to place before the country the real facts of the financial situation, bad as it was, especially as aggravated by the great expenses entailed by the enforced mobilization for months together of large forces for defence. Their work was followed in January, 1913,



PORTUGUESE CAVALRY CROSSING A BRIDGE ACROSS THE TAGUS.

by that of Dr. Affonso Costa, the Democratic chief, who entered at the head of the first organized party Government of the Republic. He found the Treasury burdened with an enormous debt, the result of the accumulated chronic deficits of a generation. He was himself faced by an estimated deficit of 9,000 contos (some £1,800,000). Assuming himself the post of Minister of Finance, he bent all the powers of the State to the task of converting this chronic deficit into a surplus. His administration during the six months from then to June marks a really great effort to deal with what had been the most pressing problem for the nation for 50 years. To have converted the chronic deficit of over a generation into even a problematic surplus was much indeed. His victory at the autumn by-elections was a foregone conclusion. Hitherto he had been loyally supported by the Unionists under Dr. Brito Camacho, the Opposition being formed by the Evolutionists under Dr. Antonio José d'Almeida, and the Independents under Senhor Machado Santos. Much hung upon these elections. A Democratic victory at the polls would render Dr. Affonso Costa independent in the lower Chamber, and would virtually decide the approaching General and Presidential elections, and mean the consequent indefinite exclusion of the Opposition from power.

The Democratic victory proved to be a sweeping one, and the Unionists, indignant at the scant consideration shown them by their former allies, joined with the Opposition to force Costa's retirement. The cooperation of the two most capable heads of the Republic was at an end. Meanwhile Dr. Bernardino Machado, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Government, and the Democratic candidate at the first Presidential election, had returned from Brazil, where he had represented the Republic. To him was entrusted the task of forming an extra-party Government. This was in February, 1914. Less daring, decided, and rapid in action than Affonso Costa, he was possessed of imperturbable courtesy, subtlety and patience, great powers of work and of persuasion. Costa made friends or enemies. Dr. Bernardino Machado was prepared to use either. He was as keen and polished as a Toledo blade, elastic and penetrating, if not strong. He was Prime Minister when the war broke out. He soon became President of the Republic.

The outbreak of hostilities in Europe thus found Portugal still a Republic, in spite of the numerous attempts to overthrow the régime by force. These had differed considerably. The first incursion in 1911 had been mainly to reinstate King Manoel. The second was rather on behalf of the Church, and its authors were divided, some favouring Manoel, and others Dom Miguel, the representative of the old Absolutist line, who had been living in Austria and was in close touch with the Austrian Court. This party had continued to gather strength through the influence of the clerical party, who ever more whole-heartedly advocated German "discipline" and Austrian absolutism in Church and State, in opposition to the free Parliamentary institutions of Great Britain and France. They were in close sympathy with the old Carlist—the modern Jaymist—party in Spain, the declared enemy of both France and England. The third and most dangerous movement against the Republic—that of October 21, 1913—was in the main their work.

Thus the long duel between clericals and anti-clericals continued, though its character had changed. Victorious in arms, the Republic had now turned against it the same weapons as had served to wreck the Monarchy. Those self-same dissentient forces which by their campaign of intrigue and suggestion had succeeded in destroying five out of the six Governments of King Manoel, and had brought down the Monarchy itself, were united to foment division among the different Republican groups. In the words of President Arriaga's book, "*Na Primeira Presidencia da Republica Portuguesa,*" ". . . these differences were aggravated by the clever, disloyal and terrible war carried on by reactionaries of all kinds, and principally by the religious reaction, a war of all such as felt themselves wounded in their legitimate or illegitimate rights by the overthrow of the Monarchist régime."

This campaign bade fair to be successful. The Republic, which had resisted armed force and continual internal unrest, seemed likely in the beginning of 1914 to fall a victim to the bitterness of the contending parties. The Unionists had continued to gather strength during their alliance with the Democrats in 1913, under the patriotic leadership of Dr. Brito Camacho, who had made it his first aim to combat the Governmental instability which had proved the ruin of the Monarchy. The election of the autumn converted this party into the bitter foes of the



FULL SPEED AHEAD! A TORPEDO BOAT.

Government. Fearless and able, Dr. Brito Camacho had the fame of a dour hater. He had shown loyalty in his alliance with Affonso Costa. The practical annihilation of his party in the elections was a wound which was not likely soon to heal. It already bore bitter fruit in the bloody Revolution of May 14, 1915. The junction of the Unionist and Evolutionist groups in January of 1914 forced Affonso Costa to retire, and thus it was in Portugal, as in Italy and in Spain, that the Government called upon to decide the attitude of the nation with regard to the war was an avowedly temporary transitional body, in this case an extra-party aggregation, only called into power owing to the extraordinary rancour shown by the parties, for the purpose of "accalmation" and the conducting of the coming elections. The Government entered office irregularly. In its composition it was as irregular as in the circumstances attending its entrance into power. It consisted not alone of Republicans, but of both old Monarchists and Dissidents. The men composing it were, for the most part, non-party and unquestionably able men. No great evidence of division in the Cabinet marked its early months of power. With the outbreak of the war in Europe, there early became apparent the

existence of two distinct currents of opinion in the Government, which did much to influence not alone the actual policy of the nation, but the whole trend of feeling in the country.

But, it may be asked, What has this to do with the war? It has everything. Germany had been very busy in Portugal.

The outbreak of hostilities came as a shock to all Europe. Yet in those early weeks of August and September which witnessed the invasion of Belgium, there existed a far less vivid realisation of what the war meant in the minds of the average Londoner than in Lisbon. The Englishman shaken out of his cherished peace, yet serenely certain that "we shall win," went quietly about his work—when he did not enlist—and left the necessary steps to be taken to the Government. The Portuguese, knowing well the unrelenting efforts of the Germans in his own land, as contrasted with the easy indifference of the British, gauged things differently. Great Britain never dreamed of involving other nations, and sought, if possible, to limit the area of the conflict. Portugal, like all the Peninsula, knew that this meant the beginning of a fight to a finish, and, remembering all her past

history, counted on being called in, and that at once.

Now Germany was prepared for this. Not only, as the result of bitter and carefully fomented party strife, was the Government flung temporarily into the hands of a non-colour mixed administration, but in those first days and weeks of the war the barracks were sown with anonymous leaflets against Portugal's participation in the war, while it was sought to enlist officers, journalists, and politicians on behalf of a policy of neutrality.

What, in this crisis, was the action of the Portuguese Government? On August 4 Great Britain declared war. On August 7, at a specially convoked meeting of the Cortes, the whole Legislature, following the lead of the Prime Minister, declared for the unconditional support of the Allies, and passed, without one dissentient vote, a motion empowering the Government to maintain order in the country and to take such financial and economic measures as circumstances might demand.


The motion, studiously general and non-committal in tone, as drafted by the Prime Minister, Dr. Bernardino Machado, was accepted unanimously by an enthusiastic Cortes, as the preliminary step to a policy of active support of the Allies. The speakers, the leaders of all the parties, vied with each other in paying tributes to Great Britain and France. Great crowds marched cheering through the streets to demonstrate before the British, French, Russian, Belgian, and Serbian Legations. The newspapers wrote for the most part with sympathy and many with enthusiasm.

To understand what followed, it is necessary to know something of the constitution of the Ministry. Portuguese politics during the first two years of war fall logically into two parts, coinciding with the Presidencies of Dr. Manuel d'Arriaga and Dr. Bernardino Machado, separated by the sanguinary episode of the Revolution of May 14, 1915, and the brief Presidential interregnum under Dr. Theophilo Braga which followed it. The Government in power when the war broke out was that of Dr. Bernardino Machado. It was, as has been said, a mixed and an extra-party Ministry, its members being drawn from outside either of the recognized parliamentary parties. It had entered on office in February, 1914, but six months before the war. It started as an administration of non-party politicians to maintain a governmental truce, as a Ministry

of "conciliation," and to preside over the coming elections with impartiality. Its entrance was the direct result of the personal action of the then President, Dr. Arriaga, in conjunction with the Opposition.

It was on January 24, 1914, that the union of the Unionists, under Dr. Brito Camacho, with the Evolutionist Opposition, in conjunction with the action of the President, resulted in the resignation of the then Democratic Government of Dr. Affonso Costa. The junction of Dr. Brito Camacho with the Opposition altered the whole political balance. Dr. Costa had held office since January, 1913, as chief of the first definitely party Government under the Republic. He had been supported originally by Dr. Brito Camacho, who had consistently supported the previous Governments with a view to preventing the continuance of that instability which had destroyed the Monarchy. The sweeping victory of the Democrats in the November by-elections, coupled with the approach of the General and Presidential elections in 1915, converted him into the Government's bitterest enemy. In the Provisional Government Dr. Brito Camacho had proved himself one of the most able men of the Republic. Resourceful, clear-headed, and fearless, his junction with the Opposition altered the whole political balance. Able as Dr. Affonso Costa's administration had unquestionably been, from January to June of 1913, it had been thoroughly partisan in character. At the time of his resignation, on January 24, 1914, probably no man in Portugal—not even João Franco at the time of his fall—was better hated than was Dr. Affonso Costa. The Monarchists hated and feared him as their ablest enemy. The Church hated him as being the man who had expelled the Jesuits and the Religious Orders, and carried through the law for the Separation of Church and State. The capitalist class feared the extension of his social programme. The Socialists and Syndicalists hated him for his forced repression of their centres in 1913. His Republican rivals feared his retention of power until the forthcoming General and Presidential elections as meaning their own indefinite exclusion from office.

Failing to overthrow the Ministry in the Cortes, the Opposition now had recourse to the President, Dr. Arriaga. He, led by the vain hope of preventing a yet more serious struggle between the parties, and lured by the dream of



MOBILIZATION OF THE ARMY: REVIEWING A CAVALRY DIVISION.

securing a real and permanent peace for his country, on January 24, 1914, wrote a circular letter to the leaders of the Government and the Opposition. In this letter he invited their co-operation in the formation of a new Ministry to carry out a special programme, which he outlined. This aimed at a national pacification. Its main proposals were three—a full political amnesty, the revision of the law for the Separation of the Church, and provision for the free conduct of an unbiased General Election. By the political amnesty the President hoped to satisfy the Monarchists, by the revision of the Law of Separation to content the Church, and by a non-party election to pacify the Opposition.

President Arriaga's aims, as set forth in this letter, were undoubtedly of the best. But thus to address an invitation to the leaders of the Opposition to cooperate for the carrying into effect of a personal Presidential programme, not only without the prior agreement of his Government, but, as in the present instance, against their express advice, was a most serious step to take. It was, as the Prime Minister, Dr. Affonso Costa, pointed out, an absolutely unconstitutional act. Together with certain sentences in the President's letter, it appeared to imply censure on the Government. Dr. Costa, in view of the President's insistence on sending this letter in spite of his remonstrance, tendered his resignation and that of his Government. Thus it was that on February 10, 1914, Dr. Bernardino Machado, who had been entrusted by President Arriaga with the formation of an extra-party Government of "conciliation," entered office.

The new Government began well. On February 10 it took office. By February 23 it had passed a most ample political amnesty, releasing at once all the Monarchist prisoners who had been arrested in connection with the incursions of 1911, 1912, and the internal movements of the previous April and October. In the words of President Arriaga, in his book, "Na Primeira Presidencia da Republica Portuguesa," already quoted:

Some of the salutary effects of the change were already evident; greater quiet was to be noted in political debate, both within and without the Parliament. The famous cordiality of the leader of the Government, which, notwithstanding the irony with which it has been referred to, can never be too great in a new-born régime where fresh social orders are called upon to take part in the public administration, had been clearly salutary.

Then came the war.

It has been seen that the decision of the



PORTUGUESE MOTOR-TRANSPORT.

whole Cortes, led by the Government, was taken promptly. How, then, did it come about that not till March, 1916, some twenty months later, did Germany—not Portugal—declare war and recall her Minister? How, too, despite reiterated offers of assistance to the Allies, first on August 7, 1914, later at a second specially convoked session of the Cortes on November 23, and again by the succeeding Government in December of the same year, had the Portuguese attitude remained so undecided as seemed to be the case?

First, because the unanimous vote of the Cortes on August 7, 1914, merely signified the general desire of all parties to secure themselves by declared adhesion to the traditional policy of the British Alliance, while it tied no one to the acceptance of any definite line of action, all responsibility being delegated to the Government. The Prime Minister's action in convoking the Cortes was an eminently political one. His attitude, determined apparently no less by the internal situation than by considerations of foreign policy, carried with it the approval of the entire Cortes. Unanimous so far as the Republic was concerned, it awoke instant response abroad. The Monarchist leaders, recognising its importance, hastened to offer their personal support to the Government. King Manoel made offer of his service to King George. The Prime Minister had scored.

But the unity which Dr. Bernardino Machado had apparently evoked on behalf of his pro-

Ally policy was not fated to continue. For the unity which marked the session of August 7 was but superficial, while the roots of division were deep. The political sentiment of the mass was pro-British, intellectually the sympathies of perhaps more were actively French—for all the Latin world had learned much of France. There the unity ended. The personal bitterness which separated the party leaders was real. No line of action which was suggested by one was likely to meet with common support. This the enemy well knew. The Prime Minister knew well, also, the many currents among which he was called upon to steer. His speech was definitely pro-Ally. The motion he submitted to the vote was studiously non-committal and unprovocative, while conceding him full power to act.

Unquestionably his convocation of the Cortes was intended to arouse such sympathy at home and such a response abroad as should strengthen his hands. It was in a measure successful, as we have seen. The current was set definitely in the direction of active intervention on behalf of the Allies. Not one voice in the Parliament or the Press was then raised in contradiction.

It must be remembered that this was still in the first week of the war. The attitude of Great Britain, France, Russia, Belgium, Serbia, and Japan was already known. The action of the mass of lesser European nations still remained undecided. That policy of ambiguous neutrality which injured the Allies only less than war had not yet crystallized into fact.



PORTUGUESE ARTILLERY OFFICERS WATCHING GUN PRACTICE.

Those manifold considerations of trade and material interest which were later to play so great a part in the decision had not yet made themselves felt. All the liberty-loving elements of the peoples in Italy, Spain, Holland, Denmark, and the Balkans were clearly with the Allies. A lead was wanted, and a clear lead. But that lead did not come.

The Allies, Great Britain above all, were militarily unprepared. Diplomatically they were yet more unprepared. It is certain that the crash found the moral sympathy of the world on their side—in part owing to that very fact. That proved to be a great factor. It would have proved infinitely greater had prompt decision grasped the immense value of the moment and of a clear issue. A really national response on the part of Great Britain and France to what was in truth a national lead would have meant much in Portugal and beyond it. Response there was, but tardy and unconvincing. The occasion passed. In Great Britain, as a whole, there existed no rudimentary idea of the vastness and thoroughness of German preparation in other countries. Nor did politicians realize, in their insular ignorance, that Turkey, Greece, Spain, and the Balkans “mattered”!

Meanwhile, in Portugal, the Government did not content themselves with mere demonstrations. There was no contemporary publication of the negotiations which took place between the two Governments, but everything would go to show that, though much may have been wanting, as was but natural, in the way of preparation and supplies, goodwill to serve the Allies was not wanting, in spite of all Germany's years of work.

The first practical evidence of this was the prompt signature on August 12 of the long-delayed Treaty of Commerce with Great Britain, which only came finally into force on September 23, 1916. The history of the Treaty is that of all British action in recent years. We have seen how rapidly Germany secured the Treaty which in less than half a dozen years had well nigh secured her commercial and political predominance in both Portugal and Portuguese Africa. This she got because she knew what she wanted, a desideratum which has been often lacking when Great Britain has been concerned. On November 12, 1914, a special Commercial Mission visited Great Britain to treat of means for increasing Anglo-Portuguese trade. This Mission owed its initiation to the action of the British Chamber

of Commerce in Portugal, seconded by the British Minister in Lisbon, Sir Lancelot Carnegie.

Yet more significant was the Government's prompt dispatch of military expeditions to Angola and Mozambique. On August 7, the very day of the unanimous declaration in the Cortes, the British Imperial Government had telegraphed to General Botha, in reply to the South African Government's offer to release the garrison of loyal troops in the Dominion for service elsewhere. The Home Government then suggested that the occupation of "such parts of German South-West Africa as would give them the command of Swakopmund, Lüderitzbucht, and the wireless stations there or in the interior," would be regarded as "a great and urgent Imperial service." This telegram was reinforced by a second on August 9 urging the capture also of the long-distance wireless station at Windhuk, "as of great importance," while recognising that these objects could "only be effected in reasonable time by a joint naval and military expedition up the coast." On August 10 General Botha telegraphed the decision of his Government to undertake a military expedition into German South-West Africa, in co-operation with the British Government. It was not till September 9, however, that he publicly announced the decision of the South African Government to undertake this expedition, an announcement

followed almost at once by the defection of Beyers and Maritz.

Meanwhile, on August 17, the Portuguese Minister for the Colonies had demanded from the Minister of War troops for military expeditions to be sent to Angola and Mozambique—colonies adjoining German South-West and German East Africa, and on September 11, only two days after the decision of the South African Government had been announced, the two expeditions sailed from Lisbon on board the *Mozambique* and the *Durham Castle*. The expeditions were commanded by Major Rocadas and Major Amorim, two Colonial officers of high standing. These first expeditions were rapidly followed up by other forces. On October 1 330 infantry sailed on board the *Africa* to reinforce the garrison of Mossamedes. On October 20 telegrams reported an engagement with German troops on the southern frontier of Angola. On the 29th



PORTUGUESE ARTILLERY IN THE FIELD.



[Elliott & Fry.]

SIR LANCELOT CARNEGIE,
British Minister at Lisbon.


a battalion of marines was placed at the disposal of the Colonial Office for service in Africa, sailing on November 5 on board the *Beira*, under the command of Capt. Lieut. Coriolanus da Costa, for Angola. December 1 saw the first instalment of a further expeditionary force of mounted troops leave for Africa on board the *Cabo Verde*. On December 3 the third battalion of the 17th Infantry, with artillery, also left for Angola, on board the steamships *Peninsula* and *Ambaea*. On December 10 a further battalion of the 17th Infantry sailed on board the *Africa*, also for Angola. Dr. Bernardino Machado gave in his resignation and that of his Ministry to the President on December 5. On December 11 the Government left office.

To this event it is certain that internal questions contributed, questions particularly connected with the relations of the two Houses of Parliament and with the coming elections. But behind these purely internal matters,

deeper and more important than all there remained "the English question," and, intimately connected with it, that of Portugal's participation or non-participation in the war. The truth is that, ever since the first outbreak of hostilities in Europe, this question had in reality dwarfed all else, particularly after the originally decided action taken at the historic meeting of the Cortes on August 7. For that action was no less a direct challenge to Germany than a deliberate appeal to Great Britain. By placing themselves and the nation on the side of the Allies, the Government at once drew down upon themselves the unrelenting attacks of the entire pro-German section of Portuguese society.

Everywhere Germany had a definite policy. No administration that had favoured her but had been supported, and had had its way made easier and smoother internally, and often more profitable externally. No administration, on the other hand, dared to favour the Allies but it found itself involved in a maze of internal and external difficulties—strikes, food riots, party rivalries assuming a bitterness and extension beyond the normal. The raising of religious and sectarian questions was deliberately and persistently employed by Germany in every part of Europe, and not least in Portugal. It is not surprising, then, that, in spite of the first unanimous vote, and even by reason of it, the Government early found themselves face to face with grave divisions alike in the country, the Cortes, and the Cabinet.

It is clear that Dr. Bernardino Machado sought by the meeting of August 7 to obtain strength from the united support of the Cortes and the country in Portugal, and abroad from the countenance of the Allies. This fact is evident in almost every act of his administration. We see it in the enthusiastic receptions accorded to the officers of a British warship which paid an unexpected visit to Lisbon on September 28, 1914—the first visit of the kind since the establishment of the Republic, as all Portugal was quick to observe. So, too, it is clear in the similarly hearty welcome given to the officers and crew of a French warship which entered the Tagus on October 4 to compliment the Republic on the anniversary of its institution; and in the repeated demonstrations on behalf of the Allies before the various legations. Most evident of all is it in the Premier's adoption and decided



Trenches constructed at the School of Practical Engineering.



Sappers preparing a trench.

MOBILIZATION OF THE ARMY: TRENCH CONSTRUCTION IN PORTUGAL.



MOBILIZATION OF THE ARMY.
Portuguese Cavalry fording a river.

and persistent support of the Democratic policy, advocating the immediate dispatch of a special Portuguese contingent to take part with Great Britain and France in the European field of war.

This proposal it was that very early gave rise to definite division among the three Republican parties in the Cabinet, and—as is evident from President Arriaga's book—between the President and the Prime Minister themselves. However originally proposed, the suggestion was adopted by the Democrats, and, as is certain, by the Prime Minister. This gave rise to rapid and ever-widening differences with the other parties, the Evolutionists and the Unionists. All claimed to be alike pro-Ally. All announced themselves ready to respond to any lead from Great Britain. But Great Britain gave no obvious lead, and neither of them was prepared to accept that of Senhor Affonso Costa. By the uncertainty existing as to Great Britain's real wishes in the matter, way was opened for endless campaigns and recrimination, and the public feeling which had marked the original action of the Government was dangerously divided and damped, to the sole advantage of Germany. Sincere and disinterested partisans of the Allies, as were Dr. Brito Camacho and his colleagues of the *Lucta*, became the bitterest of opponents of active participation in the war, as forming the central feature of the Democratic programme. No party dared frankly to oppose any action taken ostensibly on behalf of Great

Britain. All, therefore, concurred in speaking and voting in favour of the Allies. But all the sections, Republican and Monarchist, sought to prevent their rivals from profiting by such support and to frustrate whatever action they might suggest. Thus, long before the three months that separated the passing of the two votes of August 7 and November 23, what had been, despite party differences, something like a national response to a really national lead on the part of the Government had been whittled down into a narrow and bitterly contested party issue. This was further subordinated to a multitude of wholly internal and party interests, of which the elections formed the principal.

Meanwhile it became clear that the Cabinet was no more united than were the parties. The Prime Minister clearly leaned toward the full Democratic programme for Portugal's active intervention in the war. The Minister of Marine, Senhor Neuparth, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Colonel Freire d'Andrade, held that Portugal should await the invitation of her Ally. Thus the Prime Minister's speech on August 7 was for unreserved support of the British Alliance and of the Allies. On the 18th of the same month the Foreign Minister, in company with the Director-General of his Ministry and his Secretary, called personally at the Austrian Legation to compliment the Austrian Minister on the birthday of the Emperor. Naturally the act provoked criticism, as did certain definite orders for main-

taining neutrality given by the Minister of Marine and of the Colonies. Somewhat later a reference by the Foreign Minister to "two friendly nations," made in reply to a special deputation which had visited him with a collective message of protest against the barbarities committed by the Germans in Belgium, occasioned even greater offence.


This was the greater seeing that without question Colonel Freire d'Andrade was one of the strong men of the Government. His original entrance into the Cabinet had occasioned much bitter criticism on the part of the Monarchists, and not a little talk in other circles. It had added much to the prestige of the Government, for in colonial circles Freire d'Andrade's position was unique. During his long-continued term of office in Africa, as Governor of Lorenzo Marques and later of Mozambique, he had secured the trust of the Colony and the Home Government. So much was this the case that, though appointed by João Franco in 1906, on the fall of his Government he had been continued in office through all the six Governments of King Manoel's reign and after the Revolution retained by the

Republic. He had been the negotiator of the Treaty with the South African Union and was held to be British in sympathy. He had won a reputation as a successful colonial administrator, not alone in Portugal, but in both British and German colonial circles. The Colonies were also strongly represented in the person of Senhor Lisboa de Lima. The action of the Foreign Minister did much to give colour to the rumours, diligently spread abroad, that, far from supporting Portugal in an attitude of belligerency, Great Britain had from the first favoured her maintaining a policy of neutrality.

The question was directly raised by Lieut. Leotte de Rego, a prominent naval officer and one of the leading spirits in the Revolution of May 14, who, in a series of outspoken articles in the Press, followed by public addresses, continued to urge the Government to adopt a clear and active policy in support of the Allies, and the sending of a force to France. First censured, he was later imprisoned, by order of the Minister of Marine, for breach of discipline. In his imprisonment, as in his propaganda, he received no support from British circles, which continued to hold themselves as far as possible



PORTUGUESE CAVALRY NEAR THE TAGUS.



PAY-DAY IN THE ARMY.

aloof from association with Portuguese political parties.

It was during this Government that the proposals for the formation of a Portuguese contingent to assist the Allies in France took definite form. As early as August this had been foreshadowed in the Press. Senhor João Chagas, the Portuguese Minister in Paris, was credited with being their active advocate. On October 1 an unofficial notice in the *Seculo* stated that requests for artillery had been received from Great Britain. This the Minister of War, a thorough soldier, objected to sending, except with their complement of men. This had led to the request for the dispatch of a regular force of all arms, which the Government took immediate steps to furnish. Orders for the mobilization were published. On October 18 a special Military Mission sailed for England to confer with Lord Kitchener as to the action to be taken. Decrees nominating the Commandant and Staff and fixing the composition of the force had been issued, and on October 19 the Portuguese Minister in Madrid, as the result of telegraphic instructions from Lisbon, had duly intimated to the Spanish Government Portugal's entrance on belligerency, when, on the night of October 20, Monarchist risings in Mafra and other parts of the country occurred. The railway and the telegraphic lines were interrupted and the mobilization was brought temporarily to a standstill.

The risings proved absolutely abortive, though the interruptions occasioned in various parts of the country in evident collusion pointed to a widespread conspiracy. Those directly implicated were in several cases Monarchist conspirators connected with the incursions of 1911, 1912, and the rising of October 23, 1913, among them figuring certain of those only amnestied by this same Government on February 23.

Though interrupted in their preparations, the Government, far from desisting, on November 23 convoked a second special session of the Cortes, to hear read the definite invitation of Great Britain for Portugal to take part with her in the war. Hitherto it had been generally understood that, while France was ready and anxious for Portugal's active cooperation, Great Britain doubted its immediate expediency. That objection was now to be removed. A clear call, as later in the case for the utilization of the German ships, would have done much to sweep away opposition and to strengthen the pro-British section of the Republican party for its difficult task. The courteous, but subdued and somewhat ambiguously worded, message was again received with favourable speeches and a unanimous vote, but the enthusiasm that had characterized the original session had gone, and the vote gave little real strength to the Government. Orders were published next day for the mobilization of a new division. Again its composition had been determined and the command decided on, when renewed difficulty in the Chamber and, as it would seem, divergence of views in the Cabinet and with the President led Dr. Bernardino Machado, on December 5, to hand in his resignation. That he in no way drew back from the policy which he had maintained, despite the temporary nature of his Government and the divisions in the Cortes and the Cabinet, is evidenced by the publication on December 7, 1914, of an Army Order of November 23, not only appointing the Commandant and Staff for the new Division, but even providing for such details as the identification discs to be worn by the troops to serve in Europe. So for the second time were the plans for the participation of a Portuguese contingent in the war frustrated.

On the fall of the Government of Dr. Bernardino Machado all semblance of truce between the parties came to an end. The new Government, under the leadership of Senhor

Victor Hugo de Azevedo Coutinho, the former President of the Chamber, was distinctly Democratic. On its first presentation to the Cortes, both the Prime Minister and the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Augusto Soares, stated the central feature of their policy to be the integral fulfilment of those pledges for active support of the Allies understood to have been given to the nation on August 7 and November 23. A message given by these Ministers at this time ran :

The President and Government of the Republic :

The programme of the present Government, as laid before Congress, is essentially national and non-political, consisting of three principal points : First, the firm and efficacious defence of the realm ; secondly, the resolve to carry out the mandate accorded by Parliament on November 23, regarding our participation in the war in Europe and wherever else we may be called upon to defend our territories, or fulfil our duties, according to the conditions of our alliance with England ; thirdly, the holding of general elections as soon as possible. Taking into consideration the present financial crisis, it is noticeable that the financial situation of the country calls for no new taxation, the Government having been able hitherto, without a loan, to face the enormous expenses imposed by inevitable necessities. At the present moment, grave for all countries, party politics have been abandoned by the members of the present Cabinet, who accepted office not to satisfy narrow ambitions but loyally to serve the nation. The Government, inspired by pure Republican faith, hopes to deserve the sympathy and approval of all who desire that the nation under the Republic should now resolutely enter on the lines of order, labour and progress, thus strengthening our internal situation and attracting the goodwill of all nations.

Dr. Soares, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, said :

The principal aim of the present Government consists in the loyal fulfilment of the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty. That action in this matter, which is considered of the


strongest and most intense interest and which corresponds with the sentiment of the Portuguese people, should not be diverted by sectarian questions of internal politics. The Democratic Party from which the present Government was formed sought by all means the formation of a Coalition Cabinet, in which all parties should be represented, and only agreed to assume office when all attempts to form a Coalition Cabinet failed. The present Government, however, immediately bound themselves to put aside all reforms and projects of a political nature inherent in its party programme, in order to realize only those mentioned in the Government programme, and this will be carried out.

But the Government was met with hostile demonstrations from its first entrance by the entire Opposition. The tension rapidly increased. On December 15 the Evolutionists, Unionists and Independents abandoned the Chamber. On the 18th the Unionists collectively renounced their seats.

News meanwhile arrived of open hostilities in Africa. Before the end of December it was known that, on the 18th, the Portuguese expedition to Angola, under Major Rocadas, had been engaged by a much larger and better equipped German force at Naulila, on the frontier of Portuguese Angola. There had been a four-hours battle, and the Portuguese general had been obliged to retire after considerable losses on both sides in killed and wounded, leaving prisoners in the hands of the Germans. A charge by the Portuguese colonial dragoons, which had suffered much in consequence, had averted complete disaster. Their commanding officer, Lieut. Aragon, was said at first to have been killed ; later he was found to have been wounded and made prisoner.



INSPECTION OF PORTUGUESE TROOPS.



PORTUGUESE INFANTRY ON A ROUTE MARCH.

He was subsequently released by the British forces under General Botha, and returned home in the following August.

This encounter, like that with General Grant's column at Sandfontein, proved the Germans to be well prepared in South-West Africa, and in far larger number than had at first been believed. The revolt of Beyers and Maritz had obliged General Botha to put off immediate action in German South-West Africa while he crushed the rebellion. Not till January was he enabled to return to deal with Damaraland. It was during this interval, and when it was certain that Portugal purposed the early dispatch of a division to the European front, that this blow was dealt her in Africa.

Major Rocadas, though outnumbered and out-weighted in artillery, had been able to retire with the main force under his command. The natives were incited to revolt, however, encouraged by his repulse.

At home the Government hurried on the dispatch of other troops.

In Portugal, on January 15, at the Presidential palace at Belem, a meeting of extraordinary importance was held. President Arriaga devoted two chapters of his book to it. These chapters are vital to any understanding of Portugal's policy in the war. The first is the report of an extra-Cabinet Council convoked by President Arriaga to treat of questions connected with the war. There were present the Prime Minister, the Ministers for War, Foreign Affairs, and the Colonies, together with Dr. Affonso Costa, Dr. Bernardino Machado and Dr. Augustos de Vasconcellos, as former Prime Ministers. The two chiefs of the Opposition, Dr. Brito Camacho and Dr. Antonio José d'Almeida, were invited. Neither came, though both sent letters. Dr. Brito Camacho's letter was solely occupied with the internal question. While assuring the President that the Government must count on his attack in all fields, as constituting the one supreme danger to the country, he offered the President his own services and those of his party. Dr. Antonio José d'Almeida's letter was not published.

The conference, as reported, turned almost solely on the war. In the words of the President: "We wished to hear certain of the leading men of our country, both immediately connected and unconnected with politics, upon this matter, in view of the complications which

it might involve us in, as the allies of England and friends of two belligerent nations."

The President then put two questions to the Council: First, should England call upon us to comply with the undertakings which we had contracted with her, would the country be able to satisfy militarily the obligations assumed, knowing as they did the poverty of our military resources? Secondly, he considered it cowardice to abandon the place he held; but it was too much for him to witness the squabbles of rival politicians. Portuguese belligerency being declared, could he count upon the cooperation of all in the supreme effort which would be required of the nation to do itself honour?

From the replies it was inferred that, with regard to armament, munitions, and military preparation, everything was wanting, in consequence of the expeditions to Africa. The Minister of War trusted that "by the end of April and beginning of May (1915), everything would be prepared to respond to the call of England." Dr. Augustos de Vasconcellos (the Portuguese Minister in Spain, who had come from Madrid) declared it was "his sincere and profound opinion that by reason of our expeditions to Africa, however great might be the good will and competence of all the ministers, it would be completely impossible to send any forces to Europe. He therefore asked whether it would not be preferable to direct our diplomatic action in such a way that, in accord with England, we might relieve ourselves of obligations with which we could not comply." In reply to the insistence of the President, Dr. Vasconcellos further stated that he had received telegraphic orders from the preceding Government (that of Dr. Bernardino Machado) to notify to Spain the fact of Portugal's belligerency, and that he had done so.

Dr. Machado here is reported to have said that there was an error as to such instructions having been given, there having been intended only a notification that Portugal was on the way to belligerency. In view of the facts as previously stated, it would appear clear that in October, when the instructions were given, the Government had definitely counted on assuming an attitude of belligerency, which the Monarchist risings of October 23 forced them to postpone.

Most really noteworthy of the declarations, however, were those of Dr. Bernardino Machado

and Drs. Affonso Costa and Augusto Soares, as definitely stating the real policy of both the existing Government and its predecessor, as to which much doubt had been felt and expressed on all hands. These declarations, as made in confidence in a private Cabinet Council, and now recorded, not by a partisan

of such policy, but rather, as it would appear, a critic, have added value. Dr. Bernardino Machado stated :

From the very beginning he held that we should not alone render such service as might be asked of us, constituting thus a species of vassalage, but that our duty and our dignity lay in taking our stand beside England, as expressed in the formula presented to Parliament. He wished thus that by our attitude it should be clearly seen that we formed a nation by cooperation with which England might honour us.

The declarations of Drs. Affonso Costa and Augusto Soares, with which Dr. Bernardino Machado expressed his agreement, were handed in in writing, and were characteristically explicit. They ran :

1. That it was well for the Republic to commit itself voluntarily to take part in the European war on the side of England.

2. That they should prepare the material which might be considered indispensable, in order that the Portuguese Division start immediately after being called upon, negotiating through the Minister of Foreign Affairs that this call should be made for the first moment in which we might be prepared, and, if it were possible, by the next summer (1915).

3. That belligerency should only be declared in perfect accord with England, without imperilling, however, our free and energetic action in Angola.

4. That the day of our departure for the war in Europe being decided, we might and ought to constitute a National Government, with the end of ensuring the perfect union of all good Portuguese until the Treaty of Peace ; meanwhile the approaching elections, presided over by the existing Government, might aid this end, by



PORTUGUESE TROOPS FOR EAST AFRICA.

The embarkation at Lisbon. Top picture : Leaving the Harbour.



PORTUGUESE TROOPS.

Leaving Lisbon to join the East African Forces in Mozambique.

conceding to each political power its legitimate representation.

5. That for this purpose and end, the Portuguese Republican Party was ready to postpone or suppress all and every political contest, even those in which it occupied a merely defensive position. At the first appeal we were ready to sacrifice all—without reserves or exceptions—for the country and the Republic.

Lisbon, January, 1915.


AFFONSO COSTA.

President Arriaga's comment is: "Our patriotic idea resulted in a new ministerial crisis. With sorrow we record the fact." This may be so. It is none the less true that in just eight days' time, without waiting to receive the Ministry's resignation, he had himself, by letter, on the night of January 23, handed over absolute and exclusive power to his personal friend, General Pimenta de Castro, and all idea of Portuguese military cooperation with the Allies was for the time at an end.

It has been seen that the Democratic policy, as set out by its responsible chiefs, was that of active intervention in the war. The attitude of the Government on this matter was clear. Meanwhile, difficulties were being actively

fomented in the army, and on January 19 these came to a head. In consequence of an alleged vexatious transference of an officer from Lisbon to the country, a movement of protest was concerted among the army officers, where the Opposition counted many adherents. The Minister of War refused to reconsider the matter, and a delegation of officers set out from the barracks facing the official residence of the President to lay it before him. The Government, anticipating this, intervened, and placed the officers under arrest on board the fleet. More than sixty of their comrades handed up their swords in consequence, and in like manner were placed in custody. This took place on January 19 and 20. On the 20th the new expedition to Africa sailed.

But rumours of risings among the troops and in the city were rife, when on January 23 there was published in the daily Press an official note, stating that "the Chief of State was determined to hear, in addition to the chiefs of the militant parties, other persons of eminence, to establish



Senhor Joaquim Pedro Martins, Education ; Senhor Soares, Foreign Affairs ; Senhor Norton de Mattos, War ; Senhor Mesquita de Carvalho, Justice ; Dr. Almeida, Prime Minister and Minister for Colonies ; Dr. Machado, President of the Republic ; Senhor Pereira Reis, Interior ; Dr. Affonso Costa, Finance ; Senhor Coutinho, Marine ; Senhor Silva, Public Works.

THE PORTUGUESE WAR CABINET, MARCH, 1916.

upon solid and patriotic bases the decision to be come to." In consequence of this note, published as it was without consultation or accord with the Government in the early hours of January 24, the Prime Minister, by letter, presented the resignation of the Ministry. A few hours later, at half-past six in the morning of the 24th, the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior waited on the President, at the Palace, to ask for the suspension of the guarantees, and the placing of the city under martial law. They met with refusal. On the evening of the 23rd the President had by letter handed over all powers to General Pimenta de Castro. Summoned to the Palace, the President there and then signed the decrees dismissing his Government, and conferring all the posts in the outgoing Ministry upon General de Castro. His letter of the previous night contained two suggestions with regard to the new Ministry to be formed. These referred to the posts of Minister of the Interior and Minister of Foreign Affairs. For the former, a decisive factor in the approaching elections, he indicated General Pimenta de Castro himself; for the latter, Major Freire d'Andrade, the recognized leader of the neutralist section in the Cabinet of Dr. Bernardino Machado.

Thus for the second time had the President by his personal action swept aside a constitutionally indicated Democratic Government, at the desire of his personal friends among the Opposition, while he persisted in ignoring the repeated offers of the Unionist leader, Dr. Brito Camacho, as contained in a second letter, of January 24.

This second flagrant abuse of power, though committed, as the former, with the best of intentions, was destined to have terrible results. The President's book leaves no possibility of doubt that the question of Portugal's participation or non-participation in the war lay at the root of his differences with his successive ministries. "A capital fact," he states, "one of supreme importance, was the antagonism of the Democratic party to our intervention as Chief of State in the grave matters which were being prepared with regard to the war, from which resulted, as will later be seen, the fall of the Ministry of Senhor Azevedo Coutinho." There lay, behind mere party hatred, internal disorders and a world of other pretexts, the real causes of the rapid fall of the Ministry and the substitution for it, not of a responsible Opposition Government, but of an absolutely unconsti-



DR. AFFONSO COSTA. *(Vandyk.)*

tutional and militarily imposed dictatorship. For Dr. Camacho, however violent in his opposition to the Democrats and their policy, was beyond question in his sympathies sincerely with the Allies, while General de Castro was not.

General Pimenta de Castro entered office, chosen by the officers of the garrison of Lisbon and by the President, to pacify the country internally, to maintain, as it would seem, "neutrality" abroad, and to carry into effect that personal Presidential programme which the Ministry of Dr. Bernardino Machado had left but in outline. One hundred and ten days he continued in power. The most contradictory opinions have been held as to his use of it. As to one thing alone are all, his supporters and opponents, agreed, and that is his absolute failure for the end for which he entered office—as a pacifier.

When revolution broke on the morning of May 14, he was found to be unsupported, not alone by the Unionists, the navy, and the city,



GERMANY DECLARES WAR ON PORTUGAL, MARCH 9, 1916.
Procession in Lisbon rejoicing on receiving the news of Germany's declaration.

but by the very army on which he wholly counted. The revolution proved short but bloody, when compared with that of October 5, 1910. One thing unquestionably the movement demonstrated—the continued devotion of the people, the fleet, and the rank and file of the army to the Republic, however strongly influential elements among the higher officers, the higher commerce, and the bureaucracy might lean toward the old regime.

With regard to the influence of General Pimenta de Castro on Portugal's policy in the war there can be no question. He ostensibly favoured "neutrality." His strong personal sympathy with Germany and German methods and his admiration of the Kaiser are placed in his defence—an extraordinary book was printed in 1915, quite unnecessarily, as it would seem, at Weimar—in direct and intentional contrast with the bitterness and antipathy with which he invariably referred to Great Britain. He entered office on January 23. On the previous December 18 the battle of Naulila had been fought. Portuguese prisoners of war remained in German hands. On January 17 he himself, acting as his own provisional Minister for Foreign Affairs, sent his *aide de camp* to offer congratulations at the German Legation on the birthday of the Emperor. Asked by the British Minister to continue the furnishing of armament, as arranged with the preceding Governments, he bluntly refused. To this refusal he attributed not a few of his difficulties. Not the least striking feature of these hundred odd days was the enthusiastic support and the high praise bestowed upon the General by the British Press.

At three o'clock on the morning of May 14, 1915, guns from the fleet gave the signal of revolt. At midday the General telephoned to friends from the Quartel General that the military had the revolution well in hand. He was absolutely mistaken. The force of the movement was in the fleet. Its soul there was Lieut. Leotte de Rego. Before the afternoon, it became clear that the Revolutionaries had with them, not the fleet alone, but the civil element in the city and the mass of the army. The dismissal of the Government was insisted upon by the Revolutionaries. The General, all being clearly lost, sent in his resignation to the President, indicating the readiness of the Evolutionist chief, Dr. Antonio d'Almeida, to accept office, and enclosing a letter from Dr.

Brito Camacho in which, in the name of his party, he declared: "I neither wish for power, nor participation in it. I shall accept whatever you may do with a view to ending rapidly, without the shedding of more blood, the fratricidal struggle that is taking place in Lisbon." The Revolution was at an end.

Senhor João Chagas had been the Portuguese Minister at Paris. To him had been attributed the original proposal for Portugal's active participation in the war. No man had done more to ensure this. Summoned from Paris to take over the Government, he was on the way when one of the leading Evolutionist



DR. MACHADO,

President of the Republic, entering the Parliament House in order to be present at the reading of Germany's declaration of war.

Senators entered the railway compartment and shot him. He was not killed, but his leadership of the Government was rendered impossible. A temporary administration entered under Dr. José de Castro. This Government conducted the Elections, which resulted in the victory of the Democrats. Dr. Theophilo Braga, the President of the Provisional Government, temporarily assumed the place of President Arriaga, who had resigned his post. The Presidential election in August resulted in the appointment of Dr. Bernardino Machado. On November 29, 1915, Dr. Affonso Costa, who had been invalided for months in consequence of a serious accident, returned to power, and active preparations began once

more to be made for Portugal's active intervention in the war.

The break with Germany came, as was seen at the beginning of this chapter, in March, 1916. Its immediate occasion was the seizure of the German ships in Portuguese ports. On February 28, 1916, the German steamers in the Tagus were seized, and Germany addressed a sharp note of protest to the Portuguese Government, which explained that it was necessary to effect the seizures wholesale, in order to forestall expected acts of *sabotage* by the Germans and their agents. On March 3 the Portuguese authorities took over four interned German steamers at Madeira. On March 9 came the German declaration of war. It was accompanied by the following verbose memorandum :

Since the outbreak of the war the Portuguese Government, by actions which are in conflict with her neutrality, has supported the enemies of the German Empire. The British troops have been allowed four times to march through Mozambique. The coaling of German ships was forbidden. The extensive sojourn of British war vessels in Portuguese ports, which is also in conflict with the laws of neutrality, was allowed ; Great Britain was also permitted to use Madeira as a *point d'appui* for her Fleet. Guns and materials of war were sold to Entente Powers, and even a destroyer was sold to Great Britain.

German cables were interrupted, the archives of the Imperial Vice-Consul in Mossamedes were seized, and expeditions sent to Africa were described as directed against Germany. At the frontier of German South-West Africa and Angola the German district commander and two officers and men were tricked into visiting Naulila, and on October 19, 1915, were declared to be under arrest. When they tried to escape arrest they were shot at and forcibly taken prisoners.

During the course of the war the Portuguese Press and Parliament have been more or less openly encouraged by the Portuguese Government to indulge in gross insults on the German people. We repeatedly protested

against these incidents in every individual case, and made most serious representations. We held the Portuguese Government responsible for all consequences, but no remedy was afforded us.

The Imperial Government, in forbearing appreciation of Portugal's difficult position, has hitherto avoided taking more serious steps in connexion with the attitude of the Portuguese Government. On February 23 the German vessels in Portuguese ports were seized and occupied by the military. On our protest, the Portuguese Government declined to go back from these forcible measures, and tried to justify them by illegal (*gesetzwidrig*) interpretations of existing treaties. These interpretations appeared to the German Government to be empty evasions. It is a fact that the Portuguese Government seized a number of German vessels out of proportion to what was necessary for meeting the shortage of Portugal's tonnage, and that the Government did not attempt even once to come to an understanding with the German shipowners, either directly or through the mediation of the German Government. The whole procedure of the Portuguese Government, therefore, represents a serious violation of existing laws and treaties.

The Portuguese Government by this procedure openly showed that it regards itself as the vassal of Great Britain, which subordinates all other considerations to British interests and wishes. Furthermore, the Portuguese Government effected the seizure of the vessels in a manner in which the intention to provoke Germany cannot fail to be seen ; the German flag was hauled down in the German vessels, and the Portuguese flag with a war pennon was hoisted, and the flagship of the Admiral fired a salute.

The Imperial Government sees itself obliged to draw the necessary conclusions from the attitude of the Portuguese Government. It regards itself from now onward in a state of war with the Portuguese Government.

This document was obviously composed mainly for home consumption—a vain attempt to conceal from the German people the significance of Portugal's intervention. It showed, as *The Times* observed, how the wind was blowing among the smaller States of Europe, "and the wind boded no good to the oppressors of the weak and the enemies of nationality "



CHAPTER CXLVII.

GERMANY'S SECOND YEAR OF WAR.

SITUATION IN AUGUST, 1915—PROMOTION OF PEACE TALK—"CENTRAL EUROPE"—RIVAL VIEWS OF GERMAN AIMS—AGITATION AGAINST ENGLAND—THE BARALONG CASE—CONTROVERSY ABOUT SUBMARINE WARFARE—TIRPITZ AGAINST THE CHANCELLOR—THE FALL OF TIRPITZ—THE CHANCELLOR'S "PEACE" SPEECH IN APRIL, 1915—DR. LIEBKNECHT'S CRITICISM—HIS IMPRISONMENT—THE SOCIALIST "SPLIT"—THE CHANCELLOR'S "WAR MAP" SPEECH—PAMPHLET SCANDALS—"JUNIUS ALTER"—THE "NATIONAL COMMITTEE"—FOOD TROUBLES—THE BATOCKI "DICTATORSHIP"—BAVARIA AND PRUSSIA—FINANCE—INDUSTRY—THE PRESS—PUBLIC OPINION IN AUGUST, 1916.

IN an earlier chapter* it has been seen how during the first year of the war Germany, in spite of many disappointments and the collapse of her original plan of campaign, steadily developed her great strength and resources, and succeeded, as her military effort grew, in meeting all demands, however great, upon her organization and administration. She had, it was observed, "shown little sign either of war weariness or of political, moral or economic exhaustion." As the summer of 1915 turned to autumn her fortunes seemed to be reaching their height. In the West her line was as firm as ever. In the East she had won Warsaw and conquered Galicia and Poland. The ill-fated Dardanelles campaign was doomed to failure, Bulgaria was about to throw in her lot with the Central Powers, Serbia and Montenegro were about to be overrun. Little wonder that the German industrialists were already mapping out the spoils in West and East, and German statesmen proclaiming the inevitable character of "a German peace," in which, as Herr von Bethmann Hollweg said in his speech on August 19, "the English policy of the balance of power must disappear," and the "new Europe" be "liberated from French intrigues, Muscovite passion of conquest, and English

guardianship." Could not Germany's enemies be compelled or induced to conclude peace upon so excellent a basis, rather than face the risk and sacrifice of an attempt to turn the scales?

The military history of the second year of war has already shown the beginning and progress of the disappointment of these hopes. After the German successes of 1915 a winter of comparative inactivity was followed by the disastrous assault on Verdun, and meanwhile the intense efforts of the Allies, and above all the policy of real strategical, industrial and political cooperation, immensely aided by the adoption of compulsory military service in England, were preparing results of the greatest magnitude on every front. So far from producing any promising response the German peace talk only strengthened the determination of the Allies. Thus Germany had to face an ever less attractive prospect, and her effort at home during the second year of war became more and more an effort to keep up appearances. While, however, the course of events was clear, progress was slow. Germany was very far from recognizing defeat, or, indeed, from recognizing the failure of her largest ambitions, and, in spite of many difficulties and privations, the spirit of her people still bore the strain.

* Vol. V. Chapter LXXXVI.

As will be seen later, the economic strain became increasingly severe, and it must be remembered that economic anxieties coloured the whole political situation. But before dealing with the economic situation it is necessary to review the chief political events and developments in some detail. The Allies could contemplate them for the most part with considerable satisfaction. The main feature was this—that, while the Allies were quietly increasing their preparations and expanding their effort, and saying little about the victory at which they were aiming except that they were determined that it should be complete, Germany was engaged in incessant discussions about her aims and desires, and in constant debates about the most profitable method of conducting the war. The results of all this discussion were not great in themselves, but as a whole the domestic events in Germany punctuated in no uncertain fashion the decline of German fortunes. It was shown in Chapter LXXXVI. that from an early stage of the war the Kaiser took care to avoid all appearance of interfering in either strategy



HERR VON BETHMANN HOLLWEG.
In conversation with Dr. Helfferich; Herr von Jagow, Foreign Secretary, in the background.



THE WAR-WORN CHANCELLOR,
Herr von Bethmann Hollweg in 1916.

or policy. He continued to maintain that attitude, and it was round the person of the Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, that all the controversies raged—controversies especially about German “war aims” generally, about the relative importance of aggression in the East and aggression in the West, and about submarine warfare.

In December, 1915, the German Government promoted a great outburst of “peace talk,” and the Socialist Party in the Reichstag was permitted, or rather encouraged, to introduce an interpellation about “German peace conditions.” The Chancellor opened the proceedings with a speech devoted almost entirely to the intervention of Bulgaria and to the opening of Germany’s “road to the East,” which he described as “a landmark of history.” He carefully denied that Germany had made any peace proposals. But his main statement was that, “if our enemies come to us with peace proposals proper to the dignity, and assuring the safety, of Germany, then we are always ready to discuss them.” He could not “enter into details.” But “neither in the East nor in the West” must Germany’s

enemies hold "gates of invasion." As to Belgium, he could not define the "guarantees" which Germany would require. The war, however, was "a defensive war of the German people and its future," and the only possible peace was a peace which "secured Germany against its repetition."

The speech was received with derision in all the countries of the Allies, and the carefully prepared German demonstration came to nothing.

During all this period the most interesting feature of the whole discussion about German "war aims" was the concentration upon what was called the Central Europe movement. It began with the revival of somewhat ancient schemes for an Austro-German fiscal and economic union. Stimulated by the Russian retreat from the Carpathians in the early summer of 1915, German professors and German economic societies made a great effort to stampede Vienna and Budapest, and to obtain the rapid conclusion, first of an Austro-Hungarian economic pact for a period of not less than 20 years—in place of the short-term "compromise," the periodical disputes about which provided the traditional political battleground between Austria and Hungary—

and, secondly, of an economic alliance between Austria-Hungary and Germany. The main idea which it was sought to popularize was that Germany and Austria-Hungary formed the natural centre of a great political and economic system, stretching from the North Sea and the Baltic to the Alps, the Adriatic, and the Danube, and destined to draw in all the States on its fringe. The new gospel was crystallized in the remarkable book "Central Europe," by Herr Friedrich Naumann, which rapidly attracted more attention than almost any other war book thus far published in any country. Outside Germany the new doctrine was first analysed in *The Times* of December 6, 1915.

Naumann started from the admission that all German efforts to obtain a separate peace with France had failed, and from the assumption that neither with England nor with Russia was effective cooperation possible. He found in the long duration of the trench warfare in both West and East ground for arguing that "trenches" would become the permanent form of frontier, and he pictured Europe as permanently divided by "two long walls from north to south, one of them running approximately from the Lower Rhine



SELLING FLAGS IN THE STREETS OF BERLIN.

to the Alps, and the other from Courland to either the right or the left of Rumania." In an extraordinary passage Naumann—who, it must be remembered, was by no means a representative of Pan-Germanism, but rather a representative German "Moderate"—sketched the inevitable fate of Germany's small neighbours:

The small peoples have only the choice between isolation and "linking up," and as, within the space of one generation, isolation will become almost intolerable for them, they must sooner or later decide with which league they will or can march—in geography, production, and intellectual direction. It is a cruel compulsion and a hard fate, but it is the dominant characteristic of the times, the categorical imperative of human development. No resistance or lamentation will avail. What is necessary can be done early or late, voluntarily or under compulsion, but the world password has been given out and must be obeyed, and he who obeys quickly will upon the whole get better chances for the future. Small States, which cannot carry on a tariff war, but need to import and to export every day, must in future place themselves on the books of one or other of the great world firms.

Meanwhile, however, the "German-Austrian-Hungarian League" must be "steered safe and sound through the Peace Congress, with adequate North Sea and Mediterranean ports at its disposal, and with attachments in North and South in preparation."

These views achieved great popularity, according well with the campaign against Serbia, the end of the ill-starred Dardanelles campaign, and the opening of the German way "from Berlin to Baghdad"—which was copiously advertised, especially in connexion with the resumption of direct railway communication, by the so-called "Balkan Express," from Germany to Constantinople. "Central Europe" was, moreover, a welcome relief from the sad experiences in the spheres of naval and colonial ambition. It is impossible to trace here either the development of the Austro-German fiscal negotiations, which were the immediate business in hand, or the stimulus which the disclosure of German ambitions gave to the closer economic cooperation of the Allies. But it must be observed that an essentially continental policy by no means satisfied German industry and commerce. From all the business centres, and especially from Hamburg with its shipping interests, came cries of warning and dissent. The Prussian Minister of Commerce, Herr Sydow, said in the Diet on February 19, 1916: "We need economic and industrial traffic with our allies, but we need it also with neutrals and with the States that are now hostile.

We shall not in future be able to do without the world markets for our industry and our trade." These views gathered strength with time—and with Germany's obvious failure to achieve the military position essential to her proposed dictation to Europe. In June, 1916, *The Times* published an analysis of recent expressions of German "business" opinion. It was all to the effect that what Germany wanted most of all was "what she had before"—before she plunged the world in war. A remarkable series of articles in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* contained dicta like this:

"We hold fast to our world-empire of work. Germany remains ready and willing to buy and to sell. And the others will have to be ready for it, too."


"Neither Austria-Hungary nor the Balkans, to which Austria-Hungary forms our bridge, can be a substitute for the free world-empire of buying and selling."

"'Germany lies on the North Sea, not at the Dardanelles.' This sentence contains the whole problem of our relations with England, the shaping of which must determine the direction of our development now and the development of the world in the coming decades. The English will have to decide what they want. If this war brings them at last to their senses, it is not impossible that the gulf may be bridged. But if they stick to their arrogant claims of naval supremacy, sooner or later it must come to a final fight, in which the British Empire will collapse."

"The main thing is to uphold the principle of most-favoured-nation treatment."

The truth, of course, was that Germany wanted everything at once, and all that she could get. She desired domination and feared isolation, wanted the world and tried to persuade herself that the world's "need of Germany" was a postulate of civilization.

While "Central Europe" thus provided a convenient ground for debating the future of German *Weltmacht*, there were more immediate, although in some respects not less unreal, subjects of dispute. Throughout the early months of 1916 a violent campaign was conducted against the Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, on the ground that he was too slow about the task of overthrowing Germany's "chief enemy," England, and too cautious or too sparing in the use of



Das ist der Drache Eigennutz,
 Der tut uns mancherlei zum Leun.
 Er macht im ganzen Land sich breit
 Und gönnt uns keine gute Zeit.

Mit unsern Feinden still im Bund
 Stiehlt er uns alles weg vom Mund
 Und hat in seiner Drachenart
 Es frech sich selber zugedehret.

Doch kriegt er uns damit nicht klein.
 Wir woll'n der Brüder würdig sein,
 Die gegen eine ganze Welt
 Den Sieg erlangen draus im Feld.

W. G. M.

Reproduced from "Simplicissimus."

THE ENEMY WITHIN.

The Dragon, see! Self-interest,
 In divers ways our plague and pest;
 Wide over all the land he spreads,
 And brings no blessing on our heads.

Leagued with our foes, in sly cabal,
 He filches from our mouths their all,
 And dragon-like his shameless pelf
 Scrapes up together for himself.

Yet he mistakes our measure; we
 Will worthy of our brothers be,
 Who 'gainst a world's opposing might
 Wrest victory out there in the fight.

LESSONS FOR THE HUNGRY.

A cartoon denouncing "the Dragon of Usury and Profiteering."

the weapons dearest to the German heart, submarines and airships. Under cover of the censorship, and in view of the obvious inability of the Government to admit in public that the chief cause of the failure of the famous Tirpitz



"submarine blockade" of 1915 was the efficiency of the British Navy, the Chancellor's opponents, who for a long time appeared to include all the Prussian Conservatives as well as the National Liberals and professional "Pan-Germans," agitated for the most "ruthless" submarine warfare against England and all neutral countries, at the risk, if necessary, of a breach with the United States. The result, in March, was the fall of Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, after a trial of strength over the "concessions" ultimately made to the United States. The disputes themselves were particularly instructive as illustrating the heat of German hatred and passion against Great Britain. Perhaps the most remarkable outburst of all was that connected with what became known as the Baralong case.

In November, 1915, the German Government sent a Memorandum to the British Government in regard to incidents alleged to have attended the destruction of a German submarine and its crew by the British auxiliary cruiser Baralong on August 19. It was stated that the German submarine had stopped the British steamer Nicosian off the Irish coast, and the crew of the



THE GERMAN CROWN PRINCE AND HIS CHILDREN

The Crown Prince's third and fourth sons. Smaller picture: the Crown Prince with his "war-baby," Princess Alexandrine Irene, horn April 7, 1915.

Nicosian having left their ship in boats, was firing on the Nicosian when the Baralong came up, flying the American flag. The German Memorandum said that the Baralong proceeded to sink the German submarine, and that, the commander and some of the crew having sprung overboard, they were shot in the water, while four German sailors found subsequently in the Nicosian were killed. The German Government "took it for granted" that the British Government would "immediately take proceedings for murder," and demanded to be informed that "the deed has been punished by a sentence of corresponding severity"; otherwise they would "consider themselves obliged to take serious decisions as to retribution for the unpunished crime." The charges were supported by allegations obtained in the United States from members of the crew of the Nicosian.

The British Government in its reply, dated December 14, expressed satisfaction at the sudden anxiety of the German Government for the vindication of the principles of civilized warfare, noted that the allegations could not be accepted as they stood, and observed that even the German charge against the Baralong was "negligible compared with the crimes which seem to have been deliberately committed by German officers, both on land and sea, against combatants and non-combatants." As it would be impossible for any tribunal to examine all the allegations, the British Government suggested that a tribunal composed of American naval officers might try the Baralong case, together with three other incidents which had occurred almost simultaneously—the sinking of the *Arabic* without warning, the German attack on the stranded British submarine E13 in Danish waters, and the sinking of the *Ruel* by a German submarine and subsequent killing and wounding of members of the crew when they had taken to their boats. It was observed that it was unnecessary to make any reply to the suggestion that the British Navy had been guilty of inhumanity. At that time the number of German sailors rescued from drowning already amounted to 1,150.

On January 10, 1916, the German Government sent another communication, which in reality was obviously prepared for the purposes of an organized demonstration which took place in the Reichstag on January 14. The points of this and the subsequent diplomatic exchanges can be briefly dismissed. Germany expressed virtuous indignation at the very suggestion that



PRINCE WILHELM FRIEDRICH OF PRUSSIA,

Eldest son of the Crown Prince. He was appointed Lieutenant in the 1st Regiment of Foot Guards on his tenth birthday, July 4, 1916.

either the German Army or the German Navy ever failed to observe "the principles of International Law and of humanity." The "proper German authorities" had "investigated exhaustively" the cases of the *Arabic*, the E13, and the *Ruel*—and duly explained away these three characteristic German crimes! The commander of the submarine which sank the *Arabic* was "convinced" that his submarine was about to be rammed. The E13 was sunk in a "fight"—which never took place. The sinking of the *Ruel* was treated as part of the "lawful" German "reprisals" against the British blockade—and the murderous attack on members of the crew of the *Ruel* after they had taken to their boats was calmly ignored! The proposal to submit the four cases to an impartial American tribunal was rejected. Finally, having failed to obtain satisfaction, the German Government promised to take its own "reprisals."



THE WOOLLEN WEEK IN BERLIN.

Boys bringing in wool from their schools.

In a reply dated February 25, the British Government tore the German contentions to pieces. It was pointed out, in particular, that the German story about the *Arabic* was contrary to all the evidence, that the story about the *E13* was wholly untrue, that the Ruel murders had never been investigated even by the Germans, and that, as regarded the *Baralong* case, the only witness whose antecedents the British Government was able to examine "was not even at sea when the events occurred of which he claimed to have been an eye-witness."

Finally, in what was called a "concluding word," on July 31, 1916, the German Government said:

In accordance with its announcement the German Government saw itself compelled to take into its own hand the retribution for the unpunished crime. It, of course, refused to reply to the misdeeds of the British seamen in the *Baralong* case by measures of similar kind—for example, the shooting of British prisoners of war. But the German airships will have convinced the English people that Germany is in a position not to leave unpunished the crimes committed by the officers and crew of the *Baralong*. Whereas, formerly, special account was taken of the inevitable peril to the civil population involved in the employment of Zeppelins for military purposes, such considerations could no longer prevail in view of the *Baralong* murder. Since then the airship weapon is—within the limits set by International Law—employed ruthlessly against England. In every case in which an airship drops its destructive bombs on London or on other English towns which are defended or contain establishments of a military character, let England remember the *Baralong* case.

This official connection, with its amusing pretence that Zeppelin raids before the *Baralong* case differed from Zeppelin raids after the *Baralong* case, and its entertaining fiction that, even as amended, Zeppelin raids were confined

within "the limits set by International Law," deserves to be placed on record. But, as has been indicated, the whole *Baralong* agitation was little but a peculiarly unscrupulous campaign deliberately organized for the benefit of German public opinion. The main thing was the Reichstag debate on January 15, and its main feature was the mobilization of the Socialists against England. Their spokesman Herr Noske, talked about the "flaming indignation of the German people," and the "impudence" of the British Government in "insulting the soldiers of the German Army and Navy and charging them with criminal conduct in war." He "rejoiced to be able to state that the German Army and German Navy respect the principles of war and humanity"; the German warriors "were not descended from Africans, whose fathers ate human flesh." The National Liberal leader, Herr Bassermann, went so far as to claim that "the German conduct of war is filled with the spirit of humanity and morality, and stands upon a superior plane of civilization!"

The Reichstag had, in fact, what the *Frankfurter Zeitung* called "an hour of greatness." For the Foreign Office the Under-Secretary, Herr Zimmermann, solemnly promised the overwrought orators that the Government would "find the right ways and means to punish sharply and emphatically this horrible deed." A great deal of mystery was made about the awful "reprisals" in store for England—although, as the lame pronouncement of July 31, already quoted, showed, the Government had nothing in view but the continuation of crimes which it was already committing to the best of its ability.

Meanwhile the more genuine controversy about submarine warfare was coming to a head. Early in February Admiral von Tirpitz and his adherents began to issue warnings to politicians and the Press that the Imperial Chancellor intended to yield all the main points that had been in dispute with the United States since the sinking of the *Lusitania*. Through all sorts of channels it was indicated that this policy would deprive Germany of the full use of a weapon which was capable of breaking British sea power, and that the policy was really being adopted because the Government was still unwilling to carry to its extreme limits the "struggle for life" between the German and British Empires. The Tirpitz party then orga-

nized a remarkable demonstration in the Prussian Diet. The Prussian Junkers promoted a violent debate on foreign affairs in the Budget Committee, whose proceedings were secret, and, when it was over, insisted, in spite of all Government protests, in publishing the text of a resolution with which the debate ended a resolution expressly demanding that the Government should prosecute submarine warfare without any regard for the consequences as concerned relations with the United States. The Government retorted by denying the right of the Prussian Diet or any other State Parliament to interfere in the control of the foreign affairs of the Empire.

But this time the quarrel could not be composed by any ordinary means. Before the Reichstag met in March the Imperial Chancellor had brought matters to a point at which the Kaiser had at last to choose between him and Tirpitz. The "submarine" parties were looking forward eagerly to a fresh campaign. "Our people," wrote the National Liberal leader, Herr Bassermann, "are filled to-day with an eager longing for ruthless war against England, determined rejection of unjustified American interference in our conduct of the war, and no hesitating deliberations as to whether resolute naval

warfare will offend this or that neutral State. Our minds are full of the question whether we possess the means to overthrow England, and this question must be answered in the affirmative. If there is ruthless submarine warfare, and if we cut the island off from imports, the spectre of economic starvation, which England wanted to raise against us, will bring proud Albion down. The fact that in our submarines we possess the means of reaching our goal is guaranteed by the expert authority of our Navy and of our Tirpitz." But "our Tirpitz" had already fallen. On March 15 it was announced that he was prevented by illness from fulfilling his duties, and on March 16 that he had resigned the office of Secretary of State for the Imperial Navy and been succeeded by his subordinate of many years, Admiral von Capelle—better known as a bureaucrat than as a sailor.

The fall of Grand Admiral von Tirpitz necessarily made a very deep impression in Germany. He had been in office for nineteen years—that is to say, throughout the whole period in which Germany had been deliberately preparing to challenge British naval supremacy. He had seen three Chancellors in office, and survived the dismissal of countless Secretaries of State. He had obtained a position enjoyed



KNITTING SOCKS FOR GERMAN SOLDIERS.
Peasant girls at work in the Spreewald, near Berlin.

by no servant of the German Empire since Bismarck. He succumbed not to any political intrigue, but to the proved futility of his methods—combined, as subsequently appeared, with the proved inaccuracy of his versions of the results achieved and of the weapons at Germany's disposal.

The immediate point, however, was that—to quote a laboured semi-official communication to the *Cologne Gazette*—"the responsible military and political conductors of the business of the people, after dutiful consideration of all the circumstances, could not resolve to go the whole way to the furthest consequences with a man and his system." Whether by accident or design, the fall of Tirpitz coincided almost to a day with the sinking by a German submarine of the large Dutch liner *Tubantia*, and on March 24 the Germans torpedoed, near Dieppe, the cross-channel steamer *Sussex*. In both cases Germany at first attempted to disavow responsibility. The *Sussex* case caused the United States to threaten the rupture of diplomatic relations with Germany. The history of these cases need not, however, be fully stated here. The point, as regarded the German domestic disputes, and as regarded relations with the United States in the immediate future, was that, in her Note published



ADMIRAL VON CAPELLE,
Who succeeded Admiral von Tirpitz, March, 1916.



ADMIRAL VON TIRPITZ
In Retreat.

on May 6, Germany promised to instruct her naval forces that "merchant vessels both within and without the area declared as a naval war zone shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives, unless the ship attempts to escape or offer resistance." Germany endeavoured, indeed, to make this "concession" dependent upon the results of diplomatic negotiations proceeding about other matters between the United States and Great Britain, and "reserved complete liberty of decision" in the "new situation" which would arise if the United States failed "to have the laws of humanity followed by all belligerent nations." But for the time being the "crisis" ended in the way that was indicated by the dismissal of Tirpitz.

In the *Sussex* Note of May, 1916, Germany protested to the United States with a great air of virtue that "twice within the past few months she had announced before the world her readiness to make peace on a basis safeguarding Germany's vital interests, thus indicating that it is not Germany's fault if peace is still withheld from the nations of Europe." The reference was, no doubt, to the Chancellor's speech in December, 1915 (quoted on page 362), and to the still more ambitious speech which, after disposing of Admiral von Tirpitz, the

Chancellor delivered in the Reichstag on April 5. This extraordinary harangue deserves analysis in some detail. It showed very clearly what, after twenty months of war, official Germany still professed to expect to gain, and it showed how desperately anxious she was to arrange a settlement before the Allies had developed their combined and co-ordinated effort.

Herr von Bethmann Hollweg began with a review of recent military events, upon which he claimed that "the military situation on all the fronts was very good, and thoroughly in accordance with German expectations." ("So," as Herr Maximilian Harden sarcastically remarked in the *Zukunft*, "he did not expect Verdun to fall before Whitsuntide, or that the speedy fall of this fortress, which has been menaced since February 21, would crush the French confidence in victory, make possible a rapid advance into badly fortified country, and compel a decision for peace!") The Chancellor then declared with indignation that it was vain for England to regard "the destruction of the military power of Prussia"—Germans always pretended to misunderstand the expression "Prussian militarism"—as the preliminary condition of all peace negotiations.

Imagine (he said) the case if I proposed to Herr Asquith to sit down with me at a table to examine the possibilities of peace, and Herr Asquith began with his final and complete destruction of the military power of Prussia. The conversation would be at an end before it had begun. To such a condition of peace there remains to us only one answer, and this answer is given by our sword. . . . It is united and free Germany that our enemies desire to destroy. Germany is again to become impotent as in former centuries, exposed to every lust for power on the part of its neighbours, the whipping boy of Europe, bound in fetters still after the war as regards the development of its economic strength. That is what our enemies mean by the destruction of the military power of Prussia. They will smash their heads.

The Chancellor then pictured Germany, on the other hand, as fighting for the salvation of "Europe." For her "the meaning and purpose" of the war was "a Germany so firmly built and so strongly protected that nobody again would fall into the temptation of desiring to destroy it." The Chancellor touched upon the problems which Germany proposed especially to solve for the benefit of "Europe." Germany and Austria-Hungary had not intended to "open the Polish question," but "there it now was," "history had advanced with iron step, and there was no going back," and so there must be "a new Poland." And then there were all the peoples that Germany

and her Allies had "liberated" between the Baltic Sea and the Volhynian Marshes. They could not be surrendered again to "the rule of reactionary Russia," and—incidentally—"not again shall Russia be allowed to mobilize her armies on the unprotected frontier of East and West Prussia; not again shall Russia with the help of French gold use the land of the Vistula as a gate of invasion, and fall upon unprotected Germany."

Poor, unprotected Germany must also be protected in the West. Here, in Belgium, the Chancellor found another race, the Flemings, ripe for German "liberation." He referred to Belgium as follows:

Just as little can anybody suppose that in the West we shall, without complete security for our future, give up (*freigeben*) the occupied territories in which the blood of our people has flowed. We shall create for ourselves real guarantees that Belgium shall not be made into an Anglo-French vassal State and into a military and economic bulwark against Germany. Here also there is no *status quo ante*. Here also fate does not retrace its steps. Here also Germany cannot again give over to Latinization the long-oppressed Flemish race. Germany will secure for the Flemish



"THE IRON TIRPITZ,"
A Wilhelmshaven Atrocity.

vance a healthy development in accordance with its rich qualities and upon the basis of its lowland (*niederländisch*) language and peculiarities. We desire to have neighbours who will not again unite against us to throttle us, but who will work with us, as we with them, for our mutual profit. Were we before the war Belgium's enemies? Did not peaceful German work and peaceful German industry cooperate at Antwerp, for all far and wide to see, in the welfare of the country? Are we not even now during the war striving to restore the life of the country as far as the war allows? The memory of the war will continue for long in the country that has had so grievous a visitation, but—in our mutual interest—we cannot allow fresh wars to arise from that.

Such was Germany's "readiness to make peace on a basis safeguarding Germany's vital interests"—and it should be added that the Chancellor violently denied the right of the Allies to conclude economic agreements amongst themselves, and claimed in the familiar way that the fate of the German colonies also would be settled by German "victories on the Continent." Peace-loving, unprotected, unaggressive Germany was now "ready" for peace with large

annexations in the Baltic Provinces and Russian Poland, and with the establishment of a controlling German influence in Belgium!

The outside world was spared much labour in criticism by one of the most effective exhibitions ever given of the art of parliamentary interruption. Knowing that—as, indeed, was the case—he would be prevented by the closure of the debate from delivering a speech, the independent Socialist Deputy, Dr. Liebknecht, destroyed the Chancellor's most careful fictions by half a dozen interjections. When the Chancellor said "Our enemies chose war," Dr. Liebknecht retorted, "It was you who chose war." The reference to the "long-oppressed Flemish race" Dr. Liebknecht described in a word as "hypoerisy," and, when the Chancellor had sketched the ideal Belgium of the future, he observed: "Then you will fall upon them." To the Chancellor's passion for "liberation" Dr. Liebknecht replied



"DOWNING STREET."

A "Kladderadatsch" Cartoon of Mr. Asquith, August, 1916.



"EDWARD VIII, OR THE MAN WITHOUT A CONSCIENCE."

A "Kladderadatsch" Cartoon of Sir Edward Grey.



[From "Kladderadatsch," November, 1915]

THE "GREY" OWL.

Dazzled by the glare of the Turkish Crescent.

that he should "begin by freeing the German people." When the Chancellor asked rhetorically whether anybody could suspect Germany of lust for territory, Dr. Liebknecht replied, "Certainly"; and when the Chancellor said, "It is for Germany and not for foreign territory that Germany's sons bleed and die," Dr. Liebknecht remarked, "That is not true."

Less than a month afterwards the Prussian authorities had sought and found their oppor-

tunity to send Dr. Liebknecht to prison. Some attempt was made to hold a May Day demonstration on a small scale in the Potsdamer Platz in Berlin, and Dr. Liebknecht was among a small group of persons arrested. In order to get over the difficulty of his immunity as a Reichstag Deputy, he was tried by court-martial in his capacity as a private in a Labour Battalion. He was found guilty of 'attempted treason' and other offences, and, at the end

of June, sentenced to two and a half years' penal servitude. The result of an appeal was that his sentence was, two months later, increased to four years' penal servitude, and he was deprived of his civil rights for a period of six years.

Herr Liebknecht had at an earlier date been practically repudiated by the Socialist Party, but his courageous actions did a good deal to end the artificial unity with which the Party as a whole had supported the Government since the beginning of the war. Fresh disputes arose



DR. LIEBKNECHT,

The German independent Socialist Deputy, in the uniform of a Labour Battalion.

over the Socialist decision to support the war credits, and in March, 1916, there was an open "split." Herr Haase, who was actually joint chairman of the Socialist Party, broke away, with the powerful support of Herr Eduard Bernstein, Herr Ledebour, Herr Stadthagen, Herr Wurm, and 13 others, and "The Eighteen" established what they called the "Social Democratic Labour Union." There was little doubt that this new minority organization contained some of the best heads in the Socialist Party, and it had the complete support of the Socialists of Berlin and other large towns. The line taken

by Herr Haase and his supporters was that the secession had become "an act of political necessity," and that the time had come for an independent policy based upon the recognized Socialist principles. The movement was important, because it provided for the first time since the outbreak of war a centre for independent criticism, and ensured a certain amount of genuine debate in the Reichstag. Thus, after the Chancellor's speech on April 5, Herr Haase denounced all "annexations," protested against any new partition of Poland, said that it was necessary not only to restore the Belgian State but to effect the complete political and economic restoration of Belgium, and, with regard especially to submarine warfare, demanded that Germany should "return to the principles of International Law." He even said that "90 per cent. of the German soldiers would, if they were asked, prefer peace to the conquest of another bit of territory."

The attitude of the great majority of the Socialist Party—now led chiefly by Herr Haase's former colleague, Herr Scheidemann—remained however, unaltered. It may, indeed, be said that, the minority apart, German Socialism became increasingly "national" rather than international. It was argued with more and more determination, especially by the Socialist leaders in great centres of industry and shipping, that the interests of Labour were now practically identical with the interests of Capital, and that Labour must postpone all ideal and theoretical considerations until the war had been "won" and German commercial prosperity had been secured.

On June 5 the Imperial Chancellor, in yet another Reichstag speech, returned to the German longing for peace. This time he talked a great deal about the diplomatic history of the crisis which preceded the war, and used afresh a phrase which he had recently coined for American consumption—that "the war map" constituted the only basis upon which peace could be discussed and concluded. The Chancellor gave a daring description of the German successes—among which he included the Battle of Verdun—that had resulted from the latest efforts of the Allies to alter the appearance of the "war map." He continued: "This is how the war map looks now. If our various enemies desire still to shut their eyes to it, then we must, will, and shall fight on till the final victory. We did what we could to pave the way to



SENIOR BOYS OF A HAMBURG SCHOOL TRAINING FOR THE NAVY.



IN A THEATRE-HOSPITAL.
Concert given at a theatre used as a Hospital.



HERR HAASE,
Leader of the Socialist
Minority.



PRINCE WEDEL,
President of the "National Committee"
for an honourable peace.



HERR SCHEIDEMANN,
Leader of the Socialist
Majority.

peace, but our enemies repelled us with scorn. Any peace discussion which we might initiate now is futile and will not lead to the goal."

But the main feature of this speech was its disclosure of the elaborate network of intrigues directed against the Government, and especially of the wide circulation of privately printed pamphlets attacking the Chancellor personally. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg defended himself with a passion and violence which were explained by the fact that the "pamphlet scandals" were the deliberate work of the Prussian Conservatives. It soon appeared that one of these productions was the work of a well-known Junker official, Herr Kapp—who was subsequently deprived of his office, just as Herr Liöbknecht had been sent to prison—while another widely circulated pamphlet bore the title: "The German Empire on the Way to Become an Episode in History. A Study of Bethmann Policy Sketched and Outlined by Junius Alter. Very Confidential. Printed as a Manuscript."

"Junius Alter"* gave the most damaging possible account of German diplomacy in the years before the war, accused the Chancellor of having spoiled the schemes of the General Staff by "delaying" mobilization during the last week of July, 1914, while he attempted to avert war, and argued that, while the German advance had been checked by the "delay" in falling upon Belgium, the "lightning attack upon France" failed because the German supplies of ammunition were inadequate, owing to a "fatal policy of economy" before the war. Not less interesting were the statements of


* The contents of this secret pamphlet were disclosed in the *Chicago Daily News* of July 11, 1916.

"Junius Alter" about the Chancellor's "peace" plans. His suggestions about Belgium in his speech of April 5 were described as "bearing the stamp of all weak-willed natures," and as "only a half-measure, which is worse than a mistake, and probably would bring fatal results." And "Junius Alter" continued:

Not less gently did the Chancellor intend to deal with France. Here also the question of the population had to be considered. It was thought that any land sacrifice by France might make that nation a permanent enemy, whereas far-reaching forbearance would "perhaps" have a conciliating effect. This consideration, though refuted by the history of 1,000 years, determined the Chancellor to confine the lands for annexation to coal and iron territory, in brief, with possible additions of lesser strategic points. That the sacrifices we were forced to make in the Vosges and on the Meuse line must be avoided in a future war, and that part of the Franco-Belgian coast would serve as a useful flank position against England—all this seems never to have occurred to Bethmann Hollweg.

Naturally the Chancellor was under the strong influence of the Secretary for the Colonies, Dr. Solf, whose ambition was tickled by the idea of being the father of great colonial possessions in Central Africa, and he also thought that the French colonial territory in the French Congo, together with the Belgian Congo, would help Solf realize his plans.

Comparatively simple for Bethmann Hollweg appeared the question of compensation by England. Where no land was to be acquired which lay anywhere near, the only possibility was certain colonial compensations in Africa, and perhaps the prospect of a larger or smaller indemnity. The British command of the sea was important, as England could close her colonies and threaten the German people with starvation. The statesmanlike brain of Bethmann Hollweg soon found a solution for this problem. The possibility never entered his mind that the power of England on land and sea could be weakened by us, first by taking part of the northern French coast, and, perhaps, secondly, by creating a powerful fleet and finding bases for it. The simplest and therefore the most practical method seemed to him the closing of a contract by which England should pledge herself in black and white to respect the freedom of the seas. In another additional Declaration of London, which at the outbreak of the war had been torn to shreds, he saw a guaranty for Germany's future.

25 Gramm Brot 49. Woche	50 Gramm Brot 49. Woche	50 Gramm Brot 49. Woche	50 Gramm Brot 49. Woche	50 Gramm Brot 49. Woche	50 Gramm Brot 49. Woche	25 Gramm Brot 49. Woche	50 Gramm Brot 49. Woche
25 Gramm Brot 49. Woche	50 Gramm Brot 49. Woche	50 Gramm Brot 49. Woche	25 Gramm Brot 49. Woche	 Nicht übertragbar Brotkarte Nicht übertragbar Berlin und Nachbarorte		25 Gramm Brot 49. Woche	50 Gramm Brot 49. Woche
25 Gramm Brot 49. Woche	50 Gramm Brot 49. Woche	25 Gramm Brot 49. Woche	50 Gramm Brot 49. Woche			25 Gramm Brot 49. Woche	50 Gramm Brot 49. Woche
25 Gramm Brot 49. Woche	50 Gramm Brot 49. Woche	Gilt nur für die 49. Woche vom 24. bis 30. Januar 1916				25 Gramm Brot 49. Woche	50 Gramm Brot 49. Woche
25 Gramm Brot 49. Woche	100 Gramm Brot 49. Woche	Müchelte beachten!				25 Gramm Brot 49. Woche	100 Gramm Brot 49. Woche
25 Gramm Brot 49. Woche	100 Gramm Brot 49. Woche	200 Gramm Brot oder 125 Gramm Mehl 49. Woche	200 Gramm Brot oder 125 Gramm Mehl 49. Woche	25 Gramm Brot 49. Woche	25 Gramm Brot 49. Woche	100 Gramm Brot 49. Woche	100 Gramm Brot 49. Woche

25 Gramm Brot 50. Woche	50 Gramm Brot 50. Woche	100 Gramm Brot 50. Woche	100 Gramm Brot 50. Woche	100 Gramm Brot 50. Woche	25 Gramm Brot 50. Woche	50 Gramm Brot 50. Woche	
25 Gramm Brot 50. Woche	50 Gramm Brot 50. Woche	 Nicht übertragbar Brotkarte Nicht übertragbar Berlin und Nachbarorte		25 Gramm Brot 50. Woche	50 Gramm Brot 50. Woche		
25 Gramm Brot 50. Woche	50 Gramm Brot 50. Woche			25 Gramm Brot 50. Woche	50 Gramm Brot 50. Woche		
25 Gramm Brot 50. Woche	50 Gramm Brot 50. Woche	Gilt nur für die 50. Woche vom 31. Jan bis 6. Febr. 1916				25 Gramm Brot 50. Woche	50 Gramm Brot 50. Woche
25 Gramm Brot 50. Woche	50 Gramm Brot 50. Woche	Müchelte beachten!				25 Gramm Brot 50. Woche	50 Gramm Brot 50. Woche
25 Gramm Brot 50. Woche	50 Gramm Brot 50. Woche	200 Gramm Brot oder 125 Gramm Mehl 50. Woche	200 Gramm Brot oder 125 Gramm Mehl 50. Woche	25 Gramm Brot 50. Woche	25 Gramm Brot 50. Woche	50 Gramm Brot 50. Woche	50 Gramm Brot 50. Woche

BERLIN BREAD TICKETS, JANUARY—FEBRUARY, 1916.

So if one only had had an understanding regarding the freedom of the seas before the outbreak of hostilities there would have been no necessity for further naval preparation! On this point an understanding could be reached without difficulty. The morning of cloudless

Anglo-German friendship was sure to dawn and the life labours of Bethmann Hollweg would be crowned as those of the statesman who had reconciled Rome and Carthage—2,000 years were needed to produce this genius!

During the summer attempts were made to relieve the oppressiveness of the political atmosphere by the formation of "committees" for the elucidation of German aims. A "National Committee," under the presidency of Prince Wedel, formerly German Ambassador in Vienna and Statthalter of Alsace-Lorraine, undertook "to arouse a uniform understanding among the German people for an honourable peace which will guarantee the secure future of the Empire." It organized a campaign of speech-making, and 42 addresses were given in various towns on August 1 by eminent professors and politicians, chiefly of the Radical or orthodox Socialist types. But the speeches shed no new light on the situation, and it was soon discovered that the "National Committee" was practically a scheme for bolstering up the Chancellor and his policy, that the various interests which promoted it could not agree among themselves, and that rival organizations used the National Committee as an argument for claiming an inconvenient freedom of speech for themselves. A curious feature of this period was the attempt made by Prince Bülow to undermine the position of Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, who had succeeded him as Imperial Chancellor in 1909.

Having allowed the public time to forget his failure as Special Ambassador to Rome in 1915, Prince Bülow revised in the best Pan-German spirit, and republished, a work on "German Policy" which he had produced a year before the war. It was really a fantastic defence of his own conduct of German affairs, and by implication a condemnation of his successor.

The measures taken during the first year of war for the control of food supplies consisted, it will be remembered, in the main in the fixing of maximum prices for many articles, and, later on, in the establishment of a Government monopoly of corn and a system of distribution by "tickets." Although in the late summer of 1915 the Government was able to boast of a surplus supply of corn in hand, the situation soon caused grave anxiety. The public had been induced to believe that all troubles would vanish with the gathering in of the 1915 harvest, and even among the Allies great disappointment began to be felt at the ineffectiveness of a blockade in which there were all too many leaks. But before the month of October had passed



A MOBILE FOOD-KITCHEN
In the streets of Charlottenburg.



THE SCARCITY OF FOOD.

Lines of people waiting to buy bread in Berlin.

there was a marked change for the worse. The harvest, although this was not admitted at the time, had turned out to be a bad one, and at the same time the effects began to be felt of the serious shortage of fats and oils. Even neutral correspondents in Berlin were allowed to report that the whole problem was of the gravest nature, although the Government insisted that there was no real want. In reality the Government had been taken by surprise, and prices rose so rapidly that in many places distress became acute. "Bitterness," said the *Cologne Gazette*, "is eating its way into the hearts of the people." The authorities distributed new regulations and fresh admonitions "to economize and to bear privations." It was decided to create comprehensive machinery for the supervision of prices, and to invest local authorities with large powers for regulation of trade, compulsory purchase of stocks, and establishment of local monopolies. For almost every important article of food authorities were set up with high-sounding titles, like the Imperial Potato Office, and at the end of October an attempt was made to check the consumption of meat by forbidding shops and restaurants to sell or serve particular kinds of meat on particular days of the week. At the same time the Press was encouraged to turn the stream of popular

discontent against "profiteering" and the middlemen, who were said to be the chief cause of the trouble.

In October the Government had also to face the butter problem, and fixed maximum prices. But the scarcity of butter remained one of the greatest difficulties, and there was no subject which provoked more intense feeling. As the *Frankfurter Zeitung* wrote in December:

Anybody who listens to the conversations of German women, no matter to what class they belong, is constantly faced with the question of butter. It is as if these women had no other care and no other yearning except butter. They talk not of war or of peace, but only of butter. For sixteen months they have been deprived perhaps of a husband, a son, or a father, and they bear it all with quiet seriousness and with free recognition that it is necessary. But when they are told that they are to be deprived of butter on their bread, they can talk about the subject for hours, and write the most idiotic letters about it to the men in the field.

Even the chief Government organ, the *North German Gazette*, declared that the "complaining and bemoaning and whining" were threatening to damage German prestige and to "endanger victory." At this time authentic reports began to reach foreign countries of rioting in Germany. There were no general disturbances, but in many places there were conflicts between the police and the crowds waiting before the shops. The German language was enriched by the new



COUNT ROEDERN,
Herr Helfferich's successor
as Finance Minister.



HERR VON BATOCKI,
The Food "Dictator."



HERR STHAMER,
Commissioner for "After-
the-War" Trade.

verb *butterstehen*—to stand and wait for butter. There was much discussion in the Budget Committee of the Reichstag, and much disputing between the agrarians and the rest of the country. The Committee adopted more than 40 resolutions demanding reforms, but the Government did not yet see the way to institute any really thorough scheme of requisitioning. On January 10, moreover, they had to announce a reduction of the daily bread ration from 225 to 200 grammes per head of the population. In practice the actual reductions varied locally—chiefly on account of the number of unused tickets returned week by week. The bread tickets reproduced on p. 377 are typical of those issued in Berlin immediately before and immediately after the reduction of the bread ration.

The situation at this time was most clearly described by the Portuguese Minister in Berlin, who, on arriving in Paris immediately after the Portuguese declaration of war on Germany, said to the Correspondent of *The Times* :

"The German people are feeling the pinch of war. The lack of butter, bread, and other necessary commodities is severely felt. But the people are far too disciplined to do more than grumble, for a long time to come. The result of the war is not in doubt, but the Allies must be prepared for a protracted and sullen resistance on the part of Germany, and ought not to underestimate the difficulty of wearing down the spirit of a people which, after all, is profoundly patriotic and schooled to accept with fatalistic resignation the decisions of its Government.

"The word 'fatalism' best expresses the mood of Germany to-day. Warlike enthusiasm has gone. Hope of a sweeping victory has departed, but nothing justifies the supposition that the German masses are likely to revolt against the authorities for many a long day. The Allies must, therefore, redouble their efforts to render the blockade increasingly stringent, and make up their minds to the fact that, though half beaten, Germany is far from recognizing in practice the hopelessness of her plight."

Thus matters went on through the spring of 1916. There could be no doubt that the situation was getting worse. Upon the whole it was the meat problem that caused most anxiety, and all that the Government could do was to invent new regulations. Thus, in April, hotels, restaurants, and pensions were required greatly to restrict the number of courses and the choice of dishes, and in various ways to check the appetite of individual customers.

Pressure on the Government increased steadily, and it was demanded in all quarters that, in place of the countless special regulations and piecemeal control, there should be a really comprehensive food policy. The Kaiser sent for the Presidents of the Reichstag and the Prussian Diet and informed them that he "definitely expected a speedy end to be now put to the abuses"—adding in his best manner that there was "no question of a perilous state of want, or, indeed, of any real state of want at all." Professor Rubner, the head of the Kaiser's chief institution for scientific research—the Physiological Institute of the University of Berlin—put matters

differently. "Rapid remedies," he said, "are necessary. The efforts to regulate prices must give way as soon as possible to thorough action. The defective organization behind the front is bringing us political injuries and embittering the population, while it fails to guarantee the most suitable employment of our home resources. These resources are at the same time the resources from which we have to feed the Army in the field."

Towards the end of May, 1916, the Government, with a great flourish of trumpets, announced the new remedies. The Imperial Minister of the Interior, Herr Delbrück, who had hitherto been at least nominally responsible for the food control, went into retirement, and a War Nutrition Office (*Kriegsernährungsamt*) was set up as a separate Imperial Department, under Herr von Batoeki, hitherto Governor of the Province of East Prussia, assisted by a Prussian military officer of high rank and by representatives of the

Bavarian bureaucracy. The Press and the public—much to his subsequent embarrassment—promptly named Herr von Batoeki "the Food Dictator." Certainly the powers of the new Department were ample. It was given "the right of disposal" over all stocks of necessaries of life, raw materials, and other commodities, and all fodder, this right of disposal including the power to regulate trade and consumption, importation and exportation, and prices.


The scheme was excellent in appearance, but the experience of the next few months was that it produced little change. The main reason was simple. The War Nutrition Office could not exercise its powers over the Empire as a whole, because the State Governments refused to sacrifice the interests of their own people by removing their various vetoes on exportation over their frontiers. In his first speech in the Budget Committee of the Reichstag Herr von Batoeki, himself a typical



"One portion of peas and carrots, please, and could you cook a goose next Sunday, because daddy is coming home on leave?"



"Hullo! How long have you been keeping a mule?"
"Since the soup-kitchens came in. You see, I am a big eater, and now I have taken to riding, too."



"Delicious my love! You really never cooked anything better."



"The Moneybags family can at last give dinner-parties again."

THE DELIGHTS OF TRAVELLING KITCHENS.

(From *Fliegende Blätter*.)

Prussian Junker, bluntly declared that great difficulties were arising out of the relations of the Federal States. "From Würtemberg," he said, "menacing letters have already reached me protesting against the sucking dry of Würtemberg by Prussia. Without the ready cooperation of the authorities of the Federal States, their organizations, and their entire population, my work cannot be successful." Least successful of all were the efforts of Prussia to intimidate Bavaria. Both the Imperial Chancellor and Herr von Batoeki paid well-advertised visits to Bavaria—only to find the King more than usually hard of hearing and the Bavarian Premier, Count Hertling more than usually stubborn. At the


end of June the *Frankfurter Zeitung* declared bitterly that there was "no longer any talk whatever of the original programme of a uniform economic area." Bavaria had excellent reasons for her attitude. To yield to the Prussian demands would do more to provoke Bavarian animosity than to promote German unity. It was well known that Bavaria had been forced to provide far more than her share of the supply of meat for the army, and North Germany had taken all the Bavarian dairy produce that could be got—a good deal of it apparently for exportation to neutral countries for the benefit of the depreciated German currency. Moreover, as the summer advanced there was increasing hostility to the army of Prussian tourists who invaded all the Bavarian health resorts in search of plentiful supplies. And, as a matter of fact—partly owing to the inefficiency of the easy-going South German bureaucracy—conditions were by no means satisfactory in many Bavarian towns. Food riots of a somewhat serious kind occurred at Munich in the month of June. Dr. Heim, the head of the Bavarian Peasants' League, actually published a jubilant account of Herr von Batoeki's discomfiture. He showed that, when he visited Munich, Herr von Batoeki



THE HINDENBURG BRIDGE.

In the Bornholmer Strasse, Berlin.

Circle picture: Frau von Hindenburg signs the visitors' book at the wooden statue of Hindenburg.



A MODEL OF THE "EMDEN" IN THE BERLIN MUSEUM.

Circle picture: Memorial to German airmen at Gotha.

was compelled to abandon his charges against Bavaria, although when he returned to Berlin he began to talk again about "breaking down opposition." It was in vain that the Kaiser tried flattery, and spoke of "the friendly rivalry of North and South in effecting the even distribution of foodstuffs and other necessaries."


Thus the situation, on the whole, became worse rather than better during the summer of 1916, although conditions varied greatly and the strain was far greater in the towns than in the country. The food control, with all its defects, performed remarkable work and, indeed, saved the situation; but little by little the British blockade and the increasing domestic difficulties of all kinds produced problems which no amount of organization could completely solve. Yet the fact remained that after two years of war the gathering in of a new harvest found Germany by no means "starved out."

One further device for the relief of distress deserves mention—the establishment, partly by private effort, but, in the main, by municipal organization, of public kitchens, at or from which cooked meals were provided at moderate prices. They achieved a certain amount of success. In Berlin, for example, the "middle class" kitchens alone were in June, 1916, said to be providing about 25,000



persons with a daily meal. But these establishments were not popular, and it was found that, with the existing rations, wholesale cooking could not provide anything but very dull and unattractive fare.

It would need a large volume to describe all the economic restrictions that became necessary during the second year of the war. In the case of many articles compulsory confiscation took the place of the former appeals for voluntary "sacrifice." Thus, in October, 1915, the Government seized practically all articles made of copper, brass, nickel, and other metals of military value. In April, 1916, the shortage of oils and fats made it necessary to add soap to the list of articles obtainable only by "ticket," and the monthly ration per head was fixed at 100 grammes of toilet soap and 500 grammes of other soaps or substitutes. But perhaps the compulsory economy of clothes was the most remarkable



PAPER FOR GOLD.

A certificate of the surrender of gold to the Imperial Bank.

development. The first warning to German women was the sudden stoppage by the military authorities of the spring "bargain sales." At the beginning of February the Government assumed control of practically all textile products, and permitted the sale of most kinds of manufactured clothing only under stringent regulations. Little by little the control was tightened, and—under the auspices of the Prussian Ministry of War!—a committee of specialists drew up a detailed table of the maximum length of material to be used in each article of dress for women, girls, and children. In June a further step was taken by the establishment of an Imperial Clothing Office and the organization of a scheme of clothes rationing. Expensive clothing was for the most part left on the free list, on the ground that the wealthy would thus not compete with the poor, but the general public could henceforth obtain clothes, like bread and butter, only by tickets granted upon the results of an exhaustive census of German wardrobes.

The Third German War Loan was issued in September, 1915.* A Fourth Loan was issued in March, 1916, and a Fifth Loan in September, 1916. It is convenient to state here the

* Cp. Vol. V., p. 191.

borrowing operations of the first two years of war. The whole Imperial Debt in the spring of 1914 had amounted to only something less than £250,000,000.

The War Credits voted by the Reichstag were:

	£
August, 1914... ..	250,000,000
December, 1914	250,000,000
March, 1915	500,000,000
August, 1915	500,000,000
December, 1915	500,000,000
June, 1916	600,000,000
Total	2,600,000,000


The results of the first four loan issues, according to the final official reports, were:

	Price.	Subscriptions. £	Number of Subscriptions.
September, 1914	97½	224,040,000	1,177,235
March, 1915	98½	455,135,000	2,691,060
September, 1915	99	608,130,000	3,966,418
March, 1916	98½	538,400,000	5,279,645
Totals		£1,825,705,000	13,114,358

All the loans bore interest at 5 per cent. The result of the Fourth Loan issue was hailed as an immense triumph, and when he asked for fresh credits in December, 1915, the Secretary of State for the Imperial Treasury, Herr Helfferich, delivered one of his most bombastic speeches, and made an amusing attempt to contrast the brilliance of the German position with the sad plight of British finance. "The foundations of the British Empire," he declared, "are tottering, and when the British Empire has gone to pieces it will not rise again in thousands of years. We stand firm as a rock in its native ground, but on the golden pillars of the British Empire gleams in flaming characters, 'Mene, mene, tekel, upharsin.'" The speech provoked great merriment in all parts of the world; in Berlin, curiously enough, it caused depression on the Bourse. The more Dr. Helfferich explained German finance the greater was the depreciation of the mark in all neutral countries. As Mr. Montagu, who at the time was Financial Secretary to the Treasury, remarked:

Germany, with hardly any payments to make outside Europe, has nevertheless to see her exchange falling away to vanishing point. She has realized all her available assets in the shape of negotiable foreign securities, and ever since the outbreak of the war she has suspended specie payments. What is the explanation of this fall in the value of the mark? One only is possible, the manufacture and abuse of paper credit. The mark has lost all relation to the gold standard.

The raising of the Fourth Loan in March.



"THE KNIGHT IN GOLDEN ARMOUR."

A typical glorification of Herr Helfferich at the time of his bombastic speeches on finance.

1916, was Dr. Helfferich's last financial feat. His reputation in Germany had suffered a good deal by the fact that, whereas during the first year of war he had repeatedly insisted that any weakness in the German financial system would assuredly be repaired by the exaction of large indemnities from Germany's vanquished enemies, he gradually became increasingly reticent about indemnity prospects. In March, 1916, he was, moreover, compelled to forget a famous

speech in which he had declared the British practice of raising taxes in war time to be antiquated. He still relied entirely on loans to meet the war expenditure, but attempted to raise taxes enough to maintain a balance in the ordinary Imperial Budget—or rather, as his German critics were careful to point out, in a Budget relieved of all military and naval expenditure of every kind. His taxation proposals were both miscellaneous and unpopular and,

like so many of his less pretentious predecessors in office, he had to see his proposals turned inside out by the Reichstag. In May, 1916, a compromise was adopted which was optimistically estimated to promise rather more than Herr Helfferich had demanded. But the last word on the subject came from the Socialist *Vorwärts*, which remarked: "In England £300,000,000 has been raised by taxation. In England considerable direct taxes have been introduced. If you had to pay £300,000,000, as the people of England do, we should have peace to-morrow." Towards the end of May the retirement, already recorded, of Herr Delbrück, gave Herr Helfferich a welcome opportunity of escape, and he became Imperial Secretary of State for the Interior, being succeeded at the Treasury by a certain Count

Roedern, hitherto Secretary of State for Alsace-Lorraine.

The really remarkable feature of the financial situation during the second year of war was the sensational and persistent decline of German credit. The truth was that the value of the mark had declined by about 30 per cent. in practically all neutral countries. Early in 1916 the Government organized an ambitious scheme of control, and every effort was made to utilize German holdings of foreign securities. But the relief was always both slight and temporary.

The adaptation of German industry and trade to war conditions, and the general character of the industrial and commercial situation, were fully described in Chapter LXXXVI. With the continuation of the war and the increasing severity of the British blockade the situation became worse, especially as regards raw materials, but the developments during the second year of war were not very remarkable. The most striking features were the anxiety about the ultimate translation of war conditions into peace conditions and the efforts made to prepare for industrial cooperation on a colossal scale. The very perfection of the machinery of State control aroused fear of the destruction of initiative, and above all Germany was troubled by the certain prospect of having to resume trading with a greatly depreciated currency. The Imperial Government announced in May, 1916, that its policy would be to pro-



GERMANY'S "POSTAL" SUBMARINE, U 35,
Which carried the Kaiser's autograph letter to King Alfonso, June, 1916. Circle portrait: Captain von Arnould de la Periere, the commander.



THE GERMAN "COMMERCIAL" SUBMARINE "DEUTSCHLAND,"
Which visited New York.

mote the formation of comprehensive industrial associations, with State support. A great deal of preliminary work was done in this direction, and Herr Sthamer, of Hamburg, was appointed "Imperial Commissioner" for after-the-war trade problems. There were remarkable advances in the movement towards syndication on the largest scale, the most important example being the practical fusion of all the existing aniline dyes syndicates. There was also a strong movement for the linking-up of industry and finance with shipping. Herr Hugo Stinnes, the coal magnate, associated himself with the Hamburg-Amerika Line and the North-German Lloyd when those concerns absorbed the important Woermann Line, and prominent bank directors became directors of the great shipping companies. During the summer of 1916, moreover, the shipping companies secured a promise from the Government to guarantee the interest on new capital, and elaborate schemes were developed for building up the German Mercantile Marine. The syndication process made progress in all directions, and the Germans organized gigantic coal combinations in Austria. But it was with increasingly heavy hearts that the German industrialists pursued preparations for victory that would square ill with defeat,

and made ready for the end of what Herr Ballin in June, 1916, impatiently described as "the greatest, bloodiest, and also stupidest war in history."

It is obvious from what has been said that the situation generally during the second year of war showed gradual but marked deterioration, and it was easy to trace the gradual decline in the enthusiasm of Press and other public utterances. The most extravagant of them were for the most part but faint echoes of the hoarse chorus of vituperation and boasting which was so remarkable in the early months of the war. Yet some of the Press campaigns were striking enough—especially on occasions like the return of the lonely commerce raider *Möwe* to port, the arrival of the "commercial submarine" *Deutschland* at New York, the celebration of the Battle of Jutland Bank (May 31–June 1, 1916) as a great German victory, the Zeppelin raids on England, or the appointment of Marshal von Hindenburg as Chief of the General Staff. Of other matters which stirred public excitement during the second year of war it is sufficient to mention an astounding German attempt at the beginning of April, 1916, to create the belief that England was

about to violate Dutch neutrality and land troops in Holland, and the death, in June, first of the famous Marshal von der Goltz, and then of General von Moltke, the former Chief of the General Staff, who had been superseded in the autumn of 1914 after the collapse of the original German plan of campaign in the West. Of all events outside Germany none created such a deep impression as the final adoption of conscription in England.

After the return of the *Möwe* in March, 1916, the papers were full of ridiculous claims like that of the *Hamburger Nachrichten* :

Does England rule the seas? Will England threaten us with the cutting off for all time to come of German shipping? This boasting could by nothing be made more ridiculous than by the deeds of the *Möwe* and her undisturbed return home. Can any one of our enemies show similar deeds and such heroic boldness as our fighters have shown on land, on sea, and in the air?

Or take the following quotation from the *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* after the Battle of Jutland Bank :

It is one of the most momentous naval victories in the history of the world, and a decision in the present struggle of the peoples of which the full bearings are quite incalculable. The sea-ruling predominance of Albion, upon which the whole prestige of our British enemy depends, has, for the first time, found its master.

"Hatred," especially of England, still remained popular, and although the outbursts were somewhat subdued, it was still possible for a Munich medical journal to write in May, 1916 :

Let there be education in hatred, education in the veneration of hatred, education in the love of hatred. Let there be organization of hatred. Away with the immature fear of brutality and fanaticism. Let us adopt politically the motto, "More smacks and fewer kisses." We must not hesitate to declare blasphemously that to us has been given faith, hope, and hatred, but the greatest of these is hatred.

There were still the most astonishing exhibitions of German inability to appreciate treatment which was heartily desired for Germany's enemies. While all Germany was eagerly demanding Zeppelin raids on English towns, and clamouring for the destruction of London, a semi-official account of a successful French reprisal on Karlsruhe in July, 1916, contained passages like the following :


"Despairing mothers wandered among the terribly mutilated bodies looking for their dead darlings. One of them had lost three boys; another, the widow of a soldier, had lost her only son. Even soldiers, who out there in the field had been shaken by none of the horrors of battle, admitted that they had never seen anything so terrible. The French

nation, which likes to boast of its chivalry and distinction, can note another piece of heroism in its history.

"One hundred and fifty-four German children have had to bleed, and 82 of them have had to die, in order that the airmen of proud France might be able to boast of a triumph which had been denied to them in battle with the German masters of the air. And what of the German people? Will paralysing fear damage their further courage? The French know us ill if they expect that. Out of the deep mourning for the murdered youth, and out of the sincere sympathy with the sorrowing mothers, nothing but new and indignant strength will arise to strengthen our will for victory. The innocent victims buried in the cemetery at Karlsruhe have not fallen in vain for the Fatherland. France, as well as we ourselves, will long bear them in painful memory."

Every aspect of German war life was treated with immense seriousness. Generals issued solemn orders to German women against extravagance in dress, and enforced compulsory saving upon boys engaged in war work. Dr. Ott, a Court Chaplain, gravely described as follows a visit of the Kaiser in July, 1916, to the Western front, and the delivery by His Majesty of a sermon :

"It was more than a meeting of the Kaiser with the Field Chaplains; it was a new binding together of the Empire of the World with the Empire of God, a union of the Sword with the Bible, a satisfaction of the Church by the State. . . . He spoke to us for half an hour. He spoke vivaciously, skilfully, quite freely, now in the light tone of conversation, often with a hearty laugh, then again seriously and emphatically, at times with strong temperament, often with classical emphasis. . . . He to whom so much power has been given over our fate and the fate of the peoples spoke with such grave and true piety. He is a guardian of souls, a father of the Church. It was once more a pleasure to be a German and a Christian. It is a pride and an unspeakable happiness, as our Chaplain-General said, to be permitted at the call of such a Kaiser to bear the banner of Christ among the banners of victory of our troops. . . . We stood in a half-circle. The dull light of lamps, mingled with the faint light of the day, fell upon a pair of calm, grave, firm eyes. They flashed when brave deeds were reported, and there was a golden gleam in them when a jest gave occasion for laughter.



FEEDING THE GERMAN ARMY.
In a refrigerating-room.



A KITCHEN ON WHEELS.
In the German Empress's hospital-train.

... The Kaiser departed with an amiable smile as he had come. A climax of our life in the field had passed. A new and exalted splendour surrounded the future."

From time to time there were unfortunate disclosures as to the distance between the war habits of the German people and the accounts of them published abroad. Thus, in May, 1916, the police-president of Munich published a bitter attack on the "extortioners and hunters after enjoyment, the selfish, superficial *viveurs* and hoarders of food, and the vain, coquettish women" of the Bavarian capital, and contrasted the "riotous living" with the sufferings of the poor.

This brief review may well conclude with a remarkable account of the tendencies of opinion among the great masses of the people which, in August, 1916, was published in his weekly paper, *Die Hilfe*, by Herr Friedrich Naumann. The author of "Central Europe," who, as has been seen, had played a remarkable part in the encouragement of German ambitions, now wrote :

When the war began, everybody was convinced that now we must fight; for how could we let other peoples tear us to pieces? At that time everybody understood that this was a case of necessity, just as if we were threatened by a flood or a fire. But to-day there are people enough who no longer rightly know why we are still fighting. There really are these people.

I was visited lately by a soldier who, late in the war, was taken up in the Landsturm, and who now, as a grown man, has passed through his time of training in barracks. I know him well, and I know that by very reason of his calling he understands the way of thinking of the simple people. He said to me:—"It must be explained to the people quite simply and intelligibly why they are still fighting, because they do not know." I answered that two years are surely enough to make it clear to the thickest head. He, however, replied:—"Two years ago all these people knew; but as they read the newspapers only irregularly, have little knowledge of geography, and have no training in historical thought, they, even at the beginning, grasped the general impression rather than the detailed events. Meanwhile, all that has for them returned to a state of flux and become obscure, and now they are mentally helpless in face of the sacrifices of the long war. Hence it becomes possible for the agitation of the Liebknecht type to find its way into the very Army."

I then made further inquiries among men and women who, by constant contact, know something of the way of thinking of small people, and this is what I heard.

Two years are a long time for the memory, especially when people's sufferings and experiences have been so manifold during this time. At the beginning people had no real idea what war is, but they were ready to conduct war. Meanwhile, death in the field and privations at home have become greater than any power of imagination had previously conceived. Hence the impression easily arises that one has been pushed into something which one did not really desire. The necessity of what is happening is questioned, and the longing that the abnormal state of things may cease dims the eyes to the inevitable character of events. To this is then added the old and eternal mistrust of the small for the great, and it is said:—"Those people at the top need the war, and that is why we have to endure it."

And then what a marvellous picture of the beginning of the war takes shape in the brain! From the simple fact that the ultimatum to Serbia was dispatched by Austria, and that the formal declarations of war were dispatched by us to Russia and France, it is concluded that we produced the war. What everybody knew at the beginning of August, 1914—that the declarations of war were only a consequence of the threats and mobilizations pouring in upon us—passes out of sight, and only the formal course of events remains. To this is then added the unscrupulous campaign of agitation and of calumny by Germans of Germans, as if we had been the disturbers of the peace. One has seen fly-sheets which talk as if it depended on our Government whether it should will peace to-morrow or not. The burden of the trouble and want caused by the war is put upon the Government. Assuredly this hateful perversion is really believed only by few. But some of it sticks—as though the German Government were at bottom just as guilty as the English Government or the Russian Government—and a dull feeling gets abroad that all the peoples have been condemned to many sufferings by the mistakes and sins of those who rule them.

And there is something still further. Owing to the fact that we have been somewhat vigorous in hailing and celebrating our victories, many people who are weak in arithmetic have lost all sense of the fact that there are still great Russian, English, French, and Italian forces in existence. When, therefore, after two years the very greatest efforts have still to be made, it is as though we had been cheated of our bargain. People can no longer rightly believe that the present battles are inevitable battles of defence. They have rather the gloomy suspicion that a policy of conquest, over and above what is necessary, is being pursued. And here a positively disastrous effect is produced by certain documents in which great leagues and private persons express the lust of conquest. Only general ideas of their contents reach the great mass of the people; but, to the best of my belief, their existence is well known in every barracks, in every workshop, and in every village inn. The consequence of this conquest literature is the disappearance of simple faith in the defensive war.

But the truth was only slowly dawning, and there was no prospect that the process of disillusionment could be completed by anything short of complete military defeat.



CHAPTER CXLVIII.

OPERATIONS NORTH OF THE PRIPET MARSHES : SUMMER, 1916.

THE PART PLAYED BY THE NORTHERN AND CENTRE ARMIES IN THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE OF 1916—
BARANOVITCHE, SMORGON AND RIGA THE ONLY SCENES OF SERIOUS FIGHTING—TOPOGRAPHICAL
DESCRIPTION OF BARANOVITCHE—THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE AT SMORGON—RUSSIAN ATTACKS
AGAINST BARANOVITCHE—THE BATTLE ON THE DVINA FRONT.

IN the Russian offensive of 1916 it was in the advance of General Brusiloff's armies, south of the Pripet Marshes, that the most important and most spectacular military events of the summer took place, that the most decisive victories were won, and that the greatest progress was achieved. But while the "moving battle" primarily attracts attention and appeals to popular imagination the other side of modern warfare ought not to be passed over in silence.

Comparing the Russian offensive of 1916 with the German offensive at Verdun, or the Franco-British offensive on the Somme, one is struck by the great length of the "active front" in the East. The movement was planned from the very outset on an infinitely wider scale, and owing to the brilliant work of the Russian Armies engaged in the fighting, its execution did full justice to the scheme. Even so, however, the advance embraced only slightly more than one-third of the original front of June, 1916. Whilst the Armies of General Brusiloff were pressing forward in the south, those of General Evert in the centre and General Kuropatkin in the north continued to fight what was practically a stationary battle. Their chief aim was to contain the opposing forces of Field-Marshal von Hindenburg, and to prevent him from lending efficient succour to the Austro-Hungarian armies in Volhynia and Galicia. Of the 48 German infantry

divisions and the 10 cavalry divisions which in the spring of 1916 held the line from the Baltic Sea to the Pripet Marshes, it proved possible to move only comparatively few towards Kovel, Brody, or on to the Dniester front. That this was so, was the result of the continuous pressure exercised by the opposing Russian armies. This, in itself, was a considerable and most valuable achievement, and constituted their main share in the great victories of the summer of 1916. Besides that, however, many direct successes were scored by them in the numerous battles and minor engagements fought at different times in practically all the main sectors of the northern front. For also in that respect conditions on the Eastern front differed from those prevailing in the West: even the stationary part of the Russian line continued to show considerably more activity than was seen on the stationary part of the line in France.

This difference was largely due to the obvious differences in the mutual relations of the active and stationary sectors in the two theatres of war. Whilst in either of them an offensive, of the new type developed in this war, was unthinkable except on a limited front, in the West a much larger part of the forces could in turn bear the brunt of the fighting. Action in the East could not be localized in the same way, nor the principle of employing units by

rotation be used in attack to the same extent. The Eastern front was much longer, the communications behind it much poorer, and the barrier of the Marshes rendered difficult lateral movements between the southern and northern armies. Even the parts of the front on which no movements were planned had, in view of the difficulties of transport, to be held by comparatively stronger forces.

Most of the minor engagements fought in the north bore the character of reconnaissances, or were daring attempts of individual commanders at improving their tactical position in their particular sectors. They served to break the boredom of inaction, and to make

certain that those on the opposite side, who had been "paired" in that game of stationary warfare, were not cheating. The only three sectors north of the Marshes in which battles were fought on any considerable scale were those of Baranovitché, Smorgon and Riga.

Baranovitché lies on the southern slope of the plateau which from the north and north-west closes in the low-lying basin of the Pripet. The average level of this district exceeds 600 feet, and most of it is dry ground. It can be called "plateau" only in a very loose sense. Its surface is cut by many streams, frequently winding through marshy valleys and the landscape is marked by ranges of broken heights, covered with dense forests. A few miles north by north-east of Baranovitché lies the watershed between the Rivers Servech and Shehara; from here the Servech flows due north, the Shehara due south. Near Koreliehe the Servech joins the Niemen; some 30 miles south of Baranovitché the Shehara is linked by the Oginski Canal with the Yasiolda, a tributary of the Pripet. Beginning with these points, however, the Niemen, Servech and Shehara change direction: they draw



AT BARANOVITCHE.

Russian officers viewing the German positions. Smaller picture: Lunch at the front.

closer together till, having formed semi-circles round the Novogrodek heights and the hills south of Baranovitché, they join near Mosty, some 40 miles east of Grodno and some 60 miles west of the narrow watershed.

Baranovitché was one of the chief railway junctions in the northern theatre of war. It is here that the only railway leading across the Pripet Marshes—namely, that from Vilna to Kovno—meets the line which, skirting the Pripet district from the north and north-west, runs from Smolensk, by Orsha and Minsk, to Brest-Litovsk. Another railway, running due west, connects Baranovitché with the district of Volkovysk, where it branches out into three lines; these continue towards the important strategical centres of Grodno, Bielostok and Siedltse. The battle-front as established in September, 1915, and maintained in its essential parts throughout the following year, extended only about eight miles east of Baranovitché. Between Mikolaïeff in the north, and the Oginski Canal in the south, it followed the upper courses of the Niemen, Servech and Shchारा; their marshy valleys offered considerable facilities for defence. It is obvious that our Allies, who still hold firm in their hands practically the entire line across the Pripet Marshes, did not defer the re-linking up of the system connecting Lithuania and Volhynia till the few square miles round Baranovitché had been recovered. They made a new connexion by a short cross line behind the front. The capture of Baranovitché was therefore of no vital importance for their front if they wished to remain on the defensive in that region. Its loss would, however, have meant a serious blow to the Germans. Had it been followed up by the reconquest of the country between the Niemen and the Shchара by the Russians, the entire German position north of the Marshes would have been gravely compromised. Vilna would have been out-flanked, and a retreat on to the line of the Svienta, Niemen and Bug would have become a matter of a comparatively short time. Hence Baranovitché had to be held by the Germans at any cost. According to German officers whom the Russians captured during the first successful rush beyond the enemy's line of defences, Hindenburg told the men of this sector, "Nothing remains between us and the Russian cavalry except your positions. Hold them to the last breath, to the last drop of blood."



In view of the vital importance which it had for the Germans, Baranovitché was a suitable point for attack whenever our Allies wished to make their pressure felt in the northern half of their front. Moreover, though to break through the German lines was not the only, and in most cases not even the chief, aim of the Russian operations in the northern area in the summer of 1916, it was natural that a sector should be singled out for attack in which the piercing of the enemy's front would have had the greatest strategic consequences. This was the case of the sector of Baranovitché. It is obvious that a Russian army advancing in that district would have soonest established direct cooperation with the victorious forces of General Brusiloff, and their joint strength might have in time been applied for a concentric movement against Brest-Litovsk. And in fact there were moments when a piercing of the German lines near Baranovitché seemed imminent. The attempt was finally abandoned, not because it was found altogether impossible, but because the forces which its realization would have required were applied in another direction where their action was of greater immediate importance.



RUSSIANS IN THE FIRING LINE.
They are provided with solid overhead cover.

With a characteristic frankness, of which only men fully confident of victory are capable, General Alexeieff spoke of the Baranovitché episode in an interview which he gave to the Petrograd Correspondent of *The Times* on July 22, 1916. "Minor disappointments are inevitable," said he; "for instance, in our first attempt to break the German lines at Baranovitché." "Tell our English Allies," was the message given to *The Times* correspondent three days earlier by General Evert, the commander of the Russian centre, "that sooner or later we shall overcome the resistance of the Germans here. The situation at the present time is in no wise comparable with the position a year ago. Yet the armies over which I then assumed command safely issued from the Molodetchna operation, which threatened us with serious consequences. If the difficulties then confronting us were safely negotiated at that time, when arms and munitions were lacking, we need entertain no anxiety as to the outcome of the present operation."

The high ground between Smorgon and Krevo formed the favourite scene of the

German attacks. The important railway station of Molodetchna, the junction of the Polotsk-Lida and the Vilna-Minsk lines was the objective of their attempts in that region. For a short time in September, 1915, the Germans had held this vital sector in the communications behind the Russian front; they lost it about the time of the fall of Vilna, and never since did they succeed in making any progress against General Evert's Armies. Still they continued to repeat their attacks in that region whenever the need arose of relieving some other part of the line by means of counter-pressure.

A futile attempt of that kind was carried out in the neighbourhood of Krevo, in anticipation of the imminent Russian offensive, in the first days of June, 1916.* By the night of June 5-6 the fighting extended over the entire Krevo-Smorgon front. All these German attacks proved of no avail. They were renewed during the night of June 10-11. By that time the number of Austrian prisoners in the hands of our Allies exceeded 100,000. German reinforcements were hurried to Vol-

* Cf. Chapter CXXXVII., p. 22.

hynia by every possible route: but yet it was felt that some more immediate help was needed from the big German Armies tied down in the northern area. An offensive with important effectives was, therefore, started near the village of Kochany, south of Krevo. At first enemy parties succeeded in penetrating a wood west of that village, but under the fire of the Russian artillery and overwhelmed with hand grenades they had to evacuate the greater part of the sector of the wood which they had occupied. About the same time other German attacks were delivered also on the Yasioldn front and in the Dvina region which, since the late autumn of 1915, had formed an almost separate theatre of war, the scene of numerous disconnected encounters, but of hardly any more serious operations.

After this burst of German activity offensive movements were again abandoned, excepting again the Smorgon - Krevo sector. Here the fighting culminated in a more serious battle between June 20-22. None of the German attacks resulted, however, in any permanent gains, and at no time did the Russian Higher Command allow its plans to be in any way disturbed by the German threat against Molodetchna and Minsk. Whilst the operations were still developing, the distinguished military correspondent of the

Russky Invalid, Colonel Clerget, foretold their inevitable failure. For a sudden rupture of the Russian front the Germans lacked the indispensable numerical strength, while, on the other hand, the time factor did not permit the enemy to undertake a slow and methodic battering of the Russian line.

Meantime the Germans had collected considerable forces in the Kovel district for their counter-offensive against the right flank of the Lutsk salient.* To prevent further withdrawals of troops in that direction from the neighbouring districts north of the Pripet Marshes, our Allies delivered their first attacks in the direction of Baranovitché. The Fourth Russian Army, under General Rogozza, including the Grenadier Corps, was facing in that district the Ninth German Army under General von Woyrsch, composed mainly of Prussian troops from Brandenburg, Posen, and Silesia (these included also Polish regiments), and of the Twelfth Austro-Hungarian Army Corps, consisting mainly of Rumanians from Transylvania.†

"In the very first weeks of the war," wrote from the Baranovitché front the correspondent of the Vienna *Reichspost*, "our

* Cf. Chapter CXXXVII., pp. 27-30.

† Cf. Chapter CXXXVII., p. 12.



A GUN IN POSITION.

"The Russian artillery has been from the very beginning of the war a most serious opponent."

Russian opponents proved their remarkable efficiency and their high technique in matters concerning artillery and field fortifications. Since then, however, they have continued to make enormous progress, which shows marked traces of French and Japanese military science." The attack was prepared by the exceedingly careful development of a whole network of saps and trenches. Each attacking detachment had its route carefully traced in that labyrinth, and had its own system of communication trenches for the bringing up of reinforcements and ammunition. The organized ground was of such extent that there was room for ample reserves under its cover, whilst on the other hand the attacking forces could get within a very short distance of the enemy's lines without being exposed to his fire.


No less remarkable was the artillery preparation. "The Russian artillery has been from the very beginning of the war a most serious opponent," wrote another by no means friendly critic (Herr Roda Roda in the Vienna *Neue Freie Presse*). "Their observation service is excellent and their batteries are skilfully placed also with a view to enfilading fire. The amazing mobility of individual batteries, even in stationary trench warfare, has caused

one artillery group of that kind to get from our men the nickname of 'travelling circus.' All the batteries get the ranges of their objectives—trenches, dug-outs, *points d'appui*, the positions of the reserves, of the roads leading up to the front-lines, of the positions of batteries, etc.—only a few days before the decisive attack; they do it under cover of a simultaneous, in appearance aimless, widely scattered fire. . . ."

This system was applied also at Baranovitché with a success for which again an enemy witness may be quoted. "Quite suddenly on the morning of June 13," wrote the military correspondent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* (July 22), "the Russians opened a hurricane fire which completely flattened out our positions east of Stoloviehe; we had not even noticed it when the Russian artillery some time before had got its ranges. . . ." At 4 p.m. the Russian infantry started the attack on the front, beginning with Krushin (on the Baranovitché-Minsk railway) and going along the marshy valley of the Upper Shehara, past the Koldichevo Lake, to north of the watershed in the Gorodische region, held by Austro-Hungarian troops. Several important points were won on that day. The attack was continued the next morning, followed up by



EFFECT OF GERMAN HIGH-EXPLOSIVE SHELLS
in a village, showing the killed under the shelter of the houses.



numerous counter-attacks of the enemy, both in this region and farther south on the Oginski Canal.

It was not, however, until the first days of July that the battle round Baranovitché reached its height. The armies of Generals Lesh and Kaledin were on the point of resuming their offensive south of the marshes on the Styr and the Stokhod.* In connexion with that movement the Russian attack was reopened against the front of the Ninth German Army. Careful preparations had been made for this renewal of fighting. Along the historic highways which traverse this land of rolling plains and wooded heights, notably the great broad route which carried Napoleon's legions in the surge and ebb of invasion, likewise along the newly constructed railways, masses of men, guns and transport had been moving to take up their appointed places in the second act of the battle. The Germans had to cease sending reinforcements to the south, and in all haste began gathering all available troops for the defence of Baranovitché. One division which had received orders to proceed to Kovel was recalled at the last moment. The 84th Division was hurried down from the Lida front as reinforcement for General von Bredow's Landwehr Division, which was holding some of the most important positions next to the Baranovitché-Luninets-Sarny railway (the railway across the Marshes); help was required all the more

since it had recently lost a few of its own regiments—most of these having been transferred to the Stokhod front. Now it was von Bredow's Division which, on the Sarietchie-Labusy-Darovo front, between the road and the railway leading from the south-east towards Baranovitché, had to meet, in conjunction with other Prussian troops, some of the most violent Russian attacks. At the same time another attack was developing in the north against the Austrian positions in the region of Karchevo.

On July 2, at dawn, the Russian batteries opened a heavy fire against the German positions: after some three hours it suddenly broke off, to be resumed on the following night about 9 p.m. Then a bombardment followed full of horror even for seasoned troops. "The artillery fire which now developed on both sides was something frightful even for those of us who have gone through the entire terrible retreat of our armies from the Dunayets," wrote a Russian officer in the *Russkoje Slovo*. "We have seen and we know hurricano fire, but this was something still more frightful—a mad, wild dance of death, a chaos of destruction, something supernatural, even for us artillerymen. It seemed like the culminating point of a struggle between Titans fighting for death rather than for life. All the bitterness, the sufferings, the insults with which was strewn the long path of our retreat from the Dunayets, were poured out in this fire—in the wild cry: 'Vengeance, terrible, bitter vengeance on the enemy!'"

In the southern theatre of war, in Volhynia and in the Bukovina, the verdict of 1915 had already been reversed. Here also in the northern Polésie the enemy was to feel the new force of the Russian armies. The battle-front was continually extending, the fighting was growing in intensity. "If in the first days of our offensive," wrote a Russian eye-witness of the battle, "the Germans were still showing plenty of self-confidence, the picture changed considerably as the fighting continued. Even our normal artillery fire seemed a surprise to them, and with a certain amount of amazement they had to give up the sweet dreams about the cheap triumphs of the preceding year. 'Another kind of Russians have come!' was their cry, and along the entire line they began to offer a desperate resistance. Justice ought to be rendered to the enemy: he fought *sans peur et sans reproche*. The Germans continued the

* Cf. Chapter CXLIII., pp. 205-214.



ON THE LOOK-OUT FOR ENEMY AIRCRAFT

A Russian machine gun in position.

battle literally to the last drop of their blood ; half-dead, they were still shooting, and died rather than surrender." Even so, however, in spite of all their desperate heroism, one thing remained which they were unable to stand. "Several times our men tried to enter into a bayonet fight, but the Germans, following their time-honoured custom, discreetly declined it. All their hope in the field lies in the machine-guns. . . ."

"Anyhow, trench fortresses (many of them 24 feet deep), trench palaces (not even electric light was missing in them), abundance of machine-guns; fields covered with barbed wire, the courage of the German soldier, though born from despair—none of these proved an obstacle to our advance. . . ."

On the very first day of the infantry attacks (July 3) one division drove in the enemy front for nearly four miles, but had to level up its flanks. By the close of the second day our Allies had penetrated into and firmly held the German front for a distance of about 12 miles in breadth and nearly 2 miles in depth. The entire first line and considerable portions of the second line of defence were conquered. No less important was the haul of men and material.

In the first two days one division alone had captured 27 officers and 1,000 men. The total number of prisoners taken between July 3 and 5 amounted to 78 officers and 3,040 men. During the next few days the battle continued with extreme fierceness round Darovo, Labusy, Mikhalovo and Ekimoviche. The Germans were obeying Hindenburg's desperate summons. All available forces were thrown into the struggle. The battle assumed a character resembling that at Verdun. "The difficulties confronting us are similar to those experienced in France and Flanders," wrote the Petrograd Correspondent of *The Times*, then with the Centre Armies. "It would be expecting too much for the Russians here to break through as General Brusiloff succeeded in breaking through in the south. We have a different enemy, different positions to negotiate, and by keeping the foe pinned here we are lightening the task of our victorious legions south of the Pripet." And as long as these continued, in the words of the Russian soldier, "to break Austria's ribs and bones," it would have been a waste to sacrifice men on a prolonged offensive against the formidable German lines in the north, beyond what was needed to prevent them

from withdrawing troops to the southern area.

This they could now do no longer. Not merely had they to set in action considerable forces for attempts to recover the lost ground south of Baranovitché, but they had moreover to replace by German units the battered Twelfth Austro-Hungarian Army Corps round Karchevo. On the very first day the Austrian troops, mostly Rumanians fighting with the greatest unwillingness under command of their Magyar masters, had lost two lines of trenches on the north of the watershed. They received immediately a "stiffening" of Brandenburgers, who, according to the evidence of prisoners, opened fire against their "allies" whenever these made any attempt to retreat, and also otherwise treated them with the greatest brutality and contempt. Gradually the Austro-Hungarian troops were removed from their positions on the Servech.

About July 9 the battle round Baranovitché began to lose in intensity. Our Allies had organized the ground which they had conquered

during the previous week, but were not pressing on any farther. On July 14 the Germans started their counter-offensive. Careful preparations had been made during the preceding few days. Then at last came the assault. Especially in the district of Gorodishche and along the river Skrobova, where



THE TSAR AT THE FRONT.
His Majesty inspecting a Cossack guard of honour.



RUSSIAN CAVALRY.

the Austrians had lost important positions, the attacks of the enemy were delivered with the greatest violence.

"It was a desperate enterprise, which cost them dear," wrote the Petrograd Correspondent of *The Times* from Headquarters under date of July 17. "On the 14th inst., after an artillery preparation lasting from 1.30 to 6.30, including three hours of the intensest hurricane fire, the German attack was launched in three successive waves. Our men met them with sharp, murderous volleys, after which I saw a field strewn with German slain. Only one of our lines was reached by the enemy, who lodged in a few salients of our first line, where the trenches had been smashed by their gunners. But these we regained on the following day."

The German attacks were renewed in the valley of the Skrobova on July 24. On the next day fighting was reported near Gorodishche, and on July 26 near Labusy. None of these attempts assumed, however, serious proportions, the battle of July 14 practically marking the close of the operations round Baranovitché.

In the last week of July and the first days of August the Germans once more tried a new attack in the district of Smorgon, with no more success than on previous occasions.

There was one other battle fought about that time in the northern area which deserves more attention than it received in the great days of

Berestechko and Tlumatch. It was the fighting round Beresmundé and Kemmern in the week following on July 16. It was preceded by a violent bombardment of the German lines both from land and sea. The infantry attacks which followed were fully successful, especially in the district of Kemmern. In the course of three days German positions were carried on a front extending from the Gulf of Riga to Ikskull to a depth of one to two miles; on the extreme right, near the coast, the advance even reached 12 miles. The losses of the Germans in that battle were estimated at about 10,000. The advance, however, did not lead to any further operations, and remains a mere episode in the stationary warfare which had prevailed on the Dvina front since the time of the battles for Riga and Dvinsk, fought in the autumn of 1915.

About the middle of August the Armies of General Brusiloff in the south had concluded the second phase of their operations, having reached the new line extending from the Stokhod past Brody, Bzhezhaný, Halitch and Stanislavoff to the Carpathian Mountains; north of the Pripet Marshes the two opposing armies, in spite of numerous attempts on either side to break the *impasse*, were still facing one another practically on the front which had been established at the close of the great Austro-German offensive in the autumn of 1915.



CHAPTER CXLIX.

THE INTERVENTION OF RUMANIA.

RUMANIAN POLICY IN 1914—ORIGINS AND HISTORY OF RUMANIA—THE HOHENZOLLERNS—KING CHARLES AND AUSTRO-GERMAN HEGEMONY IN RUMANIA—GERMAN FINANCIAL PENETRATION—ALLIANCE WITH THE CENTRAL POWERS—THE RUMANIANS IN HUNGARY—MACEDONIA—THE BALKAN WARS—PEACE OF BUKAREST—DOMESTIC POLITICS—BRATIANU'S CAUTION—NEUTRALITY OR INTERVENTION—THE DIPLOMATIC STRUGGLE AT BUKAREST—THE SALE OF RUMANIAN CEREALS—AGREEMENT WITH THE ALLIES—THE FATEFUL COUNCIL—DECLARATION OF WAR ON AUSTRIA-HUNGARY—KING FERDINAND AND HIS PEOPLE—THE RUMANIAN ARMY—THE STRATEGICAL PROBLEM—INVASION OF TRANSYLVANIA.

FROM the outbreak of the war the attitude of Rumania engaged the attention of the belligerent Powers of Europe.

Recent events had made Rumania's political orientation very uncertain, and that uncertainty it was not in the interests of the Rumanian Government immediately to dispel. The Powers had from the first realized the importance of Rumania as an economic factor; as the war extended to the Balkans her strategical and military importance became still clearer. But for two years the Prime Minister, Bratianu, held his hand and earned for himself and his Government the name of "the Rumanian sphinx."

Yet to an observer of Rumania's geographical and historical position the factors which must determine her course of action were perfectly clear. To some extent indeed history and geography had been opposing factors in the determination of her policy. According to neither criterion was she mainly a Balkan State. As a land of corn and oil her business connections must be with the industrialised countries of Western Europe rather than with her more primitive southern neighbours. Her chief routes by rail and river led to Austria-Hungary and Germany. As

an outpost of Western Europe against the East—so Rumanians conceived of their position—as a Latin island in a Slav ocean, Rumania had been led to fortify herself against a Russian advance on Constantinople by the establishment of close economic and political relations with the Central Powers. The hold of German capital over her industries was reinforced by the dynastic tie represented since 1865 by her Hohenzollern ruler and the political understanding she had concluded in 1883 with the Triple Alliance.

Historically, Rumania's traditions pointed in exactly the opposite direction. With a mixed population, descended in part from the original Danubian and Illyrian peoples that still survive in the Albanian race, in part from Romans and Romanized Dalmatians whom Trajan and his successors settled there to guard half-conquered Dacia, in part from strata left by the various waves of migration—Celtic, Gothic, Slav and Tartar—that have surged along the road to Constantinople, Rumania evolved from this chaos of warring elements a distinct and interesting Græco-Latin civilization of her own. In religion she is Orthodox, in communion with the Phanar at Constantinople, Russia and



CAVALRY PATROL STARTING OUT TO RECONNOITRE.

the Balkan States. Her language, literature and customs show many traces of close relations with her Slav neighbours. During the eighteenth century and the earlier part of the nineteenth century the Rumanians looked to Russia for help in their struggle with the 'Turks and the 'Turks' nominee Princes, and they did not look in vain. However much Russian protection of the Danubian Principalities was actuated and impeded by ulterior motives, Russia played a great part in freeing them from Turkish control, and the Russian Governor, Count Kiselev, who re-organized the administration of Moldavia and Wallachia in the early '30's, laid the foundations of modern Rumania. A still stronger influence was that of France. Partly by descent, above all by language and tradition, the Rumanians can claim to be a Latin people. During the Middle Ages contact with the West was largely broken off, but the revival of French culture at the courts of the eighteenth century Phanariot princes aroused once more the latent Latinism of the people. The moral effect of the French Revolution may have had considerable effect on the national movement of the beginning of the

nineteenth century and culminated in the Revolution of 1848, the first triumph of the new Rumanian *intelligentsia*.

The succeeding decade witnessed the union of the two Principalities, and in this achievement France under Napoleon III. played an important part. During the reign of Prince Cuza (1859-1866) the interests—generally conflicting—of France and Russia remained preponderant. In the light of history it was an extraordinary act of trustfulness on the part of Napoleon when he urged that Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen should be called to succeed Cuza. The year 1866 marks the triumph of Prussia not only in Germany but in Rumania.

The following 17 years witnessed the success of this movement. Prince Charles was at first opposed and attacked, even by the Liberal leader Bratianu, who had played a great part in summoning him to the throne, over the measures he favoured for attracting German capital and German science to the country. During the war of 1870 Rumanian sympathies were strongly pro-French, but the defeat of France convinced even her warmest

sympathisers that they must look elsewhere for political support. Bismarck had originally advised the young Hohenzollern prince to maintain the friendliest relations with Russia, and for the first few years of his reign Prince Charles followed this policy, knowing well that only with Russian help could he achieve his dream of achieving full Rumanian independence of the Sultan. The opportunity came in 1877, and the Prince, after some keen negotiation, threw himself with enthusiasm into the war on Russia's side. The Rumanian Army, thanks to the care he had given it, proved its worth in and after the taking of Plevna, and was largely instrumental in securing complete victory. The result was Rumanian independence, signalized three years later by the proclamation of Prince Charles




M. NICHOLAS MISU,
Rumanian Minister in London.

as King. But the war none the less left bitter memories behind it; for Russia, while handing over to Rumania the bulk of the Turkish province of Dobrudja, demanded the return to her of the three departments of Bessarabia which the Powers had won back for Moldavia after the Crimean War. The "theft" of Bessarabia, as Rumanians unrestrainedly called it, fixed a deep gulf between Russia and Rumania and prepared Rumanian feeling for a new step for which King Charles had been patiently educating it.

German influences had already followed in the wake of the Hohenzollern Prince. Nor indeed had Prince Charles any alternative. There was little to be hoped from France in the

early '70's. Russia had been tried and found wanting. England was remote and indifferent. Germany, on the other hand, was not only his native country but in his eyes and the world's the "coming" country. The vigour and talent which their newly-founded Empire inspired in the German people overflowed into other countries. Prince Charles brought German instructors to remodel his army, German contractors and engineers to build the indispensable railways, German capital to finance Rumanian industries and give solidity to Rumanian banks. At first unpopular for this reason, the Prince subsequently earned the gratitude and approval of his subjects for what he did for the development of the country. The Germans did much for Rumania. Situated as Rumania was between Austria-Hungary and Russia—the devil and the deep sea—she looked to Germany as the only possible friend. Germany alone could control Austria-Hungary and thwart Russian policy towards Rumania. The bond became gradually closer. What had been the favourite scheme of the King became the reasoned view of the leading statesmen of Rumania. In 1883 the rapprochement was converted into an alliance.

Such an alliance was in fact as inevitable for



(Elliott & Fry.)
SIR GEORGE BARCLAY,
British Minister at Bukarest.

Rumania as Italy's adhesion to the Austro-German Alliance in the previous year was to the sister nation. Their positions were very similar. Just as Italy had parted with France over Tunis, so Rumania had parted with Russia over Bessarabia. The "honest broker" in both cases was Bismarek. But there was a still stronger parallel between Italy and Rumania. As Count Nigra once said to Prince Bülow, Italy and Austria must be either allies or foes. Rumania was in a similar position. In Transylvania, which Hungary had finally deprived of its autonomy in 1867, some 60 per cent. of the population is Ruman. Rumania would have fought Hungary in 1866 had she dared, and subsequently the ill-treatment of the Hungarian Rumanians deepened the feeling in Rumania on the question. Even in 1869 Bismarek had worked for a rapprochement between the two countries, a rapprochement seriously impeded by the Transylvanian question. It took him 14 years to secure it, but in 1883 it became an accomplished though not an admitted fact, for with King Charles's approval the Prime Minister, Bratianu, met Count Kalnoky at Vienna and Bismarek at Gastein, and thenceforth Rumania's adhesion to the Triple Alliance became a postulate of European diplomacy. That there was never a public announcement of it may have been due to a desire not to irritate the Russian Government and popular Rumanian sentiment. While Bratianu had the support not only of his own compact National Liberal party but also of the "Young Conservatives," among whom P. Carp (then Minister in Vienna) and T. Maiorescu worked hard for the conclusion of the alliance, there was considerable dislike of it among politicians of the extreme Right and Left—Russophil boyars and Francophil Radicals—and feeling in the country was at the moment intensely Hungarophobe. For whatever reason, the treaty remained an agreement of ministers, unratified by Parliament.

The following 30 years constantly strengthened the Austro-German hegemony in Rumania. Already in 1875 a commercial treaty had been concluded with Austria-Hungary by the Lascar Catargi Government according the Dual Monarchy most favourable terms. During the following decade the value of Austro-Hungarian goods imported was trebled, and in 1882 constituted 50 per cent. of Rumania's total imports. But behind Austria-Hungary

stood a far more dangerous friend. It was only in the late '80's that Prince Bismarek set forth on his campaign for the commercial conquest of Italy. It was almost at the same time that German trade and finance began the methodical conquest of Rumania. Taking advantage of a temporary trade-war between Rumania and Austria-Hungary, Germany embarked in 1886 on a struggle for the Rumanian market. By 1889 she had secured first place in spite of French and British efforts, and her share of Rumania's total annual imports rose from 29 per cent. in that year to 40·33 per cent. in 1913. Into the second place stepped Austria-Hungary, and, after the resumption of friendly relations in 1891, maintained an average share of Rumania's total imports amounting to about 25 per cent.


The victory of German trade in Rumania was due in part to the lack of organization of other competing countries, but above all to the methods employed. Here, as elsewhere, the close interconnection of trade with scientific research stood the Germans in good stead. Their practice of turning out vast quantities of cheap and attractive, if "shoddy," goods enabled them to flood the Rumanian market. But, above all, their success was due to the system of long credits allowed by German export firms to Rumanian traders. Where English, French and Italian firms were unwilling to grant more than three to six months' grace, German houses willingly allowed twelve to fifteen, asking no payment for the goods supplied till the retailers had actually disposed of them and made their profits. The industry of Germans in learning foreign languages and in studying foreign tastes was reinforced by the fact that German was already the chief commercial language of Rumania owing to the presence and activity of Jewish merchants in the towns.

The Germans could not, however, have taken the risks through which they won their victory without the help of the banks. Here, as elsewhere, the German banks, especially the Deutsche Bank and the Diskonto-Gesellschaft, were the mainstays of German foreign policy. Their representatives and commercial agents supplemented the reports of the many consuls and vice-consuls of the Central Powers. The Diskonto-Gesellschaft first and foremost occupied itself with the loans raised by the Rumanian Government on the Berlin market. After 1866—the year of Prince Charles's



KING FERDINAND OF RUMANIA.

His Majesty succeeded to the throne on the death of his uncle, King Charles, on October 10, 1914.
He married on January 10, 1893, Princess Marie, eldest daughter of the Duke of Edinburgh,
son of Queen Victoria.



ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS

accession—practically all the Rumanian loans were effected in Berlin. In 1907 the German Consul-General calculated that Rumania's public debt amounted to 1,430,000,000 lei (£57,200,000): in 1912 it was estimated at £63,040,000. Of the former sum about £30,776,880 was owing to Germany, France being second creditor to the extent of some £18,500,000. In other words, Rumania was paying yearly in interest to Germany about £2,000,000, which a Rumanian writer indignantly calls a "new form of tribute, a sort of servitude." *

But State loans were but a small part of Rumania's obligations to Germany. It was in the long run on German banks, which backed German trade, that Rumania depended for 40 per cent. of her imports, and these she was forced to pay for in cash, since Germany only took in exchange 6·62 per cent. of her exports, which went mainly to Belgium, Great Britain and Italy. But German finance played a far more direct part in Rumania. It had

secured a control over Rumanian industry and finance which, while stimulating and solidifying, might at will be converted into a stranglehold. German enterprise played a great part in the development of modern Rumania. The first Rumanian railways were constructed under a contract by the Prussian Jew Strausberg—whose claims Bismarck unfortunately pushed—and afterwards taken over by the Rumanian Government. During the late '90's the Germans waged a successful war for the control of the petroleum industry with the American Standard Oil Company. In 1903 *Steaua Romana* ("the Rumanian Star") fell into the hands of the *Diskonto-Gesellschaft*, which put it under the direction of the *Deutsche Petroleum-Aktien-Gesellschaft*, of Berlin. The shares in this company were mainly in the hands of the chief German banks, headed as usual by the *Deutsche Bank*. Between 1905 and 1914 some dozen other companies for the production of petroleum were formed with German capital, and by 1914 Germany claimed 37 per cent. of the capital invested in Rumanian oil (this is exclusive of Rumanian companies mainly

* Dr. Marcel Bibiri-Sturia in his recent "*Germania in România*" (1916), which gives a very full account of German enterprise in Rumania.

backed by German finance), Great Britain coming next with 30 per cent. The same thing is true of the electrical industry, of sugar, beer, paper, cloth, cotton and cement manufacture, and of the exploitation of woods and forests. On every side there was evidence of German enterprise and of its success.

Most important of all, Rumanian banking was brought into close touch with Germany. Up till 1895 the chief banks in Rumania, apart from the National Bank, had been French. After 1865 there had also been an English bank of Rumania, originally formed as a Rumanian company. In 1895 the Deutsche Gesellschaft and S. Bleichröder, of Berlin, founded the "Banca Generala Româna," which became now one of the leading banks of Rumania. In 1904 followed the "Banca de Credit Român." in 1905 the Marmorosch Blank & Co.'s Bank, in 1907 the "Banca Commerciala Româna"—all of them in the main backed by and to a large extent founded with German capital. The smaller provincial banks were equally under the control of German, Austrian and Hungarian finance, and

Austrian capital again was the foundation of the three great insurance societies, Dacia-România, Nazionale and Generala. Instances of this might be multiplied indefinitely, but enough has been said to show that Germany had secured the control, if not of Rumanian hearts, at least of Rumanian purses.

Politically, Rumania came more and more into line with the general policy of the Triple Alliance. By 1910 Rumania and Turkey were almost considered as constituting with Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy a Quintuple Alliance, the members of which were united by common hostilities and at least mutual economic advantages. Economic and political relations with Germany, strengthened by distrust of and resentment against Russia and Bulgaria, had proved more forceful than the natural sentiments of affection which attracted Rumania to France. Rumanian interests would in fact have become wholly identified with those of the Central European *bloc* but for the fact that between them loomed the question of Rumania irredenta.

Allusion has already been made to the unjustifiable incorporation of Transylvania in



RUMANIA'S ARTILLERY—HOWITZERS.

Hungary in 1867, when Francis Joseph, as one of the many concessions made to establish the Austro-Hungarian *Ausgleich*, threw Transylvania as a sop to the Magyars. It is true that by the Nationalities Law of 1868 the Hungarian Government promised scrupulous respect of its Rumanian subjects' language, nationality and religion. But this promise, like so many others, was only made to be broken. It was followed by the Electoral Law of 1874, which gerrymandered the constituencies in such a way as to deny the Rumanian population any adequate representation in the Hungarian Parliament. Under the narrow nationalistic *régime* of Koloman Tisza laws aiming at the Magyarization of Rumanian schools were passed in 1879, 1883 and 1891. Similar methods were resorted to in order to make the Rumanian Orthodox and Uniate clergy a means of Magyarizing the province. While in 1863 58 per cent. of the schools were non-Magyar, in 1892 the percentage had fallen to 14—*i.e.*, 2,386 out of the 16,917, instead of 6,458 out of 13,798. The administration of the country was almost entirely in Magyar hands. The Magyar authorities ruthlessly controlled the elections, effectually silencing the voice of the Rumanian population. Whereas on the basis of population the Rumanians of Hungary should possess about 69 representatives out of 413, these were never allowed to exceed 14 (in the year 1906), and through the scandalous elections of 1910 were reduced to five!

The Rumans of Hungary resisted resolutely this policy which aimed at denationalising them. In 1881, as a result of a great national convention at Hermannstadt, a Rumanian National Party was formed whose programme embraced the preservation of the Rumanian language, schools and Church, the appointment of Rumanian-speaking officials and the restoration of Transylvanian autonomy under the Hungarian Crown. Permission was refused by the Hungarian Crown to a petition that these demands should be laid before the Emperor-King and every form of persecution was applied to the nationalist leaders. Since 1892 the struggle had become still more acute, the Magyar oligarchy refusing all concessions. The *régime* of reaction culminated in Apponyi's school law of 1907 and the election scandals of 1910.*

The Rumans of Hungary were thus forced

* Vividly described in R. W. Seton-Watson's "Corruption and Reform in Hungary."

to look beyond the Carpathians to their "free" brothers. In 1891 there was founded in Bukarest the Liga Culturala, a society whose object was the protection of the interests of the whole Rumanian race. In press and Parliament attention was constantly directed to the condition of Rumania's "unredeemed" brothers. The problem was a big one. In Hungary itself—according to 1910 Magyar official statistics—lived 2,949,032 Rumans, of whom half were to be found in the province of Transylvania and the remainder in the eastern part of the Banat of Temesvár, and in the counties of Máramaros, Szatmár, Bihar, Szilágy, Arad,* etc. Another 275,115 Rumans lived under the Austrian Government, chiefly in Bukovina, where they formed more than one-third of the population. On the other hand, the larger part—nearly two-thirds—of the population of Bessarabia, annexed by Russia in 1812, was Rumanian, and the claim of these Bessarabian Rumans served to distract Rumania's attention from the question of Transylvania. Further there were people of Rumanian stock in N.E. Serbia and in Macedonia, and though their incorporation in Rumania was out of the question, their fate keenly interested the country.

It was, indeed, over the question of Macedonia alone that Rumania played much part in Balkan politics during the early years of the twentieth century. The condition of the Vlachs of Macedonia was a grievance which she found Turkey more willing to sympathise with (for political reasons) than Greece or Bulgaria. Accordingly Rumania held aloof from the first Balkan war. Fears were even expressed lest she should join Turkey, but she avoided any such false step. While she had no territorial irredenta to secure by participation in the war, she was necessarily interested in maintaining the Balkan equilibrium, and she warned the belligerents to this effect soon after the outbreak of hostilities. Bulgaria's action in attacking her allies on June 29, 1913, could not, therefore, leave Rumania indifferent. Already, in anticipation of such a catastrophe, Serbia and Greece had made provisional arrangements with Rumania. The latter had to consider the

* Rumanians claim—and a recent brochure by C. S. Hasnas, called "Condițiunile Vieții Culturale a Românilor din afara de Regat" (Conditions of the Cultural Life of the Rumanians out of the Kingdom) gives very good reason for the claim—that in fact there are at least 3,935,120 Rumans in Hungary and probably well over 4,000,000.



RUMANIAN CAVALRY AND INFANTRY AT MACHINE GUN PRACTICE.

attitude of Russia and Austria-Hungary before anything else. Bulgaria's action in anticipating the arbitration of Russia and treacherously attacking Serbia had roused the wrath of the Russian Government, and in reliance on assurances from the latter that her intervention would not be looked on unfavourably, Rumania, on July 10, declared war and invaded Bulgaria. Austria-Hungary, having obstinately believed in Bulgarian success, found her Rumanian ally in the field against her favourite protégé. Powerless to prevent, the Central Powers were obliged to condone Rumania's action, but it was clear to the world that another rent had been made in the Triple Alliance similar to that involved by Italy's war on Turkey two years before.

Rumania's part in the operations of the second Balkan war was bloodless but decisive. She emerged from it unscathed and with heightened prestige and it was to her capital that the delegates of the Balkan States came to arrange the terms of peace. By this peace, signed on August 10, 1913, Rumania obtained an increased share of Dobrudja, including the city of Silistra, which she had vainly demanded in 1878, and sufficient territory to interpose between the Bulgarian frontier and the important railway Bukarest-Cerna-Voda-Constantza. Subsequent events proved her wisdom.

But it was neither territorial gain nor increased prestige in the Balkans that was to prove the most important result for Rumania from the war. The prime fact was that Rumania had broken with the policy of close association with the Central Powers that had been her guiding principle since 1883.

King Charles, in order to smooth over the difficulties which had shown themselves, diplomatically telegraphed to the German Emperor:

"After heavy difficulties have been overcome, the conclusion of peace is assured, and, thanks to you, it remains a final peace. With all my heart I thank you for your loyal friendship and good-will."

With characteristic slowness the German Emperor hastened to congratulate Rumania on her recent policy:

"Your telegram which arrived to-night gives me real and great joy. I offer you my most sincere and hearty congratulations on the splendid result, for which not only your own people, but all of the belligerent States and the

whole of Europe, have to thank your wise and trusty statesmanlike policy. At the same time your mentioning that I have been able to contribute to what has been achieved is a great satisfaction to me. I rejoice at our mutual co-operation in the cause of peace."

To this King Charles replied:

"The kind words in your extremely cordial telegram fill me with pride and sincere gratitude. Once again accept my warmest thanks for your warm interest and your effective share in recent events so significant for my country."

Exactly a year elapsed between the signature of the Treaty of Bukarest and the famous Crown Council of August 5, 1914. That year was marked in Rumanian foreign policy by negotiations with and overtures to each of the great European groups in turn. As regards Balkan policy Rumania was equally diplomatic. Whilst it was generally considered that the alliance with Greece and Serbia had ripened into a permanent *entente*, the Rumanian Government was careful to maintain the friendliest relations with Germany and even to consider the possibility of a Tureco-Bulgaro-Rumanian alliance. Renewed overtures to Austria-Hungary over the Transylvanian question were, however, able to procure nothing except vague promises of concessions from Count Tisza which the Rumanian National Party pronounced quite inadequate. The fall of Maiorescu's Conservative Coalition Cabinet on January 13, 1914, was in part attributed to its failure to secure any concessions from the Hungarian Government. The Bratianu Ministry which succeeded him felt free to determine Rumania's orientation on opportunist lines and to make Rumania's support a legitimate object of barter. Crown Prince Ferdinand went off to visit the Tsar at Tsarskoe Selo early in the year, but was careful to go on to Berlin and reaffirm Rumania's friendship with Germany. His eldest son, Prince Charles, was at the time an officer in the Prussian Guards.

Hungarian intransigence, however, increased the difficulties between Rumania and the Central Powers which advocates of an understanding with Russia were not slow to take advantage of. On June 14 the Tsar visited King Charles at Constantza. Matrimonial alliances were in the air, an engagement between Prince Charles, eldest son of the Crown Prince, and the Grand Duchess Tatiana being widely talked of. During July, Rumanian relations with Austria-Hungary and with



RUMANIAN INFANTRY ON THE FRONTIER.

Bulgaria grew steadily worse. Such was the atmosphere on which the storm-cloud of war burst on July 28.

Before dealing with Rumania's attitude to the new situation that had arisen it is well to consider internal political conditions. Rumanian politics during the nineteenth century were based on two great party traditions. For centuries the real rulers of the country had been the great landed proprietors, the *boieri* or boyars, over whom the Princes of Wallachia and Moldavia held at times a precarious sway. These great families owned practically all the land and disposed at will of the services of the uneducated peasants who cultivated their lands as villeins. The boyars were partly of native, partly of Phanariot (Constantinopolitan Greek) descent. From among them (there are some 65 in Wallachia and over 300 in Moldavia) had been chosen the hospodars who ruled the two principalities as tributaries of the Sultan. The treaty of Adrianople imposed by Russia on Turkey in 1829 changed the term of office from seven years to a life tenure, and thereby the first step was taken towards the emancipation of the ruler from the power of the boyars. The *réglement organique*, the constitution drawn up by the Russian Governor-General, Count

Kiselev, for the two principalities in 1831 recognized, however, the old rights and immunities of the boyars. It was not till 1848 that the first step was taken in the direction of democratic control. The revolution of that year, led by C. A. Rosetti and the brothers Bratianu, was inspired by contemporary movements in France and Germany. The country was not yet ripe for the radical changes the provisional government proposed. The movement was abruptly terminated by Russian and Turkish intervention, and the constitution of 1849 practically restored the boyars to power, where they remained till the accession of Prince Alexander Cuza, first ruler of the united principalities. Chosen by the unanimous support of all the progressive parties in Rumania, Cuza eventually turned all against him. Himself a benevolent despot who introduced sweeping reforms by arbitrary methods, he aroused the distrust of Conservatives by his introduction of nominally universal suffrage and the distribution of land to the peasants, while he failed to gain the favour of the Radicals, who disliked his methods. Popular amongst the people, Cuza fell a victim to a coalition of opposing parties. The Constituent Assembly that ratified the choice of his successor voted the constitution which, with modifications introduced in 1879



CROWN PRINCE OF RUMANIA.

Prince Charles, born October 1893.

and 1884, remained that of Rumania at the time of the Great War.

When Prince Charles arrived in Rumania he found only two parties—Conservatives and Liberals, generally called “Whites” and “Reds.” It was from a combination of the two that his first cabinet was made up. During the first four years of his reign there were six or seven changes of ministry. The two great parties had split into various groups which alternately supported and opposed each other. Out of this chaos emerged clearly defined parties. Thus, among the Liberals, Bratianu and C. A. Rosetti stood forth as the unrestrained supporters of extreme democracy and even Republicanism. Another less progressive group, mainly Moldavians, constituted themselves into a “Liberal and Independent Fraction,” and with them may be mentioned the great Moldavian Kogalniceanu. Further, there were a great number of politicians of rather undetermined Liberal or Conservative leanings. There were the thorough Conservatives who came to look on Lascaur Catargi as their leader. And finally, from 1868 on, a new party, the “Young Conservatives” or “Junimists” began to make their influence felt, led by N. Gane, P. Carp, T. Maiorescu and Th. Rosetti. With

this group A. Marghiloman was afterwards associated. The year 1876 marks the coalition of various groups to form the National Liberal party, of which Bratianu, abandoning his revolutionary radicalism, took the leadership. During a premiership of twelve years (1876–1888) he welded this party into the strongest in the country. A resolute foreign policy which did not hesitate to choose war on Russia's side in 1877 and an alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1883 marked this régime. In home affairs Bratianu relied on thorough, if sometimes unscrupulous, organization of the administration and the control of the chief industries of the country by the Government and its nominees. As against this the Conservatives fought for individual liberty and for the maintenance of the existing régime. The Junimists, who supported Bratianu's alliance with the Central Powers, were on the whole his most formidable opponents, for they combined efficiency and honesty in their administrative policy with sound if not sensational democratic principles. Their amalgamation in 1891 with Catargi's Conservatives restored that party to a vigorous and progressive policy. Between 1891 and 1910 Conservatives and Liberals succeeded one another several times in office. In the last-mentioned year the leadership of the Liberal Party passed from Dimitrie Sturdza to I. C. Bratianu, son of the great statesman who had died in 1891. In the same year there was the periodic eruption in the Conservative party, this time led by the brilliant politician and diplomatist Take Ionescu, who successively disappointed with “Liberalism” and “Conservatism” revived, in different circumstances, the old idea of the Junimists of Tory Democracy. Ionescu's “Conservative Democrat” party burst on the political world as an inconvenient troubler of the peace. King Charles, who, during his 44 years' reign, had learned to work with and manage the two great parties to the greater glory of his foreign policy, was irritated by the appearance of a new party with radically distinct aims. However, in 1912, he was obliged to accept the new leader as a member of the Conservative coalition cabinet, which included the two Junimists Maiorescu (as Premier) and Marghiloman. It was this cabinet which carried out the war with Bulgaria of 1913. In January, 1914, it was overthrown and the King called Bratianu to power. Bratianu found himself with large majorities in both Houses. In the Senate the Liberals numbered



THE QUEEN OF RUMANIA.

Barnett.

115—3

80, Conservatives 22, Conservative-Democrats 12, Independents 2. In the Chamber the Liberals had 138, the Conservatives 22, Conservative-Democrats 18, Nationalists 2, Independents 3.

This was the Parliamentary situation on the outbreak of the European war. The Central Powers did not delay sounding the Rumanian King and Government as to Rumanian intervention in accordance with the treaty of 1883. The King and Government on this point were in disagreement. The King, whose policy for 48 years had been close political and economic association with the Germanic Powers, and who might justly claim that that policy had borne fruit in the material progress of Rumania, urged intervention on the German side. The extent and value of British action was doubtful, and a victory of the Alliance led by Prussia seemed a sure prospect to the Hohenzollern King. Moreover, he believed that by Russia's defeat Rumania could recover Bessarabia and check for ever Russian ambitions on Constantinople. Rumania by her services to the Central Powers would be morally and materially in a stronger position to secure from Hungary, with Germany's help, better conditions, perhaps even full autonomy, for Transylvania. In any case Rumania's closest interests were bound up with the Powers that had for 30 years been her providers and bankers. Finally, Germany stood before him as the model of a strong, modern, scientifically organized State such as it was his ambition to see Rumania.

The Rumanian Government thought otherwise. Germany's full victory, in view of Italy's declaration of neutrality and Britain's declaration of war, was doubtful. There was little to be hoped for from Hungary, whose existence as at present constituted demanded the ruthless Magyarization of all the other nationalities. Austria-Hungary's ultimate survival was uncertain, whereas Russia must always be a Great Power. Intervention on either side was too risky to justify itself. Rumania was inadequately munitioned, and her frontier long and difficult to defend. It is clear that on this point the Bratianu Government was right. Had Rumania intervened on either side in August, 1914, her lot might have been a hard one.

For the moment only the fulfilment of the treaty was in question. The Government acknowledged its validity—it had been tacitly admitted, but never ratified, by Parliament—

but disputed its applicability. Like Italy, Rumania could not agree to the claim that the Germanic Powers were the attacked party; and like Italy, Rumania had not been previously advised of Austria-Hungary's intentions. For the King intervention was required by Rumania's honour, and, as explained above, by Rumania's interests. However, in view of the Government's difference of opinion it was difficult to convince the country of the fact. Recent events had heightened anti-Magyar and anti-Bulgar feeling amongst the majority of the people. By religion they were connected with Russia, by race and language they felt themselves Latins. Only certain and great material advantages could have outweighed these sentimental objections.

To test representative feeling the King called an extraordinary Crown Council as an advisory—of course not a legally responsible—body. To this Council, which met on August 5, were invited Cabinet Ministers, party leaders, ex-Prime Ministers and ex-Presidents of the two Houses of Parliament. Prominent among the Opposition leaders were the ex-Premiers Carp, Majorescu and Rosetti (all original Junimist leaders), the Conservative Democrat chief, Take Ionescu, and the Conservative leaders Marghiloman, I. Lahovary and N. Filipescu. Of these politicians the three first mentioned were by sympathy and tradition pro-German. The Junimist Party, since its foundation in 1874, had been in entire accord with the King's policy of close association with Germany, and could point to the material progress that association had brought about. Similar views, but held with less deep-rooted conviction, were those of the Conservative leader Marghiloman, himself by education a Junimist. As for the other politicians present, Lahovary and Filipescu represented the old Wallachian tradition of friendship with Russia, reinforced by strong Francophil sympathies. Take Ionescu alone appears to have been dominated by a sense of the real situation in Europe, a consciousness that in the great issues at stake in this war Rumanian ideals and interests alike were bound up with the defeat of the Germanic Powers.

When the question was put, Carp alone definitely urged intervention on the side of the Central Powers. He set forth Rumania's historic fears of Russia and her economic associations with Central Europe. The other three Germanophiles' position is more obscure, but they

apparently considered immediate intervention too dangerous and favoured "expectant neutrality," to be followed by intervention when Germany's victory, in which they certainly believed, had been brought nearer. All their colleagues of both parties were, however, against them. To the King's great disappointment the Council by a large majority decided against intervention, and in favour of a declaration of Rumania's neutrality.

The King made a last appeal to his Army, but there, too, a huge majority of officers pronounced themselves definitely against the intervention he favoured. The decision was a shock

The lure of Transylvania attracted even the cautious Bratianu, and he therefore hastened to secure first reversion of that province.

Meanwhile the Germanophiles had not wasted their time. German propagandist agencies established themselves throughout the country. At Bukarest a "Rumano-German bureau of commercial information" was set up and afterwards expanded into the "Rumano-German agency of information." This agency issued daily gratis a very complete budget of "telegraphic news" containing the usual sensational lies. In addition it circulated hundreds of thousands of brochures and leaflets glorifying



RUMANIAN RED CROSS WITH DISINFECTANT APPARATUS.

to him and at his age—seventy-six—may have hastened his death, which took place two months later, about the time of that of the Italian Foreign Secretary, the Marquis di San Giuliano.

Neutrality decided on, Bratianu wished to secure to his country at least some advantages from the decision. On or about October 15—as was afterwards revealed in the German Press—an understanding was arrived at with Russia by which Transylvania was promised to Rumania in return for her temporary or permanent (the point is disputed) neutrality. Lahovary, Filipescu and Ionescu had seen in the Russian victories Rumania's opportunity. Already on the fall of Lemberg (September 3) Filipescu declared that Rumania's "moment" had come.

the ideals and strength of the Central Powers and discrediting their opponents. In this work many Rumanians co-operated and many of them honestly believed that they were engaged in a patriotic campaign, on the ground that Rumania's future ought to be associated with that of the Central Powers. The German propaganda went further. It did not confine itself merely to close collaboration with those party organs which by tradition or conviction were pro-German. The chief of these were *Tsara*, descendant of the original paper of Carp's Junimist party, and Marghiloman's papers *Steagul* ("The Standard"), *La Politique* and *Inainte* ("Forwards!"). Already on August 13, 1914, a new paper, *Ziua* ("The Day") began to appear in Rumanian as semi-official

Austro-German organ. An arrangement was made by which the old nationalist writer Slavici put his papers *Minerva* and *Seur*: ("The Evening") at the disposal of the German propaganda. On March 14, 1915, Carp issued a new paper, *Moldova*, which was to prove the most violent of all pro-German organs. On June 11 of the same year Marghiloman began a new paper, *Iushul*, in the Moldavian capital which served as a dumping ground for any such absurd anti-British tales as even German papers in Bukarest hesitated to publish. The number of provincial papers founded or subsidised by the German propaganda was legion. Against them the pro-Entente press fought a vigorous campaign. Filipescu's paper *Epoca*, Ionescu's *Actsiunea* and *La Roumanie*, and the independent *Adeverul*, *Dimineatsa* and *Journal des Balkans* headed the counter-attack, and the violence of their language was justified by the greatness of the provocation. The Government organs *Viitorul* ("The Future"), *L'Indépendance Roumanie* and *Mishcareea* ("The Movement") were necessarily discreet and impartially severe on violence of any sort. The chief paper of the country, *Universul*, showed at one time signs of submission to the German financial yoke which drove from it its editor Fermo to join an independent Liberal Interventionist paper, *Natsionalul*, founded in November, 1915, by the deputy Toma Stelian. *Universul*, however, saved itself from purchase by the Germans, and under the political directorship of General Crainicianu defended "expectant neutrality" and Ententophilism with dignity and success. From this it afterwards—in April, 1916—progressed to Interventionism and support of Ionescu's cause.

The Germanophil campaign was greatly assisted by the efforts of the German Minister at Bukarest. Many able German diplomatists had served a course of apprenticeship in the Rumanian capital. In recent times, Kiderlen-Wächter, Prince Bülow, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein had all represented Germany in Rumania. (Similarly Austria-Hungary had been represented by such diplomatists as Count Goluchowski and Count Aehrenthal.) In September, 1914, the German Minister was recalled and Baron von dem Bussche sent to succeed him. Baron von dem Bussehe had the reputation of belonging to the most ruthless Prussian school. He had intrigued abundantly in Washington as Councillor of Embassy, in Berlin as the Foreign Office official in charge of British and

American questions, and in Argentina in the years immediately before the Great War. For two years he, his Austrian colleague, Count Czernin, and the able and unscrupulous Bulgarian Minister, M. Radev,* kept up the Germanic cause in Bukarest with an industry which in their friends' eyes deserved success.

The Rumanian Government, however, was deaf to these sirens' songs. As the Russians swept through Galicia and Italian intervention appeared increasingly imminent, Rumanian eyes were naturally turned to the Carpathians. The new King's resolute words at his accession and the opening of Parliament at the end of November, 1914, showed that no diplomatic or dynastic shackles would in future be allowed to impede Rumania's freedom of action in pursuit of her national ideals. The Russian advance into Bukovina in January, 1915, brought the question to the front. Bratianu in supporting a new Army vote in Parliament spoke of the need of "active preparation for the decisive hour which will mark a historic date for the Rumanian people." On January 28 a British loan of £5,000,000 was announced. Reserves were called up and negotiations were rumoured to be proceeding, but the Russian retreat from Bukovina cut matters short for the moment.

But negotiations were in the air. Italy was negotiating with Austria and the failure of these negotiations infallibly meant her intervention. It was generally supposed in Rumania as elsewhere that Italy and Rumania were working closely together in their dealings with the Entente Powers. Enthusiasts for "Latin unity" held demonstrations in Rome and Bukarest, and it was generally expected that the two countries would intervene simultaneously. That they did not do so was widely attributed by Italians to Rumanian over-caution, by Rumanians to Italy's neglect to support Rumanian interests. In fact it was due to other causes. In the first place Russia and Rumania found it hard to reach an agreement over territorial concessions. If Transylvania had been recognized as hypothetically theirs in return for neutrality, what, Rumanians asked, was the extra inducement to them to intervene? Extreme claims to the whole of the Banat of Temesvár and Bukovina found no acceptance at

* The Ministers of the Entente were Sir George Barclay and M. Poklewski-Koziell (Russia)—who had both recently represented their countries at Teheran; Baron Fasciotti (Italy), and M. Blondel (France), who in the spring of 1916 was succeeded by the Comte de Saint-Aulaire.



TYPE OF RUMANIAN CAVALRYMAN.



ARTILLERY GOING INTO ACTION.

Petrograd as they impinged on the rights of Slav nationalities. In the second place, Rumania, inadequately supplied with munitions, could not enter the war unless the fall of the Dardanelles and the opening up of communications by that additional route were secured, while she needed a guarantee as to Bulgaria's behaviour. The naval attack on the Dardanelles failed definitely on March 18. The territorial questions discussed in the negotiations were still undecided. By the time these promised a favourable solution it was already too late, for the Russian retreat from the Dunajec had begun on April 28, three days after the Anglo-French landing in Gallipoli. Rumania was therefore in no position to intervene simultaneously with Italy on May 23.

During the early months of 1915 the Interventionists had naturally become more active. Speaking at a large meeting of the "League for the National Unity of the Rumans" at Braila on March 23, Filipescu declared that if Rumania did not take this opportunity of liberating Transylvania not only the future of Rumanism but the present position of Rumania would be endangered. A week later at Iashi Filipescu argued that the Bessarabian question was not comparable with the Transylvanian. The Conservative Party—always liable to periodic disruption—was in fact breaking up. Italian intervention brought the quarrel between the rival leaders, Marghiloman and Filipescu, to a head. Marghiloman was drifting to the German side, and on June 1 he was outvoted in the Executive Committee of the Party. He appealed to the general Party Congress, and claimed that he obtained a vote of confidence there by a majority of 100 members out of the 305 present. The Interventionists, however,

disputed these numbers, and in any case discounted the authority of the Congress, which was composed of ex-officials and not in touch with the mass of the electors. A split inevitably followed, and the pro-German and pro-Ententist groups of the party elected Marghiloman and Ioan Lahovary respectively as their leaders. A month later Lahovary died and Filipescu became chief of the Conservative—or, as his opponents called it, the Conservative-Dissident—Party.

The Russian retreat had, however, put Rumanian intervention on the Entente side out of the question. Bratianu had, indeed, forbidden the transit of munitions to Turkey, but he was forced to be most circumspect in his dealings with the Central European Powers, for the probability of the Dardanelles falling became daily more remote, there was no help in Russia, and on July 26 Bulgaria's convention with Turkey was made public by *The Times* Correspondent in the Balkan Peninsula. Rumanian agriculturalists urgently demanded markets for their grain, and at the beginning of June it was rumoured that the wheat crop had been bought up by Austria. The Government, indeed, careful for the internal needs of the country, had since the beginning of the war forbidden the export of cereals, but it was doubtful if it could continue to do so. There even seemed a danger of Bratianu being forced politically into the Austro-German camp. The German propaganda very actively worked for such a consummation. On June 9—presumably—under German pressure—Austria-Hungary is alleged [by *La Roumanie*, May 29/June 11, 1915, and *Iashul*, February 7/20, 1916] to have offered Rumania to cede her Bukovina and guarantee her "most satisfactory treatment" of the Ru-

mans of Transylvania in return for her intervention. Germany added her own guarantees and the additional lure of Bessarabia which Rumania with Austro-German assistance might hope to conquer from Russia. A week before Mackensen had entered Przemysl, and thirteen days later Böhm-Ermolli entered Lemberg. It was a unique moment for the Germanophil Interventionists. But Bratianu refused to be drawn. Possibly, with reason, he distrusted Habsburg promises about Bukovina and Magyar promises about Transylvania—to which recent Hungarian policy had already given the lie. Certainly he knew public opinion was against the Central Powers. To offend a great and growing empire like Russia would mean future anxieties and future retribution, whereas Austria-Hungary bore all the marks of senility and approaching decomposition. In any case he refused the bait.

The Germanophils continued their campaign undeterred. Marghiloman and his followers more and more espoused the cause for which Carp had always stood. The German propagandist press multiplied exceedingly and replenished the Rumanian public with news made in Germany. The Ententophils were therefore thrown more and more together.


Since the beginning of the war Filipescu and Take Ionescu had in fact been in agreement as to the necessity of ultimate intervention on the Entente side. They had been associated in the Cultural League, the League for National Unity, the "National Action" and other patriotic irredentist organizations. They found support in the numerous Transylvanians who had made their way across the frontier—priests like Father Vasile Lucaci, writers like the poet Octavian Goga, and numerous professors, clergymen, journalists and political thinkers who saw in the Magyar the hereditary and inevitable foe. These Interventionists carried on a lively campaign against the German propaganda and its press. They began with a great students' demonstration on September 1 in commemoration of the 314th anniversary of the death of Michael the Brave, the Wallachian prince who for the only time in history united under his sway—though but for a year or two—the whole Rumanian race. They next proceeded to organize a "Guard of the National Dignity" whose members patrolled the streets seizing and tearing up all the Germanophil papers sold or distributed in the streets. Meanwhile their papers, like *Adeverul*, foretold a Germano-Bulgarian invasion of Serbia and demanded



RUMANIAN RECRUITS TAKING THE OATH.



WAR DEMONSTRATION IN RUMANIA:



A SCENE IN BUKAREST, JULY, 1916.


that Rumania should, in agreement with Greece, come to Serbia's help.

Bratianu was, however, not in a position to do so. In spite of Venizelos's desire for intervention, the Rumanian Premier understood the difficulties he would meet with in King Constantine and the Greek General Staff. It was not clear if the Western Powers meant to give Serbia more than "diplomatic" help. The last hopes of taking the Dardanelles were past. Surrounded by German, Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian armies, with nowhere to look for munitions which she badly needed, Rumania was not in a position to intervene, though her sympathies with Serbia were strong. The Germans were redoubling their efforts at Bukarest and their press spoke almost daily of a Carp-Maiorescu-Marghiloman Government which should replace Bratianu if he did not give satisfaction.

On September 23 Bulgaria mobilised. On October 5 Venizelos was forced to resign. On October 9 the Germanic armies occupied Belgrade. Feeling was much excited in Bukarest. On September 26 a great Interventionist meeting took place at which Filipescu, Take

Ionescu and prominent Ententophil politicians and journalists participated. Filipescu declared that the Germans could only put 300,000 men against Serbia. Their invasion could certainly be repulsed if Rumania intervened. The Entente Powers should be asked to supply 150,000 men. The meeting passed a resolution condemning German propagandist methods and calling on the Government "to order the mobilization of all our military forces." As a result of the meeting the various Interventionist societies decided to combine in a great national association to be called the "Unionist Federation." Filipescu was nominated leader and a manifesto was addressed to the nation stating the programme of the Federation to be the realization of a Great Rumania.

Both groups of the belligerents had in the meantime sounded Bratianu. The Entente Powers hoped that the threat of Rumanian intervention might stop Bulgaria and save Serbia from the fate which threatened her. The Central Powers were anxious to secure themselves against an attack by Rumania on the left flank of their advance. The reasons why Bratianu was unable to accede to the Entente's



RELIEVING THE GUARD.





THE ROYAL PALACE FACING THE AUSTRIAN FRONTIER.

overtures have already been stated. Rumania ran the risk of complete strategical isolation; her supply of munitions was inadequate. Only, therefore, the certainty of a speedy opening of the Dardanelles could warrant a decision to intervene. Bratianu informed the Entente Powers that unless they could send 400,000 men to Salonika Rumanian intervention was out of the question. Such a demand was unrealisable, and Bratianu had therefore nothing for it but to inform the Central Powers that Rumania proposed to remain neutral. According to the Berlin *Lokal-Anzeiger* (October 4) this assurance was given to Bulgaria on September 20. Rumania was, in fact, in a critical situation. If the Austro-Germans had, as many of their military advisers demanded, followed up their conquest of Serbia by a great invasion of Rumania, the latter must ultimately have succumbed. Fortunately the diplomacy of Bratianu averted the danger. The Central Powers in consequence of the British blockade and the poor harvest of 1915 badly needed cereals. On October 30 Bratianu thought fit to placate the Austro-German threats and the

restiveness of the agriculturists by a promise to allow once more the export of grain which had been forbidden since August, 1914. The Government announced the appointment of a new Central Grain Export Commission through which, *but through which alone*, the resumption of commercial relations with the Central Powers was authorized. While this did not wholly please the Germanophil agrarians, who would have preferred unrestricted permission of export, it held out hopes of arrangements to the Central Powers. In fact some six weeks later it was announced that the Austro-German Grain Import Association had purchased 50,000 wagon-loads of grain. The price demanded—£6,450,000 and an export duty of 18 per cent. (to be paid in gold)—called forth an angry protest from the *Cologne Gazette* (December 28), but there was no help for it. The Germans were forced to pay heavily for the grain they needed.

Bratianu's cautious policy, however justified by circumstances, did not in the least content the Ententophil Interventionists. Their press protested vigorously against the "desertion"



RUMANIAN CAVALRY.

of Serbia and demanded immediate intervention and permission for Russian troops to pass through Rumania and attack the Bulgars. The Bukarest correspondent of the *Corriere della Sera* (October 31) declared that at a council of war two-thirds of the generals present were in favour of intervention. Ten days before General Crainicianu had declared in *Universul* that "the strategic situation will be admirable, ideal." Another great interventionist meeting was held on October 25 by the Unionist Federation and its supporters. A demonstration took place afterwards. The soldiers intervened, and there were some casualties. Bratianu was in no mood for adventures, and on October 31 his policy was enthusiastically endorsed at a National Liberal party meeting, though a few members like Stelian and Moldoveanu had already gone over to the Interventionists. On November 4 the professors joined in the controversy with a manifesto signed by 53 of them in favour of immediate intervention, and on November 24 the Unionist Federation reiterated its demand.

On November 29 Parliament met after an adjournment which had lasted a year. The Interventionists at once began to interpellate the Government as to Rumania's military unpreparedness, the German propaganda, and relations with foreign Powers. A fierce debate on foreign policy continued for practically a fortnight. The case for joining the Central Powers was stated fully by the Russophobe die-hards, Carp and Stere. The Government's policy of armed expectancy was warmly defended by moderate interventionists like Professor Iorga. Finally, following on many impassioned speeches, Take Ionescu wound up with an oratorical masterpiece, in which he developed the international meaning of the war and insisted on the urgent need for Rumania to intervene and win the union of the whole Rumanian race. The Government thus gave every opportunity for discussing foreign policy, but refused to prophesy. A cautious statement from Bratianu concluded the debate, and both Houses passed a vote of confidence by large majorities. Parliament then adjourned for five weeks.

Before it reassembled two important arrangements had been made. In the first place the acute political crisis, which was developing, was averted. The Transylvanian leaders, Father Lucaci and Octavian Goga, had stood as candidates for two vacant seats in the Chamber. On

January 17 the first ballot took place, and Father Lucaci appeared first and Goga second on their respective lists. A new ballot was required, but before it was taken it was announced that the Federation had withdrawn its two candidates, leaving the two seats to the Government's nominees. It was clear that an arrangement had been arrived at with the Government, and the Independent press claimed to know the substance of interviews of Entente Ministers with the Government and the Interventionist leaders on January 17 and 18. The Marghilomanist press proceeded to a systematic campaign of abuse of Bratianu for his "truce" with the Federationists. Henceforth the Germanophiles were never in doubt that Bratianu had definitely thrown in his lot with the Entente Powers and that it was assurances to that effect which had induced the Interventionists to abandon for the time being their anti-Governmental campaign.

The other cause for the Germanophiles' anger with Bratianu was the sale—announced on January 12—to a British syndicate of 80,000 wagon-loads of cereals. The Marghilomanist press violently criticized this deal as being of a purely political character and connected with official financial relations with the British Government. The Government press maintained that it was a purely commercial transaction, but neither the Germanophile nor the Federationist press accepted this point of view. Emphasis was laid on a second loan placed in London about this time.

Bratianu was prudent enough to allow the conclusion of another grain deal with the Austro-Germans shortly afterwards. This purchase comprised 140,000 wagons of cereals. A large part of these was exported, but the completion of the contract was interrupted by Rumania's subsequent declaration of war. A further attempt of the Central Powers to corner the flour supplies of the country in order to provision Turkey was, however, countered by energetic action on the part of the British Bureau which, through the banker Chrissoveloni, bought up on April 29 the whole of the 40 per cent. of the flour output available for export. The importance of these two British purchases in circumventing German plans and in conciliating agrarian feeling is obvious.

Meanwhile on April 16 the Parliamentary session closed. The last months had been devoted mainly to the question of the Budget, to authorisation of an internal loan—which

ultimately reached £16,000,000—to the investigation of smuggling scandals and to the passing of necessary military measures.

The Interventionists had confined themselves since the "truce" to criticisms of the Government's internal policy and had dropped their interpellations on foreign affairs. But the prorogation of Parliament was followed by a renewal of the Interventionist campaign. Already on May 13 a "fusion" of Ionescu's Conservative Democrat and Filipescu's Conservative Party was rumoured in the Government press. The imprudent language of Count Czernin, who threatened Ionescu with the withdrawal of his Austro-Hungarian decorations, precipitated matters. Ionescu hastened to send back the insignia of the Iron Crown and the Red Eagle to the Austrian and German Ministers. His example was applauded and imitated. A huge banquet was given in honour of those who had done so and at this banquet all the prominent Interventionists were present. Ionescu himself spoke reaffirming the need for immediate intervention and a telegram was read out from Filipescu, who was unable through illness to be present, in which he spoke of the increasingly close association between himself and Ionescu during the last 22 months—an association which had now resulted in "the accomplished fact of a fusion between our two parties." The press of all parties showed the greatest interest in the event, the Interventionists greeting it with enthusiasm, the Marghilomanists with abuse, the Government papers with assumed amusement. The Marghilomanist *Iashul* wrote, for instance (June 6), "Filipescu's party has been swallowed up in the Takist quagmire," and *La Politique* told Filipescu that he was paying the penalty for his "desertion" of Marghiloman a year ago. The Governmental *Indépendance Roumaine* wrote, "Another fusion! How many does that make and how long will it last?" *Viitorul* sarcastically congratulated Ionescu on "getting the naïf Filipescu under his control."

The "fusion" was not easy to effect owing to disagreements on internal policy between Filipescu's and Ionescu's parties. But with tact and conciliatoriness real harmony was soon established. Take Ionescu took charge of the new party in Bukarest and a Filipescan, Greceanu, at Iashi. Military events soon supplied them with material for agitation. The beginning of the great Russian offensive on

June 4 opened up the question of intervention once more, especially as it was soon succeeded by the defeat of the Austrian invasion of Italy which on May 24 *Steagul* had held up to Rumanians as a warning of their own fate in case of intervention. The taking of Czernowitz on June 18 provided the first occasion for a public demonstration. Ionescu took the opportunity publicly to renounce his "truce" with the Government on foreign policy and to regain his complete freedom of action. He formulated the demand for a "national Government" and for immediate intervention. The demand was repeated at a second demonstration on June 26, when Ionescu explained that the national Government he demanded could not include Marghiloman. At a third meeting held on July 3 Greceanu called on the Government to resign. All these meetings were preparatory to a general demonstration on July 17 at which both Filipescu and Ionescu spoke. The former impatiently denounced Bratianu's policy as over-canny and materialistic. Further delay was intolerable.

"I do not pronounce," he said, "in favour of a National Government—that the country will exact when it needs it—but I do urgently demand what Republican France has obtained, national union. Men of all parties and men attached to no parties . . . let them all unite, even the Liberals, and form a Government which should have no other care than for the interests of the land. . . . We ought respectfully to address ourselves to the King and say to him, 'Sire, give us sacred union. Make an appeal to all the Rumanians and you will accomplish the greatest act and most beautiful deed possible for your Majesty.'" This appeal was seconded by Ionescu, who called on the King to prove himself "the best of Rumanians." The dynasty, he said, will only be strong "when it has its roots this side of the Carpathians. . . . Give us war and sacred unity, so that together we may make a Great Rumania; for in a *small* Rumania there is no room either for you or for us."

Meanwhile the Germanophiles had continued their campaign unabashed. The successes of the Entente Powers were systematically minimised in their press, which demonstrated daily the certainty of Germany's victory and the dazzling prospects of commercial association with "Central Europe." In the heat of press and party warfare the Marghilomanists' veneer of neutralism wore off and they became frank



RUMANIAN INFANTRY.

exponents of alliance with Germany. Their press daily disseminated the most grotesque lies about the British people and naturally seized on any delay or hesitation in supplying Rumania with goods she needed, to hold up British hostility to Rumania as self-evident. They exhibited in pleasing contrast with this alleged churlishness on Great Britain's part the lavish way in which the Germans were sending goods into the country. The "Carmen Sylva" trains loaded with instalments of £6,300,000 worth of goods which were due to Rumania in part exchange for her last corn sale began to arrive with great pomp and



M. ION C. BRATIANU,
Prime Minister.

circumstance. Austria-Hungary in emulation of these promised a series of "Mercury" trains. The two Central Powers began once again to think themselves in high favour in Bukarest. Even a section of the Entente Press illogically allowed itself to be misled into an entirely false conception of Rumania's real position

Meanwhile Bratianu maintained a discreet and diplomatic silence. He had never abandoned the hope of championing Rumania's national aspirations, but the difficulties in the way of immediate action had hitherto been

immense. As we have seen Rumania, was inadequately munitioned and strategically isolated. The first difficulty took time to surmount. The Bukarest correspondent of the *Berliner Tageblatt* (July 14) wrote that Bratianu had assured the Entente Ministers; who since June 29 had been putting the case for intervention very strongly before him, that "we march as soon as we have the munitions." It was no longer the case, as he alleged, that the Ministers replied, "We deliver the munitions as soon as Rumania marches." There had been previously much haggling over this point, but the real difficulty in the past was not so much this as the difficulty of providing Rumania in view of the demands which the other Entente armies were making for guns and shells. The difficulty, however, was ultimately solved, and M. Briand's Government contributed largely to this desirable result. On July 23 Lederer (the correspondent) wrote: "It is now an indisputable fact that the first train with munitions from Russia has entered the country." Henceforward Rumania could rely on the regular supply of munitions.

The strategical problem was two-fold. Rumania asked for support from the north and from the south. Bratianu was naturally anxious about the prospects of a war on two fronts. Eager, like every Rumanian, to begin the invasion of Transylvania, he considered it necessary first to provide for the safety of the southern front. Writing in *Adeverul* General Gardescu had demanded that 150,000 to 200,000 Russian troops should march through Dobrudja to attack Bulgaria. Once a promise of Russian support was assured, Bratianu asked further for such an offensive from Salonika as would at least contain the large Bulgarian forces required for that extended front. This demand had always been in the forefront of Rumania's conditions. The Premier's brother, Vintila Bratianu, is said to have remarked many months before (*Berliner Tageblatt*, January 17) that Rumania's whole attitude depended on whether or not the Entente Powers held and reinforced Salonika; if they evacuated it they would be "committing suicide." *Universul* (February 16) wrote that "an Anglo-French army of two to three hundred thousand men at Salonika, a number which ought to be largely increased, assures an intervention of Rumania on the side of the Entente." Again on March 14, in the same paper, General Crainicianu declared that the Entente Powers

could secure Rumanian support, not by victories on other fronts, but only by a successful advance in the Balkans. On April 14 and again on May 12, *Adeverul* insisted on the necessity for an Allied offensive from Salonika. On May 14 *La Roumanie* wrote that "the Rumanians only await a sign from Salonika to pass the Carpathians." The *Journal des Balkans* (July 11) and *Natsionalul* (July 19) made the same declaration. It required therefore an assurance of the Entente armies' support before Bratianu could fix any date for intervention: and, as the Paris Correspondent of *The Times* (August 30) pointed out, it was not till March 27 that the Entente was in a position to give any such assurance.

Two matters remained to be settled—the extent of Rumania's compensations and the extent of her military operations. The former question required delicate handling, as Russian and Serbian interests had also to be consulted and a fair arrangement arrived at as to the future of conquered territories so far as possible on the basis of nationality. The range of discussion as regards Austria-Hungary included Transylvania, the Banat of Temesvar, and the county of Máramaros. The future relations of Russia and Rumania also necessarily required negotiation.

In return for assured gains Rumania was, of course, to intervene. The question naturally suggested itself as to the extent of her action. The example of Italy seemed superficially an argument for a limited war against Austria-Hungary. The Rumanian Government favoured such a limited war, at least to start with. Rumania's territorial aspirations were confined to Austro-Hungarian territory. She had nothing to gain and much to lose from war with Bulgaria and Germany, especially with the latter, with whom, as we have seen, she had been in the closest economic relations. In the case of Bulgaria, Rumania's aims were purely defensive. There was every attraction to her in the prospect of being able to devote herself to the Transylvanian campaign, keeping up merely a watchful neutrality on the Danube. The Rumanian Government might naturally, then, wish to confine itself to a declaration of war on Austria-Hungary and had reasons for wishing to avoid unnecessary complications. As events proved this policy was impracticable. Germany declared war in order to encourage the flagging spirit of her allies and above all to devote herself to the defence

of her all-important connexion with Sofia and Constantinople. Bulgarian reluctance—real or feigned—was overcome after four days by the all-powerful German influences at Sofia. That such a situation would eventually be reached was foreseen by other Rumanians; papers like *La Roumanie* had always maintained that there could be no limited war and that Rumania must be wholeheartedly the friend of her friends and the enemy of their enemies.

Events moved quickly. It was afterwards announced in the Press that a convention between Rumania and the Entente Powers was



M. TAKE IONESCU,

Prominent Leader of the Rumanian Irredentists.

signed on August 17. According to *Natsionalul* (August 28) the final arrangement was reached on August 23. Apparently the German Government was not aware of it till this date. On August 15 General Sarrail attacked the Bulgarians, and this was followed by the Bulgarian invasion of Greece, which had at least the desired effect of withdrawing parts of their army farther from the Danube front. The Germanophiles had expected the convention to be signed on August 14, and the fact that this did not take place inspired papers like *Steagul* with the idea that after all Bratianu was think-

ing better of it. *Adeverul* (August 15), on the other hand, showed itself disappointed and uneasy. On August 25 Maiorescu, who had lately returned from Germany, was received by the King, and this fact may have suggested a revival of the old *canard* that King Ferdinand, in concert with the Germanic Powers, might seek to impose a Maiorescu-Carp-Marghiloman ministry on the country. It was with excited perplexity that the country received the news, published in a special edition of *Viitorul* (August 26) that "the agitation and unrest apparent in various quarters have made H.M. the King wish to hear in Council the opinions not only of his Government and the representatives of Parliament but also those of the party leaders, ex-Prime Ministers and ex-Presidents of the legislative bodies." A new Crown Council was called for 10 a.m. the following day at the Palace of Cotroceni. It was clear that the policy decided on on August 5, 1914, was once more to be discussed.

The Council was attended like the former by Cabinet Ministers; by the party leaders, A. Marghiloman, N. Filipescu and Take Ionescu; by the ex-Prime Ministers P. Carp, T. Maiorescu and Th. Rosetti, who had all been leading members of the "Junimist" Party and



RUSSIAN AND RUMANIAN SOLDIERS
In the Streets of a Rumanian Town.

had to the last kept up its tradition of pro-Germanism; and by past and present Presidents of the two Houses—M. Pherekyde (President of the Chamber), C. F. Robescu (Vice-President of the Senate acting for the absent President, V. Missir), C. Olanescu and A. Cantacuzino-Pasheanu. The King presided and hastened to acquaint the members of the Council with the fact that he had decided on immediate war with Austria-Hungary. It was reported that he concluded, "May Rumania conquer her enemies as I have conquered myself." The moment had come to liberate Transylvania. The decision whether or not to carry out the King's proposal rested with the Council, but there could be little doubt as to that decision. The King's proposal was naturally that agreed on with his Cabinet. Filipescu and Ionescu saw in sight the fulfilment of their desires. The ex-Presidents were favourable. Only the three ex-Prime Ministers remained staunch to the views of their youth. As for Marghiloman, he protested, but apparently did not vote against the proposal. The Council consequently decided on war, and a Note setting forth the reasons for the decision was at once formally conveyed to the Austro-Hungarian Minister, Count Czernin.

The Note ran as follows:

"The alliance concluded between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy had, according to the precise statements of the Governments themselves, only an essentially conservative and defensive character. Its principal object was to guarantee the Allied countries against any attack from outside and to consolidate the state of things created by previous treaties. It was with the desire to harmonize her policy with these pacific tendencies that Rumania joined that alliance. Devoted to the work of her internal constitution, and faithful to her firm resolution to remain in the region of the Lower Danube an element of order and equilibrium, Rumania has not ceased to contribute to the maintenance of peace in the Balkans. The last Balkan wars, by destroying the *status quo*, imposed upon her a new line of conduct. Her intervention gave peace and re-established the equilibrium. For herself she was satisfied with a rectification of frontier which gave her greater security against aggression, and which, at the same time, repaired the injustice committed to her detriment at the Congress of Berlin. But in the pursuit of this aim Rumania



M. NICHOLAS FILIPESCU,
A leader of the Rumanian
Irredentists.



M. E. PORUMBARU,
Minister for Foreign
Affairs.



M. ANTONESCU,
Minister of Justice.

was disappointed to observe that she did not meet from the Cabinet of Vienna the attitude that she was entitled to expect.

“When the present war broke out Rumania, like Italy, declined to associate herself with the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary, of which she had not been notified by the Cabinet of Vienna. In the spring of 1915 Italy declared war against Austria-Hungary. The Triple Alliance no longer existed. The reasons which determined the adherence of Rumania to this political system disappeared. At the same time, in place of a grouping of States seeking by common efforts to work in agreement in order to assure peace and the conservation of the situation *de facto* and *de jure* created by treaties, Rumania found herself in presence of Powers making war on each other for the sole purpose of transforming from top to bottom the old arrangements which had served as a basis for their treaty of alliance.


“These profound changes were for Rumania an evident proof that the object that she had pursued in joining the Triple Alliance could no longer be attained and that she must direct her views and her efforts towards new paths, the more so as the work undertaken by Austria-Hungary assumed a character threatening the essential interests of Rumania as well as her most legitimate national aspirations. In the presence of so radical a modification of the situation between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Rumania the latter resumed her liberty of action.

“The neutrality which the Royal Government imposed upon itself in consequence of a declaration of war made independent of its will and contrary to its interests was adopted, in the first instance, as a result of assurances given at

the outset by the Imperial and Royal Government that the Monarchy in declaring war on Serbia was not inspired by a spirit of conquest, and that it had absolutely no territorial acquisitions in view. These assurances were not realized. To-day we are confronted by a situation *de facto* from which may arise great territorial transformations and political changes of a nature to constitute a grave menace to the security and future of Rumania. The work of peace which Rumania, faithful to the spirit of the Triple Alliance, attempted to accomplish was thus rendered barren by those who themselves were called upon to support and defend it.

“In adhering in 1883 to the group of Central Powers Rumania, far from forgetting the ties of blood which united the populations of the kingdom to those Rumanians who are subject to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, saw in the relations of friendship and alliance which were established between the three Great Powers a precious pledge for her domestic tranquillity, as well as for the improvement of the lot of the Rumanians of Austria-Hungary. In effect Germany and Italy, who had reconstituted their States on the basis of the principles of nationality, could not but recognize the legitimacy of the foundation on which their own existence reposed. As for Austria-Hungary, she found in friendly relations established between her and the Kingdom of Rumania assurances for her tranquillity both in her interior and on our common frontiers, for she was bound to know to what an extent the discontent of her Rumanian population found an echo among us, threatening every moment to trouble the good relations between the two States.

“The hope which we based from this point



RUMANIAN TROOPS CROSSING A PONTOON BRIDGE NEAR THE AUSTRIAN FRONTIER.

of view upon our adhesion to the Triple Alliance remained unfulfilled during more than thirty years. The Rumanians of the Monarchy not only never saw any reform introduced of a nature to give them even a semblance of satisfaction, but, on the contrary, they were treated as an inferior race and condemned to suffer the oppression of a foreign element which constitutes only a minority in the midst of the diverse nationalities constituting the Austro-Hungarian State. All the injustices which our brothers were thus made to suffer maintained between our country and the Monarchy a continual state of animosity which the Governments of the Kingdom only succeeded in appeasing at the cost of great difficulties and numerous sacrifices.

“When the present war broke out it might have been hoped that the Austro-Hungarian Government, at least at the last moment, would end by convincing itself of the urgent necessity of putting an end to this injustice, which endangered not only our relations of friendship, but even the normal relations which ought to exist between neighbouring States. Two years of war, during which Rumania has preserved her neutrality, proved that Austria-Hungary, hostile to all domestic reform that might ameliorate the life of the peoples she governs, showed herself as prompt to sacrifice them as she was powerless to defend them against external attacks. The war, in which almost the whole of Europe is taking part, raises the gravest problems affecting the national development and the very existence of States. Rumania, from a desire to contribute in hastening the end of the conflict, and governed by the necessity of safeguarding her racial interests, finds herself forced to enter into line by the side of those who are able to assure her the realization of her national unity. For these reasons she considers herself from this moment in a state of war with Austria-Hungary.”

King Ferdinand hastened to publish two appeals—to the army and to the nation. The first ran as follows :

“Soldiers, I have called you to bear your standards beyond the frontiers, where our brothers await you impatiently, their hearts full of hope. The shades of the great Voivods, Michael the Brave and Stephen the Great, whose mortal remains rest in the lands you go to deliver, will lead you to victory as worthy successors of the soldiers who were victorious at Rasboieni, at Calugareni, and at Plevna. You

will fight by the side of the great nations to whom we are united. A desperate struggle awaits you. You will support its weight and with God's help victory will be ours. Show yourselves worthy of the glory of your ancestors. Throughout the ages a whole people will bless you and sing your praises.”

To his people King Ferdinand appealed as follows :

“RUMANIANS !


“The war which now for two years has hemmed in our frontiers more and more closely has shaken the old foundations of Europe and shown that henceforth it is solely on a national foundation that the peaceful life of its peoples can be assured. It has brought this day which has been awaited for centuries by the national conscience: the day of the union of the Rumanian race. After interminable centuries of misfortune and cruel trials our ancestors succeeded in founding the Rumanian State through the union of the Principalities, through the War of Independence, and through indefatigable labour from the national renaissance. To-day it is given to us to assure unshakably and in its fulness the work realized for the moment by Michael the Brave: the union of the Rumanians on both sides of the Carpathians. It is on us that it depends to-day to deliver from foreign domination our brothers beyond the mountains and the lands of Bukovina, where Stephen the Great sleeps his eternal sleep. It is in us, in the virtues of the race, in our gallantry, that lives the powerful force which will give them once more the right to prosper in peace, in conformity with the customs and the aspirations of our common race, in a complete and free Rumania from the Theiss to the sea.

“We Rumanians, animated by the sacred duty which weighs on us, are resolved like men to confront all the sacrifices inseparable from a bitter war. We set forth for the struggle with the enthusiasm of a people which has unshakable faith in its destinies.

“The glorious fruits of victory will be our recompense.

“With the help of God—forward !”

The die was cast. Rumania had crossed her Rubicon, the Carpathians. For better or for worse she had thrown herself on the side of the Allies. Next day, after a meeting of the Federal Council, Germany declared war and on September 1 Bulgaria followed her example.



GENERAL VIEW OF BRASSO (KRONSTADT),

Situated in a narrow valley at the base of the Transylvanian Alps, near the border of Rumania.

The Rumanian principalities at the beginning of the nineteenth century were quite inadequately provided with means of defence. Though both Walachia and Moldavia had splendid traditions of military achievements under rulers like Michael the Brave and Stephen the Great, who had defeated the Turks and temporarily unified the race, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries witnessed a decline of this spirit under Turkish suzerainty and Phanariot rule. The principalities were nominally defended by Turkey, or occupied by Russia, and Rumanians were deprived of their independence in foreign affairs. After the Treaty of Adrianople (1829), the Russian Governor-General Count Kiselev proceeded to reorganize the defensive forces of the country, providing for frontier troops (*graniceri*) and a small regular army. This amounted, however, to only 4,587 men in Walachia and only 1,096 in Moldavia. The principalities played but a passive part in the Crimean War, and the army was more concerned with internal than external politics. Prince Charles found it quite inadequate in numbers and training and urgently needing bringing up to date. The Prince introduced Prussian instructors, headed by Lieut.-Col. Krensky, from whose arrival in

1867 begins the organization of the Rumanian army. Ten years later this army, which in 1861 Prince Wittgenstein had scornfully called "a band of tattered gipsies," had become an important factor in the decision of Russia's war against Turkey. Rumanian troops showed their courage and admirable soldierly qualities in this campaign, and their capture of the Grivitsa redoubt on September 11, 1877, was one of the great feats of the war. Two army corps took part in the operations, comprising most of Rumania's then available forces. In 1882 the army was raised to four army corps and regional recruiting adopted. Subsequent reforms in 1891, 1900 and 1908-11 still further increased both peace and war strength and coordinated all the military forces of the country. Excellent strategical and military lessons were learnt from the short Bulgarian campaign of 1913.

Service was obligatory and continuous. The forces were divided into three sections. The first was composed of citizens between 21 and 30—both field army and reserves. From 30 to 36 all fit citizens must serve in the territorial militia or Landwehr, which included both time-expired soldiers and those exempted from field service. They were called up for shooting

practice in the spring and field manoeuvres in the autumn of every year. The last line of defence was a sort of Landsturm (*Gloata*) for home service only.

The field army was divided into five army corps—stationed at Craiova (or Turnu-Severin), Bukarest, Galatz, Iashi and Constantza. Each consisted of two active divisions and one in reserve. There were two brigades in each division, two regiments in each brigade, and three battalions to each regiment. Each corps had further attached to it a brigade (two regiments) of cavalry, called *calarashi*—men who provided their own horses, served about three months in their first year, and subsequently were called up in turns for 40 days in the second and 30 in the third year. In addition there was attached to each corps a howitzer (105 mm.) regiment, a pioneers' battalion, and other supplementary services. There was, further, a cavalry corps consisting of two divisions (*i.e.*, six brigades, twelve regiments) of *roshiori* ("Red Hussars") and five brigades of *calarashi*. The rifle used by the infantry was the 6.5 mm. Mänlicher (model 93).

The field artillery was composed of 20 regiments. In each regiment were seven

batteries (two mounted and one *depôt*) with four guns (1908 Krupp 75 mm.) each. There was, further, a regiment of horse artillery (seven batteries) and of siege artillery (nine batteries). Finally there were special frontier regiments (*graniceri*) some batteries of mountain guns and 155 mm. Schneider howitzers, a battalion of Danube pontoon builders, and other pontoon detachments, and other auxiliary services.

The medical service was excellent and disposed of skilled surgeons and a fully organized staff. Necessarily the requirements of a European war, however, imposed serious demands on a country like Rumania, which was not yet fully developed.

The higher command had learnt much both from Germany and France. The Chief of the General Staff, Zottu, was an old man and retired shortly before Rumania intervened, but he was subsequently appointed Chief of the General Staff of the Army of Operations. His assistant was General Iliescu, Secretary-General to the War Office. The Assistant Chief was Gen. Cristescu, who had distinguished himself by his cooperation with the Serbian staff during the Balkan Wars. The Army Corps commanders were Generals Averescu, Cottescu,



GENERAL VIEW OF RUSTCHUK,

A town in Bulgaria, on the Danube, opposite the Rumanian town of Giurgevo.

Aslan, Presan, and Georgescu. On the former, as commander of the First Corps at Turmu-Severin, was to fall the initiation of the Transylvanian campaign, which he was to conduct, Gen. Popovici (of the Cavalry Corps) succeeding to the command of the First Army Corps. Gen. Aslan had to bear the first brunt of Mackensen's invasion of Dobrudja. After the initial retirement there his place was taken by Gen. Averescu. The latter was succeeded in Transylvania by an ex-Minister of War, Gen. Crainicianu, who had always stood in the forefront of the Irredentist movement and had assisted the Interventionist campaign through his articles in *Universul*.

On the outbreak of war the Prime Minister, who as Minister of War had been personally responsible for the great work of preparation and equipment during the two previous years, abandoned his portfolio to his capable brother, Vintila Bratianu.

Finally the Commander-in-Chief was King Ferdinand himself, who, by his patriotic attitude, had proved himself in *La Roumanie's* phrase, "The greatest Rumanian of them all."

The Kingdom of Rumania forms roughly the shape of an L reversed or of a boxing-glove with a long thumb. Including the parts of Russia and Austria-Hungary inhabited by the Rumanian race it makes practically a square—very roughly 480 kilometres (300 miles) from N. to S. and E. to W. Its frontier with Hungary is also that of a reversed L, and throughout its 370 miles it is bounded by the Carpathians and Transylvanian Alps. Another 100 miles or more of frontier separates Bukovina from Moldavia, from whom Austria took it in 1775. For some 250 miles Rumania's southern frontier is formed by the Danube. Just above Tutrakan it leaves that river and runs almost in a straight line S.E. till it reaches the Black Sea half-way between Balchik and Varna. From Russia it is divided by the Pruth and, from Reni on to the sea, by the Danube, of which the Pruth is a tributary.

The Carpathians form a natural but not an impenetrable defence. In the course of their sweep from Bukovina to the Danube they are crossed by passes and pierced by rivers. In the north the average height is some 4,500 feet. Between the Borgo Pass (4,100 ft.), which leads from Bukovina down on to the Beszterze (Biștritz) river valley, and the Tömös Pass (3,475 feet), due south of Kronstadt, there

are five passes utilizable in varying degrees by an invading army — the Tölgyes ("oaky") at 2,150 feet, the Békás 1,890 feet, the Gyimes ("mistletoe") 2,445, the Ojtoz 2,900 and the Bodza ("elder-tree") 2,125 feet. Of these five passes only one—the Gyimes—carries a railway, but a good road runs through the Tölgyes into the upper Maros valley. By these two routes the Rumanian armies could easily reach both the Maros and Alt valleys.

Farther south there are easier avenues of approach. The Tömös Pass—its name means "narrow"—is the route taken by the main railway connecting Bukarest with Transylvania, and is penetrated by a tunnel. A good road traverses the pass, which is flanked 10 miles or so to the west by the Törzburger Pass, which is considerably higher (4,175 feet), but carries a road. Farther west is the Roten Turm ("Red Tower") Pass, which is much lower (only 1,485 feet), and not so much a mountain pass as a rift in the mountains, through which flows the river Olt (Aluta), joining Hermannstadt (Nagy Szeben; *Rum.*, Sibiu) with Little Walachia by road and railway. Still farther west is the Szurdok ("narrow passage") Pass at 1,720 feet, through which the river Jiu (Zsil) flows on its way to the Danube at Rahovo. A good road runs through it, connecting the Hungarian station Lipazeny with the Rumanian railhead at Târgul Jiuului. Lastly, far away in the extreme S.E. corner of Hungary, by the Iron Gates, the main line from Budapest to Bukarest passes through Vârciorova to Turnu-Severin.

Whatever the Rumanian plan of campaign was it was obviously strategically advisable to occupy the passes at once. This done, opportunities for a successful advance offered in the direction of Oláh Toplicza and Szent Miklós, the occupation of which secured the upper valley of the Maros. Simultaneously a successful offensive by the Tömös and Roten Turm Passes would turn the valley of the Olt. Further advances on Petrosény and Orsova would serve to draw off the enemy forces and to secure local advantages—the coal-mines of the Jiu valley at Petrosény and the command of the Iron Gates at Orsova.

The Austro-Hungarian troops, if unable to put adequate numbers on the Carpathian front to resist the Rumanians, could withdraw in the first place to the line of the Maros and Olt (Aluta) rivers, the mountains behind which form a second line



(1) General Crainicianu, (2) General Popovici, (3) General Averescu, Army Corps Commanders ;
(4) General Iliescu, Secretary-General to the War Office ; (5) General Zottu, Chief of the General Staff ;
(6) General Georgescu, (7) General Presan, Army Corps Commanders.

LEADERS OF THE RUMANIAN ARMY.



THE FRONTIERS OF RUMANIA.

of defence served by four branch railways down the rivers Görgeny, Little Kokel and Great Kokel with railheads at Görgeny, Parajd and Székely Udvárhely, and farther south by the great strategic loops of railways based on Schässburg (Segesvar), Karlsburg (Rum., Alba Iulia; Hung., Gyula Fehérvár), Hatszeg and Karansebes. However, any such Rumanian advance as that described in the preceding paragraph would turn this line and force the Austro-Hungarian forces to base themselves on the line of the Maros, from which numerous branch railways offered excellent avenues of attack. By so retiring, the military authorities of the Dual Monarchy would shorten their line from about 360 to about 230 miles, a relief which their rapidly diminishing numbers

called for urgently. From a military point of view there was everything to be said for this plan, which was in fact adopted, but it met with lively criticism in the Hungarian Parliament, because it meant abandoning to the invaders the counties of Csik, Udvárhely and Háromszek, the population of which is mainly Szekler or Magyar.

As Rumania declared war on Austria-Hungary on August 27 (night) and till September 1 it was not clear what Bulgaria's attitude would be, it was obvious that hostilities would begin with the invasion of Transylvania. On her southern frontier Rumania was faced by a neighbour whom indeed she disliked, but from war with whom she had little to gain. The Danube was a protection from invasion to both

parties, for it is deep and wide and bridgeless from Belgrade to Cerna Voda ("Black water"), where the railway from Bukarest crosses it on the way to Constantza. On the other hand, the Rumanian shore might be heavily shelled from the low hills running along the south bank, and until the promised Russian auxiliaries should arrive in Dobrudja that province was open to attack. To defend it the Rumanians had at their disposal the Cerna Voda-Constantza railway and a new line nearly or quite completed running from Tulcea to Dobrich (Bazargie) and intersecting the former at Mejidich. Bukarest was absolutely secure from attack so long as Turtucaia (Tutrakan) and Silistra remained in Rumanian hands, and even their fall could not seriously endanger Rumania unless the Cerna Voda bridge also fell to the enemy. But the treaty of Bukarest had interposed a further defensible strip of territory between the Bulgarian frontier and the Cerna Voda railway.

There were, in a sense, two courses of action open to Rumania. One was to declare war on Bulgaria at the same time as on Austria-Hungary, and while holding the Carpathian passes to throw the bulk of her troops on Sofia,

crossing the Danube where it is joined by the Jiu opposite Rahova (as in 1913) or elsewhere. Or she might at once invade Transylvania. As has been seen, Rumanian opinion was overwhelmingly in favour of the second course. In the first place, after two years of neutrality it was necessary to inspire the Rumanian people with the hope of at once beginning the work of liberating their enslaved brothers in Hungary. An advance into Transylvania could stiffen the moral of the nation as nothing else could. Further, there seemed every prospect that a large portion of the Transylvanian salient could at once be occupied with little trouble and a heavy blow thus inflicted on the enemy's prestige and economic resources. But, besides this, Rumania had no immediate desire to begin hostilities with Bulgaria—at least certainly not till the Russian assisting armies were in position. It seemed to be in Rumania's interests to delay the decision for some time, at least till assured of strong Russian support and a simultaneous offensive from Salonika. Certain Interventionist papers had indeed months before—*e.g.*, *Adeverul* (March 23) and *Universul* (March 24)—suggested that the "shortest way to Transylvania" ran "through



ROTEN TURM ("RED TOWER") PASS,
In the Transylvanian Alps between Transylvania and Rumania.




ON THE FRONTIER.

Where Rumania, Russia, and Austria meet.

Sofia," but such was certainly not the general opinion in Rumania. The risk lay in the possibility of an enemy invasion of Dobrudja, which, even if not "decisive," might prove an

impediment to the hastening of the Allies' victory in the Balkans and the snapping of Germany's link with the East. As events proved, the risk was real.



THE ROYAL BRIDGE, "CAROL I."

CHAPTER CL.

THE LAW AND ENEMY TRADING.

BRITISH COMMON LAW AND TRADING IN WAR TIME—THE ANGLO-GERMAN TRADE PROBLEM—GOVERNMENT HESITATIONS AND DELAYS—ROYAL PROCLAMATIONS AND TREASURY RULES—HISTORY OF THE RULE AGAINST ENEMY TRADING—THE AMERICAN VIEW—GERMAN LAW AND PRACTICE—TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACTS—LICENCES TO TRADE—FAMOUS CASES OF THE WAR—DOMINION LEGISLATION—LORD HALSBURY'S JUDGMENT IN THE DAIMLER COMPANY CASE—CONVICTIONS FOR TRADING WITH THE ENEMY—GERMAN BANKS IN LONDON.

THE outbreak, unexpected and tremendous, of the War of 1914 presented to Great Britain many old war problems in a new and extraordinarily complicated shape. The weapons of war had been altered beyond recognition, strategy had assumed new and almost incomprehensible forms, sea warfare had taken to itself a speed and a range which made Trafalgar seem as far away as Salamis, and the problems of trade and national life in war time were scarcely comparable with conditions in any other age, near or remote. But in the working out of all these aspects of the position it was found, on a broad view, that the old principles were operating, although on a vaster stage, and that the precautions and the methods of earlier ages had, in fact, to be brought once again into play both in war and commerce in war time, though often in new guise and with new names.

The methods of Elizabeth and Pitt, and the traditional practices of the Common Law, were seen once more playing a not unfamiliar part. Again the world beheld the strange spectacle of the British people, and British statesmen, slowly recognizing the greatness of the occasion and tardily but splendidly rising to it. In no

field of national life was this more noticeable than in the field of trade, our own field where we had so often and so unexpectedly played the game of success. Apart, moreover, from the factors common to all wars, the chances of fate and the rashness of German statesmen had suddenly brought into mortal combat two great trading nations. The one had with incredible slowness and apparent lack of enterprise built up a world-wide trade; the other had by devices devious but thorough striven for years to oust Great Britain from her control of the finances and the markets of the world. For years the German officials had sneered at British traders as inefficient and lazy, ill-trained and unfit to hold even a first rank place in the commerce of the world. For years the British, with more method than appeared on the surface, but certainly with inadequate intellectual outlook, had been quietly and not altogether ineffectively parrying the German attack, and in fact, piling up huge accessions of trade. The British mind and temper had, however, become restive under the process, and when war was thrust upon her England gradually became determined to deal thoroughly with Germany's aggressive trade policy also.

The trade problem that the war presented had to be dealt with in a variety of ways. One of the methods was set to work with incomparable skill and speed. The British Fleet cleared the seas and drove German commerce in its open and obvious form out of the markets of the world. But the trade problem was not solved by the Fleet, though it was insoluble without it. Direct trading with the enemy, by a combination of blockade and the strict application of a developed doctrine of contraband, was gradually reduced to a minimum, though the slowness of the British Government to adopt a thorough policy of investment delayed the work of the most efficient Fleet that the world had known, and cost the British Empire and her Allies many hundreds of millions of pounds that might have been saved. But even if access to Germany by sea were totally closed the problem was by no means solved. The New Commerce was of such an intricate character, the New Finance of so elaborate a reticulation, that the trading power of the enemy only began to fail when her merchant fleets

were swept from the seas. In a measure this was realized, but the British Government applied and amplified in the most leisurely fashion the old principle of the English Common Law that trading with the enemy is illegal. Two days after the declaration of war the Crown issued the customary proclamation against trading with the enemy, but the wording of this document showed that in the endeavour to keep the world-wide machinery of commerce intact from the shock of war the Government were surrendering many of the old advantages that that doctrine of illegality ensured. With what seemed incredible slowness during a period of more than a year the Government stopped loophole after loophole through which German trade could flow with almost unrestricted facility. Sometimes it almost seemed as if the internationalization of trade had taken from the British the power to strike true and full as in the old days.

The de-nationalization of trade, in fact, had made the problem one of immense complexity. When trading houses dominated markets in



LENS MAKING AT NORTHAMPTON INSTITUTE.
General view of one of the workshops.



A FORMER GERMAN INDUSTRY.


British women workers, under the direction of the Ministry of Munitions, learning to make lenses for optical instruments at the Northampton Institute. The larger picture illustrates a worker grinding and polishing twenty lenses at one operation by the aid of a special holder. Smaller picture: Rounding twenty-five prisms. They are bound in form with plaster of Paris.

London, Berlin and New York, and controlled on behalf of a super-paternal State great shipping lines, it was extraordinarily difficult to crush the trade of the enemy and at the same time to use the stock exchanges of the world for the purposes of war finance. The complexity of the position at the opening of the war seemed almost insuperable, and the difficulty was vastly enhanced by the extraordinary and sinister control that the Germans had secured in the banking system of the world, and the subtle relationship of that banking system to the intricate ramifications of State-aided German trade. To crush down the system of exchanges was impossible; to drive out the German influence, operative on so enormous a scale in the United States, was impossible; the only thing that seemed possible was by slow degrees to eliminate German control from the banking system and the trading system of England and her colonies until at last it would be possible to bring to bear with all its primal force the ancient



doctrine that trading with the enemy in any shape or form was illegal and often treasonable.

The slowness of the process seemed indeed almost a matter for despair, and had it not been for the steady application of the old doctrine by the Law Courts and the clear grasp of the situation shown by the House of Lords, the Privy Council, and also by Sir Samuel Evans in the Prize Court, it would have been



LOOKING FOR CONTRABAND.
Inspecting bales with the aid of X-rays.

almost impossible to sweep out the German taint. The legal subtleties on occasions overcame the more timid Courts, and certain decisions showed a want of courage and sound grasp of principles that would have shocked Lord Stowell. The decision that a limited company, registered in England but consisting entirely of Germans resident (with the exception of the secretary) in Germany, was an English company, and not subject to the restrictions against enemy trading, roused the emphatic dissent of England's leading judges and jurists. But on the whole the courts of law made it clear that the enemy was not to be allowed to secure unjust advantages through the medium of legal subtleties.

The Dominions, as will be seen, dealt with these problems in swifter fashion.

The history of the rule against trading with the enemy reaches back into the earliest records of organized States. It is unnecessary here to enter into the Grecian, Roman and mediæval rules against trading with the enemy, save to say that they were so strict that the fact of such trade transformed a neutral into an enemy. When we emerge into the period of the international jurists, after the first quarter of the seventeenth century, Vattel asserted that "when the head of a State or sovereign declares war against another sovereign it implies that the whole nation declares war against the other, as the sovereign represents the nation, and acts for the whole society. Thus these two nations are enemies, and all the subjects of the one are enemies to all the subjects of the other."

The effort made by Rousseau to introduce a different view, the view that it is the States only and not the subjects that are at war, was in fact without any influence on the theory of war. This view of Vattel was the view of Grotius and Burlamaqui and may be taken to represent the actualities of any war. It was accepted by Chancellor Kent in the famous American case of *Griswold v. Waddington*, which decided in 1819 that, as soon as a war is commenced, all trading, negotiation, communication or intercourse between the citizens of the United States and the enemy, without the direct permission of the Government is unlawful, and that therefore no valid contract could exist nor any promise arise by implication of law from any transaction with an enemy. The Court consequently held that a commercial partnership

existing between a citizen of the United States of America and that of another country is dissolved by the outbreak of war between the two countries. This view was based on the universal practice of nations and the Common Law of England. Grotius expressly states that private contracts with the enemy, touching private actions and things, are unlawful and controlled by the superior duty which the citizen owes to his own State. Vattel confines the right of making contracts with the enemy to cases of necessity arising out of the war as in the case of a contract of ransom. But this contract, though once admitted in English law, is no longer binding. Bynkershoek states that "from the nature of war itself, all commercial intercourse ceases between enemies. For what purpose would trade be carried on, if, as is clearly the case, the goods of enemies brought into our country are liable to confiscation? But all commercial intercourse must cease, and in declarations of war this mutual commerce is interdicted, and it is often done by subsequent edicts. But although there be no special prohibition of trading with the enemy, yet it is forbidden by the very right or laws of war." This was the view of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and it was certainly the view in the middle ages. Evidence as to this is given by Dr. Christopher Robinson in his Reports of the Decisions of Lord Stowell. In the mediæval practice of the Court of Admiralty it is laid down:—"Item, soit enquis de tous ceux, qui entreeommument, vendent ou achètent avec aucuns des enemis de notre seigneur Le Roi, sans license espeeiale du Roi, ou de son admiral." In the case of the *Cosmopolite* Lord Stowell (then, 1801, Sir William Scott) declared that it is perfectly well known, that by war, "all communication" between the subjects of the belligerent countries must be suspended, and that "no intercourse" can legally be carried on between the subjects of the hostile States, but by the special licence of their respective Governments. In the case of *Griswold v. Waddington*, already mentioned, the Chancellor said:

We have been reviewing the opinions of the most eminent jurists, and the usages of the most distinguished continental nations of Europe, touching the lawfulness of any commerce or communication with the enemy in time of war. Our researches, hitherto, have been confined to the *European* Continent; we have not scarcely placed even a foot on *British* ground; and yet we see that the highest authorities on the law of nations, *Grotius*, *Puffendorf*, *Burlamaqui*, *Bynkershoek*, and *Heineccius*, and a series of more subordinate and local opinions, such as those of *Bocrius*, *Cleirac*, *Falin*, and *Emerigon*, and the maritime ordinances



A DAY'S MAIL.
Parcels for British prisoners interned in Germany.

of Spain, France, Holland, and Sweden, unitedly prove that all private communication and commerce with an enemy in time of war are unlawful, and that by the mere fact and force of the declaration of war, all the subjects of one state are placed in direct hostility to all the subjects of the other.

The learned Chancellor then turned to Great Britain, the country involved as an enemy in the particular suit, and said :

If any nation truly understands and wisely pursues the interests of commerce, it must be *Great Britain*. Her commercial character began to display itself to the admiration of *Europe*, as early as the reign of Queen *Elizabeth*, who was styled by her contemporaries, the restorer of naval glory and the mistress of the ocean. Since that time the nation, by her commerce, her arts, and freedom, has gradually risen to the highest pitch of grandeur and power. She seems almost to have realized the truth of that great maxim, as it is termed by *Huet*, and with which Themistocles and other statesmen of antiquity were deeply impressed, that the power which was master of the sea was master of the world.

In this passage of singular generosity the great American judge led up to the practice of Great Britain in respect to commerce in time of war. It is quite clear, and the evidence has increased since the case was decided, that in mediæval England trading with the enemy was illegal. It was always an offence, and in certain cases it was high treason. High treason in those cases it remained to the night of the

outbreak of war, as the King's Proclamation of August 5, 1914, reminded the British people.

The whole question of trading with the enemy was elaborately discussed in Westminster Hall in 1684 in the great suit of *The East India Company v. Sandys*. The Attorney General, Sir Robert Sawyer, declared that :

The Common Law is a prohibition of itself, and is at open war with alien enemies ; whether the commerce with alien enemies without license be within the extent of aiding and comforting the King's enemies within the Statute of 25 Edward III. [The Statute of Treasons] I shall not at this time argue ; but it may be worth while for the interlopers who traffic into foreign nations, not in amity with the King, without license, well to consider that point. Before the statute, at Common Law, it was criminal.

This ominous remark might well have been kept in mind by modern "interlopers who traffic into foreign nations not in amity with the King," some of whom, however, soon felt the heavy hand of the law that Sir Robert Sawyer, in the reign of James II., brought to the minds of men who placed profit above patriotism.

The eighteenth-century law cases in the English Courts are not without interest and significance. In the case of the *St. Philip*, heard in 1747, it was decided that all trade

and intercourse between subjects of States at war is illegal, even though no express prohibition is issued, since every subject by virtue of his allegiance is obliged to assist the King and distress his enemies to the utmost of his abilities, and not to aid or assist them by trade or otherwise. In the *Irish* case, decided in 1781 (where it was stated that the Irish Commissioners of Revenue and Excise had openly permitted the carrying on in time of war of the wine trade between Bordeaux and Dublin), it was held that such trading with the enemy was illegal, despite the fact that during the war the Irish legislature had merely imposed an additional duty on French wines. In 1785 it was held that while the Grenada islands were in French possession (though the inhabitants were British in principle and affection) that trading with the islands was illegal. In 1795 it was held, in the case of the *Elnigheid*, that corn shipped in France before the outbreak of war on February 1, 1793, must on capture be condemned, though the cargo was actually laden in time of peace, and the declaration of war by France against England and Holland was not announced till two days after the ship had sailed. The Lords of the Admiralty, sitting in the Prize Appeal

Courts, were immovable; no exceptions would they allow to the rule that trading with the enemy, direct or indirect, was illegal. Goods sent by the enemy in payment of debts contracted before the war were held to be good prize; so far were the sturdy upholders of the Common and Admiralty Law prepared to go in the year 1795. It must be admitted that Sir Samuel Evans did not hesitate to follow this bold and fearless doctrine.

"If any nation truly understands and wisely pursues the interests of commerce, it must be Great Britain." This American view in the year 1819 was, on the whole, sustained by the



WOUNDED SOLDIERS AS CENSORS.
Searching for contraband at a London Parcel Office.

English Courts in the years 1914-16. It does not pay the commerce of this country in time of war to trade with the enemy. The English Maritime Courts held to this doctrine with a pleasing consistency that was in effect a monument to the influence of Lord Stowell. But the King's Bench was, perhaps, not as wise as in old time, while administrative action often undid, and fatally undid, in the way of precedent the sound judicial principles of the Courts. It must be admitted that the English Courts of Common Law and Chancery have never fully exhibited in this matter of trading with the enemy the directness and the common sense that have governed the decisions of the English Prize Courts and the American Courts. Lord Hardwicke, in 1749, had some weaknesses in the matter. He seemed to wish to create possibilities of intercourse. Chancellor Kent rightly characterised his views as "loose and almost unmeaning" "idle doubts (for they are nothing more)." Lord Mansfield was also a little vague. Mr. J. Butler tells us "on the legality of insurances of enemy's property, I never could get Lord Mansfield to reason. He never went beyond the ground of expedience, and thought it for the interest of the country to insure enemy's property. The illegality of such underwriting is now pretty well settled." In the case of *Potts v. Bell*, in the year 1800, a case of insurance on the conveyance of goods, purchased in an enemy's country, from Holland to England, it was held "to be illegal for a subject in time of war, without license, to bring, even in a neutral ship, from an enemy's port, goods which were purchased by his agent, resident in the enemy's country, after the commencement of hostilities."

Lord Stowell, in the famous case of *The Hoop*, asked :

Who can be insensible to the consequences that might follow if every person in time of war had a right to carry on a commercial intercourse with the enemy, and, under colour of that, had the means of carrying on any other species of intercourse he might think fit? The inconvenience to the public might be extreme. Another principle of law of a less politic nature, but equally general in its reception, and direct in its application, forbids this sort of communication; and that is the total inability of an enemy to enforce any such contract by suit. In the law of almost every country, the character of alien enemy carries with it a disability to sue. . . . A state of things in which contracts cannot be enforced cannot be a state of legal commerce. . . . The legality of commerce and the mutual use of courts of justice must be inseparable.

Chancellor Kent declared with respect to

the views of English Courts on the question that

there is an entire harmony and uniformity of decision and that, too, from very early times, between their courts of maritime and common law. *England* has adopted, and steadily asserted, the same universal principle which we have seen laid down by the most enlightened jurists, and put in practice by the most commercial nations on the Continent of *Europe*. We now return, with pleasure, from the other side of the *Atlantic*, to look into the laws and decisions of this country; they will be found to have adopted the *European* rule in its utmost extent.

The importance of the enforcement of this rule by Great Britain in the Great War was obvious.

The general prohibition of trading with the enemy which is indicated in all the law cases and in the writings of the leading jurists up to the end of the Napoleonic wars does not, according to Dr. E. J. Schuster, apply to Germany.

He tells us that

there are no rules of German law corresponding to the general rules of British law prohibiting trade and other intercourse with alien enemies. Trade with the enemy is, in fact, permitted except in so far as there is no express prohibition. The prohibitions issued so far have always purported to be issued by way of retaliation against particular countries. The most far-reaching of these prohibitions was put into force by the Ordinance of September 30, 1914, which was originally directed only against the British Empire, but which by subsequent Ordinances was extended to France and Russia.

This policy on the part of Germany was the obvious policy of a rising commercial country. No doubt Germany hoped that by abstaining from the practice usual in war of cutting off commercial and social relations with the enemy, she would secure the power during the war of pouring her goods into enemy dominions and thus gain money for her war and deprive the enemy of part of the means of fighting. This, like so many other German devices, was childish in the extreme. As has been seen, it has always been England's policy to shut out the enemy *toto cælo* at the opening of war. This attitude of England, grim and uncompromising, at once settled the question. There must be two sides even to German trading.

Hence payments to an enemy country in money or by negotiable instruments and the export of prohibited goods from Germany or a neutral country to the enemy were penally prohibited. But there were exceptions as to the transmission of money as well as goods. Payments of debts or fulfilment of obligations due in Germany to an enemy were postponed, not forbidden. An alien enemy could sue in a German Court, but the defendant could secure



AUXILIARY FLEET AT PATROL WORK.

On the look-out for suspicious craft.

what Dr. Schuster calls "an indefinite stay of proceedings." He adds, "Rights affecting property—*e.g.*, the right to obtain a divorce, or the custody of a child, may, however, be enforced by an alien enemy notwithstanding the war." But on one point Germany was as strict as other belligerents: the securing of the control of businesses in the possession of

alien enemies when war broke out. By an Ordinance of September 4, 1914, inspectors were appointed for any business "which is managed or controlled in an enemy country or the profits of which are either wholly or partly to be remitted to an enemy country." Dr. Schuster goes on to say that an inspector had power "(1) to prohibit any particular transaction or



PRIZES OF WAR: THE "MARIE LEONHARDT."

A German vessel of 2000 tons captured in the Thames. The ship was unloaded under the superintendence of the Police.

any particular communication; (2) to inspect books, documents, and stock-in-trade and negotiable instruments; (3) to require information on all matters affecting the business." It is to be noticed that "the managers of an inspected undertaking are subject to penalties if they make money payments or transmit other property to an enemy country, but the inspectors are in such particular case authorized to relax this rule." This is not without significance. It was not German policy to cut down enemy trade if it could be helped. Her real anxiety was to get her goods out of the country and her victim's money into her treasury. By an Ordinance of November 26, 1914, directed against France, but extended to British undertakings on December 22, 1914, concerns where the preponderating capital was British or French could be administered by a special officer appointed by the State authorities or limited to the carrying out of existing transactions. Dr. Schuster also tells us that "the authorities have power to inquire into the real facts as to the beneficial ownership of the shares in any such undertaking."

In the case of France, a Ministerial decree issuing from Bordeaux, and dated September 27, 1914, forbade all trading with the enemy, that is to say, with Germans or Austrians, or persons residing in either of the Empires: "Tout commerce . . . se trouve et demeure interdit. De même, il est défendu aux sujets desdits empires de se livrer, directement ou par personne interposée, à tout commerce sur le territoire français ou de protectorat français." The making of contracts, the execution of pecuniary obligations was forbidden. Sequestration of the goods of enemy firms in France followed on October 13. The matter proved complicated, and on November 4 a "circulaire relative au contrôle des séquestres de biens de sujets allemands, autrichiens ou hongrois" was issued. Further circulars followed on November 14 and December 5. The business of clearing the German out of the trading world of France was sufficiently difficult but was effectively carried out.

It is now necessary to approach in some

detail, avoiding as far as possible technical phraseology, the group of problems as to trading with the enemy which emerged at the opening of the war, and even after more than two years of legislation, administration, litigation, and prosecution were not fully solved. On August 5, 1914, came the initial Royal Proclamation. This interesting document recited that a state of war existed between "Us and the German Emperor," that "it is contrary to law for any person resident, carrying on business, or being in Our Dominions, to trade or have any commercial intercourse with any person resident, carrying on business, or being in the German Empire without Our permission," and that "it is, therefore, expedient and necessary to warn all persons resident, carrying on business, or being in Our Dominions of their duties and obligations towards Us, Our Crown, and Government." And proceeded to "warn all persons resident, carrying on business, or being in our Dominions" against certain acts, as follows:

(1) "Not to supply to or obtain from the said Empire any goods, wares, or merchandise, or to supply to or obtain the same from any person resident, carrying on business, or being therein, nor to supply to

or obtain from any person any goods, wares or merchandise for or by way of transmission to or from the said Empire, or to or from any person resident, carrying on business, or being therein, nor to trade in or carry any goods, wares, or merchandise destined for or coming from the said Empire, or for or from any person resident, carrying on business, or being therein:

(2) "Nor to permit any British ship to leave for, enter, or communicate with any port or place in the said Empire:

(3) "Nor to make or enter into any new marine, life, fire, or other policy or contract of insurance with or for the benefit of any person resident, carrying on business, or being in the said Empire, nor under any existing policy or contract of insurance to make any payment to or for the benefit of any such person in respect of any loss due to the belligerent action of His Majesty's forces or of those of any ally of His Majesty:

(4) "Nor to enter into any new commercial, financial, or other contract or obligation with or for the benefit of any person resident, carrying on business, or being in the said Empire:"

These provisions seemed to be extremely



UNLOADING THE GERMAN VESSEL "MARIE LEONHARDT."

broad, but even as they stood they were really inadequate, and they were apparently cut down in the latter part of the Proclamation. It was declared "that any transactions to, with, or for the benefit of any person resident, carrying on business, or being in the said Empire which are not treasonable and are not for the time being expressly prohibited by Us either by virtue of this Proclamation or otherwise, and which but for the existence of the state of war aforesaid would be lawful, are hereby permitted."

The advisers of the Crown, in view of the extraordinary ramifications of modern commerce and the consequent interactions between neutrals and belligerents, seemed unable to allow the ancient Common Law to take its normal and, as subsequent events showed, proper way. Looking back on the events of the opening of the war from a sufficient distance it is plain that the advisers of the Crown, incapable, of course, of estimating the duration of the war, were afraid of permanently injuring British commerce by the enforcement of the broad Common Law rule that all trading with the enemy is unlawful. It was more than doubtful whether the Common Law could be cut down by a Royal Proclamation made with the advice of the Privy Council. Among the ramifications of commerce in 1914 was the practice of great banks and business houses to have branches in different countries.

The Proclamation dealt with this position in the difficult case of foreign branches of enemy firms. It declared (after stating that the word "person" should include any body of persons corporate or incorporate) that "where any person has, or has an interest in, houses or branches of business in some other country as well as in Our Dominions, or in the said Empire [of Germany] (as the case may be), this Proclamation shall not apply to the trading or commercial intercourse carried on by such person solely from and by such houses or branches of business in such other country."

This was a remarkable limitation of the Common Law.

This Proclamation was extended to Austria-Hungary on August 12, 1914. On August 21 a still more astonishing document, intending to explain the Proclamations, issued from the Treasury. It stated:

(1) "For the purpose of deciding what transactions with foreign traders are permitted, the important thing is to consider where the foreign trader resides and carries on business, and not the nationality of the foreign trader.

(2) "Consequently, there is, as a rule, no objection to British firms trading with German or Austrian firms established in neutral or British territory. What is prohibited is trade with any firms established in hostile territory.

(3) "If a firm with headquarters in hostile



FOR EXAMINATION.

A British warship holds up a steamer in the North Sea.



BOARDING A SAILING VESSEL.

Crew of a warship's cutter examining a vessel for contraband.

territory has a branch in neutral or British territory, trade with the branch is (apart from prohibitions in special cases) permissible, as long as the trade is *bona fide* with the branch, and no transaction with the head office is involved. . . .

"This explanation is issued in order to promote confidence and certainty in British commercial transactions; but it must be understood that, in case of need, the Government will still be free to impose stricter regulations or special prohibitions in the national interest."

Public temper was not likely, fortunately, as we shall see, to endorse such a state of things, and with an agility that reflected the anger of all patriotic Englishmen a further Proclamation of September 9, 1914, revoked both the Proclamations of August 5 and 12 and the official explanation of August 21,

and substituted a new set of rules. By these rules the word "enemy" was defined, but the definition showed that the advisers of the Crown were not prepared to enforce fully the stringent doctrine against trading with the enemy: "the expression 'enemy' in this Proclamation means any person or body of persons, of whatever nationality, resident or carrying on business in the enemy country, but does not include persons of enemy nationality who are neither resident nor carrying on business in the enemy country. In the case of incorporated bodies, enemy character attaches only to those incorporated in an enemy country." The same policy was operating in this Proclamation as in that of August 5. No doubt the Proclamations would keep German toys out of England, but they could not keep English gold out of Germany. But

the Treasury, as we have said, had to face a very difficult problem, and delay was supposed to be necessary in the interests of the exchanges of the world.



On September 18 the Trading with the Enemy Act, 1914, was passed and imposed very severe penalties by way of fine and imprisonment upon any person trading with the enemy within the meaning of the Act. Moreover, the Act declared that "a person shall be deemed to have traded with the enemy if he has entered into any transaction or done any act which was, at the time of such transaction or act, prohibited by or under any Proclamation issued by His Majesty dealing with trading with the enemy for the time being in force or which at common law or by statute constitutes an offence of trading with the enemy." It is true that the Act adds that "any transaction or act permitted by or under any such Proclamation shall not be deemed to be trading with the enemy," and this seemed to give statutory force to any exceptions contained in the Proclamations, but in fact the authority of the Common Law as to trading with the enemy was asserted by the Act, and it would therefore be a question for the Courts to decide whether or not the Common Law was ousted by the Proclamation. A case of trading with the



HELD UP IN HOLLAND

Examining cases of German-made toys at Rotterdam



IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

Going aboard a dhow in search of contraband.

enemy could be brought into the Courts, discussed at any length, and if the Court were compelled to hold that the trading was legitimate, nevertheless legislation would instantly have followed.

In the case of *Wolf v. Carr* the Court of Appeal was not bound by the provision (Clause 6) of the Proclamation of September 9, to the effect that "where an enemy has a branch locally situated in British, allied, or neutral territory, not being neutral territory in Europe, transactions by or with such branch shall not be treated as transactions by or with the enemy." The German plaintiffs, who were cotton-waste manufacturers resident in Germany, had a branch in England and brought an action upon contracts entered into by the English branch before the war. The Court held that at Common Law the contracts became illegal on the outbreak of war, and therefore the transaction sued on did not come within Clause 6 of the Proclamation.

Again, Sir Samuel Evans held, in the case of the *Eumæus*, where certain goods seized as prize were claimed by the Japanese branch of a Hamburg firm, that Section 6 (above quoted) of the Proclamation did not protect the goods from condemnation; that the sole question was

whether or not the goods were German goods, and that the goods must be regarded as the property of the German company and not of the Japanese branch.

A further Proclamation of October 8, 1914, gave an extension to the necessary system of licences for trading in certain cases with the enemy and in part repealed the doctrine of Clause 6 of the Proclamation of September 6 by the provision that "where an enemy has a branch locally situated in British, allied or neutral, territory, which carries on the business of insurance or re-insurance of whatever nature, transactions by or with such branch in respect of the business of insurance or re-insurance shall be considered as transactions by or with an enemy." However, the case of *Ingle v. Mannheim Continental Insurance Company* showed that the law against enemy trading, whether at Common Law or by statute, was still incapable of protecting England from enemy trading influence. But the Government was awake to the necessities of the position, and by a Board of Trade Notice of October 9, 1914, intended to prevent breaches of the law against trading with the enemy, the Commissioners of Customs

shall be considered as transactions with the enemy."

The Treasury, on February 3, 1915, issued an explanatory statement to the effect that "it was not intended, nor is it proposed, to interfere by this Proclamation with *bona fide* commercial transactions simply on the ground that they may involve some financial operation which technically comes within the meaning of the words, 'banking business,' if that operation is merely incidental to the transaction, and does not affect the general character of the transaction, as a commercial (distinguished from a banking) transaction." The Treasury went on to state:

"Nor was it intended, nor is it proposed, to interfere by this Proclamation with transactions of British banks or their branches with firms which do not do banking business"—Treasury English is not notable for its purity—"or which, in carrying out the special transaction, are acting in the ordinary way of commerce, and not in any way as bankers, so long as those transactions are permissible independently of the Proclamation.

"Licences will also be granted in proper cases to British banking firms having branches in neutral countries, not being neutral countries in Europe, enabling them to continue their banking business, notwithstanding that the business, by bringing them into contact at some point or another with branches of enemy banks, may technically be within the prohibition of the Proclamation."

The Treasury should have realized that this "contact at some point or another with branches of enemy banks" was, in fact, continuous contact; that the whole system of German banking was not merely the English system of bill-broking, but that of financing and controlling business all over the world.

Before this date, however—in fact, on November 27, 1914—the Trading with the Enemy Act had been amended by an Act which created custodians of enemy property in England and Wales (the Public Trustee), Scotland and Ireland. All dividends, interest, or share of profits that would have been payable to a person who became by the fact of the war an enemy were thenceforward to be paid to the appropriate custodian, and trustees for enemies were directed to notify the custodian of the fact under the sanction of very heavy penalties. A similar duty was imposed on every company incorporated or represented in the United



[Elliott & Fry.]

SIR SAMUEL EVANS.

President of the Admiralty Court

Kingdom; the company had to supply the custodian with full particulars of all shares, stocks, debentures, and debenture stock, and other obligations of the company held by or for the benefit of the enemy. The Act went on to make assignments of debts or any transfer, or the benefit of any obligation by or on behalf of an enemy invalid. Moreover, "no transfer . . . by or on behalf of an enemy of any securities shall confer on the transferee any rights or remedies in respect thereof." The Act further made an *attempt* to trade with the enemy equally an offence with successful trading, and made aiding and abetting trading with the enemy a crime, and even indirect dealings with property that had the intention of helping an enemy became trading with the enemy.

The question of the banks was certainly never realized in all its urgency until late in the war. On September 19, 1914, the Home Secretary issued a licence by which he permitted London agencies of the Deutsche Bank, the Dresdner Bank, and the Disconto-Gesellschaft to carry on business in the United Kingdom subject to certain limitations, conditions, supervision, and requirements as to the deposit of money and securities. The power to grant such licence had been created by the Aliens Restriction (No. 2) Order on

August 10, 1914. This Order provided that an alien enemy should not carry on or engage in any banking business except with the permission in writing of the Secretary of State for Home Affairs on terms. The licence seems to have been granted as a matter of course, and it was not until more than two years later that the danger of the proceeding was at last denounced.

On September 19, 1914, the Home Secretary gave permission to the London agencies of the Oesterreichische Laender Bank and the Anglo-Austrian Bank, and on November 30, 1914, to the Imperial Ottoman Bank and the National Bank of Turkey, to carry on banking business in the United Kingdom



[Elliott & Fry.]

Mr. C. J. STEWART.
The Public Trustee.

subject to limitations identical with those imposed on the German banks. The limitations were, of course, of a stringent kind: the permission to trade only extended to the completion of the transactions of a banking character entered into before August 5, 1914, so far as those transactions would, in ordinary course, have been carried through, or with, the London establishments. The only new transactions allowed were those "necessary or desirable" for the purpose of completing the above first-mentioned transactions. The intention of all this was clear enough. The banks were only to wind up work in hand on August 5, 1914, but, with such a system as the

German bank system, this might mean almost any extension of activity, since there were practically no limits to the relativity of old to new transactions under a system where commercial and banking transactions were indissolubly mingled by a system of trade loans. Apparently these considerations did not apply to the London branches. Moreover, a licence was granted on October 14, 1914, to the London agencies of these German and Austrian banks to receive dividends on certain shares, and to accept transfers approved by the official supervisor of such shares. Sir W. Plender, the Controller of the London agencies of these banks, in his letter of October 8, 1914, to the Secretary of the London Stock Exchange, wrote:

With regard to the case of shares registered in the name of any one of the banks, without the London agency of such bank being specifically referred to, I am not in a position to say that the dividends will be received in London. If the shares are in Canadian companies they would presumably either be paid to the London agencies or withheld, as the companies would not be entitled to pay to Berlin. American companies would, however be under no such restriction, and I am not in a position, therefore, to say that dividends might not be forwarded to Berlin on the instructions of the Berlin office.

This letter throws some light on the elasticity of the German banking system. On January 8, 1915, licence was granted to the London agencies of the Turkish banks to enter into transactions at any or all of their establishments in the United Kingdom in respect of banking business with any establishments of the said banks in France, Cyprus, Egypt, or any part of the Ottoman Dominions occupied by the Allies, subject, however, to the original restrictions of November 30, 1914. Moreover, by further licence of January 8, 1915, persons, firms, or companies resident, carrying on business, or being in the United Kingdom were allowed to enter into transactions in respect of banking business with the above-mentioned establishments of those Ottoman banks. Thus a purely German company registered in England could deal freely through the Ottoman banks in France or Egypt. Probably this result was not foreseen, or, if foreseen, was not regarded as likely to benefit the enemy. But, of course, under conditions obtaining during the war, benefit to the enemy was not limited to actual imports of commodities. There are other ways of adding to the wealth and war-waging capacity of a country that is not absolutely closed by sea and land.

The Stock Exchange on November 12, 1914, laid down the useful rule that "Stock Exchange



WAR.

From a calendar for 1916, published by the *Berliner Tageblatt*. The representation of the coming peace emphasizes the restoration of German world trade and prosperity. The factories are busy, and contented Hanseatic merchants are superintending the shipment of German exports.


transactions entered into by a member of the Stock Exchange before the war on behalf of an enemy, and not completed when hostilities began, cannot, in view of the law relating to trading with the enemy, be completed by such member for the enemy. Such member is entitled to close the transaction by purchase or sale as the case may be." This practice was, however, somewhat limited in operation by the necessary adoption of the limited meaning of the word "enemy" contained in the Proclamation. Presumably a transaction with a purely German company registered in England could have been completed; indeed, completion could have been enforced. On December 21, 1914, the Stock Exchange



PEACE.

confirmed the Resolution that "American Share Certificates standing in the name of an Alien Enemy are no longer a good delivery," and the following day the following notice was posted: "Members and clerks who have been admitted under the provisions of Rule 29 are required to re-exhibit their Letters of Naturalization. Those who were formerly citizens of countries at present at war with the United Kingdom will be further required to satisfy the Committee that they have been denationalized in their country of origin."

When the Stock Exchange was re-opened on January 4, 1915, only British-born members and clerks and members and clerks who had qualified as required by the note of December 22



ON THE SWISS FRONTIER.

A searchlight running on rails along the boundary.

were admitted. The highly patriotic attitude displayed by the Stock Exchange throughout the war was no mean factor in the elimination of the subtler elements of enemy trade; and that that attitude was not welcomed by the enemy an imprudent law suit proved. The Stock Exchange realized very completely the ramifications of Trade-Banking, and was never deceived by the plausible reasons that kept enemy trading in some form or another alive during the war. It perhaps should be mentioned here that the rules as to the vesting and application of enemy property were made applicable in Ireland on February 4, 1915, in pursuance of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 1914.



The Trading with the Enemy Amendment Act passed on July 29, 1915, extended the rule as to the payment to the Custodian of dividends, interest and profits payable to or for the benefit of enemies to interest on securities issued by the British Government or the Government of any British Dominion or any Foreign Government or by any Corporation within or without the United Kingdom. The same act required due notification to be made to the Custodian of bank balances, deposits or debts due to enemies, and the duty of making the return was extended to companies.

By the Customs (War Powers) Act passed on March 16, 1915, it was provided that where the Commissioners of Customs and Excise had reason to suspect that the country of origin of any goods imported into the United Kingdom was an enemy country the goods might be seized, and in any proceedings for the forfeiture and condemnation thereof the country of origin should be deemed to be such an enemy country unless the contrary was proved. This Act was extended on July 29, 1915, to apply to any goods which the Commissioners had reason to suspect were being imported in contravention of the law relating to trading with the enemy.

By a Proclamation dated June 25, 1915, it was laid down that the rules as to trading with the enemy should apply to any person or body of persons of enemy nationality resident or carrying on business in China, Siam, Persia, or Morocco in the same manner as they applied to persons or bodies of persons resident or carrying on business in an enemy country. Opinion on the subject of enemy trading was growing rapidly at this date, and in this Proclamation there is the further provision that where an enemy had a local branch in China, Siam, Persia, or Morocco, nothing in Clause 6 of the Proclamation of Sep-

tember 9, 1914, should be construed so as to prevent transaction by or with that branch being treated as a transaction by or with an enemy. The provisions of the Proclamation of June 25, 1915, were on November 10, 1915, extended to Liberia and Portuguese East Africa and by an Order of the Privy Council of July 18, 1916, it was pointed out that these Proclamations made trading with enemy firms in Persia, Morocco, or Portuguese East Africa an offence, even if the firms were not black-listed. During the period various Rules of Court for England and Ireland dealing with the vesting and application of enemy property were issued. By the middle of the year 1915 it was gradually being realized by the advisers of the Crown that the network of German finance, commerce, and political intrigue could not be dealt with without breaking down trading that in indirect ways was affording large and welcome support to the enemy in Europe. It certainly was astonishing that the appreciation of the position was so long delayed. The strength of Germany largely lay in the hold that she had secured by her banking system on the machinery of world trade.

The system of royal licences to trade is very ancient, and came into practice in days when freedom of foreign exchange was unknown. Thus Dr. Cumingham tells us that in 1394 the King "granted licence to all his liege people of the realm of England to ship and carry corn out of the said realm to what parts please them except to his enemies." Moreover, foreign



A PATROL ON THE SWISS FRONTIER.

Smaller picture: An observation post in a tree-top.

merchants obtained royal permission to trade within the realm. Edward III. definitely encouraged foreign trade. From early times the trade between England and Germany was large and was carried on at East Coast towns as well as in London. But the royal power to license trade was not limited to trade in peace time. The question of policy, the question whether the importation of goods was a primary necessity, determined whether a licence should issue, and it did not turn on the question whether the licensee was an alien friend or an alien enemy. This was necessarily the case everywhere, and even Napoleon, to take a comparatively recent instance, issued licences permitting the importation of English goods, despite his famous Continental system which was to destroy England. Thus we might expect to find, as in fact was the case, that in the Great War a system of licensing, a system of necessary exemption within clearly defined limits from the mischief of the Acts against enemy trading, would arise. Thus in the proclamation of September 9, 1914, it was stated that "Nothing in this Proclamation shall be taken to prohibit anything which shall be expressly permitted by Our licence, or by the licence given on Our behalf by a Secretary of State, or the Board of Trade, whether such licences be especially granted to individuals or be announced as applying to classes of persons." Thus by licence granted by Mr. McKenna as a Secretary of State on September 22, 1914, persons authorized by him were to be empowered by the Treasury to make such payments and to carry out such exchange transactions for the benefit of persons resident in an enemy country or to receive payment of monies from persons so resident as the Treasury might sanction. On September 23 a licence was granted by the Board of Trade permitting payment of certain fees in respect of patents, designs, and trade marks. On September 25 the Board of Trade granted a licence permitting British owners of cargoes lying in neutral ports in enemy-owned ships to pay freight and other necessary charges to the agent of the ship-owner at such ports. Before this date a licence was granted by the Home Secretary permitting certain German banks to carry on business, subject to elaborate restrictions by which the operations were limited to making the realizable assets of the banks available for distribution and to discharging these liabilities as far as might be practicable. Again, on October 14, licence was granted to

these banks to receive dividends on certain shares and to transfer such dividends in accordance with the directions and restrictions of the licence. On January 8, 1915, licence by the Treasury permitted transactions by certain Turkish banks with certain branches. But, on the whole, licences were granted very sparsely during the Great War.

It will be convenient to summarize briefly the subsequent legislation. On December 23, 1915, an Act was passed to provide for the extension of the restrictions relating to trading with the enemy to persons to whom, although not resident or carrying on business in enemy territory, it was, by reason of their enemy nationality or enemy associations, expedient to extend such restrictions. The power to prohibit trading with such persons or bodies of persons was to be exercised by Royal Proclamations. Any list of persons and bodies of persons, incorporated or unincorporated, with whom such trading was prohibited by a Proclamation under the Act could be varied or added to by an Order made by the Lords of the Council on the recommendation of a Secretary of State. Moreover, such prohibited trading was declared to be trading with the enemy. By a Proclamation, under the Act dated February 29, 1916, the King prohibited all persons or bodies of persons, incorporated or unincorporated, resident, carrying on business, or being in the United Kingdom, from trading with any of the persons or bodies of persons mentioned in the List contained in the Proclamation. This List was varied and added to by subsequent Orders in Council. The Proclamation was amended on April 26 and revoked on May 23, when a new Proclamation was substituted, which itself was varied and extended on August 8 and 22. On July 18, 1916, the black list was vastly extended by the addition of names from all over the neutral world, including a long list—mostly with German names—from the United States of America. On January 27, 1916, the Board of Trade were given power, where it appeared that the business carried on in the United Kingdom by any person, firm, or company was, by reason of the enemy nationality or enemy association of that person, firm or company, or of the members of that firm or company or any of them, or otherwise, carried on wholly or mainly for the benefit of or under the control of enemy subjects, to make an order prohibiting the carrying on of the business except under conditions or requiring the business to be wound

up. Instances of winding-up orders under the Act are to be found in the *London Gazette* for October 17, 20, 24 and 27, 1916. The Board of Trade were also given power to appoint a controller to carry out the order, with very large powers of management, while the distribution of the proceeds and assets of the business were provided for and the publication of lists of persons, firms, and companies who were subject to an order under the Act was directed. The Act also made provision for the cancellation of all contracts with enemies or persons subject to an order where such contracts were against the public interest; it gave the Board power to vest enemy property in a custodian; it imposed upon every enemy subject in the United Kingdom a duty to make returns to the custodian when required as to property belonging to him or in which he was interested; it gave the custodian the right to have any enemy patent granted to him in pursuance of an order under the Trading with the Enemy Acts; it extended (a provision of a most significant kind) the duration of restrictions on dealings with enemy property to such period after the war as might be declared by Order in Council. The Act, moreover, in view of the decision of the Court of Appeal in the *Continental Tyre Company* case, enabled the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies to refuse registration of Companies where any subscriber of the Memo-

randum of Association or a proposed director was an enemy, and to direct the winding up of any company which was carrying on business that infringed the rule against trading with the enemy, either directly or through an agent, branch, or subsidiary company outside the United Kingdom.

On August 10, 1916, a further Act was passed to make provision with respect to copyright under the Copyright Act of 1911, in works first published or made in an enemy country during the war. Such copyright in all such works was deemed by the Act to vest in the Public Trustee in his capacity as custodian under the Trading with the Enemy Acts.

All these supplementary Acts improved little by little the general position, and gradually, as supplemented by the decisions of the Courts, made trading with the enemy, even in indirect fashion, substantially difficult, though it could hardly be said that the legislation stopped the processes of evasion that the position of branches in neutral countries made possible.

It is more than a matter of interest to turn to the special legislation of the Dominions and Crown Colonies of the British Empire relating to trading with the enemy. The Isle of Man and Jersey adopted in full the home legislation, but when we turn to the great Dominions we find special problems dealt with in special fashion. First consider the



BEEF FOR EXPORTATION: A SCENE AT ROTTERDAM.



[Vandyk.]
Rt. Hon. W. M. HUGHES.
Prime Minister of Australia

Far East. The Commercial Intercourse with Enemies Ordinance (No. 6) applied not only to British-India, but to the territories of the native princes and chiefs and to all persons and to all subjects of the King and to all servants of the King in such territories. It was by section 3 made illegal to take any part, direct or indirect, in the floating of loans by an enemy State, or to enter into any contracts with or deal in any way with such State. Moreover, any contravention of the provisions of any Royal Proclamation or Order in Council relating to trading with the enemy was made subject to heavy penalties by way of imprisonment and fine. Where a company or an association was an offender, any cognisant member or officer was to be deemed to have committed the offence. Thus the Government of India was in the position to deal with the special trading problems of India.

Ceylon adopted no local attitude on the subject of enemy trading, but by Ordinance 20 of the year 1914 placed herself in the exact position obtaining in Great Britain. At Hong Kong a special Trading with the Enemy Ordinance (No. 25, 1914) was passed, making the colony subject to the Royal Proclamations on the question. In the Straits Settlements the English legislation was reproduced, not only as to trading with the enemy, but as to the winding up of alien enemy trading companies, an aspect of the problem that had special significance in the Far East. In the Mauritius a Proclamation, on September 15, 1914, forbade trading with the enemy, and



[Vandyk.]
Rt. Hon. SIR ROBERT BORDEN.
Prime Minister of Canada.

this was confirmed by Ordinance 28. In the Seychelles, as early as August 3, 1914, the Governor was given by Ordinance power to forbid trading with the enemy under very heavy penalties, while Ordinance No. 20 authorized the issue of warrants of inspection and the appointment of a controller of any business where any offence had been or was likely to be committed. Thus we see that throughout the Far East the problem of rooting out German influence and the corrupt practices of German trade was vividly in mind from the opening of the war. The vigour with which this work was undertaken had undoubtedly very important results.

When we turn (in the valuable compilation of imperial legislation contained in the *Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation* for January, 1916, and in "The Summary of Emergency Legislation passed by the Parliaments of the Empire," issued by the Empire Parliamentary Association) from the Far East to the Far South we find that the Commonwealth of Australia, legislating for the whole continent, at once imposed, on the subject of trading with the enemy, legislation practically identical with the Acts passed in the United Kingdom, and those Acts were supported by the War Precautions Act (Defence of the Realm) and the Aliens Restriction Act. Australia was peculiarly alive to the dangers of Germanism in trade, for she was suffering from it at the outbreak of war, and was watching her commerce and her industry slowly passing into the unseen, but unrelaxing, control of a subtle

combination of banking and trading methods. It was perhaps a not altogether insignificant fact that by the Commonwealth Bank Act of 1914 power was given to the State Bank to acquire or take over the business of any other bank. In accordance with the Enemy Contracts Amendment Act (No. 11, 1915) the "Australian Metal Company" was crushed. Mr. Hughes stated (*The Times*, March 10, 1916) that "for twelve months after war broke out not an ounce of Australian lead or zinc—the life-blood of munitions—could be bought in the heart of the Empire except through a German agency. . . . This great metal combine, controlled everywhere by German influence, called itself in America the American Metal Company, in Africa the African Metal Company, in Australia the Australian Metal Company." Mr. Hughes did not state what name it bore in England, but the question was often asked during the war whether this great combine was still affecting the price of metal in the country. At any rate, in Australia the company was wound up.

In New Zealand trading with the enemy was defined in accordance with the King's Proclamation, and declared to be an indictable offence, punishable by a long term of imprisonment and a heavy fine. In the case of a corporation the maximum fine was £5,000. More-



(Swaine.)

Rt. Hon. W. F. MASSEY.
Prime Minister of New Zealand.

over, large powers of search on warrant were created in the case where any person was suspected of trading with the enemy. The Acts of 1914-15 against such trading were elaborate and effective, and were supplemented by the Enemy Contracts Act of July 28, 1915, which struck swiftly at great and dangerous corporations. The law in Fiji was not less stringent than in the great Dominions.

In the Middle South of the Empire, as we may call South and Central Africa, we find that Northern Rhodesia, Gambia, the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Uganda, Zanzibar, all provided with speed against the trade of and with the enemy, and of course the great Dominion of South Africa in her legislation of 1914-15 took stringent measures to throttle all vestiges of German trade. British Guiana adopted the home legislation.


When we pass north-west we find that Canada had recourse to the most stringent of war legislation. Her boundaries marched with the boundaries of a neutral nation to some extent dominated in commercial spirit by its huge German population, and hence it was necessary to take the most detailed precautions to keep the enemy, his trade, his corruption and his fatal influence out of this great British Dominion. The Governor, of course, was given enormous powers, including "censorship, arrest, detention, exclusion and deportation, control of harbours and ports, trading, exportation, importation, production and manufacture; appropriation, control, forfeiture, and disposition of property and of the use thereof."



Whitlock

Mr. JUSTICE BAILHACHE.

Who heard the Mannheim Insurance Company case.



TAKEN OFF A DUTCH STEAMER.

Parcels containing rubber which were produced as evidence at a Prize Court.

an impossibility. The Empire had awakened to its own capacity; it would never again allow the German trader and banker to act as the forerunner of the German armies.

Canada was determined to sweep out with a relentless besom the whole influence of German trade. It is probable that that influence had not become so entirely dominating and vicious as in Australia, but Canada's turn was at hand, and the Great War came in time to save her from evils that were constantly increasing in the United States. Newfoundland was no less determined to protect itself from "the Great Anarchist" of Europe, and gave to its Ministry powers not less wide than those wielded by the Duke of Connaught in Council in Canada in the first two years of the war.

Bermuda, the West Indies and the Mediterranean Colonies, with their anti-German Trading legislation, completed the world-wide revolt against the international criminal. It was a wonderful spectacle; not less wonderful in its way than the supplies of men and goods and money that the Empire sent to the assistance of the Mother Country was the organization of the entire Empire against the persistence of German trade. The action of the Empire overseas rendered the revival of Germanism

It is now necessary to consider briefly some leading cases decided during the war in the English Courts as to trading with the enemy. In the case of *In re Bank für Handel und Industrie* Mr. Justice Warrington decided that Section 4 (1) of the Trading with the Enemy Amendment Act, 1914, which empowered the Court, on the application of a creditor of an enemy, to vest in the official custodian any real or personal property belonging to the enemy, was directed against specific property which could be definitely pointed out and did not include an alleged credit balance on a running account between the enemy and a bank, the existence of which balance was denied by the bank. To say the least, it was unfortunate that the Act did not provide means of ascertaining whether such floating balance existed and of securing that such balance if it did exist should pass into the hands of the Government custodian.

In the case of *W. L. Ingle, Limited, v. Mannheim Insurance Company* Mr. Justice Bailhache took the somewhat surprising step of extending to the case of companies the Common Law rule that the question whether an individual is an

alien enemy for the purposes of contracts and rights of suit depends on whether he carries on business in this country or not. He said that the rule applied to companies whose head office was in Germany but which had a branch office in England in respect of business transactions with such branch office. This view of the identical character of a corporation and an individual was based on the view of the House of Lords in the case of *Janson v. Driefontein Mines*, arising out of the South African War in 1902. The view that a corporation is "a natural born subject" of the country where it exists proved to be extraordinarily fruitful of evil during the Great War, and it received its first manifestation at the hands of Mr. Justice Bailhache. It was impossible for a judge of first instance to stand up against the satiric legal genius of Lord Macnaghten and the *obiter dicta* of the Law Lords. Yet common sense and common prudence both seemed to protest against the assumption that a limited company which might well in its inception and conduct be an alien enemy, is because of its place of registration "a natural born subject" of the country under the laws of which it was regis-



Elliott & Fry.

LORD COZENS-HARDY.

One of the Court of Appeal which heard the Daimler Company Case.



[Whitlock.]

Mr. JUSTICE ATKIN.

Who decided that war dissolves partnership between British subjects and alien enemies.

tered. But this fatal and unusual sense of legal logic was destined to go farther than it was carried by Mr. Justice Bailhache. In the case of the *Continental Tyre and Rubber Company (Great Britain), Limited, v. Daimler Company, Limited*, the plaintiff company was a trading company incorporated in England and carrying on business at the registered office in London. It was, in fact, a good example of the German trading principle that every country must be penetrated by branches of a central German concern: the principle that dominates the various German metal companies. In this case the London company was an offshoot of a German company, its business being to capture for the German company the English tyre market. Similar offshoots existed in various parts of the world. The vast bulk of the shares of the company were held by the German company, and the remaining shares, except one, were held by Germans resident in Germany. The one share was held by the secretary of the company, a German by birth who was naturalized in England in 1910. All the directors were Germans resident in Germany. The Court of Appeal held, on January 15, 1915, that this

was an English company ; that the constitution of the company had nothing to do with the case ; that the payment of a debt to the company was not a payment to the alien enemy shareholders or for their benefit, and that the right of the plaintiff company to recover a debt in the English Courts was not affected by the fact that the whole personnel of the company was German. The judges responsible for this decision were Lord Reading, Lord Cozens-Hardy, Lord Justice Kennedy, Lord Justice Phillimore and Lord Justice Pickford. The redeeming features of the case were the brilliant dissenting judgment of Lord Justice Buckley (subsequently Lord Wrenbury) and the protest in the columns of *The Times* from eminent law peers. Lord Wrenbury, in the course of his judgment, said :

The immense importance of the question whether it is impossible for any purpose to look behind the corporation at the person of the incorporator may be illustrated by the case of Merchant Shipping. Under S. 1 (d) of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, ships owned by a Shipping Company incorporated in this country are British ships. The individual members of that body corporate may be aliens. If the personality of the incorporators can for no purpose be regarded there is nothing to prevent alien enemies from owning and sailing British ships under the British flag. If this judgment be (as having regard to the judgment of the other members of the Court I must assume that it is) wrong, the matter is one which calls urgently for legislation.

The learned judge pointed out that those



LORD SHAW.

A Law Lord who heard the Daimler Company case.



[Whitlock.]

LORD HALSBURY.

Former Lord Chancellor, who delivered the leading judgment in the Daimler case.

great lawyers and jurists of the United States. Marshall and Story, would have none of the doctrine that an artificial corporation is either a citizen or an alien. It is necessary to go behind the corporation to see what in fact is the nature of the creature. The case was carried to the House of Lords, but apparently till the hearing of the appeal on June 30, 1916, German companies could freely operate in England if they had gone through the inexpensive formality of registering their London agents as an English limited company.

The House of Lords has not infrequently been found, even by a Radical Government, a very real help in time of trouble, and once more it proved its virtue in the *Daimler* case. First of all, the House of Lords swept the action out of the way altogether on the ground that the secretary of the company had no authority from the company to commence the action. "No one," said that eminent lawyer, Lord Halsbury, who at the age of ninety years showed a legal virility and acumen worthy of the greatest days of English law, "has authority to issue a writ on behalf of an alien enemy, because he has no right himself to sue in the Courts of a King with whom his own Sovereign is at war. No person or any body of persons to whom attaches the disability of being under such circumstances can have authority, and to attempt to shield

the fact of giving the enemy the money due to them by the machinery invented for a lawful purpose would be equivalent to enclosing the gold and attempting to excuse it by alleging that the bag containing it was of English manufacture."

Probably few judgments delivered in recent years have had such an incisive and caustic quality as this judgment by Lord Halsbury. He dealt with Lord Reading's argument in the Court of Appeal in a most effective fashion. He said :

I observe the Lord Chief Justice says that the company is a live thing. If it were, it would be capable of loyalty and disloyalty. But it is not; and the argument of its being incapable of being loyal or disloyal is founded on its not being "a live thing." Neither is the bag in my illustration "a live thing." And the mere machinery to do an illegal act will not purge its illegality—*fraus circuitu non purgatur*. After all, this is a question of ingenious words, useful for the purpose for which they were designed, but wholly incapable of being strained to an illegal purpose. The limited liability was a very useful introduction into our system, and there was no reason why foreigners should not, while dealing honestly with us, partake of the benefits of that institution; but it seems to me too monstrous to suppose that for an unlawful, because, after a declaration of war, a hostile, purpose the forms of that institution should be used, and enemies of the State, while actually at war with us, be allowed to continue trading and actually to sue for their profits in trade in an English Court of justice.

All the members of the House of Lords sitting to hear this extraordinarily important case concurred in the judgment delivered in respect

to the question of authority by Lord Halsbury: Viscount Mersey, Lord Kinnear, Lord Atkinson, Lord Shaw of Dunfermline, Lord Parker of Waddington, Lord Sumner, and Lord Parmoor. It was certainly the strongest Court that had sat in England during the twentieth century, and it swept away with one accord the pestilent doctrine laid down by the Court of Appeal that an alien enemy by shrouding himself in the fictions of our company law could evade the time-long common law that it is always illegal and often treasonable to trade with the enemy. Lord Shaw and Lord Parmoor considered that this particular company was not an enemy company or one of enemy character.

It is important to quote some of the arguments of some of the law lords. Lord Shaw, for instance, stated a general proposition that every British subject should keep in mind :

There is no debate at this time of day on the general proposition that the direct and immediate consequence of a declaration of war by or against this country is to make all trading with the enemy illegal. The proposition was dealt with recently in this House in the case of *Horlock v. Beal*. War is war, not between Sovereigns or Governments alone. It puts each subject of the one belligerent into the position of being the legal enemy of each subject of the other belligerent; and all persons bound in allegiance and loyalty to His Majesty are consequently and immediately, by the force of the common law, forbidden to trade with the enemy Power



FOREIGN CARGO-BOATS IN THE HARBOUR AT BREMERHAVEN.



FOREIGN SAILING-BOATS LYING IN PORT AT HAMBURG.

or its subjects . . . the prohibition against trading is binding in regard to all action, direct or indirect, personal or representative. . . . trading with the enemy on behalf of a company is just as much prohibited as personal trading. A limited company, incorporated in England and although English as regards all the results which flow from such incorporation, is thus completely barred by the Trading with the Enemy Acts—not by reason of the company's allegiance or loyalty, but by reason of the fact that there is no human agency possible within the realm through which, and within the law, trading with the enemy could be accomplished. In obedience to that law all trading with the enemy, direct or indirect, stops; no firm or company, wheresoever or howsoever directed, can so trade, nor can anything be negotiated or transacted for it through any person or agency in this country.

Lord Parker and Lord Sumner (with the assent of Lord Mersey and Lord Kinnear) laid down the principle that an English company can assume "an enemy character. This will be the case if its agents or the persons in *de facto* control of its affairs, whether authorized or not, are resident in an enemy country, or, wherever resident, are adhering to the enemy or taking instructions from or acting under the control of enemies. A person knowingly dealing with the company in such a case is trading with the enemy." The learned lords laid down two further propositions of singular importance in relation to commerce during war: (1) "A company registered in the United Kingdom, but carrying on business in

a neutral country through agents properly authorized and resident here or in the neutral country, is *prima facie* to be regarded as a friend, but may, through its agents or persons in *de facto* control of its affairs, assume an enemy character"; (2) "A company registered in the United Kingdom but carrying on business in an enemy country is to be regarded as an enemy."

These and other propositions were set out by Lord Parker in order to afford "convenient and intelligible guidance to the public on questions of trading with the enemy." For this reason these rules or principles deserved, and still deserve, the widest circulation. The House of Lords on June 30, 1916, dealt a deliberate and deadly blow at that system of enemy trade which had, by reason of the intricacies of company and banking law the world over, spread like a cancerous network almost incapable of elimination. The House of Lords dealt with the illegal basis of the whole process—illegal, that is to say, in time of war. It struck straight at the cause while carefully safeguarding itself from any proposition that could be said to hamper trading between all foreigners and Great Britain at the end of the war. That future eventuality was no concern of the House of Lords. The sole concern of



THE FRUIT AND VEGETABLE MARKET AT HAMBURG.

that great bench of lawyers was to see that English legal fictions were not used, as had unhappily been the case, for the purpose of evading in every region of the British Empire the law against trading with the enemy. The limited company afforded the Germans an admirable instrument for that purpose: the House of Lords took that instrument out of their hands. The decision, in fact, operated as a guide to the Courts throughout the Empire, and it is certain that in the decision on the *Daimler Company* case the House of Lords rendered a service that could not have been so adequately performed even by legislation. One further quotation from Lord Parker's judgment is necessary, as it summarises in a phrase the operative force of the Statutes and Proclamations on the subject of trading with the enemy referred to in this chapter. "I have," he said, "carefully considered them, and do not think that they limit or exclude Common Law rules or principles or, in the case of corporations, restrict the trade which is unlawful to trading with such corporations as are incorporated under the laws of an enemy country. Equally little can the Proclamations be read as licences to do anything that they do not in terms prohibit."

This great suit and the specific language

used on the whole question of trading with the enemy render it unnecessary here to refer to the many other law suits dealing with specific and technical questions of trading with the enemy. It will be sufficient to refer in a few words to the important case of *Porter v. Freudenberg*, decided in the Court of Appeal on January 19, 1915, since it laid down certain principles that are of great importance in the various problems of enemy trading. The judgment delivered by Lord Reading was a fine exposition of the history of the law relating to suits in which alien enemies are involved. The Court held that the test of a person being an alien enemy is his place of residence or business and not his nationality; that an alien cannot sue in the King's Courts unless he has a licence to reside in the realm; that he may be sued in those Courts, and if sued may defend and appeal. All these points were of importance in view of the fact that there was a large licensed alien population in the United Kingdom during the war, and in view of the fact that aliens outside the realm, and unlicensed aliens within, were determined to take every advantage for the purpose of trade of the facilities offered by the British Courts. Slowly but effectually the alien enemy was suppressed in his adventures, and during the third



THE FOWNES CASE.

Carrying away from the Court the Company's books which were referred to in the case.

year of the war he was no longer able to secure from Statutes, Proclamations, or decisions of the Law Courts that comfort which seemed so easy to secure earlier in the war. All that remained was the attempt by fraud or force to push German goods into British markets. With some such cases this chapter must conclude.

One of the chief needs of Germany during the war was iron ore, and she was not particular where she got it—from Belgium or France by robbery, from England and the Dominions by fraud. Iron ore destined for Krupp's works shipped on a Dutch steamer at a Spanish port figured in the Prize Court on May 17, 1915. A few days later Scotland, and incidentally Great Britain, was stirred by the prosecution of Glasgow merchants for agreeing to supply and, in fact, supplying the Phœnix, the Krupp and the Rheinische Steel Works companies with iron ore from Nova Scotia. The case was tried before Lord Strathelyde and a jury in the Court of Justiciary at Edinburgh in June, 1915, when the Lord Advocate contended that Messrs. William Jacks & Co. had as full control over the ore in question when it was on the quay at Rotterdam as if it lay in their warehouse in Glasgow. The agents at Rotter-

dam asked for definite instructions as to the ore at the outbreak of war and the accused made no effort to prevent it getting into Germany. That was the case for the Crown. The Judge, in his summing-up, laid stress on the fact that the defendants had tried to stop the vessel going to Rotterdam and therefore knew the danger. The jury, by a majority, found the defendants guilty, "but in view of the unprecedented circumstances of this particular case owing to the sudden outbreak of war and the consequent violent derangement of ordinary commercial transactions" unanimously asked for the utmost possible leniency to the accused. Lord Strathelyde, in passing sentence, said: "You have been convicted on a series of charges of the gravity of which you were fully conscious, and no words are needed to intensify the painfulness of the position in which you find yourselves. The Act which I am administering warrants imposition of a long term of penal servitude, in addition to a fine. . . . I give the fullest possible weight to the recommendation to leniency, and, after anxious consideration, the least sentence which I think it my duty to impose on each of you is imprisonment for six calendar months and, in addition, a fine of £2,000 each, with an additional six months imprisonment each in default of payment." The punishment was, no doubt, severe for men in the position of the prisoners, who had already suffered the terrible disgrace of the charge and the trial; but it was certainly the minimum that could be imposed. A fine alone would not have proved a deterrent to others who might be tempted by the prices that Germany was prepared to offer for the means of enlarging her supplies of munitions of war. The penalty was undoubtedly effective. Comparatively few cases of this type disgraced the annals of the war as waged by Great Britain, and it may be said here that, apart altogether from deterrents or fear of exposure, the sense of public spirit was so strong that there was in the vast majority of cases little fear that important business houses would yield to the sordid temptations that Germany offered. Indeed, in some cases, the obscurity of the Government proclamations was responsible for what at first sight looked like crime. The wording of the proclamation in respect to business with the foreign branches of a London firm was so far from clear that Mr. Justice Rowlatt, in the case of the charge against Mr. J. T. Drughorn of entering into a contract to supply iron ore to Germany, said

(at the trial on January 20, 1915) that "it might have been considered the policy of the Government that business done abroad, having its centre in London, should not be interfered with to the extent that we now saw necessary to interfere with it." The defendant had, in fact, been misled by the wording of the proclamation against trading with the enemy and had acted in perfect good faith. The judge, therefore, imposed a merely nominal penalty and the defendant suffered neither in purse nor reputation.

The charge against Messrs. Fownes at the Guildhall in the City of London, on January 18, 1916, of having traded, between September 15, 1914, and December 15, 1914, with the enemy by obtaining goods from Germany, was very exceptional. It was the converse of the Glasgow case, where the charge was the exporting of what was practically war material to Germany. The Fownes firm had branches in New York and Germany. The latter branch, it was stated, was registered as a limited



(Vandyk.)

LORD JUSTICE ELDON BANKES.

Who heard an important case concerning enemy shares in a British shipping company.



MR. JUSTICE YOUNGER.

Who heard an important case concerning debts of Krupps, of Essen.

company, all the shares in which were held by the London firm. Mr. Travers Humphreys, for the prosecution, stated that "the New York branch was managed by Mr. Ernest Smellie, who was also an Englishman. It was a mere branch of the London house, and in respect of goods sent direct from Germany to New York payment was made from London and the proceeds of the sale of the goods imported from Germany came back to London. . . . An undertaking was given to each of these German manufacturers [four different firms in Saxony] that while they could not have cash for their goods for the present, they should be paid at the end of the war—with interest." It was quite clear that Messrs. Fownes declined to remit any money until after the war. The defendants eventually pleaded guilty, their counsel stating that "upon the question of what were the true legal relations between a branch in New York of an English partnership and German traders in Germany no public light had been thrown." Of course, the only possible defences in such a case were that the Government had left the legal position obscure and that the defendants had no intention (as was the case) of benefiting Germany. Mr. Justice Low, in passing sentence, said that "we must

show to all and sundry engaged in business that these offences, if committed, cannot be redeemed by a pecuniary penalty," and upon two of the three prisoners terms of imprisonment in the second division were imposed. Looking at these cases in the perspective of time, the true interest of them lies in the fact that the complex new relations of commerce between England, Germany and America made it very difficult, but not impossible, to enforce the common law doctrine against trading with the enemy. The fact that such cases were rare showed that English traders resisted in a patriotic fashion the temptation to trade with Germany through neutral countries. In an earlier case Albert Kupfer was charged with paying to a firm in Holland a debt due from the Frankfort branch of his firm. The firm had also a branch in Johannesburg. The prisoner was convicted and sentenced to a short term of imprisonment. A question of law arose as to whether the payment was illegal, since it was a payment to a neutral. Lord Reading held on February 9, 1915, that the payment was a payment within the Proclamation of September 9, 1914, which was introduced to prevent devices by which mercantile houses might seek indirectly to make payments notwithstanding the prohibition against making them direct. The conviction was, therefore, affirmed. Some of the cases of prosecution were really due not to want of patriotism, but to a natural desire to collect debts due from German firms. Thus the former German consul at Birmingham was convicted of trying to collect such debts amounting to large sums, and fined, though the Crown readily admitted that there was no hostile intention on the part of the unfortunate merchant.

The real difficulty of the position was not these sporadic cases; it was the almost insuperable difficulty of freeing British finance and commerce from German influence. A striking instance of Germanic methods was that of the Groedel Brothers Steamship Company (Limited). Lord Wrenbury, in his famous dissenting judgment in the *Daimler Company* case, pointed out the danger of an English limited company formed to conduct a shipping business, and in fact entirely composed of Germans. He evidently did not know of the *Groedel* case, which exactly illustrated his point. This "English" company owned four steamships registered in Great Britain and flying the

British flag, but practically all the shareholders were Hungarians who lived in Budapest. The steamers, intended to load timber from the forests of Transylvania, were built by an English firm on mortgage terms (long since paid off), so that the share capital of £5,000 bore no relationship to the immense value of the four ships of the company. Of the 500 shares only four were held in England. On October 17, 1916, by an Order of the Controller appointed by the Board of Trade, the ships (then under requisition) were sold by auction at the Baltic Shipping Exchange and realized £288,500, or £15 12s. a ton, twice the normal value. It was at the time felt to be possible that other shipping firms before the war were dominated by German interests.

The case was not only a good instance of German influence, but it brought out one of the main difficulties that faced the Government of the day in the matter of trading with the enemy. A century earlier the question was a comparatively simple one, since it was ended when the fighting was ended. The difficulties of the resumption of trading after the war never arose. But that difficulty existed in a vivid form in 1914-16. The problem of *post-bellum* trading was inextricably intermingled with that of war trading. Whatever was done under the legislation against trading with the enemy had inevitably some close relation to *post-bellum* trading. It was impossible, even in the framing of legislation, to forget it. The investigations that the enforcement of the law against enemy trading necessitated showed that Germany in the pre-war period had so arranged her commerce and war finance as to secure that they should play an active part in the actual events of the war. When it became the duty of the British Government to enforce the law against trading with the enemy it at once became plain that that trading was so related to a system arranged with the war in mind that it was impossible merely to suspend relations with the intention of resuming relations on the termination of the war. The *status quo ante bellum* was clearly a *status* that was a perpetual national danger. Yet the Government, imbued with British traditions of fair play, and wide awake to the necessity of securing after the war a full share of the trade of the world, seemed to be framing the trading with the enemy legislation as to make it possible for the old order to return with the return of peace. Enemy houses in London were kept

going (as indeed they were kept going in Germany, with a very shrewd sense of *post-bellum* necessity) under strict supervision. Of this a salient example was the case of the enemy banks, to which reference has already been made. In the late autumn of 1916 a vigorous movement arose, especially in London, to eliminate the residue of German influence in finance and trade. Volleys of questions were fired in Parliament at Mr. McKenna, Mr. Herbert Samuel, Mr. Pretymann and Mr. Runciman, questions such as "whether private groups of firms are entitled to organize inter-working as before with German groups of firms, and whether he will consider the desirability of requiring that such inter-working shall at least receive the sanction of the Board of Trade?" In the House of Commons on October 17, 1916, the Unionist War Committee, under the chairmanship of Sir Edward Carson, passed this resolution:

That a Committee be appointed to examine and report to this Committee what alterations appear necessary and urgent during the war in the existing law as regards respectively, naturalization, banking, joint stock companies, and the changing of surnames, with a view to eliminating enemy influence in the conduct of the affairs of this country and in its public service.

The Committee, consisting of Mr. Ronald

McNeill, Mr. Joynson-Hicks, Mr. Rupert Gwynne, Sir Owen Philipps, Mr. Leslie Scott, Sir Henry Craik and Mr. Neville, began work at once. The efforts of these members of the House of Commons were seconded by the Corporation of the City of London, which appointed a Special Committee to deal with the question of alien enemies then still trading in the City. At that date £2,312,224 of enemy funds arising from the liquidation of German interests in England was in the hands of the Public Trustee. At last the pressure of the Law Courts fully enforcing the Common Law and the pressure of public opinion conjointly were having notable effect in all directions.

The question of the German banks in London was in October, 1916, made a test question. On October 24 Mr. Pretymann stated that no winding-up order had been made

because under the licences granted shortly after the outbreak of war due provision is made for the control by the Treasury of any transactions of these banks, and for the limitation of the business to completing transactions entered into before the war so far as necessary for making the assets available for meeting liabilities, any surplus being deposited with the Bank of England to the order of the Treasury.

From the answer it almost seemed as if the Treasury, like the Bourbons, had learnt



ON THE DANISH-GERMAN FRONTIER
Overlooking the North Sea.

nothing, even if they had forgotten nothing. The danger, as was pointed out above, was that these banks, by their very existence, rendered possible dealings in other related banking circles that fundamentally would have infringed the Common Law rule against trading with the enemy. Mr. McKenna, however, on October 26, in answer to Mr. Butcher, announced that the exceptional circumstances which placed the five banks in question in a different position to the banks that were, "as far as banking business was concerned," under the Aliens Restrictions Order had almost gone. British, Allied and neutral creditors had been paid off, the surplus of assets was then about to be transferred to the Bank of England, "together with the transfer of securities, which are at the absolute disposal of the bank itself as apart from its customers." Arrangements had been made to dispose of the securities

and balances and so break the connexion as regards all customers and vest the property of every customer in the official custodian. Mr. McKenna stated that £20,000,000 had been paid to British, Allied and neutral creditors. But vast payments to neutral creditors might have meant, although it presumably did not mean, vast payments to trustees or assignees of enemy subjects; and the realization of securities might have had the same effect. If so, the principle that trading with the enemy is illegal would have been infringed on a vast scale. Moreover, it was asserted that, as a matter of fact, the British creditors had not been provided for.

But, at any rate, the closing of the banks for "banking business" was secured before November, 1916. The question still remained open: Were these and other enemy alien banks to be finally and permanently closed for all purposes.



CHAPTER CLI.

THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME (I).

PREPARATION FOR THE OFFENSIVE—ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT—WORK OF THE ENGINEERS—AIR RECONNAISSANCE AND PHOTOGRAPHS—DESTRUCTION OF GERMAN CAPTIVE BALLOONS—THE GERMAN DEFENCES DESCRIBED—GERMAN CONFIDENCE—AREA OF THE OPERATIONS—MAIN FORCES UNDER SIR H. RAWLINSON—THE ARMY CORPS COMMANDS—THE ATTACK ON JULY 1—FRICOURT—MONTAUBAN—THE ULSTER DIVISION—LONDON TERRITORIALS—THE FRENCH OFFENSIVE UNDER GENERAL FOCH—RESULTS OF THE FIRST DAY—THE OPERATIONS FROM JULY 2 TO JULY 6—THE “HORSESHOE”—RESULTS OF JULY 7 AND 8—CONTALMAISON AND MAMETZ WOOD.

THE time had now come when the Allies were prepared to assume the offensive and to continue it.* They had troops enough available, and these were amply provided with weapons, ammunition and equipment of every kind. The progress in armament which had been made since the beginning of the year was enormous. In former campaigns it was thought sufficient to equip the first line of artillery with 500 rounds per gun. At the present time 5,000 would be insufficient. Moreover, the calibres of the weapons employed had been much added to, thereby augmenting enormously the power of the shells. This had involved a corresponding addition to the weight of ammunition which had to be moved up to the front and deposited in the advance depôts. In its turn, this taxed severely the resources of the lines of communication; but these difficulties had all been overcome.

A good idea of the effect of the greatly increased power of the Allied artillery, as shown in the preliminary bombardment, may be gathered from the description given by a German officer who was in the trenches near the Somme. It was published in New York on

July 9 in an Associated Press cable. It said that the Germans here had “rows of massively built positions” which they had regarded as “practically indestructible and impregnable, but the event proved that the progress made in offensive tactics since the September offensive had not been realized.” The German officer went on to say:


At the beginning of the artillery preparation the enemy showed us a new thing in the destruction of observation balloons. Airmen swooped down on them and shot fire-balls on them from above, a burst of flame marking the end of each balloon hit.

The second day's bombardment, on June 26, brought another surprise in the shape of aerial mines of unheard-of calibre and thrown in incredible numbers. The explosion of the first of these air torpedoes caused such a tremendous detonation that the windows of our bombproofs were shattered and a massive pillar of black earth was thrown up, perhaps a hundred yards, into the air. This showered the whole neighbourhood with turf, bricks, and earth. It was a regular eruption of Vesuvius.

The destructive effects of this uninterrupted throwing of the heaviest mines were almost immediately visible. The entrances of two bombproof shelters were buried within a few minutes, and the inmates had to be dug out. A few minutes later an orderly who had been sent with a message to the left of the company returned with the report that the trench had been completely levelled. Going to verify this, I saw as far as the eye could reach crater after crater, each about 6 ft. deep. The earth in between was thrown up in a wild, high-heaped chaos of trench timbers and wire entanglements. Nine months' work, day and night, had been destroyed in a few minutes.

Report after report arrived of “bombproof” shelters demolished by these aerial torpedoes, the inmates

* For the events immediately preceding the Battle of the Somme, see Chapter CXXI.



TWO OF THE BRITISH HOWITZERS ON THE SOMME. [Official Photograph.]

being buried in the ruins. As the trenches became rapidly levelled, communication between the different sections grew difficult, and the communication trenches leading to the second and third lines were so heavily shelled that it was impossible to traverse them. An orderly sent with a message to the captain was away for hours, and, finally, returned with his mission unaccomplished.

The left flank of my company's trench was by this time so obliterated that it was difficult to follow its trace, and the only means of progress was to dash from crater to crater, fully exposed to the enemy's fire while crossing the intervening ridges. I arrived finally, after a period of intense danger, and found the left platoon of the company in the same condition as the right platoon.

A number of the men were still buried in demolished bomb-proofs, and their comrades worked for hours excavating them. During this work our intrepid battalion surgeon arrived with an oxygen apparatus and stood for hours under heavy artillery fire administering the gas to the half-suffocated men, and attempting to revive those who had been asphyxiated.

The bombardment continued without a break, aerial torpedoes being hurled at ranges such as have never before been heard of for mine-throwers, while the French artillery was pounding every yard of the ground with an intense fire of big shells.

The Engineers and Pioneer battalions had been hard at work repairing roads or constructing new ones, improving existing railways or laying fresh lines and constructing sidings and platforms to facilitate the loading and unloading of stores, guns and troops so that a perfect system of approaches from the bases to the front was available.* The Army Ordnance Corps and the Army Service Corps had utilized these to the fullest extent. Besides

* Altogether some 3,000 miles of railway were constructed.

all this labour there was a constant succession of mines to be driven against the enemy's works and counter mines against those he was pushing forward against ours. The lighter forms of artillery, trench mortars and other engines for throwing heavy bombs over a short distance had been made in large numbers, grenades and rifle ammunition stocked by the million. Our air-planes had attained a distinct superiority over those of the enemy, their reconnaissance had furnished the directing powers of the Army with accurate photographs of the hostile defences, and the Royal Engineers had constructed from these excellent maps of the German trenches which would serve to guide our troops when engaged in turning their opponents out of them, and further by means of telephoto lenses had constructed panoramic views of the enemy's position.

The following description of the various uses to which aeroplanes were put is due to Lieutenant René Puaux, formerly on the staff of the *Temps*, who was attached to the staff of General Foch, commanding on the Somme. He wrote:

“The rôle played by the Franco-British aviation during the battle of the Somme will never be sufficiently appreciated. Pursuing aeroplanes, bombarding aeroplanes, aeroplanes for regulating fire, anti-captive balloon aeroplanes, aeroplanes for attacking infantry, photographer aviators—all these different

branches of the new arm have one and all contributed to victory.

“At the beginning of the war only a very vague idea existed of the extent to which aviation could be useful. The mind dwelt especially on reconnaissances permitting of information as to the movements of big enemy units reaching the high command. Bombardment was at the beginning of the war merely a sport.

“As for the service devoted to regulating artillery fire, I recall at the Châlons front in July, 1914, we were still at the point of manufacturing and testing an arrangement furnished with brilliant plaques of metal at the end of each of the wings—plaques which the pilot-observer had to manipulate with a steel thread in order to indicate to the artillerists who were following his movements through binoculars—‘fire to the right’—‘fire to the left.’

“We have gone a long way since then. Wireless installations have been provided for the aeroplanes, and now the regulation of artillery fire is a duty carried out with quite disconcerting ease. The aviators have become the indispensable eyes of the artillery.

“One can understand the terrible inconvenience caused by the Franco-British chasing

aeroplanes to the German artillery by reason of their pitiless vigilance in preventing the German spotters from performing their work. Deprived of its aviators the German artillery had to take to captive balloons—‘sausages’—which, from the fact of their height of 600 to 800 yards can dominate the horizon, observe the flash of cannon, and report troops on the march, and the arrival of masses of reinforcements.

“The Franco-British aviators have attacked the ‘sausages’ successfully, thanks to certain measures which they have taken, and the



AIRCRAFT ON THE WESTERN FRONT.

[Official Photographs.]

Anti-aircraft gunners spotting an enemy aeroplane. Smaller picture: an aeroplane on reconnaissance.

'sausages' fall in flames or descend precipitately as soon as our aviators are reported. One can imagine the disorganization of the fire-regulating service occasioned by these spasmodic descents.

"In default of aeroplanes or 'sausages,' the artillery can still fire according to the directing plan,* but this needs checking by observation or it is liable to be a mere squandering of ammunition. These plans have been furnished for the most part by the aerial photographic service. There is no more interesting service to be seen at work. Their apparatus, perfected to an immense focus, will take photographs with absolute detail at a height of 3,000 to 4,500 feet. Its mission accomplished, the aeroplane returns to the shed. The special photographic car is provided with developing rooms all ready prepared for the stereotype plates. Half an hour afterwards the print is on the geographical officers' table, while other prints are being despatched to the staffs, from which their charts are corrected to the slightest detail. The more numerous the photographs taken the more complete are the comparative indications.

"During the long period of two years during which the enemy armies faced each other without appreciable change of front, the German photographic aeroplane service was able to prepare excellent directing plans of the Franco-British positions. The Somme offensive has demolished all that work, however, and it is now impossible for the enemy to do it over again, since his aviators cross our lines only at very rare intervals.

* This is a map divided up into squares which enables the artillery to keep up its fire on any particular point because its position is known relatively to some particular square.

"At the present day, when the Franco-British artillery gives no respite to the enemy, the latter has no longer the opportunity of carrying on all this complicated work, and the photographs taken by our aviators tell us the naked truth. Very numerous, alas! are the aviators who have succumbed in this noble task of driving back the enemy aviators far from our lines and of flying ceaselessly over the German positions, but the value of the services they have rendered cannot be over-estimated, for they have saved the lives of thousands of their comrades by blinding the German artillery and by furnishing to the Anglo-French command the decisive elements of victory. It is owing to them that we can go on with firm step towards our common goal."

The line occupied by the British had been considerably extended. In April of 1915 it measured only 30 miles: in July, 1916, from Ypres to Frise, it was 90 miles in length.

The German view of the situation at the end of June was well shown in a typical article by the military correspondent of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, Major Moraht, actually published on July 1.

The writer began by declaring that "all the belligerent armies were now at a critical stage." The Allies had undoubtedly increased the energy and the uniformity of their conduct of war, and their great resources in money and men and their command of the sea would enable them to do everything possible "to hamper Germany's final victory." Major Moraht then went on to declare that the Russian offensive had brought no relief to the French at Verdun, and he was foolish enough to predict that "the decisive fights" before



THE NIGHT BEFORE THE ATTACK.
Men of the East Yorkshire Regiment marching up to the trenches.

[Official Photograph.]



THE LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS

Fixing bayonets before the battle, July 1, 1916.

[Official Photograph.]

Verdun were now imminent. Meanwhile, the defenders of Verdun were only "trying to gain time." The British offensive was about to begin, and "without a serious settlement of accounts with England on the battlefields in the west the Germans would not come a step nearer to peace." Major Morait and the other German writers betrayed no sense of the immensity of the coming events, and it was

clear that the Germans had not begun to dream of the defeats that were about to be inflicted upon them.

It was, indeed, almost as if the Germans had learned nothing from the previous fighting. Yet they must have been aware that in a series of rear-guard actions in the dark days of August, 1914, the British had held at bay four times their numbers. When on Sep-

tember 5 the Allies had turned against the Germans and pushed them back without a stop over the Marne to the Aisne, they must surely have felt that their opponents were their superiors in the open field. We held them beaten. But unfortunately the resources neither of the British nor French in men and equipment were sufficient to enable them to continue the pressure on their opponents. The Germans proceeded to dig themselves in and constructed the modern "*ne plus ultra*" lines by which they held us at bay for nearly 20 months while both nations were creating armies, organizing and equipping them, and, as Major Morant said in schoolboys' slang, "cribbing" from the Germans. But the Germans were destined to find that the pupils had gone one better than their teachers, and that with the modern appliances of artillery they were capable of dealing effectively with the most perfect works of defence, while their infantries were able and willing to come to close quarters with their opponents. The German argument appears to have been that the French fought bravely at Verdun, but were exhausted and incapable of any offensive movement, and that, although the British fought well in their retreat from Mons to Le Mesnil, their old army was dead and their new a mere raw, half-trained militia.

It is desirable to understand the real nature of the task which our troops had before them.

It must be remembered that the Germans had had over a year and a half to prepare their works; they were by no means the hastily thrown up defences characteristic of ordinary field operations, but were, in fact; permanent fortifications of the most perfect description. It is true there were no deep ditches to be crossed, but this obstacle was replaced by wide and strongly constructed continuous wire entanglements. These had literally to be swept away before the assaulting troops could reach the garrisons of the trenches. Moreover, the shelters constructed to protect the latter were of such a solid character as had never been found before in any fortress. Deep down with such an amount of solid earth above them that they were safe from any but the heaviest projectiles, and in some cases so deep that even these could not reach them, there had been constructed rooms in which the bulk of the troops could be kept until actually wanted to resist assault on the parapets, to which access was gained by numerous staircases. Many of the dug-outs were closed by a steel door, from which there descended a deep staircase, with the risers and treads made of wood. At the foot there were several rooms, of which the floors, walls, and roofs were boarded. The connecting passages were similarly constructed. Sometimes a second stairway led down to a second group of rooms. Some of these were arranged as hospitals, with two tiers of




[Official Photograph


LOADING WAGONS WITH FIELD ARTILLERY AMMUNITION.



Standardized Steel Door and Scraper.



Timber Staircase.



Officer's Dug-out.

GERMAN TRENCH ARCHITECTURE.

By permission of the "Architectural Review."


bunks to hold the patients. The larger dug-outs could take a whole platoon. They were often 30 feet below the surface, and when there was a second tier this was still farther down.*

At intervals in the lines of trenches specially strong works had been constructed from which a flanking fire could be brought to bear on our men when they reached a line of German trench, and these also noted as reduts from which counter-attacks could be made on our troops. Cunningly concealed machine-guns protected by concrete were placed so that they could bring an oblique and sometimes even a flanking fire on the assault. These did not prematurely betray their presence by any general engagement against the advancing infantry, but waited until the near approach of the latter rendered their fire more deadly and decisive. On many occasions they had to be silenced before the advance could be continued.

One of these arrangements, which may be taken as the type of many others, may be here briefly described. A tunnel 20 feet below the ground ran in one direction to a large dug-out and in the other beyond and in front of the trench. At the most advanced point there was a small inconspicuous emplacement strongly roofed over, led up to by stairs from the tunnel. It was just sufficient for one machine-gun and its crew of two men, and had a wide loophole just about ground level which permitted a considerable lateral range. While the bombardment of the trench was in progress the machine-gun was safe down below in the dug-out, but when the infantry attack was imminent it was rapidly brought into position and was ready for action. It will easily be understood how difficult it was to detect and destroy so small an object.

Equal care was taken with the posts constructed for snipers. These were most carefully concealed, and often connected with the subterranean organizations by tunnels from the shaft, at the top of which the sniper was securely ensconced behind a steel loop-holed shield, the front of which was concealed by some means to make it look as like the surrounding ground as possible. Generally it may be said that the snipers' stations, whether in the special places just described or in artfully-

* There is no doubt that in some cases this great security was harmful to the defence as the defenders refused to come out to take an active part in the defence.



THE BEGINNING OF THE ADVANCE.

British Infantry attacking the German second line. To the right is the German zig-zag communication trench leading from the first to the second line of trenches. At its nearer end men are at work with entrenching tools.

selected positions, in houses, trees, etc., were most carefully placed.

The use of sniping was another of the introductions made by the Germans, who had raised this form of man-killing to a fine art. They had special telescopic rifles, range-finders, telescopes, etc., and apparently looked on the shooting of individuals from the point of view of the Red Indian collecting scalps.

The point, therefore, to be borne in mind by the reader is that the fighting on the Somme was like no other fighting which had ever taken place. In no former war had such formidable defences ever been met with. Never had the fire of infantry and artillery been so formidable, never had so many grenades been flung by hand, nor others, larger and more powerful, from trench mortars, been employed.* All these destructive weapons had to be overcome and the trenches they defended pulverized before the infantry could put the final touch with the bayonet to turn the undestroyed elements of the garrison out of their position or compel them to surrender.

But the result of the fighting was to show that, great as were the resources which modern science had given to the military engineer, all these could not oppose the mighty strides which science had also made in the construction of artillery, and, as had happened before, the offensive proved itself superior to the defensive.

Neither the British nor the French favoured the mass attacks employed by the Germans—viz., columns of infantry in close order driven forward in spite of loss. It is true that in 1914 and on some few occasions later the remnants of such formations succeeded in reaching the lines of the Allies. But for one such case there were fifty in which the only result was the wholesale slaughter of the troops using this clumsy plan. In others the exhausted remnants penetrated our front trenches only to be promptly turned out by counter-attack. In the period now under description we employed the method of successive waves of infantry following at a short distance one after the other. The way for these was always prepared by the preliminary bombardment, and then when the infantry went forward they were always supported by the artillery keeping their fire a little ahead of them, and also making a barrier or screen of shell and shrapnel behind



Frederic Robinson.

LIEUT.-GEN. SIR L. E. KIGGELL, K.C.B.
Chief of the General Staff in France.

the enemy's line to stop him sending up reinforcements. This action was rendered possible by the large provision of guns and of shells with which our armies were now supplied, with the result that our attacks were nothing like as costly in life as they formerly were and far more lasting in results.

Confiding in the strength of their position, but, above all, believing that they were superior in every respect to the troops opposed to them, the Germans awaited calmly the Allies' onslaught. To them it was inconceivable that they could under any circumstances be beaten.

For the past fifty years the Prussian Army had been nurtured on a continuous diet of lies. It had been taught by mendacious history that the Germans were invincible. Frederick the Great's victories were belauded—his defeats slurred over. Rosbach was praised as the kind of result which would always be obtained whenever the Prussians met the French. The miserable results of their arrogant conceit when they went down before the French in 1806 like corn before the sickle; when the two victories of Jena and Auerstedt gained by the Imperial Troops on one day served to crumple up the whole Prussian Army so that for the remainder of the war they owed

* The various kinds of mortars made use of for these purposes have been already described. See Vol. IV., p. 376.

their defence entirely to their Russian Allies, counted as nothing. Prussia had never played a losing game well. The reason is that the Prussian system had always aimed at crushing the individual soldiers into one unthinking man, who may, indeed, be forced on to victory, but who is extremely likely to lose all heart when the balance of battle tends to turn against him. The French from the days of the Republic, for reasons which are too long to give here, had developed the fighting capacity of the individual. Even in the days of the Peninsula this was not lost sight of in our army, and of late years it had been followed to a higher pitch



[Lafayette.

LIEUT.-GEN. H. S. HORNE, C.B.

In command of the 15th Army Corps.

than in any other. Deprive the Prussians of their tyrannical leaders and they are unable to rise to the situation. In the British and French armies all the officers may be killed off, the non-commissioned officers are still there; even if they are absent the men know how to act. In both armies there are always leaders to be found. In the German army, without their directing officers the machinery comes to a standstill.

But they pointed to 1813 as sponging out 1806. Those who know military history are aware that the Prussians owed their resurrection largely to English gold, English equipment, English weapons. They claimed the great victory of Leipzig, but forgot the parts played

in it by the Austrians, the Russians and the Swedes. They ignored Lützen, Bautzen, and Dresden. It was numbers which beat Napoleon in 1814, and yet he was enabled to defeat many times his Prussian opponents. In 1815 they were again beaten at Ligny, and it was the British stand at Waterloo which finally held the Emperor and gave the Prussians time to come up to complete the victory. But for 50 years they had lived on the reputation of 1866 and 1870, and exalted themselves on the results then won without pausing to enquire how, or why, they were obtained. Hoenig had shown that in the latter war they made many mistakes. France was beaten because her forces were badly led and because after the old professional army had gone into captivity there was nothing available but raw recruits in the shape of the Mobs. Even with these, if they had been used against the German communications instead of being uselessly expended in direct attacks on the armies blockading Paris, the result might have been very different. In 1866 the Austrians and minor States of Germany were crushed in the Seven Weeks' War because they were vilely led and because they opposed the quick-loading needle-gun with the slow-loading muzzle-loader.

In the Great War Britain had had to improvise her armies; France had to organize; each had to provide new armaments. Now they possessed both numbers and weapons. In the long struggle at Verdun since the third week of February the armies of the Republic had shown that they possessed the same military capacity as was displayed by their grandfathers in the wars of a hundred years ago. Our troops in the Retreat from Mons fought as troops had seldom fought, kept back the invading hordes, and gave Joffre time to rearrange his plans, till on September 5 he turned and pressed back the Germans without a check from the Marne to the Aisne.

Truly it might be said of our own men in this terrible fighting:—

They fell undaunted and undying,
The very winds their fate seemed sighing.
The waters murmured of their name,
The woods were peopled with their fame;
The meanest rill, the mightiest river,
Rolls mingled with their name for ever.

During the last week of June* a most intense and destructive bombardment had been directed against the enemy's lines, and

* Chapter CXXI, p. 177.



[Official Photographs.]

BRITISH HEAVY GUNS IN ACTION.



Official Photograph.

**GEN. SIR HENRY RAWLINSON, BART.,
K.C.B.**

In command of the Fourth Army.

had been combined with numerous raids sent out by the British, which brought in much valuable information of the composition and distribution of the German forces. Similar action had been taken by the French. The bombardment had been maintained against the whole 90 miles of front facing our trenches, so as to keep the enemy in ignorance of the particular region selected for attack, and to prevent him from concentrating his reserves against it. Added to this were local smoke and gas attacks. The Germans were conscious that attack was imminent; indeed, prisoners subsequently taken stated that so great had been the effect of our artillery that they had expected an assault three days before it took place, but they were uncertain as to where to expect it, so general had been the bombardment. The Belgians on the extreme left had contributed their share to this bewilderment of the enemy by keeping up a constant artillery fire. Meanwhile our infantry were waiting impatiently for the moment when they should be let loose to storm the German trenches.

The area of operations was of a very different character to that over which Lord French had had to manoeuvre in the previous year. It was an agricultural, not a mining, district, and there were none of the large villages, mounds of spoil-bank and slag such as were found in the mining centres more to the north, and which were of great tactical utility to the Germans because they offered easily fortified supporting points. In Picardy, on the Somme, the ground was open though undulating. The villages were small, rarely containing more than a few hundred inhabitants, and the ground being not so much cut up afforded a better field of fire for our guns, and was also more favourable for the movements of troops. Assuming that, roughly, the objective of the British was Bapaume, and that of the French Péronne,



LIEUT.-GEN. SIR T. D'O. SNOW, K.C.B.

In command of the 7th Army Corps.

the first step was to capture the dominating ridge extending from Thiépvail to Combles, the possession of which commanded the ground for a farther advance and was important as enabling the Allied heavy artillery to be brought forward from the places in which it had hitherto been posted. This is clearly shown on the accompanying map.

The ridge in question was the main watershed of the whole system of hills stretching from the Somme Valley in the south to the tract of low ground between Lens and Cambrai in the north-east, beyond which there was the flat ground round Douai. From the ridge the ground sloped down to a small tributary of the Ancre, and then up another slope past Bapaume to a ridge some hundred feet lower than the first, covered with

woods. Beyond this the country gradually descended with a series of parallel folds of the ground of constantly decreasing height, which presented no great tactical difficulties. From the main ridge the Germans commanded the ground up which our men had to advance, and from it they were able without aeroplanes or captive balloons to watch our movements. This advantage they would lose completely when turned off the ridge. The ridge on the Allies' side was difficult to advance up because of its cut-up nature and slopes which were steep. On the other hand, the slope behind the ridge, being gentler, gave greater facility to the Germans in bringing up reserves.

The French battlefield south of the Somme may be divided into two parts, differing widely from one another in character. In the more



LIEUT.-GEN. SIR A. G. HUNTER-WESTON,
K.C.B.

In command of the 8th Army Corps.

northern sector the French advance moved up the Valley of the Somme. The river, which was sluggish, formed at intervals large reed-covered ponds and marshes, which interrupted the movements of troops. There were also clumps of trees and occasional woods. The southern portion was bare, and formed an undulating plateau.

The operations which we are about to describe were the first on a large scale which had fallen to the lot of Sir Douglas Haig and his Chief of the General Staff, Lieut.-General Sir L. E. Kiggell, to carry out. The career of the Commander-in-Chief is well known and has been previously described in these pages. General Kiggell was one of those who had combined with a thorough theoretical education consider-

able practical experience. He was a professor and subsequently Commandant of the Staff College. At the War Office he held the post of Director of Staff Duties, and subsequently Director of Home Defence and Assistant to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. When Sir William Robertson was brought home to succeed General Murray as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Kiggell went to France to serve as Chief of the General Staff to General Haig.

The actual supervision of the British troops engaged in the great advance was entrusted to General Sir Henry Rawlinson, in command of the Fourth Army. General Rawlinson had served without a break in France since the retreat from Mons and had continuously rendered good service. Under him were, with others, Generals Congreve, Horne, Hunter-Weston, Morland, Pulteney and Snow.

While Lieut.-General Sir T. D'O. Snow (7th Army Corps) was in charge of the operations about Commeacourt, the main forces engaged from Serre to the point of junction with the French were at the beginning of the operations on July 1 as follows:

Eighth Army Corps (Lieut.-General Sir A. Hunter-Weston);



[Russell.]
LIEUT.-GEN. SIR W. P. PULTENEY, K.C.B.
In command of the 3rd Army Corps.



[Langfier.

LIEUT.-GEN. SIR T. MORLAND, K.C.B.

In command of the Tenth Army Corps.

Tenth Army Corps (Lieut.-General Sir T. Morland);

Third Army Corps (Lieut.-General Sir W. P. Pulteney);

Fifteenth Army Corps (Lieut.-General H. S. Horne);

Thirteenth Army Corps (Lieut.-General W. N. Congreve, V.C.).

During the night of June 30-July 1 the bombardment had gradually increased in power, and for an hour and a half before the assault began it was raised to the highest pitch of intensity. Parapets crumbled beneath the impact of the shells, cover hitherto thought bombproof was crushed and destroyed, and the garrisons of the enemy's works, sorely shattered in *moral*, were driven down into the deepest dug-outs to seek shelter from the pitiless hail of projectiles. The artillery had played its part with unrivalled excellence; the infantry was eager to carry the bayonet into the devastated trenches and complete the work.

At half-past seven on the morning of July 1 the word was given and the British infantry leaped to the attack. It was launched over a front which extended from Gommecourt to Montauban, roughly a distance of about twenty

miles, while the French continued the line of advance for another five miles on both sides of the Somme, as far as Fay to the south of the river.

Passing rapidly over the ground which separated them from their opponents, our men carried the enemy's front line trenches with an irresistible rush which the dazed and demoralized occupants were quite incapable of withstanding.

Many important tactical points were rapidly won, Mametz, Montauban and the Bernafay Wood being taken, while Fricourt was vigorously assaulted, as also were Beaumont Hamel, where the Newfoundlanders distinguished themselves and lost heavily, and La Boisselle.

At first the resistance of the enemy was not great, he had been so knocked to pieces and intimidated by the preparatory artillery fire; but as the day wore on it grew stronger, and the fighting, especially north of the River Anere, became particularly severe. Many of the villages were clung to by the Germans with extreme tenacity, and afforded a strenuous opposition to our attacks. But our men were not to be denied, and at many places flowed round the points of resistance, thus threatening the line of retreat of the garrison. This was especially the case at Fricourt. Farther north,

**LIEUT.-GEN. W. N. CONGREGVE, V.C., C.B.**

In command of the 13th Army Corps.



[Official Photograph.]

A ROLL CALL

In the trenches on the afternoon of July 1.

Gommecourt, which formed a salient, was attacked on both sides, and a German counter-attack against Montauban was successfully repulsed.

By the end of July 1 we had made considerable progress. The right of our attack had captured German trenches on a front of seven miles and to a depth of 1,000 yards, besides taking several strongly fortified villages. In the centre of our attack we gained ground over a front of four miles, capturing many strong points; but up to the evening the enemy still held out at many others, and the struggle continued to be very severe. North of the Ancre valley we were very much less successful, and German counter-attacks even compelled us to yield a portion of the ground we captured.

Round Fricourt on July 1 the fight raged with extreme vehemence, which was prolonged

into the night and next day. The high ground to the south of the village and the greater part of the Fricourt Wood were in our possession by the evening, but it was not till 2 p.m. on Sunday, July 2, that the village was finally captured.

Fricourt was situated to the west of Mametz, and combined with this village formed a strongly-organized position which it was necessary to reduce before advancing farther up towards the main ridge on the road to which Contalmaison and Mametz Wood, and behind them the two Bazentins, the wood of that name, and Pozières would still block the way to the Bapaune road. The position formed an extended portion of the German first line, and had a frontal of about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles.* Fricourt

* When the expression "first-line" is made use of it does not mean a single line of trench, but the series of trenches which together constitute the front portion



THE BRITISH ADVANCE AT LA BOISSELLE.


A photograph taken on July 3. In the foreground is the original British front-line. In the centre is seen a crater caused by the explosion of a mine just before the assault.

Official Photograph.

itself was in a hollow west of Mametz, but the Fricourt wood slopes upwards, and was considerably lower than Mametz, so that the latter could bring a flanking fire to bear on any attack on the top end of the village and on the wood above it, the Fricourt Wood. So far as the village is concerned, its sheltered position was very favourable, and prevented the British artillery bombarding it with the efficiency it might have attained had it been less well concealed. Thus it was that heavy as was the deluge of shells poured on it, while the outer edge of trenches and obstacles had been pulverized, the dug-outs had been but little injured. When, therefore, the British attacked on July 1 the assault came to a standstill owing to the machine-guns which had been brought out from their hiding places in the dug-outs and placed on the positions prepared to sweep the streets in the interior. Thus, although the village was entered, our troops made no substantial impression on it that day, and it was not till 2 p.m. on Sunday, after more and severe shelling, that we finally took it. Behind the valley was a wood which had been strongly prepared for defence, and indeed its bombardment had in some ways increased its power as an obstacle, for it had so cut down and entangled the trees that they formed an almost impassable entanglement. Nor was this the only obstacle to an advance from Fricourt up the slope. Beyond the wood was an open space of some two hundred yards, commanded by a trench known as "Railway Alley." Farther up the slope was a copse, "Bottom Wood," which served as a gathering place for snipers and machine-guns. To its left, lower down the slope, on the western edge of Fricourt Wood, was another clump of trees, "Lonely Copse," behind which was the trench called "Lozenge Alley." A cluster of trees, known as "The Poodles," divided Lozenge Alley from Railway Alley. North of the Poodles was a triangular patch of woodland, to which the name of "Shelter Wood" had been given. After all these plantations had been cleared of their German garrisons the next point was the Quadrangle, which formed a

of the defences, and which is never less than two lines of trench, and very often, in accordance with the requirements of the ground, several more. No trench is safe in front line that has not a support close up to it to stop the enemy if he should break through the trench. This second trench is also necessary to hold supports and as a basis for counter-attack against any enemy who might force his way through the first.

detached work defending the approach to Mametz Wood on its south-western side. The Quadrangle, which was in open ground, was a fortified area of trapezoidal form wider at its southern than its northern end. The bottom trench, *i.e.*, that nearest our troops, was known as Quadrangle Trench; that which ran back from its right extremity was "Quadrangle Alley"; that from its left was designated "Pearl Alley." The top and shorter side had the name Quadrangle Support, and was protected at each end by a redoubt. Moreover, it was commanded by the fire of the enemy from Contalmaison and Mametz Wood.



THE GROUND ROUND FRICOURT.

Altogether it formed a strong position which could be easily reinforced from the German works behind. From this brief description it will be seen that the task set the British was a difficult and complicated one. To arrive from the region of Fricourt at the outskirts of Contalmaison and the Mametz Wood they had to work their way up through or round the Fricourt Wood, descend thence into dips and hollows, and ascend the heights beyond. Every yard of the ground was under the fire of machine-guns, trench mortars and rifles, and in addition there was the fire from batteries farther up or behind the ridge. The ranges of different points over which our troops had to pass had been carefully plotted on the German maps, so that it was always possible by the use of telephones and other signalling methods to let the gunners in rear know where the assaulting troops were, and



Official Photograph.

A FRENCH OUTPOST
Working a wireless installation.

thus concentrate gunfire on them. The garrison of the work were stalwart troops, fully impressed with the necessity of holding the posts entrusted to them, for they protected the approaches to the main line of communication of the Germans in France, which were of such vital importance to them.

Early in the afternoon of July 2 a brigade which had been held in reserve, but which, however, owing to being under shell-fire, had had no rest or sleep the night before, replaced the troops who had carried the village of Fricourt, proceeded to advance from it, and marched up across the lead-swept narrow open space at the southern edge of the wood. Met by a storm of machine-gun and rifle fire at almost point-blank range, struck by gusts of bursting shrapnel, their ranks rapidly thinned, but still the survivors pressed on and entered the wood. A bitter fight ensued with bayonet and point, in which our men slowly gained ground, pushing their opponents back through the terrible entanglement of wood and wire. But so desperate and stubborn was the resistance that it was only in the early evening that the northern edge of the wood was reached. Here the wearied soldiers hastily dug themselves in under fire from the Railway Alley trench, into which the survivors of the garrison of Fricourt Wood had bolted. All night long the enemy hurled projectiles at them, but our troops did not reply.

The next morning (July 3) the attack on Railway Alley trench began. It had been heavily bombarded on the 2nd, and after day-

break the artillery fire began. The wire entanglements were destroyed, but, for some reason or other, the trench itself escaped severe damage. Taking advantage of a dip in the ground, a company entered the communication trench on the right, while a battalion slipped beyond it and made for Bottom Wood, where they dislodged the enemy. From Bottom Wood a part of the battalion, bombing as they went, descended on the rear of Railway Alley and joined the company in the communication trench. A small body of Germans in Railway Alley ran back up the slope. Believing, but wrongly, that this masked the beginning of a general retreat, our troops in Fricourt Wood were ordered to make a frontal attack. They left cover and dashed forward. Unfortunately for them the main body of the enemy still held the Railway Alley trench. A terrific fire was opened by the Germans, which completely knocked over the first wave of the British, and of the supporting wave few reached the trench unhurt. But behind came a third, fourth and fifth wave, and they would not be denied. Over the parapet and into the Germans they leapt. The result was never in doubt for one moment. For a brief time they were completely masters. Several hundred prisoners were taken, and those of the garrison who had not been killed, wounded or captured took refuge in Poodles and Shelter Wood, from which they were quickly driven, leaving behind them another 400 prisoners.

While these events were occurring, troops of the same brigade, in face of a vigorous defence,

gained Lonely Copse and Lozenge Alley, and 150 prisoners fell into their hands. So far the operation had been successful, but the Quadrangle had yet to be stormed, and here we may, slightly anticipating events, deal with its final capture.

To reduce it, it was necessary to move up the western and eastern faces. Between July 4 and July 9 three separate frontal attacks on the Quadrangle Support (*i.e.*, the rear side) were made. The first two failed, but on the 9th, at midnight, our men reached to within a few yards of the central portion of the trench. Then, with a yell of "Stafford," they crossed the parapet and bayoneted the defenders. At dawn, however, the machine guns from the untaken redoubts at either end forced our men to retire back over the parapet, and it was not till after the fall of Contalmaison and the Mametz Wood, to be described later, that the British succeeded in finally capturing the Quadrangle Support trench, and with it the whole work fell into their hands.

Fricourt was a point of importance, situated at the apex of the salient formed by the German lines at this part of the field and had been fortified with the greatest care, and its strength had enabled it to hold out for nearly a day after we had taken Mametz and Montauban, which were relatively much deeper in the German lines. Its neighbourhood had already been the scene of much severe and bloody fighting.

The following description, by the special correspondent of *The Times*, of the ground

round Fricourt gives some idea of the terrible effects of the bombardment on the German defences and the village itself:

For some hours before the storm broke, I had been going over the ground newly won from the enemy in and around the village of Fricourt. It is a dreadful sight. From what were our front line trenches you go through remnants of rusted and torn barbed wire over the narrow strip of ground between the lines, across the writhing, twisted rails of what was once a railway line, through the wreckage of the enemy's wire to the German front line.

You must not imagine yourself to be walking over level ground. It was level; but it is now all ridge and pit and hummock. Nowhere—not for one single square yard, I think—can you see the true surface of the ground. You go down the sides of a huge shell hole, the bottom full of a litter of equipment, and up the other, jump across a smaller one, follow for three paces the obliterated line of an old trench, then into another shell hole. So it is over the whole of Fricourt, except that in the village itself the shapeless piles of brick and masonry, here heaped man high, there battered flat, cover all the earth.

There are no streets or houses; merely so much of the earth's surface covered with ruin and wreckage. And everywhere are the more immediate, the more terrible, relics of the fighting.


The German trenches are, as always, more elaborate than ours. Here they are deeper and wider. They are, therefore, more open to a shell bursting directly above; but, when under fire, the German soldiers keep as much as possible in their dug-outs, which are—here as always—more extensive, deeper, and better built than ours. The trenches immediately about Fricourt were not very seriously damaged by our bombardment, in contrast to other points near here, as about Montauban, where they were practically destroyed. The barbed wire in front had been cut and blown to bits, except in certain spots, and all the ground around was, as I have said, devastated beyond description. But the direct damage to the trenches themselves was comparatively slight.

The taking of Montauban was a particularly brilliant piece of work. It was achieved by our



FRENCH BOMB-THROWER.

Explosion of a bomb after being shot from a compressed-air bomb-thrower.



THE BRITISH CAPTURE MONTAUBAN, JULY 1.
Infantry, mainly Lancashire troops, supported by men from the Home Counties, including Surrey, Kent, Essex, Bedford, and Norfolk.

troops at the southern end of our lines nearest the French advance. The garrison was composed of Bavarian troops, men of tried experience in war. Against them went our newly composed armies, which had had but little previous fighting experience. There were present, among others, the Manchesters, composed largely of young clerks and warehousemen, and they went forward with a dash that veteran troops might have envied. On their way they cleared out some German advance posts and then arrived at their main objective, the village of Montauban. It was captured with very little resistance and with but slight losses. Artillery fire had rendered the village a mere rubbish heap and destroyed most of the German trenches. The left flank of the Manchesters, who appear to have been on the left of our assaulting forces, was protected by a powerful barrage fire. On the right of this regiment were other gallant troops who advanced with equal bravery, but having more difficult ground to pass over did not make such rapid progress. Notwithstanding, they still managed to move forward on the right of the force attacking Montauban in spite of the opposition they received, until they reached a difficult point called the Warren, which was full of shell craters occupied by the enemy. To turn him out took some time, but a severe bombing, followed closely by an advance with the bayonet, drove him out, and then our troops swept onwards towards the brickworks, on the right rear of Montauban facing the Bernafay Wood. This they captured almost by surprise, so unexpected was their quick advance.

The right of the British attack was well supported by the French, whose left wing never lost touch of the British right, and this correlation of forces had largely to do with the success we gained. All through this advance our men displayed individual superiority over the Germans. Where they were made to pause it was because, for each rifle they had, their opponents had a machine gun. When they came to real close quarters, in spite of opposition, they were soon able to settle the question. The German does not take kindly to the bayonet, as the Briton does, and once the machine guns were captured or silenced a decision was quickly reached.

The Ulster Division covered itself with glory in this day's fighting, and paid a heavy toll for their gallant deeds. Even in their position of rendezvous before going forward to

the assault their losses were heavy, but, notwithstanding this, when they went over the parapet they formed up as if on parade, the Irish Fusiliers, the Irish Rifles and the other Northern Irish units advancing slowly at first and then, when nearer the enemy's trenches, with a huge shout of "No surrender, boys," they charged over the two front lines of the enemy's trenches. They were met in front by heavy fire and struck on both flanks, but still battalion after battalion continued to advance with the greatest steadiness. On from the second line to the enemy's third line they went, and this was soon taken; still onward until the fourth line fell to their arms, and now it was felt that a further advance was impracticable until it could be made on a wider front than the division was capable of, and unfortunately the troops on their right and left had not been able to progress with the same rapidity. Instructions were therefore sent to stop, but, notwithstanding, on they went. It may be that the order arrived too late, or perhaps the successes they had gained and the remembrance that it was the anniversary of the Battle of the Boyne urged them to greater exertions, and into the fifth line of German trenches what remained of the gallant Ulster Division reached. It was impossible to remain there, for the position was a salient, and was liable to concentric fire against which no human beings could live, and back they went again to the second German trench, bringing with them 500 prisoners. Here they stopped and firmly held it.

The General Officer Commanding the Ulster Division issued the following special order in recognition of the gallant conduct of his men:

The General Officer Commanding the Ulster Division desires that the Division should know that in his opinion nothing finer has been done in the war than the attack by the Ulster Division on July 1. The lending of the company officers, the discipline and courage shown by all ranks of the Division, will stand out in the future history of the war as an example of what good troops, well led, are capable of accomplishing. None but troops of the best quality could have faced the fire which was brought to bear on them and the losses suffered during the advance.

Nothing could have been finer than the steadiness and discipline shown by every battalion, not only in forming up outside its own trenches, but in advancing under severe enfilading fire. The advance across the open to the German line was carried out with the steadiness of a parade movement under a fire, both from front and flanks, which could only have been faced by troops of the highest quality. The fact that the objects of the attack on one side were not obtained is no reflection on the battalions which were entrusted with the task. They did all that men could do, and, in common with every battalion in the Division, showed

the most conspicuous courage and devotion. On the other side the Division carried out every portion of its allotted task, in spite of the heaviest losses. It captured nearly 600 prisoners, and carried its advance triumphantly to the limits of the objective laid down. There is nothing in the operations carried out by the Ulster Division on July 1 that will not be a source of pride to all Ulstermen. The Division has been highly tried, and has emerged from the ordeal with unstained honour, having fulfilled in every particular the great expectations formed of it. Tales of individual and collective heroism on the part of officers and men come in from every side, too numerous to mention, but all showing that the standard of gallantry and devotion attained is one that may be equalled, but is never likely to be surpassed.

The General Officer Commanding deeply regrets the heavy losses of officers and men. He is proud beyond description, as every officer and man in the Division may well be, of the magnificent example of sublime courage and discipline which the Ulster Division has given to the Army. Ulster has every reason to be proud of the men she has given to the service of our country. Though many of our best men have gone, the spirit which animated them remains in the Division and will never die.

At a part of the field, between Hébuterne and Authuille, a distance of roughly five miles measured in a straight line, the Allies faced the Germans from opposite sides of a gentle slope with a narrow level bottom between them. On the German side the highest point

was Serre, but the top was fairly level as far as Beaumont-Hamel, where there was a steep slope down to the valley of the Ancre; then the ground rises again to another plateau which continues to Ovillers-La Boisselle. The highest elevation on this side is behind the village of Thiépval. The points mentioned were all strongly fortified with connecting trenches between. The whole position was indeed of a most formidable character, yet part of our troops managed to dash through and reached the point known as the "Crucifix," behind Thiépval; others actually reached Serre, which was taken, while some of our Southern regiments pushed their way over successive trenches of the German first-line system till they, too, were on the plateau. All this was done within an hour and a half of the attack commencing.

At another portion of our front battalions of the East Lancashire and York and Lancaster regiments advanced with great gallantry. The part at which these troops were assembled had been heavily bombarded during the night, and as the hour of attack approached the enemy



Official Photograph.

THE LONDON SCOTTISH MARCHING TO THE TRENCHES.



A CAPTURED GERMAN TRENCH NEAR OVILLERS. [Official Photograph.]

opened a tremendous barrage 50 yards before and 50 yards behind it with heavy explosive shell. At the same time the whole of the space which divided our trenches from the enemy's was swept by him, with a storm of machine-gun and rifle fire. It was through this hail of shot that our men advanced and seized the German front line, and actually fought their way over successive lines behind them.

London Territorial battalions played a considerable part in the great attack of July 1, including the Central London Rangers, the London Scottish, and the Queen's Westminsters. They attacked with irresistible fury and penetrated to the third German line, but here they were brought to a standstill, for the enemy had massed many guns and much ammunition at this point. As, moreover, the



Official Photograph.

THE BLACK WATCH

Marching back from the trenches, headed by their pipers.

Germans had made a barrier fire behind our attacking troops it was impossible to send up reinforcements or supplies, and the victorious troops were compelled to fall back.

The operations of July 1 were aided by great activity on the part of our airmen. An important railway depôt was attacked by bombs, and others were dropped on railway junctions, batteries, trenches, and other points of military importance. Our machines also attacked a railway train between Douai and Cambrai with considerable success; one airman, descending to a height of less than 900 feet above the train, dropped a bomb on one of the trucks, which exploded. The resulting fire spread to others, and it was observed that the whole train was alight, and many explosions were heard. Numerous enemy headquarters and railway centres, including the important station of Lille, were also attacked. Twenty Fokkers attacked our machines, but they were driven off, and two of them were destroyed, while all ours returned in safety. Many of the German stationary balloons also were brought down, thus depriving them of a great deal of their power of observation. Altogether we took 3,500 unwounded prisoners.

At 7.30 a.m., the same time as the British commenced their attack, the French north of the Somme advanced against the German line over a front of some three miles. The position to be captured was composed of three and four lines of trenches bound together by numerous communications and having as a central point

the fortified village of Curlu, while several clumps of trees prepared for defence formed good supporting points. The first German trenches were carried without a check; then going up the chalk slope to which the name of the "Gendarme's Hat" had been given, the troops arrived at the outskirts of Curlu. When, however, they penetrated more into the interior they were brought to a standstill by the fire of machine guns posted near the church, which had hitherto been silent. In accordance with the orders received the advance was then stopped, while a heavy fire of artillery was poured for half an hour on the village. The advance was then continued and by nightfall the whole village was captured. Three desperate counter-attacks were made from the north (from the direction of Hardecourt) but were raked by the barrier fire of the French artillery and finally driven off by the infantry fire from the captured village of Curlu.

On the south side of the Somme the assaulting troops did not move forward till 9.30. Here, too, in a few hours the French gained the object of their advance. The effect of the preparatory bombardment had been so great that the trenches had been practically destroyed, while the villages were a mass of ruins. By the evening the first lines of trench from the border of Frise to the outer edge of Estrées had been captured, the villages of Dompierre, Becquincourt and Fay taken, and beyond these the advance continued in the same methodical fashion—destruction by the artillery, advance

of the infantry, and occupation of the line of ground previously determined on, which was then put in a state of defence. The advance penetrated to a depth of one and a quarter miles and 3,500 prisoners were taken, besides guns and machine guns.

The whole attack had been under the command of General Foch with General Fayolle; the troops were chiefly the Colonial Army Corps on the left and the 20th Corps on the right.

The result of the first day's fighting was, upon the whole, very satisfactory for both the British and the French. It was not a lightning-like stroke intended to pierce the German lines right through, but rather a continuous and methodical push to make sure of the ground which had been devastated by artillery fire. This involved less loss of life and more certain results. Rapid advances are like rapid rises of the barometer, liable to quick reversals.

The German report on the first day's fighting was curious and somewhat amusing. It stated that the great Anglo-French attack which had been prepared during several months with unlimited resources was made over a front of twenty-five miles, with the result that the British gained no appreciable advantages between Gommecourt and La Boisselle. On

the other hand, it admitted that the Allied troops did penetrate the German first line and consequently "we withdrew our divisions from the completely destroyed first line trenches to positions between the first and second positions." It also admitted that "as is usual in such cases material which had been solidly built in was lost." Further it added that many minor attacks west and south-west of Tahure and at points adjacent to the main attack were made, but these failed everywhere. A few days later Berlin thought the attack had not reached its highest intensity, but, on the 8th, Major Morant returned to the charge in the *Berliner Tageblatt*. "It was doubtful," said he, "whether, from the point of view of preparation, the British offensive had not started too early." Further, he remarked "The British attack is far behind the French attack, and because *it has not succeeded*" the enemy mysteriously hints that the main blow will fall at a different place. "This makes no impression upon us, because there, as here, what we expected will be confirmed—viz., that the British are not sufficiently seasoned to drive us on to the Rhine."

During Saturday night and the next day, July 2, the fighting north of the Somme



[Official Photograph.]

IN RESERVE: ROYAL WARWICKS RESTING.

continued with great fierceness, and several violent counter-attacks were made by the Germans against the French new positions in the neighbourhood of Hardecourt, but they were all driven off with heavy losses in killed and wounded, besides 200 prisoners. Following up the advantage gained on the right bank of the river, our Allies completely occupied Curlu.

On Sunday more progress was made, as has been seen. Fricourt was captured and 800 additional prisoners were taken. A further advance was also made to the east of Fricourt, and fighting went on in the neighbourhood of Boisselle, but here the enemy resisted stubbornly and we were compelled to give up Serre. A large amount of material was taken by our troops during the fighting and many counter-attacks were driven back.

South of the Somme the positions gained the previous day were held against all counter-attacks, and round Hardecourt and Assevillers some further progress was made. The severe fighting continued during the whole day, and some further advantage was gained in the region of Hardecourt and Curlu. A strongly fortified quarry east of the latter was captured, and a footing was gained at numerous points in the second German position between the river and Assevillers. Frise was captured as well as Méréaucourt Wood somewhat to the east of the village. A considerable number of guns and a great quantity of material on all fronts fell to the Allies, and the prisoners captured by the French alone on July 1 and July 2 exceeded six thousand, besides guns, machine guns, and a large quantity of war equipment.

North of the Somme the next three days were spent by the French chiefly in con-

solidating the positions won, and taking points necessary for this purpose. They advanced up the Valley of the Somme, pushing their attack from Méréaucourt Wood towards the village of Feuillères, where there was a bridge leading northward across the Somme Canal and river to Hem. Feuillères was captured with a rush, the fighting being chiefly done with bomb and bayonet, and the Hill 105 to the south of it was also taken. Then, striking north-east, the Division employed here pushed through the Chapitre Wood, and captured the little village of Buscourt. The advance of the French in the top corner of the battlefield carried them right through the German second line, which was of great strength at this point. The first German line here consisted of three separate rows of trenches. The second line from Herbecourt, four miles west of Péronne, to Assevillers, five miles south-west of Péronne, had only two lines of trenches. North of the first-named village these stretched out to Feuillères, but had in front of them an advanced line of defence which stretched from Herbecourt to Méréaucourt Wood. By capturing Chapitre Wood a position had been gained through the three main defensive German positions, and the fact that this was done so rapidly was of great importance. The position at Feuillères and Hill 150 enabled the French guns to support the attack north of the river against Curlu, in which direction the advance had been much slower. Assevillers also was captured with great rapidity. Another important advance was made by the French troops, which, having taken Herbecourt on the 2nd, advanced and captured the whole of Flaucourt and its surrounding defences, and established themselves to the east of the



FRENCH TROOPS ADVANCING THROUGH BARBED-WIRE.



THE FRENCH OFFENSIVE.

Hoisting a 16-inch shell.

village. This was an exceedingly important gain. With Buscourt and Flaucourt in their hands they were within three miles of Péronne. From Flaucourt the German troops were driven back towards Péronne, and thus their communications with the south portion of their lines were much interrupted. The ever-winding, Somme, which flows in varying directions now north and south, now east and west, rendered communications difficult.

Across the Somme the bridges were of the usual fragile character met with all over France on unimportant roads, and could easily be destroyed by artillery fire, and the road in question for nearly one thousand yards was borne on these bridges across the marshes, the Somme Canal and river. From the plateau at Flaucourt the French commanded all this country with their artillery fire, although to the south the villages of Belloy-en-Santerre

and Barleux, both strongly fortified, were at this time untaken. Once they were captured there would be nothing but open country between the French and Péronne.

Monday, July 4, was a day of comparative quiet chiefly devoted to consolidating the ground already won. Bernafay Wood, into which our troops had penetrated on the 3rd, was this day completely captured before noon. By Authuille a slight gain was made in the German front line, and saps were run out from our line to connect it, thus making it part of our position. In many places slight gains were made, prisoners and material taken.

The line now held ran from Fricourt, Mametz to a line running from La Boisselle and Contalmaison through the Bois de Mametz past Bois Montauban to the Bernafay Wood. The village of this name was completely occupied by noon. Fighting went on all day and into the night on the outskirts of La Boisselle, where the village, although practically taken, was held by the enemy to a small extent. There was also fighting around Contalmaison. No further attacks were made by the Germans on Montauban: the only thing they did was to direct a barrage fire on the near side of the village to hinder the bringing up of reinforcements. The German artillery did not distinguish itself by any special efforts, although Mametz was somewhat severely shelled. On the other hand, our artillery brought a heavy fire to bear on the part of La Boisselle which the Germans still held. About three o'clock a tremendous thunderstorm broke over the whole of this portion of the field. The rain was torrential, made it impossible to observe, and turned every trench into a running brook, and this for a time much impeded the operations.

Near Thiépvail, a German, above a battered parapet, waved a Red Cross flag. He was allowed to come down and lift back something into the trench, and just as he got it over and into it, it was seen that what he landed was not a dead or wounded man, but a machine gun.

Heavy fighting went on throughout the night of July 4-5 in the neighbourhood of the Ancre and the Somme, and further progress was made at certain points. On Wednesday, the 5th, there was considerable artillery fire from the German side, and two determined attacks were made on our new trenches near Thiépvail, but these were easily beaten off with

loss to the enemy. The fighting was indeed almost continuous along the battle front, but was chiefly confined to local struggles for certain points of importance to us, the result being that we made some advance in certain places, and also defeated all offensive attempts of the Germans. More prisoners fell into our hands, and the total number taken from the first of the month was well over 6,000.

On the same day the French, to the north of the Somme, advanced again, and during the night of the 4-5th captured a line of German trenches to the east of Curlu. To the south of the Somme the Sormont farm was captured on the left bank of the river opposite Cléry. The final result from the 5th was that the whole of the ground south of Sormont Farm and Hill 63 on the road from Flaucourt and Barleux were gained by the French. On the same night (4-5th) the Germans made an attack on Belloy-en-Santerre after a very severe artillery preparation. This had been taken by the French on the 4th. For a short period they gained a footing in the village, but the French counter-attacked and drove them out. The village of Estrées was still partly held by the Germans, and here the fighting was very severe, but by night the last of the Germans were driven out, and a detachment which was holding a mill to the north of this village was forced to surrender. None of the attacks on the French position came to any result, all being stopped by the French fire. Further prisoners were taken, and the total number was raised to 9,000.

North of the Somme the French continued their advance, and captured in the course of July 5 the southern slopes of the knoll north of Curlu, and also several small woods which had been prepared for defence. To the east of this village the French infantry shelled the second German position, which was completely captured on a front of about $1\frac{1}{4}$ mile from the Cléry-Maricourt road as far as the Somme. Pushing on, the French attacked the village of Hem, which they captured after a smart fight which lasted till seven in the evening. They also took the farm of Monacu. This gave them an addition of over 300 prisoners to those already taken.

The capture by the French of the trenches connecting Estrées and Belloy involved the whole of the German second position to the south of the Somme on a front of about $6\frac{1}{4}$ miles.



THE EFFECTS OF A BOMBARDMENT
On the German Trenches near Ovillers.

[Official Photographs.]

On the 6th low clouds interfered with aeroplane work, but a British machine, by descending through them to within 300 feet from the ground, succeeded in surprising and bombing a train in the Bapaume area, just as German reinforcements were alighting. One of our heavy batteries inflicted severe losses on a German battalion in column of route. On the left, near Thiépval, a slight advance was made and some prisoners secured. North of La Boisselle, and eastward of that village, a determined attack was completely crushed.

At nightfall the Germans were driven from a trench on a front of a thousand yards. There was, besides, violent bomb fighting at other points between Thiépval and the northern end of Foch's left wing, where the enemy were attacking in force. North-east of Hem he recovered two little woods a thousand yards from the village; but to counterbalance this the French drove the Germans from another wood in the vicinity and easily repulsed an attack south of the Somme directed against Belloy.

The last-mentioned attack came not from Péronne, which was being shelled by the French artillery, but from the direction of Chaulnes, 10 miles south-west of it. Péronne was no longer a railhead, German reinforcements being now detrained at Roisel, nine miles away, or at Cartigny, four miles to the east of the town.

From Chaulnes, through Berny, the Bavarians were six times led to the shambles, the heaviest attack being launched at 3 p.m., when two regiments in massed formation staggered forward through the curtain of shells only to be dispersed by the bayonet. A company of Bavarians which had occupied some farm buildings on the cross-road from Belloy to Berny was obliged to surrender. By this date our Allies had captured 76 guns and hundreds of mitrailleuses.

In the night the offensive was resumed by the Germans at both ends of the French section of advance. The counter-attacks north of Hem were shattered by gun and rifle fire and several prisoners taken; the charges delivered from Berny-en-Santerre against the French lines from Estrées to Belloy were stopped by curtain fire, the enemy losing heavily. Two companies enfiladed by French machine-guns were annihilated.

To interfere with the reinforcements of men and munitions which were being hurried up by

the German Staff to the Somme, French aeroplanes bombed the railway from Nesle to Ham. Fires were observed to break out in the stations at Ham and Voyerres, both south-east of Péronne.

On the 7th the British forward movement was resumed. In anticipation of it, the enemy, during the night of the 6-7th, had been bombarding with ordinary and lachrymatory shells the British position at La Boisselle, in Montauban, and in the Bernafay Wood. Our guns took up the challenge. "Such a night!" observed an eye-witness. "I never saw anything like it. Exactly like hell, only worse; a sky full of shells and lights bursting like blazes. A regular Brock's benefit." But our troops did more than merely reply to the German fire. Early in the night of the 6-7th we made fair progress, advancing in the neighbourhood of La Boisselle and capturing 50 prisoners, moving also nearer Contalmaison, which was to be the main object for the next day. There were little woods which served as advanced posts for the Germans, called Bailiff's Wood, Peake's Wood, and Birch Tree Wood. The last named we had gained some days before. Above and a little west of Peake's Wood was an intricate nest of German trenches to which we had given the name of the Horseshoe. This we attacked at its northern and southern ends. At the former there was a strong redoubt with many machine-guns, and altogether the position was a formidable one. Our troops made good their entry. But the two assaulting bodies made no connexion with one another in the Horseshoe, and neither was aware that a considerable body of Germans lay in between them until the fire from the latter revealed the true state of affairs. To relieve the situation it was necessary to take Peake's Wood, which lay somewhat behind the Horseshoe, and which, when captured, would render the latter untenable. This was done by a separate force of troops, and then the Germans were entirely cleared out of their position.

The day broke hazy, dull, and humid; everything for miles round was shaken by the explosions of the artillery and by the bursting shells. From the north-west of Thiépval, away towards the banks of the Somme, the battle once more was joined.

On the extreme left our men met with a reverse, and the enemy temporarily regained two or three hundred yards of lost ground.



FRENCH COMMANDER ON THE SOMME.

General Fayolle (third from left) with General Balfourier (in dark uniform).

South of Thiépvil the struggle centred round the Leipzig Redoubt, at a salient in the German line. For 20 months the most up-to-date engineers had been busily strengthening this formidable work, which, it was believed, would, like the Hohenzollern Redoubt on the Loos battlefield, be sufficient to hold in check for months the advance of the Allies. Our men, who had already worked their way into the

redoubt, made during the 8th further progress. On their right a British brigade broke through 500 yards of trench in front of Ovillers, and entered the village, where a desperate struggle went on till nightfall. Farther to the south and east of La Bois elle our line was advanced 200 yards or so over a maze of German trenches 2,000 yards in length.

It was round Contalmaison, however, that



Official Photograph.

ON THE SOMME.

General Foch (on left) and General Fayolle.

the chief incidents of the day occurred. Contalmaison is about a mile and a half to the east of La Boisselle. It is flanked by woods on both sides, the Bailiff Wood on the left, the larger Mametz Wood on the right. Eastwards are Bernafay Wood, and beyond it Trônes Wood. The main trench leading up to Contalmaison was the sunken road between Round Wood and Birch Wood, woods only by courtesy, for the shell fire had felled the trees in them. The sunken road was enfiladed from Bailiff and Mametz Woods, both in the German possession. Behind Contalmaison lay the hamlet of Bazentin-le-Petit and an adjacent wood. In these some of the German reserves were hidden.

During the previous night's fighting the British, after securing the Horseshoe Trench, had moved up to the outskirts of both Contalmaison and Mametz Wood. On village and wood our batteries discharged salvo after salvo of shells. Behind the barrage of fire the British infantry advanced to storm the village. Advancing both to right and left of Mametz Wood our troops swept steadily onwards, and by 10 a.m. some were getting through the wood to take Contalmaison in flank while others

went straight for the village. Between the wood and the village five battalions of the 3rd Division of the Prussian Guard, probably at the orders of the Kaiser himself, advanced in close formation. They had left Valenciennes a few days before and, *via* Cambrai, had been hastily brought to the scene of action. No time had been given them for studying the ground and it is not, therefore, surprising that they marched straight into the barrage which was covering our advance. One of the battalions was wiped out, the others, who closed with the British, were killed, wounded, dispersed or taken prisoners. At first the Germans thought they had been defeated by British Guards. They were extremely surprised and disgusted to find they had been beaten by men of the newly raised army.

Flushed with their success our troops, mostly Yorkshiremen and other Northerners, carried Contalmaison and released several captive comrades. But at this moment rain descended in torrents and, under cover of the deluge, the Germans counter-attacked from the Mametz Wood. At the same time Contalmaison was heavily shelled. It was decided that for the time being we should evacuate the village, which was accordingly done. In the afternoon the cemetery to the south-east and the Acid Drop Copse near it were taken and our men ensconced themselves on the edge of the Mametz Wood.

Although the rain which had filled the trenches and rendered the ground slippery and sodden had impeded the advance, we had done well. The German reserves in the hamlet of Bazentin-le-Petit had suffered from our shell fire, as had large numbers of troops retiring across the open. An enemy battalion marching to the front had been peppered by the machine guns of an aeroplane flying low and had subsequently been thinned by the shells of our heavy artillery. An extract from the diary of a captured Bavarian officer, Colonel Bedall, may interest the reader :

July 7.—The English once again let off gas. Bazentin-le-Grand and the positions of the 16th Regiment were subjected to a lively bombardment on the evening of the 6th inst., which has completely wrecked them. The attack which started in the afternoon of July 6 near Contalmaison was continued without a pause and with varying success ; on July 7 the line was pierced as far as Contalmaison ; 14 companies of the 3rd Guard Division were ordered to counter-attack, coming from the direction of Martinpuich and Flers and advancing south-west on Contalmaison.

At 10 p.m. Bazentin-le-Grand was subjected to half an hour's surprise fire by the enemy's artillery. This was of unprecedented violence and destroyed the village to such an extent that there is nothing but a heap of bricks to be seen there now.



Waiting at the station.



On the way to the Internment Camp.
GERMAN PRISONERS ARRIVE IN ENGLAND.


On the 8th, in cloudy weather, our aeroplanes and kite balloons took photographs, directed the fire of batteries, and bombed the rain-soaked billets of the Germans, and also a depôt of ammunition, which exploded with a loud report. Few enemy machines went up, but three of them attacked one of our own, which, however, though disabled, landed safely at its own aerodrome. The heavy rain of the day before impeded operations on the ground, but hand-to-hand fighting went on in the ruins of Ovillers, the Germans getting the worst of the encounter. East of Montauban and of the Wood of Bernafay, after a violent bombardment, our men effected a lodgment in the Trônes Wood, capturing 130 prisoners and several machine guns. Up to then we had secured in the Battle of the Ancre-Somme 20 guns, 51 machine guns, numbers of trench mortars, *minenwerfer*, bomb-throwers, searchlights, and other war material. The French to our right by the fire of their artillery greatly assisted us, and masses of Germans counter-attacking across the open melted away under the fire of the "75" guns and of our 18-pounders. The British had attacked the Trônes Wood and a farm south-east of it, while through rain and fog the French

in the morning had successfully assaulted from trenches filled with water the knoll north of the village of Hardecourt, situated between Longueval and the right bank of the Somme. The Germans in the Hardecourt action lost in prisoners alone 623 men and 10 officers.

During the 9th the hostile artillery was more active. Nevertheless in Ovillers, now a mass of levelled trenches, ruins, and craters filled with mud and corpses, the British continued to push forward.

At night, after a gruesome fight with bomb, knife and club among the broken trees, undergrowth and tangled wire, the British secured Bailiff Wood on the edge of Contalmaison. Two vigorous German counter-attacks on our position in and near the Trônes Wood met with the fate of those delivered the day before.

This wood, triangular in shape and 1,400 yards from north to south, with a southern base of 400 yards, had been strongly defended by the Germans with trenches and wire entanglements. We had captured the southern end of the wood. In the evening the enemy bombarded it and delivered four separate and unsuccessful charges in the hope of recovering the lost ground.



IN A TRENCH AT OVILLERS.

[Official Photograph.]



[Official Photographs.]

LOOKING AFTER THE WOUNDED.

Attending to the slightly wounded.

Circle Picture: In a trench.

Bottom Picture: The helping hand across a trench.

Meanwhile, Foch, after two days' preliminary bombardment, had launched another offensive south of the Somme, and the position attacked was a front of $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Flaucourt to Belloy. The French crossed two entrenched ridges and reached the plateau capped by the Maissonette Farm.

The village of Biaches, in the western environs of Péronne, was assaulted from three sides. At 2 p.m. the French were holding the northern end, but the Germans, with machine-guns in a group of ruined houses between the market-place and the road leading to Barleux, offered stubborn resistance. Suddenly bugles sounded the charge, and a French force moved on the enemy's burrows. The Germans were dislodged, although, in a farm-house, near the church, 60 of the enemy held out for some time. By 2.45 p.m. Biaches was in the hands of our Allies, and what remained of the garrison was scampering off into the Ste. Radégonde suburb of Péronne, south of Biaches. Round Barleux there were desperate combats. By nightfall a line of trenches stretching north-eastward from Bar-



leux to Maisonnette Farm had passed into the possession of the French. These lines now ran from Hardecourt, where they joined the British, to a point on the Somme between Hem and Cléry. Thence they follow the south bank of the river from Buscourt, by Sormont Farm, past the junction of the Nord and Somme Canals to Biaches, and over the plateau of La Maisonnette to Barleux. The French looked down on the city where Charles the Bold had outwitted the treacherous Louis XI.

The time had arrived for the completion of the British operations against the enemy's 14,000 yards long front system of defence. Our main efforts were concentrated on Contalmaison and the Mametz and Trônes Woods. The next day (July 10) there descended on the doomed village hurricanes of shells. Part of the garrison, panic-stricken, bolted back into the open, where they were caught by our guns and the mitrailleuse of the brigade in the "holding" positions to the right and left. This retrograde movement was but natural. As a German prisoner who had taken part in the Verdun fighting subsequently remarked, "the shell-fire on the Somme was much worse than that in the region of the Lorraine fortress."

At 4.30 p.m. two companies of British infantry left Bailiff Wood, moving on the north-west corner of Contalmaison. Simultaneously on their right two battalions in four successive waves made for the village. The Germans had expected an attack from the south. To reach the shallow trench protecting the western face of Contalmaison 1,500 yards had to be crossed. The men were in open order, but, held up in places by wire and subjected to machine-gun fire and shells, their numbers were terribly depleted by the time they reached the trench. The sight of cold steel, however, was too much for the more numerous Germans, who retired from it, decimated by their own machine-guns.

Lying in the trench the survivors of the British battalions recovered breath. Then,

with a shout, they rushed for the village. Hedges interlaced with wire had to be negotiated, but the gallant band pressed on. The Germans in Contalmaison were numerically superior, but British individuality gained the day over German automatism. Some of the garrison flew for their lives, most surrendered, a few died at their posts.

Scarcely had the British taken cover in Contalmaison when, towards 6 p.m., the German reserves advanced to retake the village. Reinforcements were hurrying up to the support of the heroic groups of British; one of which groups, led by a second-lieutenant, emerged from the village flinging bombs at the oncoming enemy, who was driven back.

During the night the Germans counter-attacked, but were beaten off with heavy loss, and by the morning of the 11th the village was definitely in our hands. The Germans in Owillers, as a result of the fighting, were now in a dangerous salient.

To the south of Contalmaison an equally fierce struggle was proceeding for the Mametz Wood, some 220 acres in extent. At the south-westerly end the wood was fairly open; elsewhere the saplings were so close together that it was difficult to squeeze one's way between them. Lanes had been cut through them, and a German railway ran from south-west to north-east in the northern portion of the wood. At points on the edge and in the interior machine-gun emplacements had been made. A heavy howitzer and three field guns were hidden in the undergrowth.

On July 5 some of our men had entered the tiny Marlborough Wood to the east of the Mametz Wood, whose exits on that side became commanded by reverse machine-gun fire. The next day our patrols entered Mametz Wood on its southern side. By the 10th our troops had broken through the mazes of fortified area known as the Quadrangle on the south-west. On that day the real struggle for the Mametz Wood began.

END OF VOLUME NINE.

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